The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . Popple , 626 So. 2d at 186 ; see also § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2014) ; see also Terry v. . . . shall not extend beyond the place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof." § 901.151 . . . See § 901.151(3), Fla. Stat. (2014). To make an arrest, law enforcement needs probable cause. . . .
. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. . . . search the person only to the extent necessary to determine whether the person in fact has a weapon. § 901.151 . . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . State, 124 So.3d 176, 183 (Fla. 2013) ; see also § 901.151(2), Fla. . . . State, 121 So.3d 76, 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting § 901.151(5) ). . . . If such a search discloses such a weapon or any evidence of a criminal offense it may be seized. § 901.151 . . . disclose, and for the purpose of disclosing" the presence of a dangerous weapon, as authorized by section 901.151 . . .
. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993) ; see also § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2016) ; United States v. . . .
. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993) (citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)). . . .
. . . Brown, that suspicion, in and of itself, would not have justified a pat-down search pursuant to section 901.151 . . .
. . . Section 901.151, Fla. . . . Stat. § 901.151(3). . . . as a fruit of the violation of § 901.151(3). . . . Stat. § 901.151. . . . Stat. § 901.151. . . . . . § 901.151, and that McKinley’s failure to challenge the Pizza Hut identification on this ground constituted . . .
. . . Section 901.151(5), Florida Statutes (2012). . . . A patdown search is conducted for the purpose of discovering "a dangerous weapon.” § 901.151(5), Fla. . . .
. . . . §§ 856.021(2), 901.151(2); Ga.Code Ann. § 16-ll-36(b); Ind.Code § 34-28-5-3.5 (a stopped suspect must . . .
. . . of the officer or any other person” prior to searching them for the presence of a weapon) (quoting § 901.151 . . .
. . . . § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (2014); Gray v. State, 981 So.2d 562, 564-65 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); State v. . . .
. . . The standard of reasonable suspicion to support a stop is also codified in section 901.151, Florida Statutes . . . to believe that -the person had committed, was committing, or about to commit a criminal offense. § 901.151 . . . that he had committed, was committing or about to commit a crime, as required by Popple and section 901.151 . . .
. . . .” § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
. . . See § 901.151(2)-(4), Fla. Stat.; June, 131 So.3d at 6. . . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat.; State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 825 (Fla.1981). . . .
. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2012), Terry v. . . .
. . . -25 (“In determining legislative intent, we must give due weight and effect to the title of section 901.151 . . .
. . . “ ‘a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.’ ” Smith, 95 So.3d at 968 (quoting § 901.151 . . .
. . . Under section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2011), an officer can conduct a stop and frisk, i.e., a Terry . . . , was committing, or was about to commit an offense that would authorize a Terry stop under section 901.151 . . .
. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2012). The detention must be based on more than an “inarticulate hunch.” . . .
. . . State, 384 So.2d 272, 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . In addition, section 901.151(5) of the Florida Statutes (2011), known as the “Florida Stop and Frisk . . . The Florida Supreme Court has clarified that when the term “probable cause” is used in section 901.151 . . . resulting from the search is admissible. § 901.151(6), Fla. . . . Accordingly, if the defendant was legally detained pursuant to section 901.151(2), and the firearm at . . .
. . . U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and was codified by the Florida legislature in section 901.151 . . . committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime before the stop can constitutionally occur. § 901.151 . . . believe that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.” § 901.151 . . . Absent such exacerbating evidence though, the investigatory stop must terminate. § 901.151(4). . . . . § 901.151(5). . . .
. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2010); Arvizu; United States v. . . .
. . . State, 384 So.2d 272, 273-74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993); § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .
. . . . § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also United States v. . . .
. . . Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)); see § 901.151, Fla. . . .
. . . The trial court granted Hannah’s motion to suppress, explaining that pursuant to section 901.151, Florida . . . Section 901.151(3), Florida Statutes, commonly known as the “Stop and Frisk Law,” codifies the principles . . . that some movement of the detainee from the place where he is initially detained is permissible. § 901.151 . . . Citing section 901.151(3), Florida Statutes, as well as federal cases involving movement of a detainee . . .
. . . .; see § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2009); Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). . . .
. . . State, 698 So.2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (quoting § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1993)). . . . Section 901.151(5) speaks in terms of "probable cause,” however, courts have suggested that "probable . . .
. . . are permissible where an officer has a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity); § 901.151 . . . State, 771 So.2d 1238, 1243 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see also § 901.151(5), Fla. . . . WARNER and CONNER, JJ., concur. . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . . The Florida Supreme Court has indicated that the meaning of "probable cause” in section 901.151(5), is . . .
