Amendments to 831.31

1. Adderly v. State

   571 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 6 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Section 831.31 states:

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2. U.S. v. Frazier

   89 F.3d 1501 (11th Cir. 1996)   Cited 56 times   1 Legal Analyses

   2 more...

   Fla.Stat.Ann. Section(s) 831.31(1), (2) (West 1989) (emphasis added). This appears in the Forgery and Counterfeiting chapter of the Code. It is apparent that in 1990 this was a mislabeling statute. The Florida cases treat it as directed at counterfeiting, not at controlled substances. See Durr v. State, 583 So.2d 424 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1991) (no violation of Section(s) 831.31 when officers found a "clear Ziploc sandwich bag containing 12 rocks of what appeared to be cocaine, but was not"); Adderly v. State, 571 So.2d 557 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990), (reversing a conviction under the "counterfeit controlled substance" statute when the defendant possessed a "nondescript, unmarked, and unlabeled bag containing eight rocks of fake cocaine"); Twinn v. State, 442 So.2d 286, 287 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1983) (reversing defendant's conviction under Section(s) 831.31 when he was arrested with "seven clear plastic bags containing a white powder, which later proved not to be cocaine or any other controlled substance").

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3. Graham v. State

   338 So. 3d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)

   § 831.31(2), Fla. Stat. (2020). Thus, for the State to prove a violation of section 831.31(1)(a), the State must present evidence either of some labelling, which contains some identifying mark, number, or likeness of a trademark of a manufacturer other than the person who in fact manufactured the product. Alternatively, the State must prove that the substance is falsely identified as a controlled substance listed in section 893.03.

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4. J.L.F. v. State

   887 So. 2d 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 6 times

   To determine whether the evidence presented by the State is legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case of guilt against J.L.F., we must look to the statutory elements of the offense. Specifically, section 831.31 makes it a crime to "possess with intent to sell . . . a counterfeit controlled substance." § 831.31(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). A "counterfeit controlled substance" is defined in section 831.31(2) as follows:

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5. Greenwade v. State

   124 So. 3d 215 (Fla. 2013)   Cited 16 times

   It is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or to possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance. § 831.31(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). Violators of these sections may face a range of criminal charges from a second-degree misdemeanor to a third-degree felony. See§ 831.31, Fla. Stat.; § 817.563, Fla. Stat. A second-degree misdemeanor is punishable by a maximum of sixty days' imprisonment and a $500 fine, while a third-degree felony is punishable by a maximum of five years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. See§§ 775.082–83, Fla. Stat. (2009).

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6. State v. Bussey

   463 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1985)   Cited 52 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   We use the term "bogus drugs" as a short-term way of referring to the substances supplied in violation of section 817.563. "Bogus drugs" are to be distinguished from "counterfeit drugs." Section 831.31, Florida Statutes (1981), prohibits the sale, manufacture, or delivery of "counterfeit controlled substances." That statute is directed at the false or unauthorized labelling of controlled substances that are available for use by medical prescription or other authorization. Both section 817.563 and section 831.31 were enacted as parts of chapter 81-53, Laws of Florida. Chapter 81-53 took effect October 1, 1981.

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7. State v. Hayes

   446 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 3 times

   The appellant contends that the statute is defective because it fails to specifically provide the element of intent to defraud, a defect we found fatal in reviewing another statute in State v. Bussey, 444 So.2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). We cannot agree that the lack of such element renders the statute void. Section 831.31, as noted in its title, is directed to the problem of the distribution of counterfeit controlled substances, i.e., substances that may be identified as one thing but are really another. We agree that the statute does not make criminal the innocent possession of a counterfeit controlled substance, i.e., the possession by one who has no knowledge that the substance is counterfeit and who is otherwise lawfully entitled to possess what is apparently a valid controlled substance. Section 831.31 is also unlike section 893.13(2)(a)7, Florida Statutes (1981), which prohibits one from keeping a lawfully dispensed controlled substance in any container other than the one in which it was originally dispensed. See State v. Walker, 444 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

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8. Durr v. State

   583 So. 2d 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 4 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Following an anonymous tip, a police officer approached Durr and received permission to search him. The officer found a clear Ziploc sandwich bag containing 12 rocks of what appeared to be cocaine, but was not. Durr was charged under section 831.31, which makes it unlawful to possess with intent to sell or deliver a "counterfeit controlled substance." The latter term is defined in section 831.31(2)(b) as "[a]ny substance which is falsely identified by its container . . . as a substance named or described in s. 893.03" (emphasis supplied). Durr moved to dismiss the charge, alleging that an ordinary plastic sandwich bag did not "falsely identify" its contents as cocaine. The trial court denied the motion, and Durr entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal that ruling.
9. Vanhoosen v. State

   469 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 7 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Appellant appeals the trial judge's order finding him guilty of possession of a counterfeit controlled substance with intent to deliver, in violation of section 831.31, Florida Statutes. Appellant pled nolo contendere to the offense, specifically reserving his right to appeal the trial judge's denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss. We affirm.
10. Smith v. United States

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-00085-GNS-HBB (W.D. Ky. Dec. 3, 2018)

    • Motion for summary judgment
    • Motion to dismiss
    1 more...

    In applying the first prong of the discretionary function test—and even assuming that the mail carrier involved in the accident was inexperienced and not properly skilled to operate her delivery vehicle—Plaintiff has not alleged that the United States "violated a mandatory regulation or policy that allowed no judgment or choice" in reaching employment decisions. Rosebush, 119 F.3d at 441 (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322). Though not specifically addressed or relied upon by Plaintiff for this point, Section 831.31 of the "Post Office Employee and Labor Relations Manual" does require USPS hiring personnel to "ensure that only qualified applicants are hired and retained in driving positions" and refers to the definition of "qualified" in other USPS handbooks. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss & Partial Summ. J. Ex. J, DN 60-10). Other than conclusory statements in her Complaint, however, Plaintiff has failed to cite to other definitions of "qualified" or otherwise demonstrate that USPS violated this directive in hiring the mail carrier involved in the subject accident.

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