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F.S. 893.08 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.08 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.08

The 2021 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
Chapter 893
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 893.08 Florida Statutes and Case Law
893.08 Exceptions.
(1) The following may be distributed at retail without a prescription, but only by a registered pharmacist:
(a) Any compound, mixture, or preparation described in Schedule V.
(b) Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing any depressant or stimulant substance described in s. 893.03(2)(a) or (c) except any amphetamine drug or sympathomimetic amine drug or compound designated as a Schedule II controlled substance pursuant to this chapter; in s. 893.03(3)(a); or in Schedule IV, if:
1. The compound, mixture, or preparation contains one or more active medicinal ingredients not having depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system, and
2. Such ingredients are included therein in such combinations, quantity, proportion, or concentration as to vitiate the potential for abuse of the controlled substances which do have a depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system.
(2) No compound, mixture, or preparation may be dispensed under subsection (1) unless such substance may, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, be lawfully sold at retail without a prescription.
(3) The exemptions authorized by this section shall be subject to the following conditions:
(a) The compounds, mixtures, and preparations referred to in subsection (1) may be dispensed to persons under age 18 only on prescription. A bound volume must be maintained as a record of sale at retail of excepted compounds, mixtures, and preparations, and the pharmacist must require suitable identification from every unknown purchaser.
(b) Such compounds, mixtures, and preparations shall be sold by the pharmacist in good faith as a medicine and not for the purpose of evading the provisions of this chapter. The pharmacist may, in his or her discretion, withhold sale to any person whom the pharmacist reasonably believes is attempting to purchase excepted compounds, mixtures, or preparations for the purpose of abuse.
(c) The total quantity of controlled substance listed in Schedule V which may be sold to any one purchaser within a given 48-hour period shall not exceed 120 milligrams of codeine, 60 milligrams dihydrocodeine, 30 milligrams of ethyl morphine, or 240 milligrams of opium.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the kind and quantity of any controlled substance that may be prescribed, administered, or dispensed to any person, or for the use of any person or animal, when it is prescribed, administered, or dispensed in compliance with the general provisions of this chapter.
(4) The dextrorotatory isomer of 3-methoxy-n-methylmorphinan and its salts (dextromethorphan) shall not be deemed to be included in any schedule by reason of enactment of this chapter.
History.s. 8, ch. 73-331; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 6, ch. 80-354; s. 4, ch. 89-281; s. 2, ch. 93-92; s. 1440, ch. 97-102; s. 105, ch. 97-264; s. 12, ch. 99-186.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
F.S. 893.08 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.08 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.08

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 893.08
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 893.08.

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S893.08
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 893.08.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Pierz v. Gorski

    88 Wis. 2d 131 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 60 times
    The Gorskis' claim of title is not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree. As such, only the premises actually occupied may be adversely possessed, and the land is adversely possessed only if it has been "protected by a substantial inclosure," or "usually cultivated or improved" for twenty years. Secs. 893.05, 893.08,, 893.09, Stats.
    PAGE 136
  2. In re Jacuinde

    Case No. 08-15509-B-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2009)   Cited 1 times
    On October 15, 2008, Mendes filed a proof of claim for disgorgement based on California Business and Professions Code § 7031(b) in the amount of $95, 287.05. However, in support of this Motion, Mendes submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury stating at paragraph 11 that Reyes had been paid approximately $73, 893.08 through the mortgage and escrow companies. The Motion does not address or explain this discrepancy.
  3. Europa Int. v. Direct Access

    315 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 2010)   Cited 14 times
    Europa filed its original petition against appellees Direct Access Trader Corp. f/k/a InvestIN.com and Laurence D. Briggs in 1999 seeking damages for breach of a loan agreement. The trial court granted Europa's traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment in December 2006. On March 29, 2007, the trial court signed a final judgment against appellees, jointly and severally, in the amount of $407, 893.08. Appellees appealed the final judgment in InvestIN.com Corp. v. Europa International Ltd., 293 S.W.3d 819 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied). This court affirmed the summary judgments against InvestIN.com Corp. but reversed and rendered a take nothing judgment against Briggs. Id.
  4. Buza v. Wojtalewicz

    180 N.W.2d 556 (Wis. 1970)   Cited 18 times
    Sec. 893.10 provides that sec. 893.08 is a twenty-year statute.
    PAGE 564
  5. Anderson v. City of Milwaukee

    208 Wis. 2d 18 (Wis. 1997)   Cited 65 times
    ¶ 21. In addition, we conclude that the damage limitation of Wis. Stat. § 893.08(3) is not an affirmative defense that is deemed waived if not raised in a responsive pleading or by motion. The damage limitation is not listed as an affirmative defense in Wis. Stat. § 803.02(3). Furthermore, although § 802.02(3) explicitly states that affirmative defenses are not "limited to the following," the damage limitation does not fit within the criteria for determining when a matter not specified should be considered an affirmative defense. Specifically, in discussing Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is similar to Wis. Stat. § 802.02(3), Charles Wright and Arthur Miller set forth the criteria of policy, fairness, probability, and surprise for making this determination. See Charles Wright Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1271 (1990). The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Snyder v. City of Minneapolis , 441 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Minn. 1989), indicated that the relevant criteria are surprise and fairness when determining whether a cap on municipal tort liability is an affirmative defense. The court concluded:
    PAGE 33
  6. Lawton v. Borchardt Living Trust

    768 N.W.2d 62 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009)
    In the absence of evidence upon which a legal description of the occupied area could be based, the claim of adverse possession must fail. While absolute precision or utilization of a surveyor is not required to establish lines of occupancy, the evidence must provide a reasonably accurate basis upon which the trial court can partition the land in accordance with sec. 893.08, Stats.
  7. Harwick v. Black

    217 Wis. 2d 691 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 30 times   1 Legal Analyses
    We disagree. We have no reason to believe that the legislature intended § 893.25, STATS., to change the law of adverse possession. The 1979 Judicial Council Committee's Note to § 893.25 states: "This provision collects in one section all material relating to 20-year adverse possession, without change in substance. Previous ss. 893.08 and 893.09, together with part of previous s. 893.10, are integrated here . . . . This section covers the substance of previous s. 893.02, also deleted." (Emphasis added.)
    PAGE 702
  8. In re Collins

    No. C 13-3177 PJH (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014)   Cited 3 times
    Danko, an attorney, worked with Terry O'Reilly for over 13 years and became a minority shareholder in the law firm, once named O'Reilly & Danko and now named O'Reilly & Collins, the present debtor, until 2009 when his employment was terminated. Danko filed a lawsuit in December 2009 in the San Francisco County Superior Court, titled Michael Danko v. Terry O'Reilly, an individual; O'Reilly & Collins, a Professional Corporation, et al., Case No. CGC-09-495203 (the "state court action"). After a jury trial, the jury found that debtor O'Reilly & Collins breached its contract with Danko and wrongfully terminated him in 2009 in order to avoid paying Danko $2.4 million in compensation due to him. Thereafter, on July 11, 2012, a judgment was entered in the superior court in favor of Danko and against debtor as follows: for $2, 418, 744.00 in damages and expense reimbursement; for prejudgment interest in the sum of $789, 893.08; for waiting time penalties pursuant to Labor Code section 203 in the amount of $41, 538.46; total of $3, 250, 175.54; plus attorney's fees and costs as subsequently to be determined by the court. On July 13, 2012, Danko caused a notice of judgment lien…
  9. Beasley v. Konczal

    275 N.W.2d 634 (Wis. 1979)   Cited 10 times
    Where the claim is not within the written description the twenty year statute applies. Sec. 893.08, Stats. 1973. Sec. 893.10(1), Stats. provides in part as follows: ". . . an adverse possession of . . . 20 years under [sec.] 893.08 . . . shall constitute a bar to an action for the recovery of such real estate so held adversely or of the possession thereof. . . . "
    PAGE 241