Cases from cite.case.law:

FOSTER, v. STATE, 244 So. 3d 430 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . New York , 445 U.S. 573, 602-03, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) ; § 901.19(1), Fla. . . .

FALCON, v. STATE, 230 So. 3d 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . 2010) (reaffirming suppression as remedy for violation of parallel knock-and-an-nounee provision of § 901.19 . . .

STATE v. MARKUS,, 211 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2017)

. . . Cases that turned on the application of section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1989) (Florida’s knock and . . . Therefore, the officers did not have the authority under subsection 901.19(1) to enter Ortiz’ apartment . . . State, 395 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (“Understate law [section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1979 . . .

STATE v. TAYLOR,, 201 So. 3d 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . based on the failure of the police to comply with Florida’s knock-and-announce statute found in section 901.19 . . . which prompted him to file his revised motion alleging the failure of the police to comply with section 901.19 . . . following part of the Benefield decision: As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19 . . . Under the peculiar facts of this case, we are convinced that § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was . . . recede from Benefield, thus leaving these exceptions applicable to instances where violations of section 901.19 . . .

MARKUS, v. STATE, 160 So. 3d 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Likewise, section 901.19, Florida Statutes— the "knock and announce” statute — has no bearing on the . . .

STATE v. Jo CABLE,, 51 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2010)

. . . See § 901.19, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla.1964), the plain language of section 901.19 would be consistent with the United . . . In Brown, the defendant argued that section 901.19(1), the knock-and-announce statute, supported the . . . Under the peculiar facts of this case, we are convinced that § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was . . . In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that “[s]ection 901.19, Florida Statutes, ... appears to . . . See Benefield, 160 So.2d at 710 (stating that section 901.19 “appears to represent a codification of . . . The 2010 version of section 901.19 remains the same as the 2005 version. . . . .

SOTO, v. STATE, 75 So. 3d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . his home after the police entered without complying with the “knock-and-announce” statute, section 901.19 . . . that they announced their purpose, which was to execute an arrest warrant, as the statute requires. § 901.19 . . .

STATE v. FERNANDEZ,, 50 So. 3d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . officers did not make the slightest effort to comply with [the knock-and-announce arrest statute, section 901.19 . . . warrantless "hot pursuit” arrest implicating a similar but separate knock-and-announce provision, section 901.19 . . .

BENNETT, v. STATE, 46 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . The State convinced the trial court that the officer’s warrantless entry was justified by section 901.19 . . . (1), Florida Statutes (2007), which provides in pertinent part as follows: 901.19 Right of officer to . . . Id. at 578 n. 6., 100 S.Ct. 1871 In fact, the Supreme Court cited Florida’s statute, section 901.19, . . . Thus, the State’s reliance on probable cause and section 901.19 is misplaced. . . .

STATE v. BROWN,, 36 So. 3d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . constitutional violation occurred; and (2) Brown’s reliance on the knock and announce statute, section 901.19 . . . Ill Brown’s argument for affirmance is based on the “knock and announce” statute, § 901.19(1), Fla. . . . Relying on section 901.19, this court concluded the officers’ warrant-and-knoek and announce-less entry . . . Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after . . .

Jo CABLE, v. STATE, 18 So. 3d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . failing to announce his purpose before entering the motel room, the officer acted in violation of section 901.19 . . . See Benefield, 160 So.2d at 710 (stating that section 901.19 “appears to represent a codification of . . .

MOBLEY, v. STATE, 14 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . . § 901.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . .

JENKINS, v. STATE, 978 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2008)

. . . Stat. (1997); 901.19(1), Fla. Stat. (1961). But see Hudson v. . . .

WOODS, v. VALENTINO, Jr., 511 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2007)

. . . . § 901.19 (limiting the instances where an officer can make a warrantless entry into a building to felony . . .

JENKINS, v. STATE, 924 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Statutes (2005), contains a knock-and-announce requirement for the execution of search warrants; section 901.19 . . . applying exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation of knock-and-announce requirements of section 901.19 . . .

STATE v. THOMPSON,, 852 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . officers who discovered them had failed to comply with the “knock and announce” requirement of section 901.19 . . .

V. P. S. a v. STATE, 816 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Therefore, the court concluded that pursuant to section 901.19, Florida Statutes (2000), the officers . . . Section 901.19(1) similarly provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after she or he has . . .

