Home
Menu
904-383-7448
F.S. 818.01 on Google Scholar

F.S. 818.01 on Casetext

Amendments to 818.01


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 818
SALE OF MORTGAGED PERSONAL PROPERTY; SIMILAR OFFENSES
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 818.01 Florida Statutes and Case Law
818.01 Disposing of personal property under lien or subject to conditional sale.
(1) Whoever shall pledge, mortgage, sell, or otherwise dispose of any personal property to him or her belonging, or which shall be in his or her possession, and which shall be subject to any written lien, or which shall be subject to any statutory lien, whether written or not, or which shall be the subject of any written conditional sale contract under which the title is retained by the vendor, without the written consent of the person holding such lien, or retaining such title; and whoever shall remove or cause to be removed beyond the limits of the county where such lien was created or such conditional sale contract was entered into, any such property, without the consent aforesaid, or shall hide, conceal or transfer, such property with intent to defeat, hinder or delay the enforcement of such lien, or the recovery of such property by the vendor, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) It shall be prima facie evidence of concealing, selling, or disposing of such personal property whenever the person owning the property at the time the lien was created, or who bought the same under such retained title contract, fails or refuses to produce such property for inspection within the county where the lien was created, or the property delivered, upon demand of the person having such lien, or retaining such title, after the debt secured by such lien has become enforceable, or the vendee has substantially defaulted in the performance of such retained title contract.
History.s. 1, ch. 4142, 1893; GS 3356; RGS 5202; s. 1, ch. 9288, 1923; CGL 7316; s. 887, ch. 71-136; s. 1275, ch. 97-102.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 818.01 on Google Scholar

F.S. 818.01 on Casetext

Amendments to 818.01


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 818.01
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

818.01 - FRAUD - DISPOSE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY UNDER LIEN - M: F


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S818.01
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 818.01.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Littman v. Commercial Bank Trust

    425 So. 2d 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 26 times
    We think it clear that to the extent of any conflict, the specific statutory provisions of sections 818.01 and 818.03 must prevail over the general terms of section 679.311. Additionally, both section 818.01 and 818.03 were amended following adoption of the UCC and after the unpublished Attorney General Opinion upon which appellants rely, demonstrating that the legislature found no conflict between the provisions. Accordingly, we find no genuine conflict exists between UCC provision 679.311 and sections 818.01 and 818.03 so as to preclude application of the latter in the instant case.
    PAGE 639
  2. Flanigan's Enterprises v. Barnett

    614 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 4 times
    There was no evidence or suggestion in this case that Barnett intended to act in a manner that would result in Flanigan's loss of its rights in the collateral, or that Barnett's exercise of its rights to dispose of the collateral after default was wrongful. Compare, e.g., Black, Starr Frost v. Prestige Finance (Debtor wrongfully sold personal property free from secured creditor's lien held liable under section 818.01). Section 818.01 may have some remaining impact in cases involving wrongful disposition of collateral by debtors and/or secured creditors seeking to destroy or evade the rights of other secured creditors, where the provisions of section 679.504 (or a like statute governing disposition of specific kinds of collateral) are not followed. However, as in this case, where the statute allowing disposition and sale of collateral by a secured creditor is followed, section 818.01 affords no basis for civil or criminal liability against a secured creditor who disposes of collateral, purchases it at the sale, and later sells it to a third party, simply because written consent from another secured creditor or lienor was not obtained. We acknowledge…
    PAGE 1202
  3. Flanigan's Enterprises v. Barnett Bank

    639 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1994)   Cited 7 times
    The district court agreed that Flanigan's was estopped from asserting its landlord's lien because Kastner had failed to raise that claim with McMackin in their telephone conversation prior to sale of the license to Hickory Point. The court further ruled that Barnett was not liable under section 818.01 because that section's consent requirement was superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code's notice provision under section 679.504, Florida Statutes (1977). The court acknowledged conflict with Hanus and Littman, wherein the courts found liability under section 818.01.
    PAGE 618
  4. As the courts below correctly determined, however, rent and collateral assignments of rent do not fall within the scope of § 818.01, which applies only to "personal property." In the words of the Supreme Court of Florida, § 818.01 tends to stabilize the sale and barter in personal property under lien . . ., and to fix its situs within the knowledge of the lienee or vendor while so burdened. It deals solely with property that is in its very nature perishable, is subject to rapid depreciation in value, is easily secluded, and is readily transported from place to place.
    PAGE 156
  5. In re Ormond Beach Assoc. Ltd. Partn.

