Home
Menu
Call outside Criminal Attorney Mark S. Barnett
904-562-8444
F.S. 893.05 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.05 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.05


The 2021 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 893
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 893.05 Florida Statutes and Case Law
893.05 Practitioners and persons administering controlled substances in their absence.
(1)(a) A practitioner, in good faith and in the course of his or her professional practice only, may prescribe, administer, dispense, mix, or otherwise prepare a controlled substance, or the practitioner may cause the controlled substance to be administered by a licensed nurse or an intern practitioner under his or her direction and supervision only.
(b) Pursuant to s. 458.347(4)(g), s. 459.022(4)(f), or s. 464.012(3), as applicable, a practitioner who supervises a licensed physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse may authorize the licensed physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse to order controlled substances for administration to a patient in a facility licensed under chapter 395 or part II of chapter 400.
(c) A veterinarian may prescribe, administer, dispense, mix, or prepare a controlled substance for use on animals only, and may cause the controlled substance to be administered by an assistant or orderly under the veterinarian’s direction and supervision only.
(d) A certified optometrist licensed under chapter 463 may not administer or prescribe a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or Schedule II of s. 893.03.
(2) When any controlled substance is dispensed by a practitioner, there shall be affixed to the original container in which the controlled substance is delivered a label on which appears:
(a) The date of delivery.
(b) The directions for use of such controlled substance.
(c) The name and address of such practitioner.
(d) The name of the patient and, if such controlled substance is prescribed for an animal, a statement describing the species of the animal.
(e) A clear, concise warning that it is a crime to transfer the controlled substance to any person other than the patient for whom prescribed.
(3) Any person who obtains from a practitioner or the practitioner’s agent, or pursuant to prescription, any controlled substance for administration to a patient during the absence of such practitioner shall return to such practitioner any unused portion of such controlled substance when it is no longer required by the patient.
History.s. 5, ch. 73-331; s. 1437, ch. 97-102; s. 13, ch. 2013-26; s. 11, ch. 2015-34; s. 30, ch. 2016-105; s. 7, ch. 2016-145; s. 84, ch. 2018-106.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
F.S. 893.05 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.05 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.05


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 893.05
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 893.05.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S893.05
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 893.05.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. ¶ 48. The Judicial Council Committee Notes do not support Wenke's assertion. The linchpin of Wenke's argument is that the Wisconsin case law codified by § 893.05 stands for the proposition that limitation periods that operate as statutes of repose are outside the scope of § 893.05 and — by virtue of some incorporation by reference — outside the scope of § 893.07. Wenke's premise is unfounded, for he has taken the concept embodied in § 893.05, which is reflected in the Committee Notes to §§ 893.05 and 893.07, and has fundamentally misconstrued it.
    PAGE 253
  2. King v. State

    336 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 10 times
    A practitioner, in good faith and in the course of his professional practice only, may prescribe, administer, dispense, mix, or otherwise prepare a controlled substance. . . . [ Fla. Stat. § 893.05(1)].
  3. Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Trust

    477 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2007)   Cited 164 times
    Moreover, as the district court correctly concluded, Bolten is distinguishable. Wisconsin law conferred on Capital a vested right — not present in Bolten — that would have been rendered useless if voluntary dismissal without prejudice was granted. In Wisconsin the expiration of the statute of limitations does more than merely close the door of the courthouse. "The expiration of the limitations period extinguishes the cause of action of the potential plaintiff and it also creates a right enjoyed by the would-be defendant to insist on that statutory bar." Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis.2d 342, 350, 550 N.W.2d 124, 128 (1996); see also Wis. STAT. § 893.05 ("When the period within which an action may be commenced on a Wisconsin cause of action has expired, the right is extinguished as well as the remedy."). Capital, having acquired a right to assert the statute of limitations bar by operation of Wisconsin law, would suffer plain legal prejudice if the Wojtases' motion for voluntary dismissal were granted. See Metro. Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1263 (it is an "abuse of discretion for a district court to find no legal prejudice, and thus to grant voluntary dismissal, where the…
    PAGE 928
  4. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson

