Amendments to 817.52

1. State v. Sampaio

   291 So. 3d 120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 6 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Although it appears that the defendant could have been charged under either statute, because the statutes proscribe similar conduct, the defendant was charged solely under section 817.52 and not section 812.155. Section 812.155 is a general statute that applies to rental property or equipment, whereas section 817.52 is a specific statute applicable solely to the leasing of vehicles. The purpose of the notice requirement contained in section 812.155 is to notify renters of the permissive inference that a failure to return rental property or equipment upon the expiration of the rental period is evidence of abandonment or refusal to redeliver the property. By contrast, section 817.52 does not create any such permissive inference. And, unlike section 812.155, section 817.52 requires proof of "intent to defraud, abandon or willfully refuse to redeliver" the property rather than allowing for a permissive inference to be made.

   PAGE 125
2. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi

   632 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1994)   Cited 248 times

   • Motion to dismiss
   2 more...

   The record reflects that Michael Mancusi sued Alamo-Rent-A-Car (Alamo) for malicious prosecution based on Mancusi's arrest for failure to return a rental car to Alamo in violation of section 817.52(3), Florida Statutes (1985). At trial, a jury awarded Mancusi $300,000 in compensatory damages and $2,700,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal summarized the facts of this case as follows:

   PAGE 1354
3. Tarpley v. Commonwealth

   Record No. 0173-15-3 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016)

   A loss prevention officer observed Tarpley steal K-Mart property worth less than $200. Tarpley was charged with felony petit larceny, third or subsequent offense, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-103 and 18.2-104. Pursuant to Code § 19.2-295.1, the Commonwealth provided Tarpley notice of its intention to introduce certified copies of Tarpley's prior convictions. One of these was a conviction for violating Florida Statute § 817.52. Tarpley filed a motion in limine asking, in part, that the trial court rule that Florida Statute § 817.52 was not substantially similar to "the most closely corresponding crime under Virginia law," for purposes of enhancement under Code § 18.2-104.

   PAGE 2
4. AGO

   94-63 (Ops. Fla. Atty. Gen. Jul. 15, 1994)

   The determination of whether a driver who fails to remit the rate of payment at the end of a shift may be charged with obtaining a vehicle with intent to defraud under section 817.52(2), Florida Statutes, is a mixed question of law and fact that may not be answered by this office. Such a determination would depend upon the specific facts and conclusions drawn regarding the effect of the agreement between the owner and the driver. If it is found that the driver is only renting the car from the owner, then the failure to remit payment for such rental would allow prosecution under section 817.52(2), Florida Statutes. If, however, the agreement is determined to be a sale by the owner to the driver of taxicab services, that incidentally includes the use of the car, prosecution pursuant to section 817.52(2), Florida Statutes would be within the discretion of the state attorney.
5. Means v. State

   127 So. 3d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 1 times

   2 more...

   In this case, a comparison of the elements of both offenses reflects that all the elements of obtaining a vehicle with intent to defraud by trick or false representation under § 817.52(1), Florida Statutes, (Count II), are included within the elements of grand theft under § 812.014(1), (Count I). Accordingly, we reverse Appellant's judgment and sentence on the lesser offense in Count II, obtaining a vehicle with intent to defraud by trick or false representation, and affirm Appellant's judgment and sentence on the greater offense in Count I, grand theft auto.

   PAGE 752
6. Rios v. State

   660 So. 2d 795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 2 times

   § 817.52(3), Fla. Stat. (1993).
7. Willingham v. City of Orlando

   929 So. 2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 64 times

   • Motion for summary judgment
   2 more...

   Several years later, according to Mr. Willingham, he was stopped in Orlando by Officer Wayne Costa of the Orlando Police Department. Officer Costa was investigating an outstanding warrant issued in Osceola County for failure to redeliver a hired vehicle, in violation of section 817.52, Florida Statutes (2003). Based on the outstanding Osceola County warrant, Officer Costa arrested Mr. Willingham outside his residence despite the protests of the appellant to the effect that his identity had been stolen, and that the officer had the wrong man. Mr. Willingham offered to get documentation for Officer Costa to demonstrate that he was not the person being sought pursuant to the warrant. Specifically, Mr. Willingham offered to produce the civil infraction disposition from the Lake County unlawful speeding case, as well as two booking photographs from the Orange County Correctional Facility. Officer Costa, however, chose not to investigate Mr. Willingham's assertion of mistaken identity.

   PAGE 46
8. Levine v. State

   849 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 2 times

   Appellant claims the court erred in refusing to give jury instructions on both venue and jurisdiction, claiming that the evidence established the offense occurred in Georgia because she failed to return the vehicle to the Atlanta agency. Section 817.52(3) provides:

   PAGE 456
9. Williams v. State

   68 So. 3d 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 7 times

   Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus challenging his pretrial detention for third-degree felony failure to return a hired vehicle. See § 817.52(3), Fla. Stat. (2009). The trial court ordered petitioner held without bond following a failure to appear for a hearing. Petitioner argues that his failure to appear was not willful and that the trial court failed to make a finding that no reasonable conditions could secure petitioner's presence at trial. We grant the petition.

   PAGE 1011
10. State v. Pugh

    350 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 2 times

    • Motion to dismiss

    Defendant was charged with unlawfully and fraudulently abandoning or refusing to redeliver a hired vehicle in contravention of Section 817.52(3), Florida Statutes. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting that there were no disputed material facts and that the undisputed facts failed to establish a prima facie case of defendant's guilt within the contemplation of said section 817.52(3). The state filed a traverse and demurrer setting forth additional facts reflecting that defendant was not granted permission or authority to keep the hired vehicle beyond a certain return date. Based upon the rationale set forth in State v. Giesy, 243 So.2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) and Camp v. State, 293 So.2d 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), it is our opinion that the information adequately charged a crime under section 817.52(3), and that defendant's motion to dismiss did not demonstrate the legal insufficiency of the information or reflect such matters as would exonerate him. State v. Giesy, supra.