The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVII
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CORRECTIONS

Chapter 910
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

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CHAPTER 910

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

910.005 State criminal jurisdiction.

910.006 State special maritime criminal jurisdiction.

910.01 Offenses committed partly in this state.

910.02 Offense committed while in transit.

910.03 Place of trial generally.

910.035 Transfer from county for plea, sentence, or participation in a problem-solving court.

910.04 Where aider in one county and offense committed in another.

910.05 Where acts constituting one offense are committed in two or more counties.

910.06 Where person in one county commits offense in another.

910.09 Cause of death inflicted in one county and death occurs in another.

910.10 Where stolen property brought into another county.

910.11 Conviction or acquittal bar to prosecution.

910.12 Trial of aider.

910.13 Accessory after the fact.

910.14 Kidnapping.

910.15 Crimes facilitated by communication systems.

910.16 Venue; public meetings law violations.

910.005 State criminal jurisdiction.—

(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense that she or he commits, while either within or outside the state, by her or his own conduct or that of another for which the person is legally accountable, if:

(a) The offense is committed wholly or partly within the state;

(b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt to commit an offense within the state;

(c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the state, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state;

(d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of both this state and the other jurisdiction; or

(e) The conduct constitutes a knowing violation of s. 286.011.

(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the conduct that is an element of the offense or the result that is an element, occurs within the state. In homicide, the “result” is either the physical contact that causes death, or the death itself; and if the body of a homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state.

(3) An offense that is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state is committed within the state, regardless of the location of the offender at the time of the omission.

History.—s. 72, ch. 70-339; s. 2, ch. 95-353; s. 1510, ch. 97-102.

910.006 State special maritime criminal jurisdiction.—

(1) LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND INTENT.—

(a) The State of Florida is a major center for international travel and trade by sea.

(b) The state has an interest in ensuring the protection of persons traveling to or from Florida by sea.

(c) The state has an interest in cooperating with the masters of ships and the governments of the United States and the other states in the maintenance of law and order on board ship.

(d) The interests of the state do not in principle require a general assertion of primary jurisdiction over acts or omissions at sea that would duplicate or conflict with the execution of any law enforcement responsibility of any other jurisdiction.

(e) The State of Florida should establish special maritime criminal jurisdiction extending to acts or omissions on board ships outside of the state under the circumstances delimited in this section.

(2) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section:

(a) “Flag state” means the state under whose laws a ship is registered.

(b) “Ship” means any watercraft or other contrivance used, capable of being used, or intended to be used as a means of transportation on water, and all phases of construction of such watercraft or contrivance.

(c) “State” means any foreign state, the United States or any state, territory, possession, or commonwealth thereof, or the District of Columbia.

(3) SPECIAL MARITIME CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.—The special maritime criminal jurisdiction of the state extends to acts or omissions on board a ship outside of the state under any of the following circumstances:

(a) There is a suspect on board the ship who is a citizen or resident of this state or a state which consents to the jurisdiction of this state.

(b) The master of the ship or an official of the flag state commits a suspect on board the ship to the custody of a law enforcement officer acting under the authority of this state.

(d) The act or omission occurs during a voyage on which over half of the revenue passengers on board the ship originally embarked and plan to finally disembark in this state, without regard to intermediate stopovers.

(e) The victim is a Florida law enforcement officer on board the ship in connection with his or her official duties.

(f) The act or omission is one of violence, detention, or depredation generally recognized as criminal, and the victim is a resident of this state.

(g) The act or omission causes or constitutes an attempt or conspiracy to cause a substantial effect in this state that is an element of the offense charged.

(h) The act or omission is one with respect to which all states may exercise criminal jurisdiction under international law or treaty.

(4) CRIMINAL PENALTY APPLICATION.—An act or omission against the person or property of another that is punishable by law when committed within this state shall be punishable in the same manner when committed within the special maritime criminal jurisdiction of this state, provided that the criminal laws of the United States prohibit substantially the same act or omission on board ships of the United States registry outside of the territory of the United States. Except for the circumstances that are within the criteria of paragraph (3)(g) or paragraph (3)(h), it shall be an affirmative defense that the act or omission was authorized by the master of the ship or an officer of the flag state in accordance with the laws of the flag state and international law. No person shall be tried under this section if that person has been tried in good faith by another state for substantially the same act or omission.

(5) ENFORCEMENT LIMITATIONS.—

(a) The Attorney General shall take all measures necessary to ensure that law enforcement officers and prosecutors acting under the authority of this state respect the following criteria in applying the provisions of this section:

1. This section is not intended to assert priority over or otherwise interfere with the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the United States, the flag state, or the state in whose territory an act or omission occurs.

