Amendments to 812.13

1. United States v. Fritts

   841 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2016)   Cited 136 times

   Later on, the Lockley Court repeated that (1) “robbery under that statute requires either the use of force, violence, a threat of imminent force or violence coupled with apparent ability, or some act that puts the victim in fear of death or great bodily harm,” (2) “[a]ll but the latter option specifically require the use or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” (3) “we find it inconceivable that any act which causes the victim to fear death or great bodily harm would not involve the use or threatened use of physical force,” and (4) “[s]ection 812.13(1) accordingly has, as an element, the ‘use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.’ U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).” Id.(emphasis added). In Lockley this Court thus held that Florida robbery is categorically a crime of violence under the elements of even the least culpable of these acts criminalized by Florida Statutes § 812.13(1). As an alternate and independent ground, we hold here that under Lockley alone a Florida armed robbery conviction under § 812.13(a) categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause.

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2. State v. Burris

   875 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2004)   Cited 94 times

   We agree with the trial court that the intended meaning of the word "carry," as used in section 812.13( 2)(a), must be sought by use of logic and common sense. The verb" carry" has many meanings. One of the principal meanings ascribed to it is "to wear, hold, or have around one," in the sense of possessing. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 319 (2d ed. 1987) (unabridged). We are of the opinion that ascribing such a meaning to "carry," as used in section 812.13( 2)(a), is perfectly consistent with the obvious intent behind the statutory provision. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla. 1981) ("legislative intent is the polestar by which the court[s] must be guided" in statutory construction, even when at odds with "the strict letter of the statute"). It seems to us that the clear intent behind section 812.13( 2)(a) is to deter the commission of robberies by persons possessing deadly weapons, and thereby to reduce the likelihood of death or serious injury to victims and bystanders. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 452 So.2d 927 (Fla. 1984) (punishment is enhanced under statute for possession of deadly weapon during commission of…

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3. Dale v. State

   703 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1998)   Cited 91 times

   § 812.13, Fla. Stat. (1995).
4. U.S. v. Lockley

   632 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2011)   Cited 201 times

   The bare elements of § 812.13(1) also satisfy the elements and residual clauses of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). We have previously discussed the elements of § 812.13(1). As stated above, robbery under that statute requires either the use of force, violence, a threat of imminent force or violence coupled with apparent ability, or some act that puts the victim in fear of death or great bodily harm. All but the latter option specifically require the use or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. And, once again, we find it in-conceivable that any act which causes the victim to fear death or great bodily harm would not involve the use or threatened use of physical force. Section 812.13(1) accordingly has, as an element, the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). Moreover, because the commentary explicitly states that the attempt to commit a "crime of violence" is itself a "crime of violence," Lockley's attempted robbery conviction categorically qualifies under the elements clause as a predicate for the career offender enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, comment, (n.l).

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5. United States v. Seabrooks

   839 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2016)   Cited 90 times

   Fla. Stat. § 812.13 (1995) (emphasis added). Robbery requires that in the course of the taking there is either “the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” Id.§ 812.13(1). The requirement of “force, violence, assault, or putting in fear” has been in the robbery statute from at least the 1970's. Robbery under § 812.13(1) does not involve a firearm and is a second-degree felony. Id.§ 812.13(2)(c). Armed robbery requires that the defendant “carried” a firearm or other deadly weapon and is a first degree felony. Id.§ 812.13(2)(a).

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6. United States v. Geozos

   870 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2017)   Cited 99 times

   In January 1981, Defendant was convicted of armed robbery in violation of section 812.13(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes. In June of that same year, he was convicted of robbery in violation of section 812.13 of the Florida Statutes and of using a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of section 790.07(2). And, in September 1981, Defendant was again convicted of armed robbery in violation of section 812.13(2)(a).

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7. Hall v. State

   517 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1988)   Cited 103 times

   In the instant case, Hall was charged with both committing a robbery while carrying a firearm, under 812.13( 1) and (2)(a), and the use and display of a firearm and the carrying of a concealed firearm while committing a felony, under 790.07(2). We hold the legislature had no intent of punishing a defendant twice for the single act of displaying a firearm or carrying a firearm while committing a robbery. To hold otherwise would mean that, for every offense of robbery in which a defendant uses or carries or displays a firearm, in violation of section 812.13, there would also be a violation of section 790.02(2). Robbery, under section 812.13( 1), becomes the enhanced offense of armed robbery under 812.13( 2)(a) by reason of the element of carrying or displaying a firearm. Interpreting the statutes according to the state would mean the offense is enhanced twice for carrying or displaying the same weapon. It is unreasonable to presume the legislature intended this result. In accordance with Carawan, we find this would constitute a dual punishment for one single act, and would be contrary to the legislative intent under the principles set forth in…

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8. Robinson v. State

   692 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1997)   Cited 90 times

   Florida's robbery statute is section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1993).

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9. United States v. Stokeling

   No. 16-12951 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 2017)   Cited 14 times

   These recent Supreme Court cases tell us that a § 812.13 unarmed robbery conviction sustained while McCloud was controlling Florida law does not fall within the ACCA's elements clause. First, heeding the Supreme Court's instruction that we should "turn[] to the version" of § 812.13 that a defendant was "actually convicted of violating," McNeill, 563 U.S. at 821, 131 S. Ct. at 2222, we must look to what the Florida state courts said about the conduct that could support a robbery conviction under § 812.13 at the time the defendant was convicted. More to the point, we must look to how Florida courts defined the least culpable conduct—in this case, the smallest degree of force—sufficient to support a § 812.13 robbery conviction at that time.

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10. Grant v. State

    138 So. 3d 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 8 times

    In this case, the amended information alleged that, during the commission of the attempted robbery, Grant “carried a firearm or other deadly weapon” and cited only to sections 812.13(1) and 812.13(2)(a), pertaining to robbery. As to the firearm portion of the charge, the jury was instructed:

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