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F.S. 818.03 on Google Scholar

F.S. 818.03 on Casetext

Amendments to 818.03


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 818
SALE OF MORTGAGED PERSONAL PROPERTY; SIMILAR OFFENSES
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 818.03 Florida Statutes and Case Law
818.03 Removing such property beyond the limits of county.Whoever shall knowingly and without the written consent of the person having such a lien thereon, as mentioned in s. 818.01, buy, take, receive or remove or cause to be removed beyond the limits of the county, any personal property subject to such lien from the owner or any person in possession thereof, and whoever shall willfully conceal such property or obstruct, delay or hinder such lienholder in prosecuting his or her rights against any of such property, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.s. 56, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2477; s. 2, ch. 4142, 1893; GS 3357, RGS 5204; CGL 7318; s. 889, ch. 71-136; s. 1276, ch. 97-102.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 818.03 on Google Scholar

F.S. 818.03 on Casetext

Amendments to 818.03


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 818.03
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

818.03 - FRAUD - REMOVE PROPERTY UNDER LIEN BEYOND COUNTY LIMIT - M: F


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S818.03
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 818.03.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Littman v. Commercial Bank Trust

    425 So. 2d 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 26 times
    Appellants' contention that neither section 818.01 nor 818.03 apply to a successor in interest to the original debtor is likewise without merit. Both sections specifically refer to "whoever" throughout, clearly not limiting their application to an original debtor under a security agreement. Compare sections 818.01 and 818.03 with section 817.562 which makes it actionable fraud to sell or otherwise dispose of secured property, but limits the scope thereof to those persons "having executed a security agreement creating a security interest in personal property." Section 817.562(2), Florida Statutes (1981). Appellants would have us distinguish Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., supra, where the defendant removed from the county and disposed of a power brake on which the plaintiff held a first mortgage, from the case sub judice on the basis that the defendant in Rosenberg was the original debtor. Contrary to appellants' assertion, there is no indication in Rosenberg that the defendant was the original debtor, nor that the decision is so limited. Therefore, its holding that a violation of sections 818.01 and 818.03 is a tort for which compensatory and punitive…
    PAGE 640
  2. State ex rel Forman v. Clackamas Cty

    45 P.3d 491 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)
    Intervenor rejoins, and we agree, that plaintiff-relator's characterization of Purser's testimony — or, at least, of its implications — is artificially narrow. While it is true that Purser's testimony focused on the application's submission in response to ZDO 818.03(K), it is also apparent that there is a necessary overlap and interrelationship between ZDO 818.03(K) and ZDO 818.04(E). Indeed, the application's submission with respect to ZDO 818.04(E) cross-references its discussion of ZDO 818.03(D) which, in turn, refers to the application's response regarding ZDO 818.03(E). See 181 Or. App. at 187-88. In sum, Purser's testimony that the proposed control measures would be inadequate to limit off-site erosion raises a disputed factual issue as to whether erosion from plaintiff-relator's putative mining operation would be contained on site.
    PAGE 189
  3. Citation Mortgage, Ltd. v. RC of a Retirement Living Ltd.

    753 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 3 times
    We affirm the dismissal with prejudice of counts 17 through 22, which allege that appellees, in misappropriating the rents from the property, violated sections 818.01 and 818.03, Florida Statutes (1991). Section 818.01, Florida Statutes, provides that it is a crime for a person to pledge, mortgage, sell or otherwise dispose of his or her personal property, which is subject to a written or statutory lien or a conditional sales contract retaining title, without the consent of the holder thereof, or to remove said property from the county without the consent of the lien holder, or to hide, conceal or transfer any such property with the intent to defeat, hinder or delay the enforcement of such lien or the recovery of the personal property. Section 818.03, Florida Statutes (1991), makes it a crime to buy, take, receive or remove personal property subject to a lien from the owner or person in possession of the property, without the lien holder's written consent, or to willfully conceal such property or obstruct, delay or hinder the lien holder in the prosecution of the lien holder's rights.
    PAGE 778
  4. Citation Mtge. v. RC of a Ret. Living