ESPIET, v. STATE, 797 So. 2d 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 901.19(1), Fla. Stat. (1999); Green v. . . . State, 632 So.2d 197, 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) ("Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1991), authorizes the . . .

K. GUERRIE, v. STATE, 691 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after . . .

DYER, v. STATE, 680 So. 2d 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . violated both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and also section 901.19 . . . This Court declines to extend F.S. 901.19 to instances where the police in hot pursuit chase a suspect . . . The decision not to expand § 901.19 any further than it already has been expanded is based in part on . . . That ease involved entry into an apartment and clearly states that “[sjeetion 901.19, Florida Statutes . . . This interpretation makes sense because it is difficult to see how section 901.19, Florida’s “knock and . . .

WILSON, v. STATE, 673 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . See, Florida Statutes, sections 901.19 (making arrest) and 933.09 (1995) (executing search warrant). . . .

FIDALGO, v. STATE, 659 So. 2d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . See, e.g., § 901.19(1), Fla.Stat. (1991); State v. Kelly, 287 So.2d 13 (Fla.1973); Benefield v. . . . for the defendant’s home or further any of the historical purposes of the Fourth Amendment or Section 901.19 . . .

M. ALBRITTON, v. STATE, 634 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . are guided by the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of a substantially similar statute, Section 901.19 . . .

GREEN, v. STATE, 632 So. 2d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1991), authorizes the police to enter a dwelling without a warrant . . .

McCLAIN, Jr. v. L. CROWDER, O, 840 F. Supp. 897 (S.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 5), the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Declare Florida Statutes Section 901.19 . . . The McClains, in turn, have moved to declare Section 901.19(1) unconstitutional. . . . Section 901.19(1) requires, inter alia, that a law enforcement officer “use all necessary and reasonable . . . Section 901.19(1) sets forth the “knock and announce’’ rule governing official entries for the purpose . . . : As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we . . .

ORTIZ, v. STATE, 600 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . Subsection 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1989), states: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after . . . Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1989), defines the authority of a law enforcement officer to make a . . . Id. § 901.19(1). . . . Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1989), was nowhere discussed. . . . In the present case section 901.19 has been raised by way of defense and the point is well taken. . . .

NAPOLI, v. STATE, 596 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . seized during a search and seizure conducted by the police in the absence of compliance with Section 901.19 . . . Section 901.19(1) provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority . . .

SAAVEDRA, v. STATE, 576 So. 2d 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . obtained after the police failed to knock and announce before entering his home, pursuant to section 901.19 . . . Under section 901.19(1), police may break into a residence to make a valid warrant-less felony arrest . . . However, section 901.19(1) is not violated when officers are voluntarily admitted. See Byrd v. . . .

STATE OF FLORIDA v. IRVING, 36 Fla. Supp. 2d 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1989)

. . . S. 901.19, the “Knock and Announce” statute, when entering the appellant’s house to assist a probation . . .

ROUNDTREE, v. STATE, 544 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1987), provides in relevant part: Right of officer to break into building . . . instant case involves one or more of the exceptions to the knock-and-announce requirement of section 901.19 . . . unlawful entry of the motel room that they occupied, they were entitled to the protections of section 901.19 . . .

STATE v. FERNANDEZ,, 538 So. 2d 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . consent to reenter the premises and need not knock and announce their authority and purpose under Section 901.19 . . .

HOUSTON, v. STATE, 528 So. 2d 940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the knock-and-announce requirements of section 901.19 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MEALY B., 851 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988)

. . . . §§ 901.19(1), 933.09 (1986). . . .

STATE v. E. GRAY,, 518 So. 2d 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . the evidence was properly admitted, finding that the entry did not involve a “breaking” subject to § 901.19 . . .

STATE v. HUME, HUME, v. STATE, 512 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1987)

. . . , section 12, of the Florida Constitution (the new search-and-seizure section), and applied section 901.19 . . . asserted failure of the arresting officers to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement of section 901.19 . . . so hold as a matter of law, especially given the mandate to strictly construe exceptions to Section 901.19 . . . of additional officers waiting outside the home did not constitute an intrusion offensive to section 901.19 . . . To rule otherwise would be contrary, in our view, to the intent of section 901.19(1) and would compromise . . .

