Amendments to 843.19

1. R.N. v. State

   257 So. 3d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 2 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   A review of section 843.19, Florida Statutes, shows that different subsections within the section employ different terms. For example, section 843.19(2) provides: "Any person who intentionally and knowingly, without lawful cause or justification , causes great bodily harm ... upon[ ] a police dog ... commits" a third-degree felony. (Emphasis added). Thus, section 843.19(2) specifically applies the legal definition of malice. In contrast, subsection 843.19(4), uses the terms "intentionally or knowingly maliciously harasses[.]" (Emphasis added).

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2. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report 2019-12

   290 So. 3d 879 (Fla. 2020)

   [CAUSING [GREAT BODILY HARM] [PERMANENT DISABILITY] [DEATH] TO] [OR] [USING A DEADLY WEAPON UPON] A [POLICE] [FIRE] [SAR] [CANINE] [HORSE] — 843.19(2) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. None Battery 843.19(3) 21.19(b) Police/Fire/SAR Canine/Horse Harass 843.19(4) 21.19(c) Police/Fire/SAR Canine/Horse Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1

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3. T.W. v. State

   98 So. 3d 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 9 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Neither section 843.19 nor any Florida case law offers a definition of “great bodily harm” under these types of circumstances. However, cases discussing “great bodily harm” in the context of aggravated battery to a human being provide some guidance. Like section 843.19, section 784.045 (aggravated battery) does not define “great bodily harm.” Nonetheless, Florida courts have generally defined “great bodily harm” as “great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises as are likely to be inflicted in a simple assault and battery.” See Gordon v. State, ––– So.3d ––––, 2011 WL 6016913 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Nguyen v. State, 858 So.2d 1259, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Heck v. State, 774 So.2d 844, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); C.A.C. v. State, 771 So.2d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Guthrie v. State, 407 So.2d 357, 358 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). In C.A.C., the Second District emphasized that the state “must prove more than that the victim suffered some harm.” 771 So.2d at 1262.

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4. Allen v. State

   211 So. 3d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

   Section 943.10, Florida Statutes (2014), refers to "any person" in defining who is a police officer. § 943.10(1), Fla. Stat. A K–9 dog is not a person. Moreover, the statutes treat police dogs differently than officers. Section 843.19, Florida Statutes (2014), provides that it is a third degree felony to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability or death to a police dog. § 843.19(2). Malicious touching of a dog is categorized as a first degree misdemeanor. § 843.19(3), Fla. Stat. On the other hand, if those crimes are committed against a law enforcement officer, they have increased penalties. See § 775.0823, Fla. Stat. (2014). The plain meaning of section 843.01, Florida Statutes, compels a conclusion that this statute applies only to resisting persons, not animals. As noted in Bass v. State , 791 So.2d 1124, 1124–25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), "[t]he trial court is not correct that police dogs receive the same treatment as a police officer."

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5. Cannada v. State

   472 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 10 times

   We also question whether, even with corroborating evidence of the dog's injuries, they would support a departure from the guidelines. Cannada was charged with injury to a police dog pursuant to section 843.19, Florida Statutes (1983). For a conviction under that statute, a defendant must inflict "great bodily harm, permanent disability, or death upon a police dog." § 843.19(2). An inherent component of a crime will not support a guideline departure. Steiner v. State, 469 So.2d 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Baker v. State, 466 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Bowdoin v. State, 464 So.2d 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Carney v. State, 458 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Twelve points for victim injury were added to the score in computing the recommended sentence. Because great injury to the police dog is an inherent component of the crime, the trial judge should not have departed from the guidelines on that basis.

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6. Durham v. State

   174 So. 3d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 3 times

   Hugh Patrick Durham appeals his conviction for resisting an officer with violence and touching, striking, or causing bodily harm to a police dog in violation of sections 843.01 and 843.19(3), Florida Statutes (2013). He challenges the resisting charge on grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the police were in the lawful execution of a legal duty, an essential element of the crime in this case, because they had unlawfully entered his home at the time he resisted the officer. See, e.g., Espiet v. State, 797 So.2d 598, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (reversing resisting charge “because the State failed to adduce evidence that the deputies were in the lawful performance of their duties when they entered Espiet's home without a warrant.”). Durham's counsel raised this issue below with a timely motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied. Reviewing the matter de novo, see Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002), we reverse.

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7. Yarn v. State

   106 So. 3d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 3 times

   With respect to the charge of battery on a police dog, we agree with Yarn that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to present evidence of Yarn's intent to commit a battery on the dog. Section 843.19(3), Florida Statutes (2009), provides that “[a]ny person who actually and intentionally maliciously touches, strikes, or causes bodily harm to a police dog” commits a first-degree misdemeanor. Thus, the State had to prove that Yarn intentionally struck or caused harm to the police dog.

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8. Tardif v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals

   Case No. 2:09-cv-537-FtM-29SPC (M.D. Fla. Sep. 29, 2010)

   • Motion for summary judgment
   • Motion to dismiss
   4 more...

   Although not referred to in § 828.17, it is also a violation of Florida law to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability, or death to a police dog, Fla. Stat. § 843.19(2); to maliciously touch, strike or cause bodily harm to a police dog, Fla. Stat. § 843.19(3); or to maliciously harass, tease, interfere with or attempt to interfere with a police dog in the performance of its duties, Fla. Stat. § 843.17(4).

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9. Bass v. State

   791 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 3 times

   The trial court is not correct that police dogs receive the same treatment as a police officer. Harming or killing a police dog is a third degree felony under section 843.19(2). Aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer is a first degree felony, and the fact that the victim of a capital felony is a law enforcement officer is a statutory aggravating factor for imposition of the death penalty. See §§ 784.07(2)(d), 921.141(5)(j), Fla. Stat. (1999). The statutes do not treat dogs the same as humans, and as much as dogs are loved and cherished by their owners, they are not persons or "individuals" for purposes of the criminal law. Cf. Helmy v. Swigert, 662 So.2d 395, 397 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) ("a dog is considered to be personal property").

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10. Nicor International Corp. v. El Paso Corp.

    318 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Fla. 2004)   Cited 6 times

    • Motion for summary judgment
    • Motion to dismiss
    8 more...

    Plaintiffs' assertion of a RICO claim against Defendants based upon obstruction of justice under chapter 843 of the Florida Statutes also fails. None of the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint even remotely establish a claim for obstruction of justice. § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (resisting officer with violence); § 843.02, Fla. Stat. (resisting officer without violence); § 843.021, Fla. Stat. (unlawful possession of a concealed handcuff key); § 843.025, Fla. Stat. (depriving officer of a means of protection or communication); § 843.03, Fla. Stat. (obstruction by disguised person); § 843.04, Fla. Stat. (refusing to assist prison officials); § 843.05, Fla. Stat. (resisting timber agent); § 843.06, Fla. Stat. (neglect or refusal to aid peace officers); § 843.08, Fla. Stat. (falsely personating officer, etc.); § 843.081, Fla. Stat. (prohibited use of certain lights); § 843.085, Fla. Stat. (unlawful use of police badges or other indica of authority); § 843.0855, Fla. Stat. (criminal actions under color of law or through use of simulated legal process); § 843.09, Fla. Stat. (escape through voluntary action of officer); § 843.10, Fla. Stat. (escape through negligence of officer); …

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