Amendments to 849.25

1. State v. Cogswell

   521 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1988)   Cited 23 times

   The relevant facts reflect that Cogswell was charged with nine counts of bookmaking under section 849.25( 1) (2), Florida Statutes (1985). These charges arose from Cogswell's allegedly receiving nine football betting cards, along with thirty-four dollars. Cogswell filed a motion to declare section 849.25 unconstitutional, claiming that the conduct proscribed by that section, a felony, was indistinguishable from the conduct proscribed by section 849.14, a misdemeanor. He asserted that the absence of standards differentiating the felony as opposed to the misdemeanor offense rendered section 849.25 susceptible to arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory application by the prosecutor. The trial judge agreed, granted the motion to dismiss, and declared the statute unconstitutional. On appeal, the district court affirmed, finding that "[t]he same prohibited conduct of `taking or receiving a bet' may be prosecuted under either statute, depending upon the discretion of the prosecutor." 504 So.2d at 465. The district court relied on our decision in Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1978), where we noted that a defendant "might have an equal protection…

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2. Shaktman v. State

   529 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 10 times

   • Motion to dismiss
   2 more...

   The appellants were charged by informations with the felony offense of bookmaking pursuant to section 849.25, Florida Statutes (1983). The appellants subsequently filed consolidated motions to dismiss the informations based upon their claim that the statute violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution. The appellants devoted a substantial portion of their argument to the point that the conduct prohibited as a felony in section 849.25 and the conduct prohibited as a misdemeanor in section 849.14 are essentially identical, thus rendering section 849.25 susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory application. Notwithstanding the appellants' contention or the validity of their arguments, the Florida supreme court has addressed this precise constitutional challenge to section 849.25 and resolved the question contrary to their position. State v. Cogswell, 521 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 1988).

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3. King v. State

   104 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1958)   Cited 65 times

   Sec. 849.01 denounces the keeping of a house or other place for any manner of gaming or gambling. Sec. 849.25 defines "bookmaking" as "the taking or receiving of any bet or wager upon the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed, power, or endurance of man, beast, fowl or motor vehicle" and provides that "whoever engages in bookmaking shall be guilty of a misdemeanor * * *". Although the information in the instant case charged that the defendants conspired "one with the other" (as well as with Moscovitz) to commit the offenses described in § 849.01 and § 849.25, the evidence does not support the charge.

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4. Santoro v. State

   959 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

   The trial court instructed the jury that in order to convict Mr. Santoro, the State had to prove (1) that he engaged in the business or profession of gambling; (2) that while so engaged, he took or received a bet or wager; and (3) that the bet or wager was upon the result of a trial or contest of skill, speed, power, or endurance of man. See § 849.25(1)(a); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 22.14. The trial court also instructed the jury to consider the section 849.25(1)(b) factors in making its deliberations. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 22.14.

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5. Movitz v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago

   982 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1997)   Cited 43 times

   Fees of the Clerk $ 60.00 Fees for service of summons and subpoenas $ 849.25 Fees of the court reporter $58,986.45 Fees for witnesses $ 9,693.96 Fees for exemplification and copies of papers $55,882.37 Fees for Defendant's experts $28,290.00 Fees for long-distance calls $ 878.73

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6. Vickery v. State

   539 So. 2d 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 3 times

   4 more...

   This distinction was most recently discussed in Shaktman v. State, 529 So.2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), where two defendants were charged with both RICO violations as well as felony bookmaking under section 849.25. As in Cogswell, the defendants in Shaktman also challenged the constitutionality of section 849.25. The Third District, in upholding the bookmaking statute, observed:

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7. State v. Tate

   420 So. 2d 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 6 times

   This is an appeal from a judgment holding that the "bookmaking" statute, section 849.25, Florida Statutes (1981), is unconstitutional. We reverse.
8. In re Stan. Jury Instr. in Criminal Cases

   543 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1989)   Cited 25 times

   1 more...

   14. Page 216 provides an instruction on bookmaking. Section 849.25, Florida Statutes, was amended by Chapter 87-243, Section 48, Laws of Florida. A revised instruction incorporating the 1987 amendments is proposed. See Exhibit 7.

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9. State v. DiGuillio

   413 So. 2d 478 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 5 times

   At the outset we note that we do not reach the question of the ambiguity of the statutes as the trial court did not rule on their constitutionality. While the statutes may lack clarity due to their similar language, we think the informations alleged felonies and thereby subjected defendants to jurisdiction of the circuit court. Each of the counts against the defendants included the allegation of "taking or receiving bets" which the statute defines as bookmaking. Each tracked the language of section 849.25 and cited that statute. These allegations were sufficient to place each of the defendants on notice as to the acts proscribed by section 849.25. Where, as here, an information refers to a statute and tracks its language, it is generally held sufficient. Martinez v. State, 368 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1979); State v. Pajon, 374 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

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10. Johnson v. State

    715 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 2 times

    (4)(a) Except as otherwise provided in ss. 828.125(2), 849.25(4), 893.135, and 921.0012, the offense of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy is ranked for purposes of sentencing under chapter 921 and determining incentive gain-time eligibility under chapter 944 one level below the ranking under s. 921.0012 or s. 921.0013 of the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to. If the criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy is of an offense ranked in level 1 or 2 under s. 921.0012 or s. 921.0013, such offense is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775. 082 or s. 775.083.

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