Amendments to 916.15

1. Johnson v. Feder

   485 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1986)   Cited 30 times

   The provision requiring reports is followed by subsection (3) of section 916.15 which discusses the requisite judicial hearings. Subsection (3) provides that both the patient and the state have the right to a hearing before the committing court in "all proceedings" under section 916.15. The only "proceedings" contemplated by the section are the initial determination by the court concerning the need for involuntary hospitalization and the filing of the required reports by the hospital administrator. Therefore, hearings are mandated after each report, if requested.

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2. Woods v. State

   969 So. 2d 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 8 times

   § 916.15( 2), Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). Thus, for commitment to be continued pursuant to section 916.15, the court must find that the defendant is mentally ill and is manifestly dangerous to himself or to others. See Wisniewski v. State, 805 So.2d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). In the instant case, the trial court did not find that the petitioner was manifestly dangerous to himself or others and failed to include findings of fact on which such a conclusion could have been based. The court merely made the conclusory finding that the petitioner "continues to meet the criteria for his continued commitment under the supervision of the Department of Children and Families." Because the trial court failed to include findings of fact in its commitment order relevant to the issue of whether a defendant is manifestly dangerous to himself or others, the order is facially deficient. See Wisniewski 805 So.2d at 901 (remanding for the trial court to issue a new order including statutorily required findings); Tavares v. State, 871 So.2d 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); see also Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.217(b)(1) (stating that order committing defendant after acquittal by reason of insanity…

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3. Dep't of Children & Families v. State

   201 So. 3d 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 5 times

   Nor does subsection (2) of the conditional release statute assist the court in upholding the commitment ordered in this case. This subsection first establishes that in the event a defendant has failed to comply with the conditions of his release, the conditions may be modified. Here, the court has found that there is no acceptable modification that is available. Subsection (2) then continues: “The court may also order that the defendant be returned to the [D]epartment if it is found, after the appointment and report of experts, that the person meets the criteria for involuntary commitment under s. 916.13 or s. 916.15.” C.Z. meets neither of these requirements. As we have noted already, C.Z. has been found to be non-restorable under section 916.13, and section 916.15 deals with defendants who have been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus, this subsection is likewise inapplicable in this case.

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4. Dept. of Children and Family v. Amaya

   10 So. 3d 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 11 times

   (9) "Forensic client" or "client" means any defendant who has been committed to the department or agency pursuant to s. 916.13, s. 916.15, or s. 916.302.

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5. Furqan v. State

   136 So. 3d 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

   916.15 Involuntary commitment of defendant adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity.—

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6. Jones v. Morgan

   Case No.: 1:15cv281/MMP/EMT (N.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2016)

   • Motion to dismiss

   Florida Statutes § 916.106(7) provides that DCF "is responsible for the treatment of forensic clients who have been . . . acquitted of a felony by reason of insanity." Fla Stat. § 916.106(7). Section 916.15 sets forth the process for the commitment of a defendant acquitted of criminal charges by reason of insanity. See Fla. Stat. § 916.15(2), (3). Section 916.16 provides the trial court with continuing jurisdiction over an involuntarily committed defendant. See Fla. Stat. § 916.16.

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7. Phillips v. State

   178 So. 3d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

   • Motion to dismiss

   Chapter 916 provides the statutory basis for such commitment. Section 916.15 addresses this commitment as follows:

   PAGE 472
8. Department of Children v. Harter

   861 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 14 times

   Section 916.15(2), Florida Statutes (2002), states in pertinent part:

   PAGE 1275
9. Kellond v. State

   206 So. 3d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

   Petitioner seeks certiorari review of the trial court's order continuing his involuntary commitment after being found not guilty of attempted murder by reason of insanity. He argues that the order of commitment was facially deficient and a departure from the essential requirements of law because it failed to make specific findings that Petitioner had "a mental illness and, because of the illness, is manifestly dangerous to himself or herself or others." § 916.15(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). We agree.

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10. Furqan v. State

    56 So. 3d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 2 times

    Yusef Furqan petitions this court for certiorari review of a September 28, 2010, circuit court order continuing his involuntary commitment pursuant to section 916.15(2), Florida Statutes (2010). Furqan argues that the order is facially insufficient because it fails to provide any findings that he has a mental illness and, as a result of that illness, is manifestly dangerous to himself or others. The State concedes that the order is facially insufficient. Because we find that the order fails to include the requisite findings under section 916.15(2), we grant the petition, quash the order, and remand for further proceedings.