Amendments to 817.563

1. M.P. v. State

   430 So. 2d 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 12 times

   The same issues raised here by appellant were recently argued in State v. Thomas, 428 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), in which our colleagues in the First District held section 817.563 to be constitutional. We agree and adopt the reasoning of the court in that case with one exception. While we may be misinterpreting what the court said in Thomas, we are concerned with its statement that section 817.563 requires the state to prove "that the defendant agreed, consented or offered to sell a substance which the defendant knew to be a controlled substance (and then sold an uncontrolled substance in lieu thereof)." Thomas, at 329-330 (emphasis added).
2. Thompson v. State

   585 So. 2d 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 18 times

   1 more...

   § 817.563, Fla. Stat.

   PAGE 493
3. U.S. v. Frazier

   89 F.3d 1501 (11th Cir. 1996)   Cited 56 times   1 Legal Analyses

   2 more...

   In sentencing Hutchinson as a career offender the court counted a 1990 Florida felony conviction as a predicate "controlled substance offense" under U.S.S.G. Section(s) 4B1.1. In the Florida case Hutchinson had pleaded nolo contendere to a violation of Florida statute Section(s) 817.563, which appears in Chapter 817 of the Florida Statutes Annotated titled "Fraudulent Practices," in Part I, thereof, titled "False Practices and Frauds, Generally." Sec. 817.563. Controlled substance named or described in s. 893.03; sale of substance in lieu thereof

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4. State v. Bussey

   463 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1985)   Cited 52 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   We use the term "bogus drugs" as a short-term way of referring to the substances supplied in violation of section 817.563. "Bogus drugs" are to be distinguished from "counterfeit drugs." Section 831.31, Florida Statutes (1981), prohibits the sale, manufacture, or delivery of "counterfeit controlled substances." That statute is directed at the false or unauthorized labelling of controlled substances that are available for use by medical prescription or other authorization. Both section 817.563 and section 831.31 were enacted as parts of chapter 81-53, Laws of Florida. Chapter 81-53 took effect October 1, 1981.

   PAGE 1145
5. Carruthers v. State

   636 So. 2d 853 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 6 times

   In Mitchell, the defendant was arrested after delivering fake cocaine to officers but before any money or consideration changed hands. There, the 4th DCA held that the sale was not completed because there was an absence of payment by the officer to the defendant, i.e., the "sell" element of the crime was lacking. See also State v. Thomas, 428 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), rev. denied, 436 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1983). In Sipp, the appellant had been arrested for selling bogus marijuana before the substance and money were exchanged. There, the 5th DCA held that because the evidence demonstrated that there was only an agreement but no delivery and no sale, there was no support for a conviction under section 817.563, Florida Statutes. In both Sipp and Mitchell, as in the instant case, the state argued that a sale was actually completed if the chapter 893 definition of sale was utilized. In both cases, the reviewing courts distinguished the chapter 893 definition of sell from the chapter 817 definition of sell. In both cases, the reviewing court found that the chapter 817 definition of sell involved an exchange of consideration for a completed sale. In both cases, the reviewing…

   PAGE 855
6. Greenwade v. State

   124 So. 3d 215 (Fla. 2013)   Cited 16 times

   It is equally apparent that the Legislature specifically intended to punish the distribution of counterfeit and look-alike substances less harshly. See§ 831.31, Fla. Stat. (2009); § 817.563, Fla. Stat. (2009). Under section 817.563:

   PAGE 228
7. State v. Thomas

   428 So. 2d 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 15 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Appellees Thomas and Williams were charged with violations of section 817.563, Fla. Stat. (1981). The State appeals the orders of the trial court granting appellees' motions to dismiss on the ground that section 817.563 is unconstitutional. Appellant argues that the legislature, in defining this crime, may properly dispense with the element of specific intent in regard to a defendant's knowledge of the nature of the substance sold, that section 817.563 does not conflict with State v. Cohen, 409 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), and that section 817.563 is a valid exercise of police power by the legislature. We agree, reverse and remand.

   PAGE 329
8. Lindsey v. State

   453 So. 2d 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 20 times

   The appellant has attacked section 817.563 as being unconstitutionally vague as a fraud statute and an improper exercise of police power. He argues that in State v. Bussey, 444 So.2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), the Fourth District ruled that section 817.563 is unconstitutional, and that this court should follow suit.

   PAGE 486
9. State v. Bussey

   444 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 12 times

   2 more...

   In conclusion, we find Section 817.563 to be a fraud statute and as such, it was a violation of due process to prosecute the defendant under the statute which makes no provision for specific intent as to the sale of the uncontrolled substance. As a fraud statute Section 817.563 is not a proper exercise of the police power and is unconstitutionally vague. The order of the trial court finding the statute unconstitutional is thus affirmed.

   PAGE 65
10. Jones v. State

    620 So. 2d 236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 2 times

    Throughout the proceedings below, the terms, "sale of a substance in lieu of a controlled substance," proscribed by Section 817.563, Florida Statutes (1989), and "sale of an imitation controlled substance," an offense under Section 817.564, Florida Statutes (1989), were used interchangeably. Although the jury was exposed several times to the erroneous title of the information, "sale of imitation controlled substance," the court's discussion of the content or substance of the charging offense tracked the language of section 817.563, i.e., sale of a substance in lieu of a controlled substance. The body of count I of the information, all of the evidence at trial, and the court's final instructions to the jury all pointed to the offense proscribed by section 817.563. Consequently, we conclude that the jury intended to convict Jones of sale of a substance in lieu of a controlled substance, and not sale of an imitation controlled substance. Cf. Lewis v. State, 154 Fla. 825, 19 So.2d 199 (1944); Cotton v. State, 395 So.2d 1287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

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