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F.S. 893.101 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.101 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.101


The 2021 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 893
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 893.101 Florida Statutes and Case Law
893.101 Legislative findings and intent.
(1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. State, Slip Opinion No. SC94701 (Fla. 2002) and Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1996), holding that the state must prove that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of a controlled substance found in his or her actual or constructive possession, were contrary to legislative intent.
(2) The Legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter. Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter.
(3) In those instances in which a defendant asserts the affirmative defense described in this section, the possession of a controlled substance, whether actual or constructive, shall give rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the substance. It is the intent of the Legislature that, in those cases where such an affirmative defense is raised, the jury shall be instructed on the permissive presumption provided in this subsection.
History.s. 1, ch. 2002-258.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
F.S. 893.101 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.101 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.101


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 893.101
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 893.101.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S893.101
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 893.101.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Wright v. State

    920 So. 2d 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 32 times
    Section 893.101, Florida Statutes, states:
    PAGE 24
  2. State v. Adkins

    96 So. 3d 412 (Fla. 2012)   Cited 652 times
    In response to this Court's decisions, the Legislature enacted a statute now codified in section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2011). Section 893.101 provides in full:
    PAGE 415
  3. Flagg v. State

    74 So. 3d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 292 times
    Shelton is not binding on this court or any other state court, and we see no reason to recede from our settled precedent simply because one federal judge has a different view of the law than this court. Moreover, we do not find the analysis in Shelton persuasive because, among other reasons, the decision misperceives the operation of the affirmative defense in section 893.101. The statute does not, as Shelton implied, require the defendant to establish his innocence by proving a lack of knowledge, see Wright, 920 So.2d at 25 (explaining that section 893.101 “does not require the defendant to prove or disprove knowledge”); rather, the statute provides that if the defense is raised, the state has the burden to overcome the defense by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of the drugs. Id.; see also Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 25.7 (explaining that the jury should find the defendant not guilty if they “have reasonable doubt on the question of whether (defendant) knew of the illicit nature of the controlled substance”). Furthermore, because lack of knowledge is not a defense to a true strict liability crime, the…
    PAGE 141
  4. Donawa v. U.S. Attorney Gen.

    735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013)   Cited 96 times   2 Legal Analyses
    We therefore conclude that Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)(2), as amended by Fla. Stat. § 893.101, does not qualify as a drug trafficking aggravated felony under the categorical approach. We conclude as well that it would be improper to engage the modified categorical approach for this statute because it is not divisible within the meaning of Descamps.
    PAGE 1283
  5. Barrientos v. State

    1 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 18 times
    Under section 893.101, "[l]ack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of [chapter 893]." § 893.101(2). The statute provides further that when a defendant asserts such an affirmative defense, "the possession of a controlled substance, whether actual or constructive, shall give rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the substance." § 893.101(3). Jose A. did not raise as an affirmative defense any claim that he lacked knowledge of the nature of the substance found in the black plastic packages, i.e., the subject of the trafficking charge. Thus he was not entitled to an instruction directing the jury to consider this issue as an affirmative defense.
    PAGE 1217
  6. Williams v. State

    45 So. 3d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 16 times
    Appellant appealed and thereafter filed a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) in which he argued that his sentences are unconstitutional because, by virtue of section 893.101, Florida Statutes, his offenses are "strict liability offenses" for which the maximum sentences that can be imposed consistent with due process are no more than one year in jail. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that Appellant's claim was not a "sentencing error" that could be raised in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, and even if it was properly raised, the claim was without merit based upon Harris v. State, 932 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), rev. denied, 962 So.2d 336 (Fla. 2007). Appellant presents this same argument on appeal, and he also argues for the first time that section 893.101 and his convictions violate due process for the same reasons that his sentences are unconstitutional.
    PAGE 16
  7. U.S. v. Bunton

    Case No. 8:10-cr-327-T-30EAJ (M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2011)   Cited 15 times
    Fla. Stat. § 893.101.
    PAGE 7
  8. Adams v. State

    76 So. 3d 367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 29 times
    As held by four unanimous district courts of appeal, including this one, we again reject Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011) and hold that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional. Accord Maestas v. State, 76 So.3d 991, 2011 WL 5964337 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722, 2011 WL 5554812 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Holcy v. State, ––– So.3d ––––, 2011 WL 5299328 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Accordingly, the order below denying postconviction relief is
    PAGE 368
  9. Norman v. State

    826 So. 2d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 17 times
    Creating Section 893.101, Florida Statutes, Chapter 2002-258, section 1, Laws of Florida, provides:
    PAGE 441