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F.S. 893.20 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.20 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.20


The 2021 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 893
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 893.20 Florida Statutes and Case Law
893.20 Continuing criminal enterprise.
(1) Any person who commits three or more felonies under this chapter in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management and who obtains substantial assets or resources from these acts is guilty of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise.
(2) A person who commits the offense of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise is guilty of a life felony, punishable pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code and by a fine of $500,000.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 948.01, with respect to any person who is found to have violated this section, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence may not be suspended, deferred, or withheld.
(4) This section does not prohibit separate convictions and sentences for violation of this section and for felony violations of this chapter.
(5) This section must be interpreted in concert with its federal analog, 21 U.S.C. s. 848.
History.s. 1, ch. 89-145; s. 25, ch. 93-406; s. 24, ch. 97-194.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
F.S. 893.20 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.20 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.20


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 893.20
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

893.20 - DANGEROUS DRUGS - CONTROLLED SUBS CONTINUING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE - F: L


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S893.20
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 893.20.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Scates v. State

    603 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1992)   Cited 46 times
    Two other sections in chapter 893 contain mandatory minimum sentences. Sections 893.135 and 893.20, Florida Statutes (1989), provide that the minimum sentences contained therein shall "not be suspended, deferred, or withheld." Also, sections 893.135 and 893.20 expressly refer to their sentences as "mandatory." There is no similar restriction in section 893.13(1)(e), and the word mandatory is not used. The omission of this language implies that the legislature intended a different construction, allowing trial judges greater discretion in sentencing decisions under section 893.13(1)(e).
    PAGE 506
  2. State v. Saephanh

    2 Wn. App. 2d 1013 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018)
    The personal property loss submitted by Orfelinda and Dias to their insurance contains fewer items than they had originally reported to police as stolen. However, the net value of the items in both lists is very close. In the police incident report the loss was stated to be $78, 075. In the insurance claim, the loss was stated to be $79, 710, plus taxes, which added another $6, 893.20.
  3. State v. Swider

    654 So. 2d 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 6 times
    Sections 893.135 and 893.20, Florida Statutes (1989), provide that the minimum sentences contained therein shall "not be suspended, deferred, or withheld." Also, sections 893.135 and 893.20 expressly refer to their sentences as "mandatory." There is no similar restriction in section 893.13(1)(e), and the word mandatory is not used. The omission of this language implies that the legislature intended a different construction, allowing trial judges greater discretion in sentencing decisions under section 893.13(1)(e). (Footnote omitted).
    PAGE 563
  4. Hill v. State

    624 So. 2d 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 6 times
    Two other sections in chapter 893 contain mandatory minimum sentences. Sections 893.135 [drug trafficking] and 893.20 [continuing criminal enterprise], Florida Statutes (1989), provide that the minimum sentences contained therein shall "not be suspended, deferred, or withheld." Also, sections 893.135 and 893.20 expressly refer to their sentences as "mandatory." There is no similar restriction in section 893.13(1)(e), and the word mandatory is not used. The omission of this language implies that the legislature intended a different construction, allowing trial judges greater discretion in sentencing decisions under section 893.13(1)(e).
    PAGE 827
  5. State v. Johnson

    627 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 2 times
    Further, although the majority refers to the mandatory minimum requirements of section 893.13(1)(e), the Supreme Court in Scates v. State, 603 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1992) compared the language of sections 893.13(1)(e) with sections 893.135 and 893.20. It noted that the word "mandatory" is not used in section 893.13(1)(e). The Supreme Court found the omission of the word "mandatory" implied the legislature intended greater discretion in sentencing decisions under section 893.13(1)(e), than under sections 893.135 and 893.20, which expressly referred to the sentences contained therein as "mandatory."
    PAGE 101
  6. Grissom v. State

    679 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 2 times
    Each of the errors he asserts is without merit except his contention that the fifty-year term of incarceration exceeds the statutory maximum. Grissom was charged in 1990 with and convicted in 1992 of engaging in a continuing criminal drug enterprise in violation of section 893.20, Florida Statutes (1989), a crime denominated a life felony calling for a twenty-five year mandatory penalty; the sentencing guidelines did not apply. Life felonies committed between October 1, 1983, and July 1, 1995, are punishable by a term of life or a term of years not to exceed forty. § 775.082 (3)(a), Florida Statutes (1995).
  7. State v. Randall

    627 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 3 times
    Our supreme court, in Scates v. State, 603 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1992), analyzed the extent of judicial discretion under the 1989 version of section 893.13, which contains the minimum mandatory penalty and is almost identical to the 1991 version of the statute at issue here. Scates was a drug abuser who had purchased cocaine for his personal use from an undercover sheriff's deputy within 1000 feet of a school. The trial court placed Scates on two years' probation and ordered him to complete drug rehabilitation pursuant to section 397.12, Florida Statutes (1989). The Scates court indicated that trial judges have greater discretion in sentencing under section 893.13(1)(e) than under other sections in chapter 893 that contain mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. See §§ 893.135 and 893.20, Fla. Stat. (1991). The supreme court approved the trial court's decision, holding that a drug offender convicted under section 893.13(1)(e) could be referred to a rehabilitation program under section 397.12 rather than sentenced to a minimum three years in prison.
    PAGE 572
  8. Waite v. City of Fort Lauderdale

    681 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 10 times
    We do not reach the issue of the propriety of the sentence, because it was not raised below. One difficulty in this case arises because, with the exception of section 318.14(10), Florida Statutes (1995), Florida law links a withhold of adjudication with probation. See §§ 921.187(1)(a)3, 948.01, Fla. Stat. (1995); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.670. Most statutory references tie the withholding of adjudication to the placement of a defendant on probation. See §§ 112.3173(2)(a), 327.36(1), 775.087(3)(a), 784.07(2), 784.08(3). 790.165(3), 893.135(3), 893.20( 3), Fla. Stat. (1995). Had the court placed Waite on probation and then immediately suspended it, the order would have been appealable under section 924.06(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), as an "order granting probation." See Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b). Also, it appears that a sentence of "time served" cannot be imposed where the imposition of a sentence has been withheld. "Time served" means that a defendant is sentenced to a definite period of incarceration and is then given immediate credit for time already spent incarcerated. Incarceration must be either a condition of probation (§§ 921.187(1)(a), 948.03(6)) or a sentence imposed…
    PAGE 902
  9. In re Amend. to the Florida R. of Crim. Proc.

    No. SC08-1834 (Fla. Dec. 30, 2008)
    — It is further ordered that the 25-year minimum sentence provisions of section 893.20, Florida Statutes, are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.
  10. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure

    998 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 2008)   Cited 1 times
    — It is further ordered that the 25-year minimum sentence provisions of section 893.20, Florida Statutes, are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.
    PAGE 1131