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Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
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The pertinent part of section 856.011 provides:We need not decide whether the Guidelines adopted the definition of public intoxication under the common law or the Model Penal Code because the Florida statute is dissimilar to both definitions. There are two critical differences between the Florida statute, on the one hand, and both the common law and the Model Penal Code, on the other hand: Florida requires that the person actually cause a public disturbance, and Florida does not proscribe any drunkenness that might harm only the intoxicated person himself. The common-law crime of public intoxication punishes being drunk in public, and the Model Penal Code, which has been adopted by several states, punishes being intoxicated in public “to the degree that [the offender] may endanger himself or other persons or property, or annoy persons in his vicinity.” Model Penal Code § 250.5 (emphasis added); see alsoDel.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1315; Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 222.202(1); 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5505; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.02; Utah Code Ann. § 76–9–701. The Florida disorderly intoxication statute punishes more culpable conduct than either the common law or the Model Penal Code: the Florida statute requires that an individual… Plaintiff was arrested and prosecuted for disorderly intoxication under Florida Statute § 856.011 which provides:Section 856.011, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: "No person in the state shall be intoxicated and endanger the safety of another person or property, and no person in the state shall be intoxicated or drink any alcoholic beverage in a public place or in or upon any public conveyance and cause a public disturbance." § 856.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2014).Here, Magielski was arrested for disorderly intoxication. Florida Statutes § 856.011 governs the crime of disorderly intoxication, and provides that:Section 856.011(1), Florida Statutes (1975), provides:Molina was charged with disorderly intoxication in violation of section 856.011, Florida Statutes (1985), by consuming beer on the public sidewalk. On the day of trial the State moved to amend to change the charge to disorderly conduct in violation of section 25-33.1, Miami Beach City Code. The State argued that the statute and the city code are substantially similar and that there could be no prejudice to the defense by reason of the amendment. Molina argued that he had never previously seen the city code section and had had no opportunity to investigate the nature of the ordinance and the defenses thereto. The trial court allowed the amendment and the case proceeded to trial.The trial court granted the motion to suppress based upon its erroneous conclusion that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional and violative of section 856.011, Florida Statutes (1985). Section 856.011 governs the condition of disorderly intoxication. Section 396.161 also addresses the condition of public intoxication. The ordinance, in contrast, proscribes the act of consuming alcoholic beverages in public. See State v. Joyce, 529 So.2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (conviction for violation of section 856.011, unlike city ordinance, requires that accused create public disturbance in addition to consuming alcoholic beverages in public place). The ordinance is narrowly drawn to forbid alcohol consumption in specific, enumerated areas: public streets, vacant lots, and package stores. The language is plain and describes with particularity the conduct to be avoided. See and compare Watts v. State, 463 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1985) (state loitering statute held constitutional); State v. Kemp, 429 So.2d 822 (Fla.2d DCA 1983) (county loitering ordinance held constitutional); Miller v. State, 411 So.2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (county ordinance which adequately set forth… Florida Statutes, Section 856.011 provides:We next consider appellant's argument that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. The state argues in its brief that this Court's recent decision in a similar case, Vernold v. State, 376 So.2d 1166 (Fla. 1979), precludes such a challenge subsequent to a plea of nolo contendere. In Vernold the defendant challenged the validity of Florida's disorderly intoxication statute, section 856.011, by a motion to dismiss, which motion was denied by the trial court. The defendant subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion. In upholding the constitutionality of section 856.011 we stated: