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F.S. 818 on Google Scholar

F.S. 818 on Casetext

Amendments to 818


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 818
SALE OF MORTGAGED PERSONAL PROPERTY; SIMILAR OFFENSES
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CHAPTER 818 Florida Statutes and Case Law
CHAPTER 818
SALE OF MORTGAGED PERSONAL PROPERTY; SIMILAR OFFENSES
818.01 Disposing of personal property under lien or subject to conditional sale.
818.02 Executing mortgage on personalty without notifying mortgagee of prior mortgages.
818.03 Removing such property beyond the limits of county.
818.04 Selling collateral security before debt due.
818.05 Sale, concealment, or disposal of property held under contract or conditional sale; penalty.
818.01 Disposing of personal property under lien or subject to conditional sale.
(1) Whoever shall pledge, mortgage, sell, or otherwise dispose of any personal property to him or her belonging, or which shall be in his or her possession, and which shall be subject to any written lien, or which shall be subject to any statutory lien, whether written or not, or which shall be the subject of any written conditional sale contract under which the title is retained by the vendor, without the written consent of the person holding such lien, or retaining such title; and whoever shall remove or cause to be removed beyond the limits of the county where such lien was created or such conditional sale contract was entered into, any such property, without the consent aforesaid, or shall hide, conceal or transfer, such property with intent to defeat, hinder or delay the enforcement of such lien, or the recovery of such property by the vendor, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) It shall be prima facie evidence of concealing, selling, or disposing of such personal property whenever the person owning the property at the time the lien was created, or who bought the same under such retained title contract, fails or refuses to produce such property for inspection within the county where the lien was created, or the property delivered, upon demand of the person having such lien, or retaining such title, after the debt secured by such lien has become enforceable, or the vendee has substantially defaulted in the performance of such retained title contract.
History.s. 1, ch. 4142, 1893; GS 3356; RGS 5202; s. 1, ch. 9288, 1923; CGL 7316; s. 887, ch. 71-136; s. 1275, ch. 97-102.
818.02 Executing mortgage on personalty without notifying mortgagee of prior mortgages.Whoever executes a second or subsequent mortgage of personal property and receives money or thing of value therein without first notifying the second or subsequent mortgagee of the existence of the prior mortgage or mortgages, whether the same be recorded or not, and of the amount of such prior indebtedness, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.s. 1, ch. 5708, 1907; RGS 5203; CGL 7317; s. 888, ch. 71-136.
818.03 Removing such property beyond the limits of county.Whoever shall knowingly and without the written consent of the person having such a lien thereon, as mentioned in s. 818.01, buy, take, receive or remove or cause to be removed beyond the limits of the county, any personal property subject to such lien from the owner or any person in possession thereof, and whoever shall willfully conceal such property or obstruct, delay or hinder such lienholder in prosecuting his or her rights against any of such property, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.s. 56, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2477; s. 2, ch. 4142, 1893; GS 3357, RGS 5204; CGL 7318; s. 889, ch. 71-136; s. 1276, ch. 97-102.
818.04 Selling collateral security before debt due.Whoever holding any collateral security deposited with him or her for the payment of a debt which may be due him or her sells, pledges, loans or in any way disposes of the same, as his or her own, before such debt becomes due and payable, and without the authority of the person depositing the same, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.s. 59, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2478; GS 3358; RGS 5205; CGL 7319; s. 890, ch. 71-136; s. 1277, ch. 97-102.
818.05 Sale, concealment, or disposal of property held under contract or conditional sale; penalty.
(1) No person who is in possession of any personal property under and by virtue of any contract or conditional sale or otherwise where the title to said personal property does not vest in the possessor, shall sell, conceal or dispose of such personal property without first having the written consent of the person then having or retaining the bona fide title to such personal property so to sell, dispose of, or conceal the same.
(2) Any person who shall violate the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.ss. 1, 2, ch. 7860, 1919; CGL 7230, 7321; s. 891, ch. 71-136.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 818 on Google Scholar

F.S. 818 on Casetext

Amendments to 818


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 818
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

633.818 - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - BY FIREFIGHTER EMPLOYER TO INSURER - M: S
818.01 - FRAUD - DISPOSE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY UNDER LIEN - M: F
818.02 - FRAUD - EXECUTE SUBSQ MORTGAGE PERSONAL PROPERTY - M: S
818.03 - FRAUD - REMOVE PROPERTY UNDER LIEN BEYOND COUNTY LIMIT - M: F
818.04 - FRAUD - SELL COLLATERAL SECURITY BEFORE DEBT IS DUE - M: F
818.05 - FRAUD - SALE DISPOSE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY UND CONTRACT - M: S


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S818
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 818.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd

    563 U.S. 731 (2011)   Cited 7,715 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the challenged conduct. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). We recently reaffirmed that lower courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
    PAGE 735
  2. Crawford-El v. Britton

    523 U.S. 574 (1998)   Cited 3,537 times   1 Legal Analyses
    The Court does not explicitly discuss this question at all. Its failure to do so is both puzzling and unfortunate. Puzzling, because immunity is a "threshold" question that must be addressed prior to consideration of the merits of a plaintiff's claim. Harlow v . Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Unfortunate, because in assuming that the answer to the question is "no," the Court establishes a precedent that is in considerable tension with, and significantly undermines, Harlow.
    PAGE 602
  3. People v. Sengpadychith

    26 Cal.4th 316 (Cal. 2001)   Cited 1,073 times
    On defendant's appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for correction of certain sentencing errors. It also faulted the trial court for not instructing the jury on the gang enhancement's primary activities requirement, but it found the error harmless under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. In support, the Court of Appeal cited this court's decision in People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293 ( Wims).
    PAGE 322
  4. Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co.