2. This section shall be administered in a manner consistent with international law, with the primary responsibility of the flag state for the maintenance of order on board ship, and with the responsibilities of the Federal Government under the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States.

3. This section shall be applied with the cooperation of the flag state and the master of the ship where feasible.

(b) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to:

1. Authorize the boarding, search, or detention of a ship or of persons or property on board a ship without the consent of the flag state or the master of the ship if the ship is located outside of this state or if the necessary law enforcement activities are otherwise beyond the jurisdiction of this state or the United States.

2. Restrict the application or enforcement of other laws of this state or the duty of law enforcement officers to protect human life, property, or the marine environment from imminent harm.

3. Constitute an assertion of jurisdiction over acts or omissions of military or law enforcement officers authorized by a state in accordance with international laws.

4. Prohibit the operation of gambling, games of chance, or other gambling activities otherwise allowable outside the territorial waters of the State of Florida.

History.—s. 1, ch. 89-201; s. 1511, ch. 97-102.

910.01 Offenses committed partly in this state.—

(1) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is consummated within this state, the offender shall be tried in the county where the offense is consummated.

(2) If the commission of an offense commenced within this state is consummated outside the state, the offender shall be tried in the county where the offense is commenced.

History.—RS 2360; GS 3185; RGS 5015; CGL 7117; s. 160, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(167); s. 73, ch. 70-339.

Note.—Former s. 932.07.

910.02 Offense committed while in transit.—If an offense is committed on a railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft traveling within this state and it is not known in which county the offense was committed, the accused may be tried in any county through which the railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft has traveled. The accused is entitled to elect the county in which she or he will be tried, as provided in s. 910.03.

History.—ss. 161, 166, 167, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(168), (173), (174); s. 74, ch. 70-339; s. 1512, ch. 97-102.

Note.—Former ss. 910.07, 910.08.

910.03 Place of trial generally.—

(1) Except as provided in s. 910.035 or in subsection (2), criminal prosecutions shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed; but if the county is not known, the accused may be charged in two or more counties conjunctively, and before trial the accused may elect the county in which he or she will be tried. By his or her election, the accused waives the right to trial in the county in which the crime was committed. Such election shall have the force and effect of the granting of an application of the accused for change of venue from the county in which the offense was committed to the county in which the case is tried.

(2) After a court orders a change of venue and in order to protect the defendant’s due process rights, the court, upon a motion of any party, shall give priority to any county which closely resembles the demographic composition of the county wherein the original venue would lie.

(3) If a court finds that a fair and impartial jury cannot be impaneled in the county where the offense was committed, and the court determines that once a jury is selected it shall be sequestered, the court on its own motion, or upon a motion of any party, may elect to select a jury from a county other than where the offense was committed. The selection of the alternative county will be governed by the requirements of subsection (2). Upon completion of jury selection, the jury shall be brought for trial to the county where the offense was committed.

History.—s. 162, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(169); s. 75, ch. 70-339; s. 2, ch. 72-45; s. 1, ch. 93-225; s. 1, ch. 94-184; s. 1513, ch. 97-102.

910.035 Transfer from county for plea, sentence, or participation in a problem-solving court.—

(1) INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION PENDING.—A defendant arrested or held in a county other than that in which an indictment or information is pending against him or her may state in writing that he or she wishes to plead guilty or nolo contendere, to waive trial in the county in which the indictment or information is pending, and to consent to disposition of the case in the county in which the defendant was arrested or is held, subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney of the court in which the indictment or information is pending. Upon receipt of the defendant’s statement and the written approval of the prosecuting attorney, the clerk of the court in which the indictment or information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding, or certified copies thereof, to the clerk of the court of competent jurisdiction for the county in which the defendant is held, and the prosecution shall continue in that county upon the information or indictment originally filed. In the event a fine is imposed upon the defendant in that county, two-thirds thereof shall be returned to the county in which the indictment or information was originally filed.

(2) INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION NOT PENDING.—A defendant arrested on a warrant issued upon a complaint in a county other than the county of arrest may state in writing that he or she wishes to plead guilty or nolo contendere, to waive trial in the county in which the warrant was issued, and to consent to disposition of the case in the county in which the defendant was arrested, subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney of the court in which the indictment or information is pending. Upon receipt of the defendant’s statement and the written approval of the prosecuting attorney, and upon the filing of an information or the return of an indictment, the clerk of the court from which the warrant was issued shall transmit the papers in the proceeding, or certified copies thereof, to the clerk of the court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant was arrested, and the prosecution shall continue in that county upon the information or indictment originally filed.