STATE v. L. PETERS,, 499 So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . We find there was no violation of the knock and announce rule, codified at Section's 901.19 and 933.09 . . . identity, used to gain admission into a house, does not constitute a breaking within the meaning of 901.19 . . .

BYRD, v. STATE, 481 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1985)

. . . .-15, 901.19, Fla.Stat. (1979). . . .

COBHAM, v. STATE, 478 So. 2d 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . demonstrates either that the officer in question complied with the “knock-and-announce” statutes, §§ 901.19 . . .

STATE v. HUME,, 463 So. 2d 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . trial court found that in effecting appel-lee’s arrest the officers had failed to comply with Section 901.19 . . . Concerning the alleged violation of Section 901.19(1), we note first the well-settled rule that the statute . . . Thus, the state argues, the case at bar presents no facts requiring suppression based on Section 901.19 . . . so hold as a matter of law, especially given the mandate to strictly construe exceptions to Section 901.19 . . . Section 901.19(1) provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority . . .

VAN ALLEN, v. STATE, 454 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . The “knock and announce” rule is more commonly encountered in the application of Section 901.19(1), Florida . . . a backdrop of common law applications: As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19 . . .

A. BURDEN, v. STATE C. DILLMAN, v. STATE, 455 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . 1981), the act of opening an unlocked screen door constituted a “breaking” within the ambit of section 901.19 . . .

JONES, v. STATE, 440 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1983)

. . . Appellant further argues that the officers’ intrusion into his dwelling violated section 901.19(1), Florida . . . limited exceptions an officer may enter a dwelling to effect an arrest without complying with section 901.19 . . . So.2d 706 (Fla.1964), advanced several exceptions to the knock and announce requirements of section 901.19 . . . Florida Statutes, stating in pertinent part: As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19 . . . Inasmuch as there were exigent circumstances present and full compliance with section 901.19(1), Florida . . .

L. WALKER, v. STATE, 433 So. 2d 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . the state to demonstrate that the police officers had acted within a recognized exception to section 901.19 . . .

RILEY, v. STATE, 448 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla.1964); § 901.19(1), Fla.Stat. (1981); although that law has recently been changed . . .

SLOAN, Jr. v. STATE, 429 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . entry of the commonly occupied portions of the mobile home, the “knock and announce" statute (Section 901.19 . . .

STATE v. CANTRELL,, 426 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . entering the house the arresting officers had violated Florida’s “knock and announce” law, section 901.19 . . . Our sister court held that under section 901.19(1) the arresting officers could only enter the premises . . . The knock and announce statute is section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides that: If . . .

GRIFFIN, v. STATE LAWRENCE v. STATE, 419 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1982)

. . . implied invitation to reenter the premises freely or must he comply with the provisions of Section 901.19 . . . of reentry described in question (1) even though the officer seeking reentry complies with Section 901.19 . . . house had an implied invitation to reenter and did not have to “knock and announce” pursuant to section 901.19 . . . In this situation, he did not need to comply with the provisions of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes . . . of reentry described in the first question even though the reentering officer complies with section 901.19 . . .

STATE v. LOEFFLER,, 410 So. 2d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . In addition, they argue that section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1979), which contains Florida’s knock . . . Section 901.19(1) reads as follows: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced . . . In making their argument, appellees assert that since the protections offered by section 901.19(1) are . . . The case law which has developed around section 901.19 makes it clear that absent certain exceptions . . . As the opinion in Benefield points out, the purpose of section 901.19(1) is to protect the privacy of . . .

STATE v. McGRIFF,, 404 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . officers did not first announce their purpose as required by our “knock and announce” law, section 901.19 . . . On its face, section 901.19 allows an officer to break into a building after he has announced his authority . . . Section 901.19 is a codification of the common law which recognized that fundamental protection. . . . , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), severely limited the constitutional application of section 901.19 . . .

SMITH, v. STATE, 399 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . was an unreasonable entry violative of the United States and Florida Constitutions, and of section 901.19 . . . Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1979), states in pertinent part: (1) If a peace officer fails to gain . . .