    33 Cal.4th 780 (Cal. 2004)   Cited 783 times   1 Legal Analyses
    The phrase "miscarriage of justice" has a settled meaning in our law, having been explained in the seminal case of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243] ( Watson). Thus, "a `miscarriage of justice' should be declared only when the court, `after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,' is of the `opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." ( Id. at p. 836.) "We have made clear that a `probability' in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility." ( College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898, 882 P.2d 894].)
    PAGE 801
  5. People v. Lasko

    23 Cal.4th 101 (Cal. 2000)   Cited 657 times
    A majority of this court recently held that when a trial court violates state law by failing to properly instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, this test applies: "[I]n a noncapital case, error in failing sua sponte to instruct, or to instruct fully, on all lesser included offenses and theories thereof which are supported by the evidence must be reviewed for prejudice exclusively under [ People v.] Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836]. A conviction of the charged offense may be reversed in consequence of this form of error only if, `after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence' (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), it appears `reasonably probable' the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836)." ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, 178.)
    PAGE 111
  6. In re Celine R

    31 Cal.4th 45 (Cal. 2003)   Cited 1,698 times
    Other than the general reference to a miscarriage of justice, the cases have not stated the exact harmless error test. (See, e.g., In re Daniel H., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 813 [finding both no "reasonable probability" and no "reasonable possibility" of prejudice].) The California Constitution prohibits a court from setting aside a judgment unless the error has resulted in a "miscarriage of justice." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) We have interpreted that language as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243].) We believe it appropriate to apply the same test in dependency matters. (10) A court should set aside a judgment due to error in not appointing separate counsel for a child or relieving conflicted counsel only if it finds a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different but for the error. We disapprove of anything in In re Patricia E., supra, 174 Cal.App.3d 1, that is inconsistent with this conclusion.
    PAGE 60
  7. U.S. v. Taylor

    54 F.3d 967 (1st Cir. 1995)   Cited 201 times
    Despite its strength and salience, the raise-or-waive rule is not absolute. But, rescue missions are restricted to the correction of "plain" errors. See United States v. Olano, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 273 (1st Cir. 1987); Griffin, 818 F.2d at 100; see generally Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).
    PAGE 972
  8. Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dept. of Mental Health

    41 F.3d 584 (10th Cir. 1994)   Cited 341 times
    Following the Harlow analysis on qualified immunity, we feel it clear that as to the first prong the defendants Goodner, LeFlore, Pendergrass and Prigmore were "government officials performing discretionary functions." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. As to defendant Clute, however, we see no basis for his satisfying the condition of being a government official exercising a discretionary function. Accordingly the dismissal as to Clute on the ground of qualified immunity was error and must be reversed. The dismissal on qualified immunity grounds with respect to defendants Goodner, LeFlore, Pendergrass and Prigmore still must be considered in light of the second Harlow prong — whether they violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. . . ." Harlow, id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. We turn now to this important question.
    PAGE 593
  9. People v. Harris

    37 Cal.4th 310 (Cal. 2005)   Cited 767 times
    Nevertheless, reversal is not required. Defendant did not object to the trial court's questions. (See People v. Corrigan (1957) 48 Cal.2d 551, 556 [ 310 P.2d 953] ["It is settled that a judge's examination of a witness may not be assigned as error on appeal where no objection was made when the questioning occurred"].) Moreover, the evidence of guilt was strong, and defendant's claim of innocence was unpersuasive. Although the trial court should not have asked questions revealing its disbelief of defendant's story, the weaknesses in that story would have been apparent to the jury, particularly after the prosecutor pointed them out in his closing argument. Thus, it is not "reasonably probable" ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243]) that the jury would have reached a different result at the guilt phase of defendant's trial if the trial court had not asked the improper questions I discussed earlier. Nor were the court's questions so damaging or unfair as to violate defendant's right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
    PAGE 372
  10. Kizer v. County of San Mateo

    53 Cal.3d 139 (Cal. 1991)   Cited 91 times
    (1a) We conclude that the Tort Claims Act in general, and Government Code section 818 in particular, are not applicable in this case. Furthermore, our decision in Younger does not compel the conclusion that the statutory civil penalties imposed by the Department are barred by Government Code section 818. Younger involved a discharge of oil into the Oakland Estuary from privately owned oil storage tanks located on property owned by the Port of Oakland, a public entity. At an administrative hearing, it was determined that both the port and the private property owner were responsible for the discharge. The state brought an action against both responsible parties for civil penalties under Water Code section 13350, subdivision (a). The port brought a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis of Government Code section 818, and the trial court granted the motion. We vacated the judgment on the pleadings because we found that the statutory penalties imposed were not punitive damages within the meaning of Government Code section 818. ( Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 39.)
    PAGE 144