F. TEJADA, v. In FORFEITURE OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED PROPERTY IN U. S. CURRENCY,,
820 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
. . . Now that the holding of Degen is clear, the question at issue remains whether section 896.106 can be . . . Section 896.106 is a statutory waiver of a fugitive’s due process rights in a civil forfeiture proceeding . . . Thus, pursuant to established laws of statutory construction, section 896.106 simply cannot be applied . . . This case then proceeded onward for nearly two-years before the passage of section 896.106. . . . Here, there is no legislative statement directing that section 896.106 be applied retroactively.
.This . . . The trial court based its dismissal of Tejada’s claim upon section 896.106, Florida Statutes (2000), . . . In 2000, the Florida legislature enacted section 896.106, effective July ' 1, 2000. . . . By enacting section 896.106, that is precisely what the Florida legislature has done.
III. . . . Tejada also argues that section 896.106 is incorrectly being applied retroactively. We disagree. . . . The only completed transaction prior to the enactment of section 896.106 was the alleged money laundering . . .