(3) EFFECT OF NOT GUILTY PLEA.—If, after the proceeding has been transferred pursuant to subsection (1) or subsection (2), the defendant pleads not guilty, the clerk shall return the papers to the court in which the prosecution was commenced, and the proceeding shall be restored to the docket of that court. The defendant’s statement that he or she wishes to plead guilty or nolo contendere shall not be used against the defendant.

(4) APPEARANCE IN RESPONSE TO A SUMMONS.—For the purpose of initiating a transfer under this section, a person who appears in response to a summons shall be treated as if he or she had been arrested on a warrant in the county of such appearance.

(5) TRANSFER FOR PARTICIPATION IN A PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT.—

(a) For purposes of this subsection, the term “problem-solving court” means a drug court pursuant to s. 948.01, s. 948.06, s. 948.08, s. 948.16, or s. 948.20; a veterans treatment court program pursuant to s. 394.47891, s. 948.08, s. 948.16, or s. 948.21; a mental health court program pursuant to s. 394.47892, s. 948.01, s. 948.06, s. 948.08, or s. 948.16; or a delinquency pretrial intervention court program pursuant to s. 985.345.

(b) Any person eligible for participation in a problem-solving court shall, upon request by the person or a court, have the case transferred to a county other than that in which the charge arose if the person agrees to the transfer, the authorized representative of the trial court consults with the authorized representative of the problem-solving court in the county to which transfer is desired, and both representatives agree to the transfer.

(c) If all parties agree to the transfer as required by paragraph (b), the trial court shall enter a transfer order directing the clerk to transfer the case to the county which has accepted the defendant into its problem-solving court.

(d)1. When transferring a pretrial problem-solving court case, the transfer order shall include a copy of the probable cause affidavit; any charging documents in the case; all reports, witness statements, test results, evidence lists, and other documents in the case; the defendant’s mailing address and telephone number; and the defendant’s written consent to abide by the rules and procedures of the receiving county’s problem-solving court.

2. When transferring a postadjudicatory problem-solving court case, the transfer order shall include a copy of the charging documents in the case; the final disposition; all reports, test results, and other documents in the case; the defendant’s mailing address and telephone number; and the defendant’s written consent to abide by the rules and procedures of the receiving county’s problem-solving court.

(e) After the transfer takes place, the receiving clerk shall set the matter for a hearing before the problem-solving court in the receiving jurisdiction to ensure the defendant’s entry into the problem-solving court.

(f) Upon successful completion of the problem-solving court program, the jurisdiction to which the case has been transferred shall dispose of the case. If the defendant does not complete the problem-solving court program successfully, the jurisdiction to which the case has been transferred shall dispose of the case within the guidelines of the Criminal Punishment Code.

History.—s. 1, ch. 72-45; s. 1514, ch. 97-102; s. 2, ch. 2001-48; s. 7, ch. 2006-97; s. 1, ch. 2015-178; s. 12, ch. 2016-127; s. 144, ch. 2019-167; s. 3, ch. 2021-240.

910.04 Where aider in one county and offense committed in another.—If a person in one county aids, abets, or procures the commission of an offense in another county, the person may be tried in either county.

History.—s. 163, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(170); s. 76, ch. 70-339; s. 1515, ch. 97-102.

910.05 Where acts constituting one offense are committed in two or more counties.—If the acts constituting one offense are committed in two or more counties, the offender may be tried in any county in which any of the acts occurred.

History.—s. 164, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(171); s. 77, ch. 70-339.

910.06 Where person in one county commits offense in another.—If a person in one county commits an offense in another county, the offender may be tried in either county.

History.—s. 165, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(172); s. 78, ch. 70-339.

910.09 Cause of death inflicted in one county and death occurs in another.—If the cause of death is inflicted in one county and death occurs in another county, the offender may be tried in either county.

History.—s. 168, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(175); s. 79, ch. 70-339.

910.10 Where stolen property brought into another county.—A person who obtains property by larceny, robbery, or embezzlement may be tried in any county in which the person exercises control over the property.

History.—s. 169, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(176); s. 80, ch. 70-339; s. 1516, ch. 97-102.

910.11 Conviction or acquittal bar to prosecution.—

(1) No person shall be held to answer on a second indictment, information, or affidavit for an offense for which the person has been acquitted. The acquittal shall be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, notwithstanding any defect in the form or circumstances of the indictment, information, or affidavit.