    137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017)   Cited 113 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Like the majority of Courts of Appeals that have considered the matter, we conclude that Midland's filing of a proof of claim that on its face indicates that the limitations period has run does not fall within the scope of any of the five relevant words of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. We believe it reasonably clear that Midland's proof of claim was not "false, deceptive, or misleading." Midland's proof of claim falls within the Bankruptcy Code's definition of the term "claim." A "claim" is a "right to payment." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). State law usually determines whether a person has such a right. See Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450–451, 127 S.Ct. 1199, 167 L.Ed.2d 178 (2007). The relevant state law is the law of Alabama. And Alabama's law, like the law of many States, provides that a creditor has the right to payment of a debt even after the limitations period has expired. See Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 974 So.2d 288, 296 (Ala.2007) (passage of time extinguishes remedy but the right remains); see also, e.g., Sallaz v. Rice, 161 Idaho 223, ––––, 384 P.3d 987, 992–993 (2016) (similar); Notte v. Merchants Mut. Ins…
    PAGE 1412
  5. Rodenberg v. State

    198 So. 3d 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 2 times
    Generally, “good faith” and “in the course of professional practice” are affirmative defenses, not elements of the offenses, because section 893.05(1) is separate from the delivery and trafficking statutes. See Norman v. State, 159 So.3d 205, 226 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (explaining that an exception contained in a subsequent or separate clause or statute is an affirmative defense); King v. State, 336 So.2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (recognizing that section 893.05 sets forth an affirmative defense).
    PAGE 934
  6. State v. Sills

    279 So. 3d 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)
    We agree with the state's arguments. An exception to the prohibitions found in the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, section 893.01, Florida Statutes (2012), et seq., is found in section 893.05(1), Florida Statutes (2012), which provides, in pertinent part: "A practitioner, in good faith and in the course of his or her professional practice only , may prescribe, administer, dispense, mix, or otherwise prepare a controlled substance ...." (emphasis added). See Rodenberg v. State , 198 So.3d 930, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("Generally, ‘good faith’ and ‘in the course of professional practice’ are affirmative defenses, not elements of the offenses, because section 893.05(1) is separate from the delivery and trafficking statutes."); King v. State , 336 So.2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) ("It is clear that s. 893.05 is an exception to the prohibitions of s. 893.13 and does not constitute a separate violation of Chapter 893.").
    PAGE 1227
  7. State v. Sanchez

    133 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 1 times
    Appellee was charged under sections 893.135(1)(c) and 893.05. Section 893.135(1)(c) provides:
    PAGE 1040
  8. State v. Sanchez

    No. 4D12-2696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2014)
    Appellee was charged under sections 893.135(1)(c) and 893.05. Section 893.135(1)(c) provides:
    PAGE 2
  9. State v. Gonzalez

    121 So. 3d 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 4 times
    c. Is 28 grams or more, but less than 30 kilograms, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 calendar years and pay a fine of $500,000. § 893.135(1)(c) 1.c., Fla. Stat. (2009). Section 893.05(1), in pertinent part, provides:
    PAGE 627
  10. Pantoja v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC

    852 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2017)   Cited 71 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Even without an express threat of litigation, such collection efforts offer opportunities for mischief and deception, as we explain below. We recognize that most states (though not Wisconsin, in this circuit) treat a debt as a debt even after the statute of limitations has run so that it cannot be legally enforced, at least if the defendant appears and asserts the affirmative defense. See, e.g., Buchanan , 776 F.3d at 396–97 (recognizing general rule); cf. Wis. Stat. § 893.05 (when statute of limitations expires, "the right is extinguished as well as the remedy"). The creditor retains the legal right to appeal to the debtor to honor the debt out of a sense of moral obligation even if the legal obligation can no longer be enforced in court. Nevertheless, the opportunities for mischief and deception, particularly when sophisticated parties aim carefully crafted messages at unsophisticated consumers, may well be so great that the better approach is simply to find that any such efforts violate the FDCPA's prohibitions on deceptive or misleading means to collect debts, § 1692e, and on "unfair or unconscionable means" to attempt to collect debts, § 1692f.
    PAGE 684