STATE v. STEFFANI, Jr., 398 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . knocked, or announced their presence, or performed the requirements of the ‘knock and announce law’, § 901.19 . . . Roman, 309 So.2d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).[] The applicability of Section 901.19(1), Fla. . . . court as one which involves questions of great public importance concerning the applicability of Sec. 901.19 . . .

STATE v. SCHWARTZ,, 398 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . The trial court found that this conduct violated the Florida “knock and announce” statute, Section 901.19 . . . (1), Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: 901.19 Right of officer to break into building (1) If a . . .

M. WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 403 So. 2d 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . Florida has long recognized the particular sanctity of the home and enacted Section 901.19(1), Florida . . . Florida courts require that Section 901.19(1) be strictly adhered to. Earman v. . . . Because the officers failed to announce their purpose, they did not comply with Section 901.19(1). . . . s peril had he demanded entry and stated his purpose, however, is a recognized exception to Section 901.19 . . .

STATE v. G. MANNING, M. T. Jr., 396 So. 2d 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . Although Benefield deals with section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1961), the right of officers to break . . .

JOHNSON, v. STATE, 395 So. 2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . limited in making a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed within his lawful presence by section 901.19 . . . Benefield made it crystal clear that the limitations on an officer’s authority contained in section 901.19 . . . of opening an unlocked screen door constitutes a “breaking” or entry within the meaning of section 901.19 . . . Since section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1979), suffers the same defect, the requirements of Payton must . . . Section 901.19 and the cases decided thereunder do not give an officer the power to exercise control . . .

STATE v. MOYER,, 394 So. 2d 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . The State conceded that they did not comply with the “knock and announce” statute, Section 901.19, Florida . . .

COSTER, v. STATE, 392 So. 2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . challenge the validity of the police officers’ entry into a private dwelling without complying with Section 901.19 . . .

HURT, v. STATE, 388 So. 2d 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . Section 901.19(1) permits a warrantless entry into a building “where the person to be arrested is or . . . warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, . . . ” While Section 901.19 . . . Assuming Section 901.19(1) may be interpreted as permitting the officers’ entry, even in the absence . . . The cases interpreting Section 901.19(1) clearly hold that law enforcement officers, prior to opening . . . State, supra, arresting officers must comply strictly with the requirements of Section 901.19(1). . . .

LAWRENCE v. STATE, 388 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . implied invitation to reenter the premises freely or must he comply with the provisions of Section 901.19 . . . of reentry described • in question (1) even though the officer seeking reentry complies with Section 901.19 . . .

McANNIS, v. STATE, 386 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . illegal, according to appellant, in that the officers failed to “knock and announce,” as required by § 901.19 . . .

STATE v. SANTAMARIA,, 385 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . authorized under the “officer’s peril” exception to the “knock and announce” requirements of Section 901.19 . . .

PAYTON v. NEW YORK, 445 U.S. 573 (U.S. 1980)

. . . . § 901.19 (1979); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-11 (1977); Idaho Code § 19-611 (1979); IE. Rev. . . .

PRECES, v. STATE, 378 So. 2d 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . maintains that Officer Martinez’ failure to knock and announce his authority and purpose violated Section 901.19 . . .

MADAR, v. STATE, 376 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . . — s. 901.19 Disposition of apparatus. s. 933.02 Search warrants, implements and appliances. . 849.093 . . .

HANSEN, v. STATE WESTFALL, v. STATE, 372 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1977) provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after . . .

STATE v. JOHNSON,, 372 So. 2d 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . Appellee’s motion to suppress evidence was grounded upon an alleged violation of Section 901.19 and Section . . . In discussing Section 901.19(1), the Florida Supreme Court, in Benefield v. . . . J., and CROSS, J., concur. . § 901.19(1) “If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced . . .

KING, v. STATE MORRIS, v. STATE, 371 So. 2d 120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . suppress the evidence taken from Morris’ home following an alleged illegal entry in violation of Section 901.19 . . . Section 901.19(1) provides: (1) If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his . . . State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla.1964), it was held that Section 901.19(1) prohibited an unannounced intrusion . . . officer conceals his identity and obtains entry by trick or ruse, there is no violation of Section 901.19 . . .

H. WILSON, v. STATE, 363 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . arrest might have been based upon probable cause, due to the failure of the police to follow Section 901.19 . . .

