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F.S. 893.15 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.15 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.15

The 2021 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
Chapter 893
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 893.15 Florida Statutes and Case Law
893.15 Rehabilitation.Any person who violates s. 893.13(6)(a) or (b) relating to possession may, in the discretion of the trial judge, be required to participate in a substance abuse services program approved or regulated by the Department of Children and Families pursuant to the provisions of chapter 397, provided the director of such program approves the placement of the defendant in such program. Such required participation shall be imposed in addition to any penalty or probation otherwise prescribed by law. However, the total time of such penalty, probation, and program participation shall not exceed the maximum length of sentence possible for the offense.
History.s. 15, ch. 73-331; s. 46, ch. 91-110; s. 40, ch. 93-39; s. 3, ch. 94-107; s. 39, ch. 97-194; s. 304, ch. 99-8; s. 306, ch. 2014-19; s. 45, ch. 2016-105.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
F.S. 893.15 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.15 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.15

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 893.15
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 893.15.

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S893.15
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 893.15.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Herzog v. Bujniewicz

    32 Wis. 2d 26 (Wis. 1966)   Cited 13 times
    The basic question is whether sec. 330.15 (1), Stats. 1963, now renumbered sec. 893.15, Stats. 1965, applies to claims based on adverse possession. We agree with the trial court that if this. section bars evidence of acts of adverse possession occurring prior to thirty years before commencement of the action that the evidence relating to acts within the thirty-year period is not sufficient to establish title in plaintiff by adverse possession. This evidence consisted only of the evidence and use of a gravel driveway located on the disputed land and the removal of weeds which grew in the driveway. This testimony is not clear or sufficient to prove the disputed property was used or cultivated or improved exclusively for the benefit of the plaintiff or that such use was of such a nature as would give notice of an exclusive dominion to the true owner or to the public. Casual weeding and the presence of part of a driveway on the disputed area under the circumstances of this case are not sufficient under Burkhardt v. Smith (1962), 17 Wis.2d 132, 115 N.W.2d 540.
    PAGE 30
  2. Turner v. Taylor

    2003 WI App. 256 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 123 times   1 Legal Analyses
    The Wisconsin legislature, however, has unwisely retained section 893.15 in its entirety. The repeal or amendment of section 893.15 should be sought since the notice provisions are different. Retention of section 893.15 in its present form can only lead to uncertainty and litigation concerning the inconsistencies. . . .
    PAGE 643
  3. Artis v. District of Columbia

    138 S. Ct. 594 (2018)   Cited 197 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Among illustrations: 21 U.S.C. § 1604 (allowing suits to proceed against certain biomaterial providers and providing that "[a]ny applicable statute of limitations shall toll during the period from the time a claimant files a petition with the Secretary under this paragraph until such time as either (i) the Secretary issues a final decision on the petition, or (ii) the petition is withdrawn," § 1604(b)(3)(C) ); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (permitting the removal of "mass actions" to federal court and providing that "[t]he limitations periods on any claims asserted in a mass action that is removed to Federal court pursuant to this subsection shall be deemed tolled during the period that the action is pending in Federal court," § 1332(d)(11)(D) ); 42 U.S.C. § 233 (providing a remedy against the United States for certain injuries caused by employees of the Public Health Service, and stating that "[t]he time limit for filing a claim under this subsection ... shall be tolled during the pendency of a [n] [administrative] request for benefits," § 233(p)(3)(A)(ii) ). See also Wis. Stat. § 893.15( 3) (2011–2012) ("A Wisconsin law limiting the time for commencement of an action on a Wisconsin…
    PAGE 602
  4. State Historical Society v. Maple Bluff

