Amendments to 827.03

1. Ford v. State

   802 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2001)   Cited 88 times   1 Legal Analyses

   Where a defendant waits until after the State rests its case to challenge the propriety of an indictment, the defendant is required to show not that the indictment is technically defective but that it is so fundamentally defective that it cannot support a judgment of conviction. In the present case, the caption of the indictment charged Ford with violating section 827.03, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), and the text of the indictment stated specific grounds. Although section 827.03 embraces three separate child abuse-related offenses (i.e., simple child abuse, aggravated child abuse, and neglect of a child) and the grounds set forth in the indictment could have supported charges of either simple child abuse under section 827.03( 1) or neglect of a child under 827.03( 3), this is not a sufficient basis for invalidating the conviction at this point. Any inquiry concerning the technical propriety of the indictment should have been raised prior to trial at which time any deficiency could have been cured. The indictment as worded adequately placed Ford on notice that he was charged with a violation of the child abuse proscriptions of section…

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2. Raford v. State

   828 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 2002)   Cited 29 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   In chapter 96-322, section 8, Laws of Florida, section 827.03 was rewritten to include three subsections: the first addressed child abuse, the second addressed aggravated child abuse, and the third addressed neglect of a child. The definition of child abuse, which previously discussed a person "permitting" injury, was substantially rewritten in the amended section 827.03(1). "Simple" child abuse was enhanced to become a third-degree felony .... Nothing in the language of this statute now appears to exempt parents from prosecution.

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3. Dufresne v. State

   826 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2002)   Cited 30 times

   § 827.03(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996). Prior to trial, the State filed an amended information, wherein it changed the dates of the alleged incidents of abuse in order to bring the case within the effective date of the 1996 revisions to section 827.03(1). Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the amended information, arguing in part that section 827.03(1) was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Following a hearing on petitioner's motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order finding the statute to be unconstitutional as being both overbroad and vague.

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4. State v. McDonald

   785 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 16 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   In chapter 96-322, section 8, Laws of Florida, section 827.03 was rewritten to include three subsections: the first addressed child abuse, the second addressed aggravated child abuse, and the third addressed neglect of a child. The definition of child abuse, which previously discussed a person "permitting" injury, was substantially rewritten in the amended section 827.03(1). "Simple" child abuse was enhanced to become a third-degree felony, and aggravated child abuse became a first-degree felony. Nothing in the language of this statute now appears to exempt parents from prosecution.

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5. Nicholson v. State

   600 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1992)   Cited 22 times

   Both of Nicholson's claims are based on the contention that only acts of commission done with specific intent are actionable under section 827.03. See Jakubczak v. State, 425 So.2d at 189 ("legislature intended to punish under section 827.03 only acts of commission done with specific intent"); State v. Harris, 537 So.2d at 1129 (same). Nicholson therefore argues that omission by failing to feed a child is insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated child abuse.

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6. Kama v. State

   507 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 31 times

   Section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1983), charges aggravated child abuse by maliciously punishing a child. Chapter 84-238, Laws of Florida, which took effect on October 1, 1984, renumbered the statute so that aggravated battery by maliciously punishing a child is now section 827.03(1)(c). Appellant waived this technical defect in the charging document by failing to object to the incorrect statutory citation.
7. Czapla v. State

   957 So. 2d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 5 times

   § 827.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). The legislature has not exempted parents from prosecution under this statute. See Raford v. State, 828 So.2d 1012, 1019-1020 (Fla. 2002), and State v. McDonald, 785 So.2d 640, 647 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

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8. Garcia v. Attorney General of U.S.

   329 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2003)   Cited 58 times

   • Motion to dismiss
   1 more...

   The record indicates that Garcia is an alien who was convicted of the crime of aggravated child abuse, in violation of §§ 827.03( 1), (3) and 784.045(1) of the Florida Statutes. "Moral turpitude" has been defined by this Court as involving, "baseness, vileness, or depravity." Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2002). Whether a crime is one of moral turpitude depends on the inherent nature of the offense, rather than a particular individual's conduct. Id. at 1215-16. Under Florida law, aggravated child abuse occurs when a person (a) commits an aggravated battery on a child; (b) willfully tortures a child; (c) maliciously punishes a child; or (d) willfully and unlawfully cages a child. Florida Stat. § 827.03( 1) (1990). Although this Court has not spoken squarely on this issue, the Ninth Circuit has held that child abuse constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. See Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F.2d 1405, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1969) (inflicting cruel corporal punishment or injury upon a child is so offensive to American ethics as to end the debate of whether moral turpitude was involved in the crime of child beating). Based upon the inherent…

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9. Wilson v. State

   744 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 12 times

   In granting appellant's (c)(4) motion, the court reduced the charge to simple or felony child abuse under section 827.03(1)(b) and denied the (c)(4) motion as to this charge. Appellant pled no contest to this third degree felony under section 827.03(1) (emphasis added), which provides as follows:

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10. State v. Christie

    939 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 2 times

    • Motion to dismiss

    Christie filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. She asserted that as a public school teacher, she was not a section 827.03(3) "caregiver" or "other person responsible for a child's welfare" if that section was read in pari, materia with section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2003). The State responded that the Chapter 39 definition of "other person responsible for a child's welfare" did not need to be super-imposed on section 827.03. Moreover, the state argued that Christie was a section 827.03 "caregiver" because, as a school teacher, she stood in loco parentis to the students during school hours and was therefore an "other person responsible for a child's welfare." § 827.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). The trial court granted Christie's motion to dismiss. The State appealed.

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