. . . . § 901.151(2)(1997) (“Florida Stop and Frisk Law”). 3. . . .
. . . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); § 901.151, Fla. Stat. mon) . . . .
. . . He contends that the basis of this legal duty was § 901.151 of the Florida Statutes. . . . . § 901.151 is Florida’s “Stop and Frisk” law. . . .
. . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2009); Richardson, 599 So.2d at 705. . . .
. . . .; see also § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
. . . Florida’s “Stop and Frisk Law,” codified in Section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2008), permits "a law . . .
. . . State, 905 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); see also § 901.151(5) Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
. . . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and section 901.151, Florida Statutes, permit . . .
. . . State, 929 So.2d 1169, 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); see also § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .
. . . (citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)). . . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
. . . See § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2006). See also Carroll v. . . .
. . . The officer was entitled under section 901.151 to conduct a reasonable inquiry to confirm or deny that . . .
. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2007); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1995). . . . See § 901.151(4); Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). . . .
. . . See § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2006). IV. . . .
. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
. . . . § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . See § 901.151(6), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
. . . Various statutes justify restraint under stated circumstances, e.g., F.S. 812.015, 901.15, 901.151 (2006 . . .
. . . Arango, 9 So.3d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); § 901.151(2), Fla. . . . Applying these principles, the stop was justified, Terry; § 901.151(2), and the order under review cannot . . .
. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993)); see also § 901.151(2), Fla. . . .
. . . under these circumstances the officer did have authority to conduct a Terry stop pursuant to section 901.151 . . . Section 901.151(2) provides: (2) Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person . . .
. . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2004); Terry v. . . .
. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2007) (“Stop and Frisk Law”); United States v. . . .
. . . Section 901.151, Florida Statutes provides, in pertinent part: (2) Whenever any law enforcement officer . . . believe that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense. § 901.151 . . . Section 901.151(2) merely requires that Vila had encountered the defendant “under circumstances which . . .
. . . While we agree that the pat-down search exceeded the scope authorized by section 901.151 of the Florida . . . To the contrary, section 901.151 of the Florida Statutes limits the scope of searches conducted during . . . extent necessary to disclose, and for the purpose of disclosiny, the presence of such weapon .... § 901.151 . . .
. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). See also State v. . . .
. . . Section 901.151(3), Florida Statutes (2007), entitled “Stop and Frisk Law,” is of importance in connection . . .
. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also Gray v. . . .
. . . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see also § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see also § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .
. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1999); see also Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. . . .
. . . See § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . State, 610 So.2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); see also § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .
. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . . See § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . . § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . .; see § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2005) (“Florida Stop and Frisk Law”). . . . circumstances surrounding the person’s presence at the location which led to the officer’s suspicions. § 901.151 . . . investigatory stop is permissible if supported by probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed. § 901.151 . . . individual is armed with a dangerous weapon and poses a threat to the officer or any other person. § 901.151 . . .
. . . . § 901.151; see Tillman v. . . .
. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla Stat. (2006). In U.S. v. . . . Regarding investigatory stops, Florida Statutes, section 901.151, provides, “[n]o person shall be temporarily . . . See § 901.151(3), Fla Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . . § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2006), states: Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state . . .
. . . See § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2004); Terry v. . . .
. . . Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2006), provides as follows: Whenever any law enforcement officer . . .
. . . .; § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . . § 901.151(4); Golphin, 945 So.2d at 1180. . . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2006); Lanier v. State, 936 So.2d 1158, 1161 (Fla. 2d DCA2006). . . . Thus, Officer Shea was justified under section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2006), in detaining Mr. . . .
. . . See §§ 901.151(6) (“Stop and Frisk Law”); 934.06 (illegally intercepted wire or oral communications), . . .
. . . State, 792 So.2d 667, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2006) (“Florida Stop and Frisk Law”) provides: Whenever any law . . .
. . . The question presented on appeal is whether Morales was authorized, pursuant to section 901.151, to stop . . . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); § 901.151, Fla. . . .
. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993); see also § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .
. . . The Florida Stop and Frisk Law, § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); Terry v. . . .
. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime”); § 901.151 . . .
. . . Further, the seizure was not pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2005), Florida’s Stop and . . .
. . . suppress because Officer Junnier did not have probable cause to conduct a pat-down search under section 901.151 . . . Section 901.151(5), Florida Statutes (2005), states: Whenever any law enforcement officer authorized . . .
. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993) (citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)). . . .
. . . Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2004), which governs detentions, provides: Whenever any law enforcement . . .
. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). . . .