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Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
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In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Place, supra, at 701, and n. 2; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972). Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however, "when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.'" Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987), quoting New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, at 351 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular context. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, supra, at 873 (search of probationer's home); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S… The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition of searches and seizures that are not supported by some objective justification governs all seizures of the person, "including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968)." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). While the Court has recognized that in some circumstances a person may be detained briefly, without probable cause to arrest him, any curtailment of a person's liberty by the police must be supported at least by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-149 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, supra.Under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), "an agency must disclose all records requested by `any person,' 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), unless the information sought falls within a specific statutory exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552(d)." Nat'l Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Multi Ag Media LLC ("Multi Ag"), a commercial vendor of agricultural data, has made FOIA requests for various records of farm data maintained by the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"). Invoking FOIA Exemption 6, which protects individual privacy interests in government records, USDA has withheld some of the requested information. Because there is a significant public interest in disclosure that outweighs the personal privacy interest USDA seeks to protect, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of USDA.In addition, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court did not observe the sentencing delay required by La.C.Cr.P. art. 873 before sentencing defendant to the maximum term of life imprisonment as a fourth-felony offender for possession of a contraband cell phone while in a penal institution. See La.R.S. 14:402(E)(7) ; La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). Sentencing occurred almost immediately after the denial of defendant's motion for new trial. Article 873 provides (emphasis added):In support of his retaliation claim, Williams relies primarily on the temporal proximity between his October 21, 1998, request for an accommodation and his December 29, 1998, termination. We have held in the ADA retaliation context that "temporal proximity between the protected activity and the termination [can be itself] sufficient to establish a causal link." Shellenberger, 318 F.3d at 183 (quoting Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "the timing of the alleged retaliatory action must be unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive before a causal link will be inferred." Shellenberger, 318 F.3d at 189 n. 9 (quoting Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, two days between the protected activity engaged in and the alleged retaliation sufficed in Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989), to support an inference of a causal connection between the two. Similarly, in Shellenberger, comments made by a supervisor suggesting retaliation ten days before termination, along with other evidence of retaliation, were sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of… The standard of review for statutory construction is well-established. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo. Pacific Int'l Servs. Corp. v. Hurip, 76 Haw. 209, 216, 873 P.2d 88, 95 (1994); Franks v. City and County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 334, 843 P.2d 668, 671 (1993). In addition, "our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature[,] which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself." Hurip, 76 Hawaii at 216, 873 P.2d at 95 (citations omitted). And "where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning." Ing v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 76 Haw. 266, 270, 874 P.2d 1091, 1095 (1994) (citations omitted). Finally, in determining the purpose of the statute, "we are not limited to the words of the statute to discern the underlying policy which the legislature seeks to promulgate . . . [but may] look to relevant legislative history[.]" Sol v. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., 76 Haw. 304, 307, 875 P.2d 921, 924 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), reconsideration denied, 76 Haw… Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Johnson's motion for class certification. Johnson filed this action pro se and does not appeal the district court's subsequent denial of his request for the appointment of counsel. As a pro se litigant, Johnson cannot bring an action on behalf of his fellow orthodox Muslim inmates. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 873 (explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 1654, the provision permitting parties to proceed pro se, provides "a personal right that does not extend to the representation of the interests of others"); Massimo v. Henderson, 468 F.2d 1209, 1210 (5th Cir. 1972) (concluding that a pro se inmate could not bring a petition for equitable relief on behalf of his fellow inmates).As stated above, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are executive officers of this State, pursuant to the Ala. Const. 1901, Art. V, § 112. Parker, 519 So.2d at 443. Moreover, claims against sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are "barred by the absolute immunity of Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901," Coleman v. City of Dothan, 598 So.2d 873, 875 (Ala. 1992) (quoting White v. Birchfield, 582 So.2d 1085, 1088 (Ala. 1991)), when the sheriffs or the deputies were "acting within the line and scope of their employment." Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794, 795 (Ala. 1996).Indeed, this distinction was expressly recognized in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 n. 8 (1975):A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the officers lacked a sufficient basis to justify the stop of the pickup. 595 F.2d 505 (1979). That court recognized that United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), provides a standard governing investigative stops of the kind involved in this case, stating: