Amendments to 837.02

1. State v. Adkins

   553 So. 2d 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 8 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   In dismissing the RICO charge against Joan Adkins, the trial court stated that the information only alleged two predicate acts against her — the acts relating to the conspiracy charge and the acts relating to the perjury charge. Though we affirm the dismissal of the perjury charge, the predicate acts which led to the State's charge of felony perjury under section 837.02 could suffice as acts comprising a chargeable offense of misdemeanor perjury under section 837.012. Section 895.02(1)(a)24 of the RICO Act indicates that among the chargeable offenses delineated in the Act are violations of "Chapter 837, relating to perjury." The Act makes no distinction between felony and misdemeanor perjuries. However, because the perjury charge delineated in the RICO count only alleges violation of section 837.02, felony perjury, dismissal of the RICO count against Joan Adkins was proper.

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2. State v. Kwitowski

   250 So. 3d 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 3 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   And when the legislature adopted section 837.02( 2) in 1997—more than a decade after Buford held that it is unconstitutional to apply the death penalty to sexual battery offenses—it defined second-degree perjury by reference to a prosecution for a "capital felony." It used a term that then (and now) was understood throughout the Code to have a specialized and legally-fixed meaning as a felony classified by the legislature as a capital felony. Capital sexual battery was then (and now) classified as a capital felony. Given that statutory context, it is not reasonable to understand the term "capital felony" in section 837.02( 2) as having any meaning other than the specialized, legal meaning it had in the context of the Florida Criminal Code at the time section 837.02( 2) was adopted. Cf. Boland v. State, 893 So.2d 683, 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (assuming that section 837.05(2), Florida Statutes (2002), which criminalizes reporting false information "concerning the alleged commission of a capital felony," applied to reports of sexual battery on children under twelve because "[i]f the reports had been correct, the doctor would have been guilty of capital…

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3. State v. Anderson

   695 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1997)   Cited 29 times

   In the present case, while Anderson's two offenses are denoted in separate statutory chapters, both crimes arose from a single act of perjury and are in fact degree variants of that crime. As noted above, section 837.02 punishes one who knowingly makes a false statement under oath in an official proceeding, and section 903.035 punishes one who intentionally makes a false statement in an application for bail. Both statutes punish the same basic crime (i.e., the violation of a legal obligation to tell the truth), and differ only in terms of the degree of violation. Under section 837.02, the violation is of a formal oath, while under section 903.035, it is not.

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4. Butterworth v. Smith

   494 U.S. 624 (1990)   Cited 123 times   1 Legal Analyses

   Florida's interest in preventing the subornation of grand jury witnesses who will later testify at trial is served by the prohibition in question to this extent: if the accused is of a mind to suborn potential witnesses against him, he will have an additional opportunity to learn of the existence of such a witness if that witness chooses to make his grand jury testimony public. But with present day criminal procedure generally requiring the disclosure of witnesses on the part of the State, see, e. g., Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.220(a), the names of these witnesses will be available to the accused sometime before trial in any event. Florida provides substantial criminal penalties for both perjury and tampering with witnesses, see Fla. Stat. §§ 837.02, 914.22 (1989), and its courts have subpoena and contempt powers available to bring recalcitrant witnesses to the stand. We think the additional effect of the ban here in question is marginal at best and insufficient to outweigh the First Amendment interest in speech involved.

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5. Arthur v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA

   569 F. App'x 669 (11th Cir. 2014)   Cited 106 times

   • Motion to dismiss
   1 more...

   Turning first to perjury, Florida recognizes both felony perjury, which occurs when a defendant makes a false statement while under oath in an official proceeding, and misdemeanor perjury, which occurs when a defendant makes a false statement under oath not in an official proceeding. Fla. Stat. § 837.02 (defining felony perjury); Fla. Stat. § 837.012 (defining misdemeanor perjury). Both may serve as predicate offenses under the Florida RICO Act. State v. Adkins, 553 So. 2d 294, 297 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989). While the Appellants did not refer to a specific perjury statute in their complaint, they only address the felony perjury statute discussed by the district court in their briefing before this Court. Thus, we only consider the felony perjury statute. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that an appellant must clearly and specifically raise an issue for review in his or her brief or it is abandoned).

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6. Mays v. State

   198 So. 3d 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 3 times

   See §§ 777.011, 837.02(1). The elements of tampering are:

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7. Iacono v. State

   930 So. 2d 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 59 times

   Allowing a defendant to ignore the oath and lie to the court only to later claim that he did so at counsel's instruction is against public policy as it condones perjury. See § 837.02, Fla. Stat. (describing the third-degree felony of perjury in an official proceeding). The waiver of rights form used when taking a plea, the oath to tell the truth, and the plea colloquy conducted by the court would be rendered meaningless if a defendant could later claim that he was purposefully lying to the court because counsel advised him to do so. A defendant is not entitled to rely on an attorney's advice to commit perjury above the solemn oath that the defendant makes to the court to tell the truth.

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8. State v. Ellis

   722 So. 2d 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 1 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   The petitioner asserts that materiality is not an element of the perjury prosecution in the present case, which was pursued under section 837.02, Florida Statutes. However, Florida cases have acknowledged that materiality is an element of the crime of perjury, e.g., Hirsch v. State, 279 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1973), and section 837.02(1) expressly provides that:
9. Cohen v. State

   985 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 2 times

   Section 837.02(2), Florida Statutes (1999) provides: "Whoever makes a false statement, which he or she does not believe to be true, under oath in an official proceeding, in regard to any material matter, commits a felony of the second degree."

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10. Anderson v. State

    669 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 2 times

    Applying section 775.021 to the instant facts, Anderson's convictions for violating both section 837.02 and section 903.035 pass the initial inquiry required by paragraph 775.021 (4)(a) because each crime requires proof of an element that the other does not. Unlike the crime of providing false information in an application for bail, the perjury charge under section 837.02 requires proof that the statement occurred in an official proceeding and also that it was made under oath. Unlike the perjury charge, to convict under section 903.035, the State must prove that the information the defendant provided was done "in connection with an application for or attempt to secure bail."

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