STATE v. WALLACE,, 329 So. 2d 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . Bell, 249 So. 2d 748 (Fla.App.4th 1971); see also section 901.19(1), F.S. . . .

STATE v. LOPEZ, 44 Fla. Supp. 47 (Palm Beach Cty. Ct. 1976)

. . . she argues that if any crime was committed outside, it was a misdemeanor which under Florida Statute 901.19 . . . Stats. 901.15 and 901.19. . . . II Florida Statute 901.19 requires that peace officers give notice of their authority and purpose and . . .

LEWIS, v. STATE, 320 So. 2d 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . . § 901.19. . . . . § 901.19 is inapplicable to the instant case as the record reflects that the arresting officers after . . . Affirmed. . “901.19 Right of officer to break into building “(1) If a peace officer fails to gain admittance . . .

OLIVERA, v. STATE, 315 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . . § 901.19. . . .

STATE v. ROMAN,, 309 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . . § 901.19(1); F.S.§ 933.09; see the leading case of Benefield v. State, Fla.1964, 160 So.2d 706. . . . . § 901.19(1) and “pursuant to the principles as [stated] in State v. . . . none of the students there, heard such a knock (or any announcement of authority as required by F.S. § 901.19 . . . The “knock-and-announce” rules applicable under F.S. § 901.19(1) to a search which follows even a justified . . .

STATE v. ENGLISH,, 308 So. 2d 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . the Florida Supreme Court concluded that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, § 901.19 . . .

UNITED STATES v. C. CHAPMAN,, 384 F. Supp. 1232 (S.D. Fla. 1974)

. . . . § 901.19(1); 18 U.S.C. § 3109. . . .

WHISNANT v. STATE, 303 So. 2d 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)

. . . . §§ 901.19(1) and 933.09, F.S.A. in executing the search warrant, thus invalidating the legality of . . .

R. RUCKER, v. STATE, 302 So. 2d 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)

. . . . § 901.19, F.S.; Prather v. State, Fla.App.2d 1966, 182 So.2d 273. . . .

STATE v. S. KELLY,, 287 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1973)

. . . . § 901.19(1), F.S.A., requiring prior announcement by the officer of his authority and purpose before . . . or other drain, and that compliance with the ‘Knock and Announce’ requirement of Sections 933.09 and 901.19 . . . The basis for recognizing the exceptions to Fla.Stat. § 901.19(1), F.S.A., in Benefield was that the . . .

MORENO, a k a v. STATE, 277 So. 2d 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)

. . . Fla.Stat., § 901.19(1), F.S.A., provides: “If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced . . .

STATE v. COLLIER, 270 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)

. . . Section 901.19(1), F.S.A.1969, which is closely analogous to F.S. . . .

T. v., 58 T.C. 792 (T.C. 1972)

. . . Ann., sec. 901.19. . . .

EARMAN, Jr. v. STATE, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972)

. . . Section 901.19(1), F.S.A. . . . Section 901.19(1), F.S.A., is necessary. Benefield v. State, supra. . . . Section 901.19(1), F.S.A., comes within the exception announced by this court in the case of State v. . . .

STATE v. S. KELLY,, 260 So. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)

. . . wherein the Supreme Court of Florida stated: “As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to 901.19 . . . Section 901.19(1) Florida Statutes, F.S. . . . or other drain, and that compliance with the “Knock and Announce” requirement of Sections 933.09 and 901.19 . . .

EARMAN, Jr. v. STATE, 253 So. 2d 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)

. . . arrest without a warrant, nor compliance with the “knock and announce” requirements of F.S. section 901.19 . . . So.2d 867, and that the officers’ failure to comply with the statutory requirements of F.S. section 901.19 . . .

STATE v. BELL, 249 So. 2d 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)

. . . State, supra, set forth the requirements of Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F. . . . The court took pains to point out, however, that the requirements of § 901.19(1) should be strictly observed . . . What is disputed, however, is that § 901.19(1) affords citizens living in these areas less protection . . . The court here analogizes the test for determining reasonableness of entry under § 901.19(1) to that . . . In conclusion, considering the strict requirements of § 901.19(1) and the Bene-field case, and in light . . . Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes 1969, F.S.A., provides that: “An officer, in order to make an arrest . . . s entry into the building in the instant case was an entry by breaking within the meaning of F.S. § 901.19 . . . into appellant’s premises without announcing his authority and purpose within the meaning of Section 901.19 . . . before their entry are not inconsistent with a good faith belief on their part that compliance with § 901.19 . . . ascertain (1) whether the circumstances were such as to reflect good faith compliance with Section 901.19 . . .