(2) When a person may be tried for an offense in two or more counties, a conviction or acquittal in one county shall be a bar to prosecution for the same offense in another county.

History.—s. 170, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(177); s. 81, ch. 70-339; s. 1517, ch. 97-102.

910.12 Trial of aider.—A person, within or outside this state, who counsels, hires, or procures a felony to be committed may be tried in the same county in which the principal felon might be tried.

History.—s. 5, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2366; GS 3191; RGS 5021; CGL 7123; s. 82, ch. 70-339.

Note.—Former s. 932.12.

910.13 Accessory after the fact.—A person who becomes an accessory after the fact to a felony may be tried in the county in which the person became an accessory or in any county in which the principal in the first degree might be tried. Prosecution of a person who is an accessory after the fact to a felony shall not be contingent on prosecution or conviction of the principal in the first degree.

History.—s. 7, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2367; GS 3192; RGS 5022; CGL 7124; s. 83, ch. 70-339; s. 1518, ch. 97-102.

Note.—Former s. 932.13.

910.14 Kidnapping.—A person who commits an offense provided for in s. 787.01 or s. 787.02 may be tried in any county in which the person’s victim has been taken or confined during the course of the offense.

History.—s. 44, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2368; GS 3193; RGS 5023; CGL 7125; s. 84, ch. 70-339; s. 55, ch. 83-215; s. 2, ch. 93-156; s. 19, ch. 93-227; s. 1519, ch. 97-102.

Note.—Former s. 932.14.

910.15 Crimes facilitated by communication systems.—

(1) A person charged with committing a crime facilitated by communication through use of the mail, telephone, or newspaper or by radio, television, Internet, or another means of electronic data communication may be tried in the county in which the dissemination originated, in which the dissemination was made, or in which any act necessary to consummate the offense occurred.

(2) For purposes of this section, if a communication is made by or made available through the use of the Internet, the communication was made in every county within the state.

History.—s. 1, ch. 80-25; s. 2, ch. 2001-99; s. 7, ch. 2007-143.

910.16 Venue; public meetings law violations.—Any knowing violation of s. 286.011 occurring outside the state shall be prosecuted in the county in which the board or commission normally conducts its official business. Any knowing violation of s. 286.011 occurring within the state may be prosecuted in the county in which the board or commission normally conducts its official business or, if the infraction occurred in another county, in that county.

History.—s. 3, ch. 95-353.

F.S. 910 on Google Scholar

F.S. 910 on Casetext

Amendments to 910

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 910

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S408.910 14 - INVADE PRIVACY - RELEASE CONF EXMPT FL HLTH CHOICES PRGM INFO - M: S

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

P. BARR, v. PURKEY, 140 S. Ct. 2594 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See Glossip , 576 U.S. at 909-910, 135 S.Ct. 2726 (BREYER, J., dissenting). . . .

J. LOMAX, v. ORTIZ- MARQUEZ,, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 203, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). . . . Jones , 549 U.S. at 203, 127 S.Ct. 910. . . .

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, LLC, III v. LLC, v. LLC, n De De La El Y v., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (U.S. 2020)

. . . temporary government ... be sooner made by Congress"); cf. 3 Stat. 524 (1819) (Florida) (similar); 31 Stat. 910 . . .

WEXFORD HEALTH, v. GARRETT, 140 S. Ct. 1611 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007), characterized this language as "boilerplate . . . ," id. , at 220, 127 S.Ct. 910, the court determined that the statute's text did not clearly displace . . . procedural practice beyond the departures specified by the PLRA itself ." 549 U.S. at 214, 127 S.Ct. 910 . . . Id. , at 220, 127 S.Ct. 910. . . .

UNITED STATES, v. SINENENG- SMITH, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (U.S. 2020)

. . . accord with the invited amici 's arguments, that § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is unconstitutionally overbroad. 910 . . . only the first, holding that § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) was facially overbroad under the First Amendment, 910 . . . advocacy, legal advice, even a grandmother's plea to her alien grandchild to remain in the United States. 910 . . .

K. G. S. a v. FACEBOOK, INC., 140 S. Ct. 2739 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-910. Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

ARCHDIOCESE OF WASHINGTON v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,, 140 S. Ct. 1198 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See 910 F.3d 1248, 1250-1254 (C.A.D.C. 2018) (Griffith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc . . .

RETIREMENT PLANS COMMITTEE OF IBM, v. W. JANDER,, 140 S. Ct. 592 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See also 910 F.3d 620 (2018). . . .

UNITED STATES v. LILLARD,, 935 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Flores , 729 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2013). . . .