    112 Wis. 2d 246 (Wis. 1983)   Cited 28 times
    On any question of statutory construction, the initial inquiry is to the plain meaning of the statute. If the statute is unambiguous, resort to judicial rules of interpretation and construction is not permitted, and the words of the statute must be given their obvious and intended meaning. Wis. Bankers Ass'n v. Mut. Savings Loan, 96 Wis.2d 438, 450, 291 N.W.2d 869 (1980). A statute, phrase or word is ambiguous when it is capable of being interpreted by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more ways. Id. at 450. The plaintiffs contend, and the trial court held, that the provisions of sec. 893.15(4), Stats. (1977), unambiguously preclude the defendants from relying on sec. 893.15(1). The trial court reasoned that since the real estate in the instant case was owned by a specified public entity, the defendants could not use sec. 893.15 to bar the plaintiffs' claim. The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to raise their claim of a reversionary interest, even though it was based on a deed older than thirty years.
    PAGE 253
  5. State v. Dugan

    685 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1996)   Cited 32 times
    Section 893.15, Florida Statutes (1993), refers to subdivisions 893.13(1)(f) and (g). However, the legislature amended section 893.13, effective January 1, 1994, eliminating subdivisions 893.13(1)(f) and (g). See ch. 93-406, § 23, Laws of Florida. The legislature directed the Division of Statutory Revision of the Joint Legislative Management Committee to prepare a reviser's bill to conform all cross-references to section 893.13 as amended. See ch. 93-406, § 33, Laws of Florida. Pursuant to this section, the legislature subsequently amended section 893.15 to refer to persons who violated subdivision 893.13(6)(a) or (b). See ch. 94-107, § 3, Laws of Florida.
    PAGE 1212
  6. Colburn v. Netflix, Inc.

    Case No. 19-cv-484-pp (E.D. Wis. Jan. 16, 2020)
    Finally, it appears that the first time the plaintiff raised Wis. Stat. §893.15 was at the December hearing, and defense counsel argued at that hearing that the court should not consider that statute in making its decision. Even had the plaintiff raised the argument in his pleadings, however, it would not have assisted him. The title of §893.15 is "Effect of an action in a non-Wisconsin forum on a Wisconsin cause of action." Section 893.15( 2) says that in a non-Wisconsin forum, the time of commencement or final disposition of an action is determined by the law of the non-Wisconsin forum. This makes sense and is sort of a Wisconsin statutory version of Hanna; if a plaintiff sues on a Wisconsin cause of action in a court other than a Wisconsin state court, that court's law applies in determining when the case "commenced." If the plaintiff had filed his case in federal court in the first instance, Rule 3 would have governed the date upon which he "commenced" his action, and under §893.15(3), the Wisconsin statute of limitations would have been tolled until the federal case was complete. But this statute doesn't substitute a federal statute of…
    PAGE 10
  7. Scates v. State

    603 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1992)   Cited 46 times
    Scates was convicted of purchasing a small amount of cocaine for personal use. The State argues that section 397.12 cannot apply here because it only relates to possession. See § 397.011(2), Fla. Stat. (1989); § 893.15, Fla. Stat. (1989) (expressly providing that chapter 397 is an alternative to sentencing under sections 893.13(1)(f) and (1)(g) (applying to possession of drugs)). We disagree. Section 397.12 does not limit itself to possessory offenses under chapter 893. Section 397.10 manifests the intent to help drug addicts without incarcerating them. For purposes of section 397.12, we fail to see any difference between possessing cocaine for personal use and purchasing a small amount of cocaine for personal use.
    PAGE 506
  8. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, I conclude that Bijou brought the present action within the applicable limitation period. Bijou's action may also be timely as the result of Wis. Stat. § 893.15(3), which provides that "a Wisconsin law limiting the time for commencement of an action on a Wisconsin cause of action is tolled from the period of commencement of the action in a non-Wisconsin forum until the time of its final disposition in that forum." However, because I have resolved the issue under § 402.725, I need not consider the applicability of § 893.15(3).
    PAGE 3
  9. Figliuzzi v. Carcajou Shooting Club

    184 Wis. 2d 572 (Wis. 1994)   Cited 19 times
    If a period of limitation prescribed in s. 893.15 (5), 1977 stats., has begun to run prior to July 1, 1980, an action shall be commenced within the period prescribed by s. 893.15, 1977 stats., or 40 years after July 1, 1980, whichever first terminates.
    PAGE 576