The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVII
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CORRECTIONS

Chapter 901
ARRESTS AND TEMPORARY DETENTIONS

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F.S. 901.07

901.07 Admission to bail when arrest occurs in another county.—

(1) When an arrest by a warrant occurs in a county other than the one in which the alleged offense was committed and the warrant issued, if the person arrested has a right to bail, the arresting officer shall inform the person of his or her right and, upon request, shall take the person before a trial court judge or other official of the same county having authority to admit to bail. The official shall admit the person arrested to bail for his or her appearance before the trial court judge who issued the warrant.

(2) If the person arrested does not have a right to bail or, when informed of his or her right to bail, does not furnish bail immediately, the officer who made the arrest or the officer having the warrant shall take the person before the trial court judge who issued the warrant.

History.—s. 7, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(7); s. 6, ch. 70-339; s. 1453, ch. 97-102; s. 20, ch. 2004-11.

F.S. 901.07 on Google Scholar

F.S. 901.07 on Casetext

Amendments to 901.07

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 901.07

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 901.07.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

ODOM, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 248 F. Supp. 3d 260 (D.D.C. 2017)

. . . Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department General Orders, specifically, GO-RAR-901.07 . . .

ROBINSON, v. PEZZAT,, 818 F.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016)

. . . Metropolitan Police, General Order GO-RAR-901.07, at 7 (2002). . . .

D. HARGRAVES, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 134 F. Supp. 3d 68 (D.D.C. 2015)

. . . To the contrary, MPD General Order 901.07 expressly states that “Members are not required to start at . . . H (“Consultant Report”) at 8 (quoting MPD General Order 901.07), ECF No. 3110 (emphasis supplied). . . .

BLAKENEY, v. O DONNELL,, 117 F. Supp. 3d 6 (D.D.C. 2015)

. . . applicable regulation(s) and/or order(s) and/or standardfs), including but not limited to, General Orders 901.07 . . .

M. GARABIS, v. UNKNOWN OFFICERS OF METROPOLITAN POLICE,, 961 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2013)

. . . . # 36-1]; MPD general order 901.07, Ex. 2 [Dkt. # 36-2]; plaintiffs expert witness report, Ex. 3 [Dkt . . . PL’s Supplemental Opp. at 7, citing G0RAR-901.07(III)(G); see also GO-RAR-901.07(V)(B)(1)(d), Ex. 2 to . . . GO-RAR-901.07(IV)(D); see also GO-RAR-901.07(V)(F)(2) (“Under no circumstances shall a member carry or . . . He stated that in light of GO-RAR-901.07(IV)(D), it was unnecessary for MPD to promulgate a separate . . . So officers outside of ERT have always been prohibited from using tasers under GO-RAR-901.07(IV)(D). . . .

HUNTER, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 824 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D.D.C. 2011)

. . . General Order 901.07 (PL’s Ex. 25) undermines Plaintiffs argument, as it outlines specific guidelines . . . General Order 901.07 defines “use of force” as “any physical contact used to effect, influence or persuade . . .

ENGLISH, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 651 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

. . . Id. at 23; see MPD General Order 901.07:V:D. . . . Id. at 24 (quoting MPD General Order 901.07:V:D:1). . . .

D. RICE, Jr. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 818 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2011)

. . . prevent his 'escape' which was in violation of the Metropolitan Police Department’s general order, G.O. 901.07 . . .

D. RICE, Jr. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 715 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2010)

. . . Rice by violating Metropolitan Police Department General Order 901.07. . . . General Order 901.07 states that “under no circumstances shall [an officer] discharge his service firearm . . .

a No. Re H. BARNES, 2 So. 3d 166 (Fla. 2009)

. . . in violation of the United States Constitution, Florida Constitution, Rule 3.130, 3.131, and Section 901.07 . . .

TAFLER, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 539 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

. . . MPD and the failure of Officer Hector to file a “Use of Force” incident report under General Order 901.07 . . . Plaintiff has provided no copy of the alleged complaint he filed, and the effective date of General Order 901.07 . . .

UNITED STATES v. J. DOYON,, 194 F.3d 207 (1st Cir. 1999)

. . . See generally 5 Weinstein s Federal Evidence § 901.07[3][a] (McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.1999). . . . .

TYSON, v. P. KEANE,, 159 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998)

. . . Berger, Wein-stein’s Federal Evidence ¶ 901.07 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.1998); Ricketts v. . . .

UNITED STATES, v. J. BLANCHARD, U. S., 48 M.J. 306 (C.A.A.F. 1998)

. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 901.07[3][a] (2d ed.1998). We agree. . . .

SCARFO, v. CABLETRON SYSTEMS, INC. SCARFO, v. CABLETRON SYSTEMS, INC. MILLER, v. CABLETRON SYSTEMS, INC. A., 54 F.3d 931 (1st Cir. 1995)

. . . The court awarded plaintiff Scarfo $1,187,-901.07 in damages for the Title VII violation (consisting . . .

RICHARDSON, v. STATE, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971)

. . . . §§ 901.03, 901.06, 901.07, 901.08, F.S.A. (1969) ; Fla.R.Crim.P. 1.121, 1.122. . . . .

LYONS, v. TOWN OF LAKE PARK,, 153 So. 2d 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)

. . . Constitution and Fla.Stat., §§ 901.07 and 901.15 F.S.A., all relating to the requirements of due process . . .

W. E. CALLAHAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AND PETERSON, SHIRLEY GUNTHER v. THE UNITED STATES, 91 Ct. Cl. 538 (Ct. Cl. 1940)

. . . . $4-,901.07 alleged to he due hy and collected from plaintiffs hy the defendant for cement alleged to . . .