    204 B.R. 336 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996)   Cited 3 times
    Ormond Beach represents that a Florida trial court, in an action filed by Citation against present and former general partners of Ormond Beach, has dismissed with prejudice Citation's claims based upon § 818.01. The court declines to rule that the Florida Supreme Court would conclude that personal property under § 818.01 includes collected rents and, accordingly, decides that Citation is not entitled under this statute to recovery of net rents collected by Ormond Beach since November 17, 1989 as damages.
    PAGE 350
  6. Royal Trust Bank, N.A. v. Von Zamft

    511 So. 2d 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 2 times
    The relevant facts are as follows. Royal Trust's complaint alleged that it was entitled to money damages because Von Zamft wrongfully sold a car which was under lien to Royal Trust, in violation of section 818.01, Florida Statutes. Von Zamft's counterclaim alleged that Royal Trust had maliciously initiated criminal prosecution against him pursuant to section 818.01.
  7. Oaks Shopping Center v. Justice Mktg

    688 So. 2d 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 1 times
    The Oaks Shopping Center, Inc. (Oaks) leased real property to Justice Marketing, Inc. (Justice) for a three year term. Oaks had a landlord lien on the equipment kept on the premises. During the term of the lease but while the monthly payments were current, Justice moved out of the premises. Harry and Shelby Justice, the owners and officers of Justice, sold the equipment to a third person. Oaks sued Justice and its officers for fraud, conversion and for violation of sections 818.01 and 818.03, Florida Statutes, for removing and disposing of the equipment upon which a landlord lien existed.
  8. Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc.

    168 So. 2d 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)   Cited 21 times
    At the outset, it should be pointed out that the appellant had no action for conversion, because at the time of the act of which she complained, she, as a mortgagee, had no present right to possession. The present right to possession is an indispensable element of the tort of conversion. Accordingly, the appellant's complaint may only stand if she has a right of recovery by virtue of being the person who was injured by appellee's violation of the penal statutes, §§ 818.01 and 818.03 Fla. Stat., F.S.A.
    PAGE 679
  9. Black, Starr Frost v. Prestige Fin

    579 So. 2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 1 times
    Here, the initial liability, not in issue, was predicated on the creditor's rights under chapter 679, the U.C.C. — Secured Transactions, and section 818.01, Florida Statutes, which concerns disposing of personal property under lien. We can discern no legislative intent from the context, wording, or history of the statute to absolve a pawnbroker of liability to a third party where the pawnbroker may have notice of the third party's interest. We note that appellee filed no cross appeal questioning the initial judgment's finding of liability under chapter 679 and section 818.01. We therefore do not address any issues concerning the validity of, or basis for, that judgment. We also do not address the other issue raised in this appeal, which is now moot.
    PAGE 298
  10. Citation Mtge. v. RC of a Ret. Living

    Nos. 5D96-710, 5D96-1794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2000)
    We affirm the dismissal with prejudice of counts 17 through 22, which allege that appellees, in misappropriating the rents from the property, violated sections 818.01 and 818.03, Florida Statutes. Section 818.01, Florida Statutes, provides that it is a crime for a person to pledge, mortgage, sell or otherwise dispose of his or her personal property, which is subject to a written or statutory lien or a conditional sales contract retaining title, without the consent of the holder thereof, or to remove said property from the county without the consent of the lien holder, or to hide, conceal or transfer any such property with the intent to defeat, hinder or delay the enforcement of such lien or the recovery of the personal property. Section 818.03, Florida Statutes, makes it a crime to buy, take, receive or remove personal property subject to a lien from the owner or person in possession of the property, without the lien holder's written consent, or to willfully conceal such property or obstruct, delay or hinder the lien holder in the prosecution of the lien holder's rights.