L. SMITH, v. SHARP,, 935 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . (citation omitted)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (same); see also Grant, 886 F.3d at 910 . . . Grant, 886 F.3d at 910 (quotation omitted) (citing McBride v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. FUENTES- RODRIGUEZ,, 935 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Reyes-Contreras , 910 F.3d 169, 183 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (rejecting a "directness of force" requirement . . .

UNITED STATES v. R. GREEN,, 935 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 589, (9th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Harvey, 597 F. . . .

NICHOLSON J. H. a J. N. G. a v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES a a, 935 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Everett , 582 F.3d 910, 926 (9th Cir. 2009). . . .

UNITED STATES v. V. GILLIAM,, 934 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Shine , 910 F.3d 1061, 1063 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding defendant's prior Missouri conviction of attempted . . .

ANDERSON, AS TRUSTEE FOR NEXT- OF- KIN OF ANDERSON v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS Dr. M. D. HCMC D. J. A. F. HCMC M. D. s J. L. L. T. D. M. T., 934 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990) show that the right he identifies is clearly established . . . civilian scuba divers if they attempted to rescue a boy who had recently fallen into Lake Michigan. 910 . . .

UNITED STATES v. EUGENE,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 225 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Morillo, 910 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting that the exception does not apply to "garden-variety" . . .

MEJIA- RAMOS, v. P. BARR,, 934 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Whitaker, 910 F.3d 1056, 1061 (8th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) . . .

J. YOCHIM, v. S. CARSON, Sr. U. S., 935 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Castro , 816 F.3d 910, 920 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .

UNITED STATES v. C. BROWN, v. N., 934 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . HBS Int'l Corp. , 910 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11th Cir. 2018) ("Parties can most assuredly waive or forfeit . . .

J. MALOUF, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,, 933 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wilkerson , 910 F.3d 254, 257 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating that no precedent would have prevented a party . . . forfeited its Appointments Clause challenge by waiting until the reply brief to present this challenge. 910 . . .

MUHAMMAD, v. MAYFIELD,, 933 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) ). . . . boundaries of proper exhaustion," King , 598 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Jones , 549 U.S. at 218, 127 S.Ct. 910 . . .

SHIFFLETT, v. Mr. KORSZNIAK, SCI Dr. Dr. Dr. Dr. Dr. Dr. P., 934 F.3d 356 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 219-20, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). . . . Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). . . .

UNITED STATES v. NG LAP SENG, Ng, Ng W. C., 934 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . McElroy , 910 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (2d Cir. 1990) ; see Arthur Andersen LLP v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. TREVINO,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 901 (W.D. Mich. 2019)

. . . Parris , 910 F.3d 835, 839 (6th Cir. 2018) ; see also United States v. . . .

DUMONT, v. REILY FOODS COMPANY, 934 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 910, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (internal citations omitted). . . .

A. LAVITE, v. J. DUNSTAN,, 932 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wernert , 823 F.3d 902, 910 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .

UNITED STATES v. SIMPSON, 932 F.3d 1154 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Miller , 557 F.3d 910, 915-18 (8th Cir. 2009). . . .

J. DOHERTY, v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,, 932 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . SLC Techs., Inc. , 318 Ill.App.3d 1101, 252 Ill.Dec. 910, 743 N.E.2d 1066, 1077 (2001) (quoting Thornton . . .

TEXAS, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION EEOC P. U. S., 933 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 351 U.S. 40, 76 S.Ct. 569, 100 L.Ed. 910 (1956), likewise undermines Defendants' contention . . .

UNITED STATES v. THOMAS,, 933 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Donadeo , 910 F.3d 886, 893 (6th Cir. 2018). . . .

UNITED STATES v. NYGREN,, 933 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . App'x 905, 910-11 (4th Cir. 2009) ; Greer, 158 F.3d at 235. . . .

O. CAMPOS, v. COOK COUNTY,, 932 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Felder , 910 F.2d 1387, 1406 (7th Cir. 1990) ). . . . See Easter House , 910 F.2d at 1406 ("[A]lmost all litigation, whether conducted in a state or federal . . .

UNITED STATES v. P. MAZZULLA, 932 F.3d 1091 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lasley, 832 F.3d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 2016) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. ESCALANTE,, 933 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Reyes-Contreras , 910 F.3d 169, 186 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (citation omitted). . . .

