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F.S. 871.01 on Google Scholar

F.S. 871.01 on Casetext

Amendments to 871.01

The 2021 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
Chapter 871
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 871.01 Florida Statutes and Case Law
871.01 Disturbing schools and religious and other assemblies.
(1) Whoever willfully interrupts or disturbs any school or any assembly of people met for the worship of God or for any lawful purpose commits a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) Whoever willfully interrupts or disturbs any assembly of people met for the purpose of acknowledging the death of an individual with a military funeral honors detail pursuant to 10 U.S.C. s. 1491 commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.ss. 19, 21, 22, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2627, 2629, 2630; GS 3547; s. 1, ch. 5719, 1907; RGS 5448; CGL 7591; s. 1130, ch. 71-136; s. 1, ch. 2006-264.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
F.S. 871.01 on Google Scholar

F.S. 871.01 on Casetext

Amendments to 871.01

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 871.01
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S871.01
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 871.01.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. S.H.B. v. State

    355 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1978)   Cited 19 times
    Section 871.01, Florida Statutes, states: "Whoever wilfully interrupts or disturbs any school or any assembly of people met for the worship of God or for any lawful purpose shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree. . . ." In denying appellant's motion for a new trial the Circuit Court initially and directly ruled on the constitutionality of Section 871.01, holding it to be constitutional on its face and as applied to appellant in the instant case. We have jurisdiction.
    PAGE 1178
  2. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach

    138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018)   Cited 170 times
    Before this Court, Lozman seeks a reversal only as to the City's alleged retaliatory arrest at the November 2006 city council meeting. The District Court instructed the jury that, for Lozman to prevail on this claim, he had to prove that the arresting officer was himself motivated by impermissible animus against Lozman's protected speech and that the officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest. The District Court determined that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support probable cause for the offenses charged at the time of the arrest (disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence). But the District Court concluded that there may have been probable cause to arrest Lozman for violating a Florida statute that prohibits interruptions or disturbances in schools, churches, or other public assemblies. Fla. Stat. § 871.01 (2017). (The City had brought this statute to the District Court's attention during the course of the litigation.) The District Court allowed the jury to decide whether there was probable cause to arrest for the public-disturbance offense.
    PAGE 1950
  3. Hayes v. City of Tampa

    CASE NO. 8:12-cv-2038-T-23TGW (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2014)
    Hayes argues that he "was at no time charged with any violation of § 871.01 and its inclusion in Miller's summary judgment motion is but an afterthought by the Defendants and was not previously plead[ed]." (Doc. 21 at 10) Whether Hayes was "charged with any violation of § 871.01" (Doc. 21 at 10) is immaterial because the issue is "not whether [Hayes's] actions actually constituted a crime." See Scarbrough, 245 F.3d at 1303 n.8. Also, although in the answer (Doc. 3) Miller never specified that he had arguable probable cause under Section 871.01, Miller pleaded that "on the date of incident . . . [Miller] was acting in his discretionary authority" and that "the arrest of the Plaintiff was supported by . . . arguable probable cause." (Doc. 3 at 6-7) Rule 8(c)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a party merely to state affirmatively any "avoidance or affirmative defense" in responding to a pleading. See Alabama Dep't of Econ. & Cmty. Affairs v. Lett, 368 Fed. Appx. 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2010) ("We agree that Dr. Lett preserved the Rule 4007(c) defense when he pleaded the statute of limitations in his answer even though the answer contained no…
    PAGE 10
  4. In re Standard

    976 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 2008)   Cited 12 times
    The statutory provisions on which these instructions are based, sections 871.01(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, criminalize conduct that involves disturbing a school, religious or lawful assembly (instruction 29.15) and disturbing a military funeral (instruction 29.16). As this Court recognized in S.H.B., these statutes can only be constitutional if narrowly construed to avoid the grave danger of criminalizing conduct that is protected under our First Amendment. See 355 So.2d at 1178. Specifically, this Court held that a person must have deliberately acted to create a disturbance in order to commit a criminal offense under section 871.01(1). See id.
    PAGE 1083
  5. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach

    No. 15-10550 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2017)   Cited 1 times
    Probable cause "constitutes an absolute bar" to a claim for false arrest. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998). That is true whether the false arrest claim is brought under the First Amendment, Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002), the Fourth Amendment, Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1430, 1435, or state law, id. at 1435. Thus, for all three false arrest claims, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find in favor of Lozman, the jury had to find that "the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe that Mr. Lozman had or was committing a crime." The jury was instructed, more specifically, to consider whether the officer had probable cause to arrest Lozman for the offense of Disturbing a Lawful Assembly, Fla. Stat. § 871.01(1). By finding for the City on the three false arrest claims, the jury thus found Officer Aguirre did have probable cause to arrest Lozman for disturbing a lawful assembly under § 871.01(1).
    PAGE 8
  6. Weidner v. State

    380 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 1980)   Cited 2 times
    The appellant contends that section 871.01 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. He argues that the statute creates no objective standard by which the statutory terms may be measured and that the statute is susceptible of application to protected expression, thus inhibiting the exercise of the right to free expression. In S.H.B. v. State, 355 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1978), this Court upheld section 871.01 against a challenge to its constitutionality grounded upon its lack of specificity and overbreadth. We decline the appellant's suggestion that we revisit that holding on the facial validity of the statute.
    PAGE 1287
  7. Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia County

    959 F. Supp. 1481 (M.D. Fla. 1997)   Cited 5 times
    The Court also finds that supplemental jurisdiction should be declined because the malicious prosecution claim is not "so related to claims in the action within [federal] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). According to the Complaint, more than one week passed before Defendants filed a criminal complaint against Wayne under Fla. Stat. § 871.01. During the ensuing week, the media reported the events at Pine Ridge High School and the Ku Klux Klan demonstrated. The expiration of one week between Wayne's suspension and the filing of charges, the subsequent demonstration at the school, and the pursuit of the criminal complaint under Fla. Stat. § 871.01, support the finding that the claims are not part of the same case or controversy.
    PAGE 1488
  8. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach

    No. 15-10550 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2019)

    including, for example, Lozman's argument that the offense of disturbing a lawful assembly, Fla. Stat. § 871.01(1), is unconstitutional and the City's various arguments. Given how much the success of Lozman's

  9. State v. Sweet

    616 So. 2d 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 1 times
    The state appeals an order of the County Court of Pinellas County dismissing charges of "disturbing a religious assembly." In so doing the county court held that the applicable statute, section 871.01, Florida Statutes (1991), is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. We have jurisdiction; section 26.012(1), Florida Statutes (1991); and reverse.
  10. In re Amir X.S.

    371 S.C. 380 (S.C. 2006)   Cited 12 times
    Similarly, in S.H.B. v. State of Florida, 355 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1977), the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the willful interruption or disturbance of "any school." Fla. Stat. § 871.01 (1973). The plaintiff, convicted under the statute for behavior that included "running through the halls of a school in session, disobeying the lawful and reasonable requests of school officials, and repeated loud utterances," claimed the statute was overly broad on its face. S.H.B., 355 So.2d at 1179. He asserted that an overbreadth analysis of the statute should be governed by cases defining the constitutional limits of breach of the peace statutes. The Florida court disagreed and held that the statute at issue only prohibited disturbances of lawful assembly (i.e. school gatherings) and therefore was limited in its application in a way that breach of the peace statutes were not. Id. at 1178. The court recognized that school gatherings are "fragile by their nature," id., and comparing the school environment to a general public forum, the court noted that in schools, "a single individual may cause havoc in a situation in which hundreds of others…
    PAGE 388