    Nos. 5D96-710, 5D96-1794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2000)
    We affirm the dismissal with prejudice of counts 17 through 22, which allege that appellees, in misappropriating the rents from the property, violated sections 818.01 and 818.03, Florida Statutes. Section 818.01, Florida Statutes, provides that it is a crime for a person to pledge, mortgage, sell or otherwise dispose of his or her personal property, which is subject to a written or statutory lien or a conditional sales contract retaining title, without the consent of the holder thereof, or to remove said property from the county without the consent of the lien holder, or to hide, conceal or transfer any such property with the intent to defeat, hinder or delay the enforcement of such lien or the recovery of the personal property. Section 818.03, Florida Statutes, makes it a crime to buy, take, receive or remove personal property subject to a lien from the owner or person in possession of the property, without the lien holder's written consent, or to willfully conceal such property or obstruct, delay or hinder the lien holder in the prosecution of the lien holder's rights.
  5. Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc.

    168 So. 2d 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)   Cited 21 times
    At the outset, it should be pointed out that the appellant had no action for conversion, because at the time of the act of which she complained, she, as a mortgagee, had no present right to possession. The present right to possession is an indispensable element of the tort of conversion. Accordingly, the appellant's complaint may only stand if she has a right of recovery by virtue of being the person who was injured by appellee's violation of the penal statutes, §§ 818.01 and 818.03 Fla. Stat., F.S.A.
    PAGE 679
  6. OPINION NO. OAG 34-89

    78 Op. Att'y Gen. 177 (Ops.Wis.Atty.Gen. 1989)
    If section 968.075 (5)(e) mandates an arrest for a forfeiture violation under section 968.075 (5)(a)2., then it is in direct conflict with chapter 818 since section 818.03 requires an order of arrest from the court in civil actions. Additionally, if such arrest is made for a violation under section 968.075 (5)(a)2., the officer could not bring the defendant before a court or issue a court date since the court only obtains personal jurisdiction in state forfeiture actions with a summons and complaint.
    PAGE 178
  7. State v. Hess

    2010 WI 82 (Wis. 2010)   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    ¶ 58. It is true that bench warrants do not require police involvement. However, civil bench warrants, like the one issued in this case, require an affidavit demonstrating the existence of the requisite cause of action, and a person may not be arrested as a remedial sanction for contempt without notice and hearing. Wis. Stat. § 818.03, 785.03(1)(a), 785.04(1)(b). These statutory requirements are intended to put the judge in a position to act as a detached and neutral magistrate with the proper facts placed before him in a manner sufficiently reliable to satisfy the constitutional requirements.
    PAGE 553
  8. Oaks Shopping Center v. Justice Mktg

    688 So. 2d 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 1 times
    The Oaks Shopping Center, Inc. (Oaks) leased real property to Justice Marketing, Inc. (Justice) for a three year term. Oaks had a landlord lien on the equipment kept on the premises. During the term of the lease but while the monthly payments were current, Justice moved out of the premises. Harry and Shelby Justice, the owners and officers of Justice, sold the equipment to a third person. Oaks sued Justice and its officers for fraud, conversion and for violation of sections 818.01 and 818.03, Florida Statutes, for removing and disposing of the equipment upon which a landlord lien existed.
  9. As a first alternative to reliance upon § 697.07, Citation invokes Fla. Stat. Ann. § 818.01, which makes it a crime to dispose of personal property subject to a lien without the written consent of the lienholder, and § 818.03, which makes it a crime to take such personal property and conceal it or obstruct a lienholder in prosecuting his or her rights in the property.
    PAGE 155
  10. Lynch Austin Realty, Inc. v. Engler

    647 So. 2d 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 3 times
    §§ 818.01 and 818.03, Fla. Stat. (1991).
    PAGE 989