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F.S. 893.30 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.30 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.30

The 2021 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
Chapter 893
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 893.30 Florida Statutes and Case Law
893.30 Controlled substance safety education and awareness.
(1) This section may be cited as the “Victoria Siegel Controlled Substance Safety Education and Awareness Act.”
(2) The department shall develop a written pamphlet relating to controlled substances which includes educational information about the following:
(a) Precautions regarding the use of pain management prescriptions.
(b) The potential for misuse and abuse of controlled substances by adults and children.
(c) The risk of controlled substance dependency and addiction.
(d) The proper storage and disposal of controlled substances.
(e) Controlled substance addiction support and treatment resources.
(f) Telephone helplines and website links that provide counseling and emergency assistance for individuals dealing with substance abuse.
(3) The department shall encourage health care providers, including, but not limited to, hospitals, county health departments, physicians, and nurses, to disseminate and display information about controlled substance safety, including, but not limited to, the pamphlet created pursuant to subsection (2).
(4) The department shall encourage consumers to discuss the risks of controlled substance use with their health care providers.
(5) The State Surgeon General shall make publicly available, by posting on the department’s website, the pamphlet created pursuant to subsection (2) and additional resources as appropriate.
(6) The department shall fund the promotion of controlled substance safety education and awareness under this section through grants from private or federal sources.
(7) The department is encouraged to collaborate with other agencies, organizations, and institutions to create a systematic approach to increasing public awareness regarding controlled substance safety.
History.s. 22, ch. 2016-212.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
F.S. 893.30 on Google Scholar

F.S. 893.30 on Casetext

Amendments to 893.30

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 893.30
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 893.30.

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S893.30
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 893.30.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. 893.30 Presumption from legal title. In every action to recover or for the possession of real property, and in every defense based on legal title, the person establishing a legal title to the premises is presumed to have been in possession of the premises within the time required by law, and the occupation of such premises by another person shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title unless it appears that such premises have been held and possessed adversely to the legal title for 7 years under s. 893.27, 10 years under s. 893.26 or 20 years under s. 893.25, before the commencement of the action."
    PAGE 365
  2. Engel v. Parker

    810 N.W.2d 861 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012)
    ¶ 13 Here, it is undisputed that Engel adversely possessed the disputed strip of land for the requisite time period, from 1954 to 1974. Thus, Herzog makes clear that Engel is entitled to application of the owner-in-possession exception. Moreover, the language of Wis. Stat. § 330.05 (1963), which Herzog cited, remains substantially unchanged today as Wis. Stat. § 893.30, carrying the same title: “Presumption from legal title.” Pursuant to Herzog and Wis. Stat. § 893.30, we must presume Engel was “in possession of the real estate involved as owner at the time the action [was] commenced.” Wis. Stat. § 893.33(5).
    PAGE 865
  3. Van Horn v. Nationwide Property Casualty Ins. Co.

    CASE NO. 1:08-CV-605 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2010)   Cited 7 times

    of each attorney. Brian Kabateck (partner) $690 785.00 $541,650.00 Richard Kellner (partner) $690 893.30 $616,377.00 Niall Yamane (25 yrs.) $430 79.25 $34,077.50 Ronald Karz (22 yrs.) $410 6.40 $2,624.00

    Hours Total Total: Brian Kabateck (partner) $450 785.00 $353,250.00 Richard Kellner (partner) $450 893.30 $401,985.00 Niall Yamane (25 yrs.) $400 79.25 $31,700.00 Ronald Karz (22 yrs.) $400 6.40 $2,560.00

  4. Lawrence's complaint also asserts a state law negligence claim. The defendants assert that this claim is barred by the governmental immunity afforded by Wis. Stat. § 893.30(4). This contention is not addressed by Lawrence.
    PAGE 27
  5. Wantuch v. Luebow

    724 N.W.2d 703 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006)
    ¶ 8 Luebow argues that the circuit court erred in trying to reconcile the testimony of Glenn Birrenkott, a former owner of the Wantuch parcel, with the testimony of Luebow's surveyor, Mead Hunt, about the location of the old cattle fence. Birrenkott testified that the old fence was located in nearly the same location as the boundary between the gravel driveway and the blacktop parking lot. The surveyor testified that the former fence was located one foot north of the new fence, which would place the old fence several feet north of where Birrenkott believed it to be. Luebow contends that the circuit court should have believed the testimony of the surveyor because all reasonable presumptions must be made in Luebow's favor as titleholder. See WIS. STAT. §§ 893.30 ("[T]he person establishing a legal title to the premises is presumed to have been in possession of the premises. . . ."); Allie , 88 Wis. 2d at 343 ("All reasonable presumptions must be made in favor of the true owner."). The court was required to start with the presumption favoring title ownership, but the court was not required, as Luebow argues, to resolve all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the…
  6. Bazan v. Kux Machine Co.

    190 N.W.2d 521 (Wis. 1971)   Cited 16 times
    Appellant contends that the two-year limitation on actions by or against a corporation after its dissolution, embodied in sec. 180.787, Stats., has been tolled by sec. 893.30. We do not agree. Globig v. Greene Gust Co. (D.C. Wis. 1961), 193 F. Supp. 544, made sec. 893.30 applicable to noncomplying foreign corporations notwithstanding the fact that service could be under sec. 180.847(4). However, we believe such a holding is predicated upon there actually being a foreign corporation in existence at the crucial time.
    PAGE 338
  7. ¶ 6 Following a hearing on the County's motions, the court concluded that any failure by Yourchuck to comply with notice requirements was technical and not prejudicial. Further, the court concluded, the statutory cap was inapplicable and WIS. STAT. § 893.30(4) did not bar Yourchuck's suit. Accordingly, the court denied the County's motion for summary judgment. Also at the hearing, Yourchuck admitted it did not have a takings case and was therefore not maintaining that claim. The court acknowledged Yourchuck's federal claim and directed it to file a fourth amended complaint specifically referencing § 1983 for clarity's sake. Based on the nature of the § 1983 claim, the court denied the County's motion in limine and refused to prohibit Yourchuck from offering lost profit evidence. The jury subsequently found in Yourchuck's favor and awarded $200,000 in damages. The County appeals.
  8. Anderson v. DeRose

    360 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Wis. 1973)
    Since I find nothing in the complaint which justifies an extension under § 893.30 to 893.38, it follows that the complaint fails by reason of the strictures of the statutory time limitations.
    PAGE 674
  9. In re Paternity of R.W.L

    116 Wis. 2d 150 (Wis. 1984)   Cited 24 times
    " 893.195 Within 5 years. Within 5 years of the date of birth of a child or if the parents live together as man and wife after the birth of the child, 5 years after they separate: An action under ch. 52 for the establishment of the paternity of the child, except that this limitation shall not apply where the parties thereto enter into an agreement for the support of the child in accordance with s. 52.28 or where a 2nd proceeding is had pursuant to s. 52.31(2). Where a warrant or summons under ch. 52 has been issued within such 5 years, ss. 893.30 and 939.74(3) shall both be applicable in computing time under this section."
    PAGE 153
  10. Sherry v. Salvo

    555 N.W.2d 402 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times
    Sherry contends that he was a "patient" within the meaning of the Act while at Tomah Memorial, and even if the City and the officers are otherwise immune under § 893.30, STATS., that immunity is pierced by the authorization in § 51.61(7)(a) of suits against municipalities by mental health patients for violation of the rights granted by the statute — including the right to refuse treatment under certain conditions. See § 51.61(1)(g)1.
    PAGE 25