UNITED STATES v. COLLIER,, 932 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rush-Richardson , 574 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 2009) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BOSYK,, 933 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lyles , 910 F.3d 787, 791 (4th Cir. 2018). . . . Sanchez , 555 F.3d 910, 914 (10th Cir. 2009). . . . Lyles , 910 F.3d at 795. . . . See Lyles , 910 F.3d at 793 ("The question, as so often in Fourth Amendment cases, is what precisely . . . Lyles , 910 F.3d at 793. . . . Lyles , 910 F.3d 787, 791 (4th Cir. 2018). A. . . . Nevertheless, we must "confine our review to the facts that were before the magistrate judge," Lyles , 910 . . .

UNITED STATES v. DUKE,, 932 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lasley , 832 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2016). . . .

UNITED STATES v. ANDERSON, 932 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Harris , 666 F.3d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 2012) ("The crime of money laundering is targeted at the activities . . . the transaction occurs, but become so only after the transaction is completed"); Harris , 666 F.3d at 910 . . .

DIONISIO, v. ULTIMATE IMAGES AND DESIGNS, INC. d b a a, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . Supp. 908, 910 (M.D. Fla. 1995) ). . . .

BORCHARDT v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,, 931 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 272 N.W.2d 910, 912-13 (Minn. 1978) ). . . .

DINE CITIZENS AGAINST RUINING OUR ENVIRONMENT v. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS U. S. LLC,, 932 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Verity , 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) ), and "few categorical rules inform[ ] this inquiry," Colusa . . . Makah , 910 F.2d at 558. . . . Makah , 910 F.2d at 558. . . . prospective injunctive] relief that would affect only the future conduct of the administrative process." 910 . . . Kescoli , 101 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Makah , 910 F.2d at 560 ). . . .

GENETIC VETERINARY SCIENCES, INC. v. LABOKLIN GMBH CO. KG,, 933 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . LLC , 910 F.3d 1199, 1205 (Fed. . . . Jack Henry , 910 F.3d at 1206 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. . . .

LEWIS v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS I II III s, 932 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dakota Access, LLC , 910 F.3d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 2018). . . .

TRACIE H. v. SAUL,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 990 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . (R. 910). See Sawyer v. Colvin , 512 F. . . .

P. J. BY THROUGH MR. MRS. W. J. L. G. MR. MRS. L. G. M. L. MR. MRS. J. L. Mr. v. CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 931 F.3d 156 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Idaho , 677 F.3d 910, 917-918 (9th Cir. 2012) (Prison Litigation Reform Act). . . .

FACIANE, v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA,, 931 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Williamson , 910 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 2018). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HALL, III,, 931 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Miller , 557 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2009). . . .

U. S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, v. MONEX CREDIT COMPANY, 931 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Padilla , 910 F.3d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 2018). This de novo review consists of two steps. . . . Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). . . .

UNITED STATES v. COONCE, Jr., 932 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Frank , 354 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. MUSCHETTE, 392 F. Supp. 3d 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . GX 255; Trial Tr. 834-35, 910. . . .

KOALA, v. KHOSLA,, 931 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Concurrence at 910-11. . . .

DOE, v. TRUMP CORPORATION,, 385 F. Supp. 3d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . If only 910 class members asserted similar damages (out of approximately 200,000 IBOs), the jurisdictional . . .

THOMPSON Z. T. G. T. III, S. T. T. T. v. DILL, 930 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lesher , 796 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2015) ). . . .

HARTMAN v. THOMPSON, 931 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wilkerson , 910 F.3d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 2018). . . .

WONGUS, v. CORRECTIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM CERT CERT s, 389 F. Supp. 3d 294 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . App'x. 910, 913 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Lum v. . . . Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 212, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). Compl. ¶¶ 10-11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. . . .

TAYLOR, v. GRUBBS v. LT. SCDC SCDC DOE, DOE, AI v. SCDC LT MR C, 930 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 204, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) ; see also Coleman , 135 S. . . .

L. C. v. ALTA LOMA SCHOOL DISTRICT,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 845 (C.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Dist. , 556 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) ( L.M. v. Capistrano ) (citation omitted). . . . Capistrano , 556 F.3d at 909 (citations omitted); see also id. at 910 (noting that "a procedural violation . . .

IN RE SANDIFER, 603 B.R. 648 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2019)

. . . in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor," if purchased within the 910 . . . In a single independent clause, the provision makes the 910-day period applicable to collateral that . . . Rather, the only limitations pertain to timing: providing a 910-day limitation on a specific type of . . . The first "thing" implicates the 910-day limitation; the "other thing" does not. . . . A 910-day limitation applies to motor vehicles acquired for the debtor's personal use. . . .