STATE v. CLARKE, L. L. T. Jr., 242 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)

. . . Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S. . . . have codified the common law rule prohibiting forcible entry in statutes similar to Florida Section 901.19 . . .

T. SUAREZ, v. STATE, 220 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)

. . . are consistent with a good faith belief on their part that they were excused from compliance with § 901.19 . . .

URQUHART, v. STATE, 211 So. 2d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)

. . . Florida Statute § 901.19(1), F.S.A., provides : “An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue . . . In Benefield the Florida Supreme Court listed four justifications for not complying with 901.19(1), stating . . . at 160 So.2d page 710: “As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida . . . Thus, due to the violation of § 901.19(1), committed by the officer while in the process of arresting . . . In addition to violating § 901.19(1) and thereby causing the resulting search and seizure of Exhibits . . .

HUTCHINSON, v. STATE, 201 So. 2d 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967)

. . . Nor was § 901.19 (1), entitled “Right of officer to break into building,” required to be invoked. . . .

UNITED STATES FLETCHER, v. L. WAINWRIGHT,, 269 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Fla. 1967)

. . . The contention made by petitioner that the arresting police officers did not comply with Section 901.19 . . .

UNITED STATES FLETCHER, v. L. WAINWRIGHT,, 269 F. Supp. 224 (S.D. Fla. 1967)

. . . The contention made by petitioner that the arresting police officers did not comply with Section 901.19 . . .

RODRIQUEZ, T. v. STATE, 189 So. 2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)

. . . The appellants have assigned this as error and assert as authority for reversal Section 901.19(1), Florida . . . Section 901.19(1) provides: “An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or . . . rule on page 710 as follows: * * * * * * “As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19 . . . Since Section 901.19(1) was not complied with the fruits of the subsequent search should have been excluded . . . before their entry are not inconsistent with a good faith belief on their part that compliance with § 901.19 . . . are consistent with a good faith belief on their part that they were excused from compliance with § 901.19 . . .

STATE v. E. MACH, 187 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)

. . . The court in its order .also referred to subsection (1) of § 901.19, F.S.A. . . . , the court stated that, “It is the court’s opinion every case involving interpretation of Sections 901.19 . . .

CASSO, O v. STATE N. KIRSCHBAUM, v. STATE, 182 So. 2d 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)

. . . Section 901.19 (1), F.S.A., which reads as follows: “An officer, in order to make an arrest * * * when . . .

PRATHER, v. STATE, 182 So. 2d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)

. . . Section 901.19, F.S.A. . . .

KOPTYRA, v. STATE, 172 So. 2d 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)

. . . Section 901.19, Fla.Stats., F.S.A. Here, as in Benefield v. . . . method of •entry into the Hardin dwelling constituted a “constructive breaking” in violation of .Section 901.19 . . . The method of entry here did not involve a breaking within the meaning of Section 901.19, Fla.Stats., . . .

HEDGES, v. STATE, 165 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)

. . . the Statute was violated by an unannounced intrusion contrary to the provisions of Florida Statute § 901.19 . . . In this case the court said: “As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), . . .

J. C. BENEFIELD, v. STATE, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964)

. . . There was no attempt whatever to comply with § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and the two acts . . . Section 901.19(1), the applicable Florida Statute, provides: “An officer, in order to make an arrest . . . They completely ignored every requirement of § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., so everything they . . . The state argues that the Ker case, supra, involved a California statute similar to § 901.19, Florida . . . Section 901.19, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., like its counterpart California statute, appears to represent . . .

KER v. CALIFORNIA, 374 U.S. 23 (U.S. 1963)

. . . . § 901.19 (1) ; Idaho Code § 19-611; Burns’ Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1009; Iowa Code Ann. §.755.9; Kan. . . .

TOM COOPER v. THE CITY OF MIAMI, 160 Fla. 656 (Fla. 1948)

. . . See Sections 849.01, 849.05, 849.14-849.16, 901.19, Fla. Stat. 1941, F.S.A.; Kirk v. . . .