Amendments to 815.04

1. Carroll v. Sarko

   2021 WI App. 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021)

   • Motion to dismiss

   ¶15 I also observe that the circuit court's comparison of the notice requirement in WIS. STAT. § 806.23 to the notice requirement in WIS. STAT. § 815.04, a provision governing execution of judgments, is inapt. The purposes of §§ 806.23 and 815.04 have been explicitly distinguished. See Chase Lumber , 228 Wis. 2d at 202 ("The ‘action on judgment’ statute exists to revive expired or expiring judgments, not to enforce freshly entered ones."). Indeed, rather than bolstering the circuit court's conclusion, the comparison between §§ 815.04( 1)(b) and 806.23 actually undermines the court's determination that "notice to the adverse party" means that service must be provided in the same manner as a summons. Unlike § 806.23, § 815.04( 1)(b) explicitly states that notice must be "served as a summons is served in a court of record." Thus, although the legislature has shown that it knows how to insert an explicit requirement that the heightened service requirements of WIS. STAT. § 801.11 apply, it has not done so with respect to § 806.23, which simply requires "notice to the adverse party." The absence of this language in § 806.23 supports the conclusion…
2. Bank of N.Y. v. Carson

   841 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 2 times

   ¶ 15 Finally, the Bank's contentions that Wis. Stat. §§ 815.04 & 846.18 compel a result different from what we have reached are unpersuasive. Section 815.04( 1)(a) provides that the execution of a judgment may issue “at any time within 5 years after the rendition of the judgment.” Section 815.04( 1)(b) explains that if no execution is issued within five years, “execution may be issued only upon leave of the court, in its discretion, upon prior notice to the judgment debtor[.]” Section 815.04( 1)(c) caps the execution of a judgment at twenty years. We agree with Carson that § 815.04 does not control in this case, not only because it is less specific than Wis. Stat. § 846.102, see Marlowe v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 2013 WI 29, ¶ 45, 346 Wis.2d 450, 828 N.W.2d 812 (“It is axiomatic that where a more specific law on a given subject is potentially in conflict with a more general one on the same subject, the former controls.”), but also because § 815.04 does not take into account the redemption period outlined in § 846.102. In other words, it simply is not true that a judgment under § 846.102 can be executed, via sale of the…

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3. Sepro Corp. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection

   839 So. 2d 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 16 times   1 Legal Analyses

   2 more...

   Id. Defining trade secrets by reference to section 812.081(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), section 815.04(3)(a) plainly covers electronic mail.

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4. Garcia v. State

   939 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

   (Emphasis added). The offense is a felony. See id. § 815.04(4)(b).

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5. AGO

   97-87 (Ops. Fla. Atty. Gen. Dec. 31, 1997)

   Section 815.04(4), Fla. Stat. (1996 Supp.), provides criminal penalties for offenses against intellectual property.
6. Willoughby v. State

   84 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

   The police subsequently obtained a warrant to search Willoughby's home and seized the laptop. Upon inspection, the police discovered that Willoughby had emailed her employer's client trust fund master list to her laptop. Willoughby was arrested and charged with unlawfully accessing a computer database in violation of sections 815.06(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006) (count one), and obtaining trade secret or confidential data in violation of sections 815.04(3)(b) and (4)(a), Florida Statutes (2006) (count two).

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7. Newberger v. State

   641 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 4 times

   Mitchell Scott Newberger was convicted of the crimes of modifying intellectual property and making a false statement to obtain a credit card. On appeal, he argues that section 815.04, Florida Statutes (1991), which criminalizes modification of intellectual property, is unconstitutional. He also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for both offenses. We hold that section 815.04 is constitutional, and affirm on that point. We also find that the evidence supported Newberger's conviction for making a false statement to obtain a credit card and affirm without discussion of the law and facts relevant to that charge. We reverse his convictions for modifying intellectual property.
8. State v. Fagg

   41 So. 3d 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

   The State appeals an Order Granting y, Motion for Judgment of Acquittal After a Jury Verdict. The State argues that Appellee's alleged act of deleting computer al files from her former employer's computer tit system constituted the destruction of data pursuant to section 815.04(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that "[w]hoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization destroys data . . . residing or existing internal or external to a computer . . . commits an offense against intellectual property." The trial court rejected this argument, concluding instead that because the employer was able to retrieve the files from its hard drives, there was no evidence that Appellee destroyed data as required for a conviction of section 815.04(2). We agree with this conclusion. We also `s agree with the trial court that although m there was testimony that the employer was able to retrieve everything except "the last four days," the employer's witness also testified that he did not know whether anything had been lost from those four days.

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9. Mortgage Now, Inc. v. Stone

   Case No. 3:09cv80/MCR (N.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2009)

   2 more...

   The court next considers plaintiff's contention that defendants have violated the FCCA. Only § 815.04 of the FCCA, which pertains to offenses against intellectual property, and § 815.06, which pertains to offenses against computer users, appear to have any arguable relevance in this case. There are few cases that interpret the FCCA but it appears that neither section has any applicability here. Both are criminal statutes; while § 815.06 additionally provides that a civil action may be brought, the defendant must first have been convicted of violating the statute. Section 815.04 does not appear to be create any civil remedy and thus implies no private right of action. See, generally, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (refusing to infer a private right of action from a "bare criminal statute"). Thus plaintiff has not shown there is a substantial likelihood it would prevail on its claim defendants violated the FCCA.

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10. Krystalis v. Dept. of Transp.

    2009 Ohio 631 (Ohio Misc. 2009)

    • Motion for summary judgment
    1 more...

    {¶ 7} It is undisputed that ODOT informed AL that its employees would be exposed to lead and chromium while working at the Carnegie project. Supplemental Specification 815.04(C) stated that AL would be "responsible to assure that workers take proper safety precautions when working in this environment." In addition, because the chemicals become airborne during blasting operations, AL was required by the contract to provide its employees with personal protective equipment and to erect containment enclosures composed of flexible tarp-like materials. See Supplemental Specification 815.04(C) .

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