R. BRADLEY, v. VILLAGE OF UNIVERSITY PARK, ILLINOIS,, 929 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Felder , 910 F.2d 1387, 1396 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1067, 111 S.Ct. 783, . . . Id. at 281-82 (citing Easter House , 910 F.2d at 1400-03 ). . . . See Easter House , 910 F.2d at 1401 (finding that the alleged deprivation "was not one that the state . . . Easter House , 910 F.2d at 1402. . . . See Easter House , 910 F.2d at 1399. . . . Felder , 910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc). . . . Felder , 910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc). . . . procedures to determine if the existing predeprivation hospital admission procedure should be used. 910 . . . a sufficiently high-ranking policy-maker may equate with or be deemed established state procedure." 910 . . . See Easter House , 910 F.2d at 1402 ; Appellees' Br. at 22, citing Clifton v. . . .

GOLAN v. FREEEATS. COM, INC. AIC LLC, R., 930 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Capitol Records , 692 F.3d at 910 ("The absolute amount of the award, not just the amount per violation . . . Co. , 910 F.3d 371, 377 (8th Cir. 2018) ("[A] class must be defined 'in such a way that anyone within . . .

UNITED STATES v. ELAM,, 930 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Torres , 163 F.3d 909, 910 n.5 (5th Cir. 1999). . . .

ALARM DETECTION SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED, v. VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, a, 930 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . LLC , 910 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2018). . . . Messaging Antitrust Litig. , 630 F.3d 622, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2010) ; see also, e.g. , Kleen Prods. , 910 . . .

JUANCHENG KANGTAI CHEMICAL CO. LTD. NAC v. UNITED STATES,, 932 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 910 F.3d 1216, 1220 (Fed. . . . See SolarWorld , 910 F.3d at 1220 n.3. . . .

SELLARS, v. CRST EXPEDITED, INC., 385 F. Supp. 3d 803 (N.D. Iowa 2019)

. . . City of Northwoods , 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005). . . .

F. MAY, v. SEGOVIA,, 929 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . See 549 U.S. at 204-11, 127 S.Ct. 910. . . . Id. at 204-06, 127 S.Ct. 910. . . . Id. at 220-21, 127 S.Ct. 910. . . . Id. at 221, 127 S.Ct. 910. . . . Id. at 219, 127 S.Ct. 910. . . . Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007), as the majority succinctly explains, "the . . . the basis of perceived policy concerns" when applying the PLRA, Jones , 549 U.S. at 212, 127 S.Ct. 910 . . .

COLLINS, v. UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME DU LAC,, 929 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cohen , 910 N.E.2d 251, 258 n.6 & 259 n.10 (Ind. . . . American Commercial Lines LLC , 910 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2018) (applying Indiana law and noting potential . . .

CARDIONET, LLC, v. SCOTTCARE CORPORATION,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 442 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Various activities in process1100 can also be performed to trigger state transitions430, 910, 915 in . . .

FORREST, v. PARRY, PHM PHM I- IV, 930 F.3d 93 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . George Washington Hotel Corp. , 27 F.3d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1994). . . . See Gibson , 355 F.3d at 223 (citing Otis , 27 F.3d at 910 ). . . .

CRUZ v. P. BARR, U. S., 929 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . INS , 952 F.2d 910, 914 (5th Cir. 1992). See Tamara-Gomez v. . . . Thibodeaux , 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000) ). Altamirano-Lopez v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. PARKER,, 929 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Shine, 910 F.3d 1061, 1063 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that Missouri's first-degree robbery statute, . . .

UNITED STATES v. BLEAU, J., 930 F.3d 35 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Young , 910 F.3d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 2018). United States v. . . .

BETANSOS, v. P. BARR,, 928 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Marmolejo-Campos , 558 F.3d at 910 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Marmolejo-Campos , 558 F.3d at 910. . . .

MBI ENERGY SERVICES, v. HOCH, a LLC, a, 929 F.3d 506 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 910 F.3d 388, 391 (8th Cir. 2018). . . .

PARTRIDGE, v. CITY OF BENTON, ARKANSAS, 929 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lesher , 796 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2015), quoting Tennessee v. . . . Rensselaer Cty. , 910 F.3d 40, 47-48 (2d Cir. 2018) ("Based on the Supreme Court's directive that only . . .

IN RE EIGHT ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS REMOVED FROM STATE COURT BY JOHNSON JOHNSON, 603 B.R. 849 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . See In re Toledo, 170 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc. , 910 F.2d 784 . . .

