Amendments to 843.08

1. Lewis v. State

   97 So. 3d 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

   Lewis was charged with falsely personating an officer during the commission of a felony, in violation of section 843.08, Florida Statutes (2008), which provides in relevant part:

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2. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2015-08

   194 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 2016)   Cited 4 times

   This instruction was approved in 1981 and amended in 2016. 21.16 FALSELY PERSONATING AN OFFICER § 843.08, Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Falsely Personating An Officer, the State must prove the following

   received law enforcement training equivalent to training for Florida law enforcement officers. § 843.08, Fla. Stat. A “watchman” means a security officer licensed under Chapter 493 of the Florida Statutes

3. State v. Beaubrun

   36 So. 3d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 2 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Thus, based on the defendant's attire, his vehicle, and his actions, the jury could reasonably find that the defendant "falsely assume[d] or pretend[ed] to be a . . . police officer . . . and [took] upon himself to act as such," in violation of section 843.08. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order of dismissal and remand for reinstatement of the charge against the defendant.

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4. State v. Alecia

   692 So. 2d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 1 times

   Appellant appeals the trial court's judgment declaring a portion of section 843.08, Florida Statutes (1995) unconstitutional and dismissing a charge of falsely assuming or pretending to be a deputy sheriff.
5. Lavis Plumbing Services v. Johnson

   515 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 5 times

   As stated in its initial enactment in 1868, section 843.08, Florida Statutes, was not intended by the Legislature to protect a particular class. Rather, in Chapter 1,637, [sub]Chapter VI, Laws of Florida (1868), a variety of crimes were enumerated under the heading of "Offenses Against Public Justice," including, at section 18, the predecessor to section 843.08. While the statute has been amended a number of times, the only modifications made have been to the names of law enforcement agency officials being impersonated. Since the stated statutory purpose was and remains protection of the "public justice" and not the protection of a "special class," as required by Roger Rankin Enterprises, 433 So.2d at 1250, and Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, 168 So.2d at 680, we cannot glean from the statute any purpose to benefit any "especial," identifiable class.

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6. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases

   288 So. 3d 540 (Fla. 2020)

   FALSELY PERSONATING AN OFFICER — 843.08 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. None Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1

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7. Moline v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

   Case No. 3:09-cv-687-J-34JBT (M.D. Fla. Sep. 25, 2012)

   • Motion to dismiss
   1 more...

   The Defendant's first sub-claim is that Florida Statute § 843.08 does not authorize habitual felony offender classification. The Defendant's claim is meritorious. The Defendant was charged pursuant to section 843.08, Florida Statutes (1995) with falsely personating a police officer during the course of the commission of a felony. (Exhibit "D.") Section 843.08, Florida Statutes (1995), provided for sentencing pursuant to sections 775.082 and 775.083, Florida Statutes (1995). The statute did not provide for sentencing as an H.F.O. pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statu[t]es (1995). § 843.08, Fla. Stat. (1995). Therefore, the Defendant's classification as an H.F.O. as to count one is improper and the Defendant must be resentenced. The Defendant's H.F.O. classification as to counts two and three is proper.

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8. Llabona v. State

   557 So. 2d 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 5 times

   For his second point on appeal, defendant maintains that the trial court's reasons for departure from the recommended guidelines sentence are either invalid or unsupported by the record. Defendant contends that the trial court's first two reasons for departure, i.e., coercion of a minor and impersonation of a police officer, are invalid because they constitute separate crimes, see §§ 827.04(3) and 843.08, Fla. Stat. (1983), for which defendant was not convicted. We agree.

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9. SVET v. STATE

   Case No. 2:05-cv-376-FtM-33SPC (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2006)

   • Motion to dismiss
   3 more...

   In addition, Plaintiff mentions several other Florida Statutes: 901.17 "Method of arrest by officer without warrant"; 943.085 "Legislative intent with respect to upgrading the quality of law enforcement officers and corrections officers"; 843.08 "Falsely personating officer, etc."; and 843.0855 "Criminal actions under color of law or through use of simulated legal process" but Plaintiff fails to link any of the conduct described with these statutes, and fails to explain which of the two defendants the accusations are brought against.

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10. Azerzer v. State

    96 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

    Under section 843.08, Florida Statutes (2010): “A person who falsely assumes or pretends to be a ... federal law enforcement officer ... and takes upon himself or herself to act as such ... commits a felony of the third degree.” (emphasis added). Without objection, the trial judge incorrectly instructed that the State had to prove that the defendant “falsely assumed or pretended to be a federal law enforcement officer or took it upon himself to act as such.” (emphasis added). This error was fundamental under Martinez v. State, 981 So.2d 449 (Fla.2008) (explaining that an error in jury instructions is fundamental if it affects a disputed element of a crime and “ ‘is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to convict ...’ ”) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1991)). Here, Azerzer's defense focused on the first element of what should have been a two-element crime. A witness testified that Azerzer claimed to be an FBI agent. Azerzer testified that he was a licensed bail bondsman who never claimed to be an FBI agent—and argued that the witness must have misunderstood him or been confused. Based upon this dispute in the evidence, Azerzer…

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