Amendments to 837.021

1. Ware v. State

   111 So. 3d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 2 times

   After the violation hearing, the state attorney's office charged the alleged victim with and obtained a conviction for perjury based on her statements connected to the domestic battery incident and at the subsequent violation of probation hearing. It is unclear from the record before us whether she was prosecuted for a violation of section 837.021, Florida Statutes (2008), felony perjury by contradictory statements; section 837.012, Florida Statutes, misdemeanor perjury when not in an official proceeding; or section 837.05, Florida Statutes, misdemeanor false reports to law enforcement authorities. Based on the record before us, it appears that the alleged victim was never charged with a violation of section 837.02, Florida Statutes, felony perjury in official proceedings for making a false statement at the VOP hearing.

   PAGE 258
2. State v. Feagle

   600 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 8 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Section 837.021(3), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that "[i]n any prosecution for perjury by inconsistent statements under this section, it is not necessary to prove which, if any, of the statements is not true." Based on that statute, the state argued that whether one or the other of appellee's statements is true or false is immaterial and need not be proved. Feagle's belief or intent concerning the contradictory statements is relevant and material, however, because section 837.021(1), Florida Statutes (1989), makes willfulness an element of the crime. Because the state's sworn traverses disputed one or more material facts, the trial court erred in granting the motions to dismiss. See Boom, 490 So.2d at 1370; Cook, 354 So.2d at 909.

   PAGE 1239
3. State v. Mitrani

   19 So. 3d 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 6 times

   The witnesses' first concern is that they might be subject to prosecution for perjury by contradictory statements if they provide sworn testimony at a deposition that materially differed from their earlier statements under oath. This concern is unfounded, provided that their compelled testimony is truthful. Section 914.04 generally prohibits the use of such testimony in any criminal investigation or proceeding against the witness. More specifically, section 837.021(4), provides that a person may not be prosecuted for making contradictory statements if the contradictory statement made in the most recent proceeding was made under a grant of immunity under section 914.04.

   PAGE 1068
4. Brown v. State

   334 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1976)   Cited 8 times

   Our statute was broadly concerned with material statements made under oath in "trials, hearings, investigations, depositions, or affidavits, in which the making of statements under oath or affirmation is required or authorized by law." Sec. 837.021(1), F.S. 1973. It was not restricted in application to formal proceedings requiring an oath, as were the Illinois and New York statutes which, because they were so restricted, were upheld in People v. Ricker, 45 Ill.2d 562, 262 N.E.2d 456 (1970), and People v. Lillis, supra. The presumption of willfulness, in its classic sense of volition and intent informed by knowledge, was attached by § 837.021 to all inconsistent statements made in any setting in which an oath was thought by an investigator or interrogator to be desirable or convenient.

   PAGE 600
5. Duckett v. State

   148 So. 3d 1163 (Fla. 2014)

   1 more...

   In his final claim, Duckett contends that section 837.021, Florida Statutes (1997), which proscribes perjury by contradictory statement, is invalid. As stated above, Gurley, who testified at trial, invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege at the evidentiary hearing on Duckett's initial postconviction motion. See Duckett II, 918 So.2d at 232. Duckett argues that the fear of a felony perjury conviction caused Gurley to invoke the privilege, which in turn violated his right to due process. Therefore, he argues that section 837.021 is invalid. The postconviction court denied the claim, noting that the issue was untimely raised and improperly pleaded because Duckett failed to explain why it was not raised previously. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2)(C)(iv). We agree that the claim was not timely raised and is procedurally barred and affirm the postconviction court's denial of the claim.

   PAGE 1170
6. Carter v. State

   384 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1980)   Cited 13 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   As to the State's contention that section 837.021( 1), has effectively abolished the defense of recantation, the Court feels otherwise where full recantation is forthcoming in the same proceeding before final submission. "A judicial investigation or trial has for its sole object the ascertainment of the truth, that justice be done. It holds out every inducement to a witness to tell the truth by inflicting severe penalties upon those who do not. This inducement would be destroyed if a witness could not correct a false statement except by running the risk of being indicted and convicted of perjury." Brannen, 114 So. p. 431. This Court cannot find, and does not believe, the Legislature by enacting section 837.021( 1) ever intended to preclude a search for the truth in the judicial process. In reaching this conclusion, the Court has not overlooked Brown v. State [ 334 So.2d 597] wherein a closely divided Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 837.021( 1). What the majority of that Court implied regarding unavailability of recantation of wilful perjured testimony as a defense is dictum. It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that count two only…

   PAGE 1257
7. The Florida Bar v. Doe

   384 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1980)   Cited 7 times

   We find it unnecessary to reach the question of the validity of the purported grants of immunity from criminal prosecution by the state attorney for Leon and Dade Counties because we hold that the original granting of immunity to Doe and Roe from criminal prosecution and Bar discipline encompassed the prohibition of using any of the statements previously made by them under oath in 1974 and 1975 as a basis for prosecution of them under section 837.021 or as a basis for Bar discipline for perjury by later contradictory statements. The initial immunization given which caused respondents to testify carries forward and protects them from now having their prior statements used against them to show inconsistency with their present testimony. See McDonald v. State, 321 So.2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), and Feldman v. State, 348 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Therefore, it was unnecessary to obtain further grants of immunity.

   PAGE 33
8. Sevin v. State

   478 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 2 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Moreover, prior to its amendment by the enactment of chapter 74-383, Laws of Florida (1974), section 837.021, prohibiting perjury by contradicting statements, read quite differently than it does since the amendment. Prior to the 1974 amendment, section 837.021 prohibited perjury by contradictory statements when made "in one or more trials, hearings, investigations, depositions or affidavits." (Emphasis added.) Sections 53 and 56 of chapter 74-383 amended section 837.021 to prohibit contradictory statements when made "in one or more official proceedings" and added section 837.011(1), which defined "official proceeding" as:

   PAGE 523
9. Duckett v. State

   148 So. 3d 1163 (Fla. 2014)

   1 more...

   In his final claim, Duckett contends that section 837.021, Florida Statutes (1997), which proscribes perjury by contradictory statement, is invalid. As stated above, Gurley, who testified at trial, invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege at the evidentiary hearing on Duckett's initial postconviction motion. See Duckett II, 918 So.2d at 232. Duckett argues that the fear of a felony perjury conviction caused Gurley to invoke the privilege, which in turn violated his right to due process. Therefore, he argues that section 837.021 is invalid. The postconviction court denied the claim, noting that the issue was untimely raised and improperly pleaded because Duckett failed to explain why it was not raised previously. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2)(C)(iv). We agree that the claim was not timely raised and is procedurally barred and affirm the postconviction court's denial of the claim. III. CONCLUSION

   PAGE 1171
10. State v. Barbuto

    571 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 3 times

    • Motion to dismiss

    The state filed an information charging the appellee with one count of perjury by inconsistent statements in violation of section 837.021, Florida Statutes (1987), and two counts of perjury in an official proceeding in violation of section 837.02, Florida Statutes (1987). The appellee filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the ground that the statements in question were not material. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the charges. The state filed a timely notice of appeal.

    PAGE 485