UNITED STATES v. SORIANO NUNEZ,, 928 F.3d 240 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Veloz-Alonso, 910 F.3d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 2018) ("[N]othing in the BRA prevents other government agencies . . . Veloz-Alonso, 910 F.3d at 269 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) ). . . . Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) ); see also Veloz-Alonso, 910 F.3d at . . .

STERNGOLD DENTAL, LLC, v. HDI GLOBAL INSURANCE COMPANY,, 929 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Co., 454 Mass. 337, 910 N.E.2d 290, 304-05 (2009) (quoting Allmerica Fin. Corp. v. . . .

FREDERKING, v. CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY,, 929 F.3d 195 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Peck , 900 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. TZACIR- GARCIA,, 928 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Reyes-Contreras , 910 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc), issued a new opinion holding that Texas robbery . . .

SOTHEBY S, INC. v. STONE,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Seward & Kissel, LLP, 12 N.Y.3d 553, 559, 883 N.Y.S.2d 147, 910 N.E.2d 976 (2009). . . .

RAULERSON, Jr. v. WARDEN,, 928 F.3d 987 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 910-11. . . .

ESTATE OF MENDEZ, Sr. Jr. v. CITY OF CERES,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1189 (E.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Verity , 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990). . . .

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, v. ARCTURUS CORPORATION L. L. C. J. R. Co. L. L. C. AMG L. L. C., 928 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Sethi , 910 F.3d at 205 (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment where "[t]he investors . . . See Sethi , 910 F.3d at 205 (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment because the defendant . . . Sethi , 910 F.3d 198, 204, (5th Cir. 2018). . . .

D. FIELDS, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF CHICAGO P., 928 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Castro , 816 F.3d 910, 917-18 (7th Cir. 2016) (performance improvement plan); Langenbach v. . . .

DIVISION SIX SPORTS, INC. FINISH LINE, INC., 928 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Real Time Resolutions, Inc. , 910 F.3d 338, 342 (7th Cir. 2018). . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. SMITH, 928 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Miller , 557 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2009) ). . . .

HALL- WADLEY, v. MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT,, 386 F. Supp. 3d 512 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . App'x 910, 913 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) ). . . .

GREEN, v. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 68 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . FDIC , 910 F. Supp. 2d 213, 221 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Mintz v. FDIC , 729 F. . . .

L. SCHMIDT v. NEWLAND, PLLC, N. A., 927 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Flake, 322 Ark. 239, 241, 910 S.W.2d 190, 191 (1995) (applying § 16-56-105 to fraud and breach of fiduciary . . . Flake, 322 Ark. 239, 242, 910 S.W.2d 190, 191 (1995). . . .

PRIESTER, Jr. v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N. A. JP M. P. C. M. L., 927 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . . & Tool Works, Inc. , 910 F.2d 167, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1990). . . .

In SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, v. BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT SECURITIES LLC, In L. L. LLC, v., 603 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Ct. 2859, 192 L.Ed.2d 910 (2015). . . . Ct. 2859, 192 L.Ed.2d 910 (2015), but this argument has also been rejected on numerous occasions by this . . .

BIEL, v. ST. JAMES SCHOOL, a a St. a, 926 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bd. of Educ. , 910 F.3d 1297, 1305-07 (9th Cir. 2018) (R. . . .

LEFEBURE v. BOEKER, D. D J. Co., 390 F. Supp. 3d 729 (M.D. La. 2019)

. . . Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 212-13, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (citing Leatherman v. . . .

HARMON, v. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, 927 F.3d 884 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . . & Tool Works, Inc. , 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[B]ecause the denial of a motion for summary . . .

UNITED STATES v. JONES,, 927 F.3d 895 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 910, 916 ; cf. United States v. . . .

FLOWERS, v. MISSISSIPPI, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (U.S. 2019)

. . . State , 947 So.2d 910, 916 (Miss. 2007) (plurality opinion). . . . State , 947 So.2d 910, 916 (Miss. 2007). . . . State , 947 So.2d 910, 935 (2007). . . .

AMERICAN LEGION, v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION, v., 139 S. Ct. 2067 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Id. , at 910. . . .

WINKLER, v. PARRIS,, 927 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Parris , 910 F.3d 835, 842 (6th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Roe v. . . .

MATTHEWS, v. P. BARR,, 927 F.3d 606 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Attorney Gen ., 910 F.3d 714, 722 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). . . . that could threaten a child's welfare" found similarly insufficient by the Third Circuit in Liao , 910 . . .

HYOSUNG TNS INC. HS v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,, 926 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 337-TA-910, 2015 WL 6755093, at *36 (Oct. 30, 2015). . . .