Amendments to 860.13

1. Hughes v. State

   943 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 9 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   In Carswell, we found that section 860.13( 2) does incorporate the federal standards for the safe operations of aircraft. Carswell, 557 So.2d at 184. As it was undisputed in Carswell that the federal standards relied upon in that case existed at the time of section 860.13's enactment, we concluded that there was no improper delegation of legislative power. Id. In the instant case, however, the parties dispute whether the federal standards relied upon in this case existed at the time that section 860.13 was reenacted in 1983. The federal standards referred to in the instant case are found in 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a), which prohibit a crewmember from acting in that capacity within eight hours of consuming any alcoholic beverage or with a blood alcohol level of .04 percent or higher. In 1983, the federal regulations clearly prohibited acting as a crewmember within eight hours of consuming alcohol. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.11. However, the prohibition against acting as a crewmember with a blood alcohol level of .04 percent or higher, did not exist in 1983. Thus, for section 860.13( 2) to adopt and include the federal regulation prohibiting acting as a crew…

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2. State v. Carswell

   557 So. 2d 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 2 times

   We first conclude that section 860.13, Florida Statutes, does not violate the single-subject rule of the Florida Constitution. This is because we find the matters in the statute are reasonably or logically connected. See Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); State v. Canova, 94 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1957). Moreover, even if the title to section 860.13, Florida Statutes, may be defective, the statute's reenactment cures any infirmity or defect in the title. See Honchell v. State, 257 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1972); Alterman Transport Lines, Inc. v. State, 405 So.2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
3. Gluhareff v. State

   888 So. 2d 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 2 times

   Appellant, a private pilot, pled guilty to operating an aircraft while under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 860.13, Florida Statutes (2001), expressly reserving two dispositive legal questions for review: First, whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague for failure to define "under the influence," and second, whether the statute is void under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because it was preempted by federal law. We answer both questions in the negative and affirm.
4. Piette v. Horn (In re Estate of Stevens)

   2015 WI App. 41 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 1 times

   ¶ 28 As the circuit court pointed out, neither Hartman nor Estate of Scheibe addressed the circumstances in which a court may approve a sale of estate property to a personal representative under Wis. Stat. § 860.13. Estate of Scheibe did not cite or discuss the predecessor to § 860.13, Wis. Stat. § 316.41. While Hartman cited § 316.41, that statute prohibited an executor from being “interested in the purchase of” estate property without both “written consent of the parties concerned ... and approval of the court after notice and hearing[.]” See Hartman, 54 Wis.2d at 52, 194 N.W.2d 653. Conversely, the current statute permits a personal representative to purchase estate property if he or she receives either consent of all interested parties or court approval. See§ 860.13.

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5. Cloyd v. State

   943 So. 2d 149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 5 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   In Carswell, we found that section 860.13( 2) does incorporate the federal standards for the safe operations of aircraft. Carswell, 557 So.2d at 184. As it was undisputed in Carswell that the federal standards relied upon in that case existed at the time of section 860.13's enactment, we concluded that there was no improper delegation of legislative power. Id. In the instant case, however, the parties dispute whether the federal standards relied upon in this case existed at the time that section 860.13 was reenacted in 1983. The federal standards referred to in the instant case are found in 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a), which prohibit a crewmember from acting in that capacity within eight hours of consuming any alcoholic beverage or with a blood alcohol level of .04 percent or higher. In 1983, the federal regulations clearly prohibited acting as a crewmember within eight hours of consuming alcohol. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.11. However, the prohibition against acting as a crewmember with a blood alcohol level of .04 percent or higher, did not exist in 1983. Thus, for section 860.13( 2) to adopt and include the federal regulation prohibiting acting as a crew…

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6. Cloyd v. McDonough

   CASE NO. 07-22339-CIV-SEITZ/McALILEY (S.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2009)

   • Motion to dismiss

   In reaching this conclusion we note that the Third District Court's determination that the state criminal statute (section 860.13) concerns a different subject matter than the applicable federal regulations ( 14 C.F.R. parts 65, 121 and 135), finds support in the Eleventh Circuit's decision which, although it did not resolve this preemption question on the merits, did observe that the preemption language of Appendix I may not encompass Florida Statute section 860.13 because "it is not absolutely clear that the challenged Florida statutes cover the same subject matter" as the federal regulations. 377 F.3d at 1273.

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7. Hughes v. Attorney General of Florida

   377 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2004)   Cited 263 times

   1 more...

   Fla. Stat. § 860.13.

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8. Lowell v. Hammarback (In re Estate of Lowell)

   2020 WI App. 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019)

   ¶31 Likewise, we also cannot conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by allowing Patricia to personally bid at the online auction. WISCONSIN STAT. § 860.13 provides a circuit court with broad authority to approve a sale of estate property to a personal representative. See Piette v. Horn , 2015 WI App 41, ¶13, 362 Wis. 2d 484, 864 N.W.2d 900. Here, the court specifically referenced this statute and explained its decision to allow Patricia to bid in the auction as follows:
9. Raik v. Dep't of Legal Affairs

   344 So. 3d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)

   (b) A violation of s. 316.027(2), s. 316.193, s. 316.1935, s. 327.35(1), s. 782.071(1)(b), or s. 860.13(1)(a) which results in physical injury or death.

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10. Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Jelinske (In re Jelinske)

    2018 WI 94 (Wis. 2018)   Cited 1 times

    Wis. Stat. § 860.13 provides:

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