Home
Menu
Call outside Criminal Attorney Mark S. Barnett
904-562-8444
F.S. 893.01 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.01 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.01


The 2021 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 893
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 893.01 Florida Statutes and Case Law
893.01 Short title.This chapter shall be cited and known as the “Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.”
History.s. 1, ch. 73-331.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
F.S. 893.01 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.01 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.01


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 893.01
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 893.01.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S893.01
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 893.01.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Here the complaint was not filed with the summons; thus the plaintiffs did not commence the action within the three-year limitations period. The trial court found the plaintiffs' claim barred by secs. 893.01 and 893.205, Stats.
    PAGE 427
  2. Davis v. State

    100 So. 3d 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 1 times
    We affirm the denial of the defendant's motion for postconviction relief in which he sought to vacate his guilty plea to drug trafficking. The district courts of appeal and our supreme court have rejected the holding of Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011). Section 893.01, Florida Statutes (2009). State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412 (Fla.2012); Maestas v. State, 76 So.3d 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Holcy v. State, 83 So.3d 778 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
  3. Edwards v. State

    268 So. 3d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 1 times
    Section 893.13 is part of the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. § 893.01. Chapter 893 is meant "to comprehensively address drug abuse prevention and control in this state." § 893.015, Fla. Stat. (2017). The plain language of section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2016) generally focuses on various controlled substances as "named or described" in various subsections of section 893.03. Under section 893.13(1)(a), the type of drug sold determines whether sale of a controlled substance is a second-degree felony, third-degree felony, or first-degree misdemeanor. Section 893.03, in turn, divides drugs into categories (schedules) based on different characteristics and varying risk of abuse. The entire focus of this statutory scheme is the meaningful differences between types of drugs and the appropriate punishment for crimes involving each type—the severity of the crime (and, therefore, the severity of the punishment) hinges on the type of drug sold. Considering this statutory scheme, it becomes clear that each type of drug sold is intended to be a "unit of prosecution" and can be punished separately. Indeed, to hold otherwise would lead to the…
    PAGE 853
  4. State v. Sills

    279 So. 3d 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)
    We agree with the state's arguments. An exception to the prohibitions found in the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, section 893.01, Florida Statutes (2012), et seq., is found in section 893.05(1), Florida Statutes (2012), which provides, in pertinent part: "A practitioner, in good faith and in the course of his or her professional practice only , may prescribe, administer, dispense, mix, or otherwise prepare a controlled substance ...." (emphasis added). See Rodenberg v. State , 198 So.3d 930, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("Generally, ‘good faith’ and ‘in the course of professional practice’ are affirmative defenses, not elements of the offenses, because section 893.05(1) is separate from the delivery and trafficking statutes."); King v. State , 336 So.2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) ("It is clear that s. 893.05 is an exception to the prohibitions of s. 893.13 and does not constitute a separate violation of Chapter 893.").
    PAGE 1227
  5. McGlothlin v. State

    749 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)   Cited 48 times
    If the Legislature had intended to include every substance within the weight classifications of the various manufacturing and possession offenses within the Act, they could have easily done so. Under the Federal scheme, an offender may be charged with possession of a controlled substance and this will include the total weight of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of a controlled substance. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Likewise, several other states also have statutory schemes which increase the range of punishment for those offenders in possession of controlled substances in greater quantities. As worded, these statutes would clearly cover the water at issue in the present case. For example, in Florida and Georgia an offender may be charged when "in actual or constructive possession of 28 grams or more of [a controlled substance] or of any mixture containing the [controlled substance]. FLA.STAT.ANN., § 893.01 (West Supp. 1987); GA.CODE ANN., § 16-13-20 (Supp. 1987). Other States have similar comprehensive drug laws.
    PAGE 860
  6. State Dept. of Hwy. Safety v. Holguin

    909 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 3 times
    § 932.701, Fla. Stat. (2004). Generally, Chapter 893 of the Florida Statutes provides that it is a violation to purchase and/or sell illegal narcotics. §§ 893.01—.20, Fla. Stat. (2004). Thus, if the money seized from Holguin's car could be shown to be reasonably linked to narcotics activity, based on the totality of the circumstances, the money would be a "contraband article" subject to forfeiture. Once a showing of probable cause has been made, the burden shifts to the claimant to rebut the probable cause showing or, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish either that the forfeiture statute was not violated or that there is an affirmative defense which entitles the claimant to repossession of the item. Lamboy v. Metro-Dade Police Department, 575 So.2d 1317, 1319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (citing Lobo v. Metro-Dade Police Dep't, 505 So.2d 621, 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)).
    PAGE 958
  7. United States v. Dudley

    Case No.: 4:13cr52/RH/CAS (N.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2017)
    Defendant's 2004 conviction fell under section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes which provides that a person may not "sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance." Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a). If the controlled substance is cocaine, a conviction under this section is a second degree felony punishable by up to fifteen years imprisonment. See Fla. Stat. §§ 893.01(a), 893.13(1)(a)1; Fla. Stat. § 775.082(3)(d). Therefore, regardless of the punishment he actually received, Defendant's 2004 conviction under § 893.13(1)(a)1 was "punishable" by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, and thus a proper predicate for the application of the career offender enhancement. Additionally, the court notes that the Eleventh Circuit has expressly held that convictions under section 893.13(1) are "controlled substance offenses." United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1267-1268 (11th Cir. 2014). Counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for his failure to object to the application of the career offender enhancement.
    PAGE 10
  8. Elfers v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co.

    571 N.W.2d 469 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 5 times
    To prevail on summary judgment, the defendants "must show a defense which would defeat the plaintiff." Rach v. Kleiber, 123 Wis.2d 473, 479, 367 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Ct.App. 1985) (quoting In re Estate of Johnson, 113 Wis.2d 126, 129-30, 334 N.W.2d 574, 576-77 (Ct.App. 1983)). The defendants in this case raise as a defense the statute of limitations, which if proved would be sufficient to defeat Christine's claims. See § 893.01, STATS. Our final step, then, is to review the record to see if a material fact is in dispute. Rach, 123 Wis.2d at 479, 367 N.W.2d at 828.
    PAGE 503
  9. Hudson v. United States

    Case No. 8:14-CV-1175-T-30TGW (M.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2014)   Cited 2 times
    In 2002, the Florida Legislature enacted Florida Statute § 893.01 providing that "knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter. Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter." Fla. Stat. § 893.101(2).
    PAGE 10
  10. Hodge v. Department of Professional Regulation

    432 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 7 times
    §§ 893.01- 893.15, Fla. Stat. (1981).