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F.S. 860.20 on Google Scholar

F.S. 860.20 on Casetext

Amendments to 860.20


The 2021 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 860
OFFENSES CONCERNING AIRCRAFT, MOTOR VEHICLES, VESSELS, AND RAILROADS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 860.20 Florida Statutes and Case Law
860.20 Outboard motors; identification numbers.
(1)(a) The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles shall adopt rules specifying the locations and manner in which serial numbers for outboard motors shall be affixed. In adopting such rules, the department shall consider the adequacy of voluntary industry standards, the current state of technology, and the overall purpose of reducing vessel and motor thefts in the state.
(b) Any outboard motor manufactured after October 1, 1985, which is for sale in the state shall comply with the serial number rules promulgated by the department. Any person, firm, or corporation which sells or offers for sale any outboard boat motor manufactured after October 1, 1985, which does not comply with this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2)(a) It is unlawful for any person to possess any outboard boat motor with the knowledge that the serial number required by subsection (1) has been removed, erased, defaced, or otherwise altered to prevent identification.
(b) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly possess, manufacture, sell or exchange, offer to sell or exchange, supply in blank, or give away any counterfeit manufacturer’s outboard motor serial number plate or decal used for the purpose of identification of any outboard motor; to authorize, direct, aid in exchange, or give away such counterfeit manufacturer’s outboard motor serial number plate or decal; or to conspire to do any of the foregoing.
(c) Any person who violates any provision of this subsection is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) If any of the serial numbers required by this section to identify ownership of an outboard motor do not exist or have been removed, erased, defaced, or otherwise altered to prevent identification and its true identity cannot be determined, the outboard motor may be seized as contraband property by a law enforcement agency and shall be subject to forfeiture pursuant to ss. 932.701-932.704. Such outboard motor may not be sold or used to propel a vessel on the waters of the state unless the department is directed by written order of a court of competent jurisdiction to issue to the outboard motor a replacement identifying number which shall be affixed to the outboard motor and shall thereafter be used for identification purposes.
History.s. 3, ch. 83-102; s. 1, ch. 84-129; s. 2, ch. 86-73; s. 476, ch. 94-356; s. 125, ch. 2002-20.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
F.S. 860.20 on Google Scholar

F.S. 860.20 on Casetext

Amendments to 860.20


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 860.20
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

860.20 - PROPERTY CRIMES - BOAT MOTOR FAIL TO COMPLY WITH RULES - M: F
860.20 2a - POSSESS COUNTERFEITED - OUTBOARD MOTOR WITH SERIAL NUMBER REMOVED - F: T
860.20 2b - COUNTERFEITING OF - MANUFACTURE OUTBOARD MOTOR SERIAL NUMBER - F: T
860.20 2b - PASS COUNTERFEITED - SELL OUTBOARD MOTOR SERIAL NUMBER - F: T
860.20 2b - POSSESS COUNTERFEITED - OUTBOARD MOTOR SERIAL NUMBER - F: T


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S860.20
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 860.20.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Caudill v. Smith

    117 N.C. App. 64 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 19 times
    Defendant's final argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury on undue influence. Defendant submitted an instruction similar to North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction 860.20, "WILLS — UNDUE INFLUENCE," in that, among the factors listed for the jury's consideration were: (1) whether the instrument is made in favor of one with whom there are no ties of blood, or not; and (2) whether it disinherits the natural objects of the drafter's bounty, or not. The trial court's instruction was, instead, based on N.C.P.I. 505.30, entitled "RESCISSION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENT — UNDUE INFLUENCE," which is similar to 860.20, but does not include the two factors listed above. We note that there is no pattern instruction specifically relating to the setting aside of a deed based on undue influence.
    PAGE 70
  2. Easter v. Beacon Tri-State Staffing, Inc.

    Case No. 2:17-cv-00197 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2020)   Cited 2 times

    renumeration in the following amount: Timekeeper Rate Hours Total Fees Attorney Jason Starling $350 per hour 860.20 hours $301,070 Attorney John Camillus $425 per hour 38.40 hours $16,320 Paralegal Alynnah Satterfield

  3. In support of the result reached by the district court, we note that the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that "[t]he canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained." Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 69 S.Ct. 575, 577, 93 L.Ed. 680 (1949) (emphasis provided); see also Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 77 S.Ct. 699, 1 L.Ed.2d 709 (1957); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 52 S.Ct. 252, 76 L.Ed. 375 (1932). A fortiori, when clearly expressed Congressional intent exists, as in the ADEA's adoption of 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") providing for no extraterritorial application, courts should be loath to circumvent such intent. The Supreme Court has also explicity held that in interpreting the ADEA's provision incorporating the FLSA, Congress should be deemed to have fully understood the FLSA and to have intended to fully incorporate its remedies and procedures. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575…
    PAGE 829
  4. Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co.

    755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985)   Cited 30 times
    But even if the approach taken by the other circuits is not completely compelling on its own terms, we can find nothing in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act or its background that suggests the Act was intended to have an extraterritorial reach beyond what might be necessary to prevent transparent evasions of the sort suggested in our last paragraph. The federal agencies responsible for enforcing the Act have assumed, apparently from the beginning, that it was intended to be limited to domestic employment. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 860.20 (1970). And to apply the Act extraterritorially could be more than a little awkward. The normal basis of national sovereignty is territorial. So if Germany has a law requiring employees to retire at the age of 65 (presumably to spread work in order to reduce unemployment), no one can doubt the authority of Germany to apply the law to Pfeiffer; and if it did so, and if the Age Discrimination in Employment Act were also applicable, Wrigley would find itself having to comply with inconsistent laws, which it could do only by moving Pfeiffer to another country. Incidentally, this particular problem would not arise under the Fair Labor…
    PAGE 557
  5. In re the Bennett Funding Group, Inc.

    CASE NO. 96-61376, Chapter 11 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2000)
    Two other areas identified in both the Auditor's Report and the Objection of the UST are potentially duplicative entries (860.20 hours/$110,037.50) and avoidance actions (2,675.10 hours/$332,024). With regard to the former, SD asserts that due to the nature of the thousands of adversary proceedings that it is prosecuting, a great deal of repetitive work is necessary which is not duplicative. (SD Response page 3) The Court has reviewed Exhibit D to the Auditor's Report and does not reach the conclusion that services isolated therein are unnecessarily duplicative. With regard to the latter services involving the avoidance actions, the Court notes the UST's further analysis that through the first four fee applications SD has expended a total of 18,150.50 hours or $2,453,388.75 for these services, yet the bankruptcy estates "have not realized any discernable benefit at this time." (See UST's Objection to Amended Fourth Interim Application dated August 3, 1999 at ~~ 6 7). In addition, the Committee in its Statement dated July 22, 1999, expresses its confusion with regard to the so-called "current investor" settlements for which SD has, apparently, taken credit. The Committee…
  6. Siegall v. Tibco Software, Inc.

    No. C 05-2146 SBA, (Related to Case Nos. C 05-2205 SBA and C 05-23 73 SBA) (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2006)   Cited 3 times
    The Court notes, however, that there is a discrepancy in the documents submitted to this Court. Specifically, in his Certification, Mr. Fenton states that, on April 15, 2005, in two separate transactions, he sold 4,540 shares of Tibco stock at $6.72 per share. However, Movants also state that Mr. Fenton sold his Tibcc shares at approximately $7.35. This results in a difference of approximately $2, 860.20. Although the Court does not condone the careless filing of inaccurate pleadings and motion papers, in light of the fact that Mr. Felton and Ms. Rajasubramanian are the sole parties seeking to be appointed as Lead Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Mr. Felton is still entitled to the presumption that he has the largest financial interest, regardless of this $2,860.20 discrepancy. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 57, 64 (D. Mass. 1996) (finding that, when only one person or group has moved to serve as lead plaintiff, that person or group presumptively has the largest financial interest in the relief sought).
    PAGE 7
  7. In Matter of the Will of Baitschora

    700 S.E.2d 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 2 times
    At the time of the execution of the will, decedent was of advanced age, seventy-six years old, and suffering in Duke University Hospital from terminal uterine sarcoma. According to her medical records, the cancer had metastasized into her lungs and liver; and at the time the will was signed, decedent appeared sickly, feeble, and in poor physical condition. During this time, decedent was also dependent upon propounder to sign medical releases at the hospital. Caveator testified that his phone calls to speak to his mother went unreturned. The attorney who drafted the will was procured by propounder, and propounder was present during the interview with the paralegal who prepared the will. Propounder made transfers of sums of cash from his aunt's accounts prior to her death, which had the effect of maximizing his post- death inheritance to the exclusion of his sisters when decedent had specifically included the sisters in beneficiary designations. There was extensive evidence demonstrating propounder's impatience in connection with the execution of the will and the power of attorney, and the rapid pace that propounder moved money and accounts as soon as he had the ability to do so…
    PAGE 22
  8. Wolf v. J.I. Case Co.

    617 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Wis. 1985)   Cited 20 times
    The plaintiff argues, however, that it would not be unfair retroactively to apply the 1984 amendment because there was a split among the authorities as to the extraterritorial applicability of the ADEA as it existed prior to October 1984. It is true that the Wage-Hour Administrator of the United States Department of Labor originally interpreted the ADEA to apply extraterritorially when employees are hired in the United States for work abroad. Opinion Letter of the Wage-Hour Administrator, 8 Lab.Rel.Rep. 401:5217 (Sept. 24, 1968). The court also recognizes that the applicable regulation in effect at the time of the plaintiff's termination, 29 C.F.R. § 860.20, is not specific as to the extraterritorial reach of the ADEA. The regulation first states that the Act is "to apply only to performance of the described discriminatory acts in places over which the United States has sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction, or legislative control." The regulation then goes on to qualify this proscription, stating that activities within such areas are covered by the ADEA "even though the [discriminatory] activities are related to employment outside of such geographical areas."
    PAGE 866
  9. United States v. London Records, Inc.

    402 F.2d 1009 (C.C.P.A. 1968)   Cited 1 times
    724.25 Phonograph records (except those provided for in item 724.15) ................................... 10% ad val. 860.30 Any sample (except samples covered by item 860.10 or 860.20), valued not over $1 each, or marked, torn, perforated, or otherwise treated so that it is unsuitable for sale or for use otherwise than as a sample, to be used in the United States only for soliciting orders for products of foreign countries ............................... Free
    PAGE 1010
  10. Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs.

    Civil Action No. 07-2265 (JAP) (D.N.J. Jun. 6, 2014)   Cited 1 times

    Copy $ 673.20 Paul Coletti, 3/26/09 Certified Copy $ 894.20 Paul Coletti, 3/27/09 Certified Copy $ 860.20 Paul Consigny Certified Copy Certification Fee $ 295.80 $ 5.00 Deponent Taxed Amount Christopher