Amendments to 921.002

1. Graham v. Florida

   560 U.S. 48 (2010)   Cited 4,099 times   46 Legal Analyses

   The trial court found Graham guilty of the earlier armed burglary and attempted armed robbery charges. It sentenced him to the maximum sentence authorized by law on each charge: life imprisonment for the armed burglary and 15 years for the attempted armed robbery. Because Florida has abolished its parole system, see Fla. Stat. § 921.002( 1)(e) (2003), a life sentence gives a defendant no possibility of release unless he is granted executive clemency. Graham filed a motion in the trial court challenging his sentence under the Eighth Amendment. The motion was deemed denied after the trial court failed to rule on it within 60 days. The First District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed, concluding that Graham's sentence was not grossly disproportionate to his crimes. 982 So.2d 43 (2008). The court took note of the seriousness of Graham's offenses and their violent nature, as well as the fact that they “were not committed by a pre-teen, but a seventeen-year-old who was ultimately sentenced at the age of nineteen.” Id., at 52. The court concluded further that Graham was incapable of rehabilitation. Although Graham “was given an unheard of probationary sentence for a life…

   PAGE 58
2. Hall v. State

   823 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2002)   Cited 150 times

   2 more...

   The expressed legislative purpose under the Code is articulated thusly: "The primary purpose of sentencing [pursuant to the Code] is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of punishment." § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998). "The penalty imposed [for an offense] is commensurate with the severity of the offense and the circumstances surrounding [it]." § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998). In addition, "[t]he severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record." § 921.002(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).
3. Carpenter v. State

   884 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 275 times

   The alleged difference in the date on which the offenses occurred is significant because the Criminal Punishment Code became effective on October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (1997). Under the Criminal Punishment Code the sentencing judge has unfettered discretion to impose the statutory maximum for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002(1)(g). Sentencing for offenses committed prior to October 1, 1998, was governed by the sentencing guidelines then in effect. See § 921.0016. Accordingly, if the offenses for which Carpenter was convicted occurred on September 28, 1998 — as Carpenter asserts — Carpenter should have been sentenced under the guidelines rather than under the Criminal Punishment Code.

   PAGE 386
4. Gandy v. State

   846 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2003)   Cited 645 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   The order from the Second District in Gandy's case reads in its entirety: "Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is treated as a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and is denied. See § 921.002(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998)." Gandy v. State, No. 2D02-2417 (Fla. 2d DCA July 17, 2002); see also Gandy v. State, 827 So.2d 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (table report). Gandy asserts in his notice to invoke that the Second District's decision in his case expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal on the same question of law.

   PAGE 1143
5. Maddox v. State

   760 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2000)   Cited 249 times

   We note that the Legislature recently amended the sentencing statute applicable to felonies committed after October 1, 1998. See ch. 97-194, Laws of Florida (creating the Florida Criminal Punishment Code, codified at sections 921.002- 921.0026, Florida Statutes (1997)); see also § 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (1999). Under this statute, the trial judge must calculate the "lowest permissible sentence." See § 921.00265, Fla. Stat. (1999). Written reasons for imposing a departure sentence are still required when a judge imposes a downward departure. See §§ 921.002(1)(f), .0025, .0026, Fla. Stat. (1999); see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(25)-(26). However, the statute allows the judge to impose a sentence "up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense," section 921.002(1)(g), without requiring the filing of any reasons for doing so. See §§ 921.002(1)(f)-(h), 921.0026; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(25)-(26).

   PAGE 107
6. Butler v. State

   838 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2003)   Cited 60 times

   (Emphasis added.) This rule harmonizes the two provisions. The first provision (section 921.002(1)(g)) applies to general sentencing, while the second provision (section 921.0024(2)) applies to those circumstances in which "the lowest permissible sentence under the Code exceeds the statutory maximum." By this rule, application of section 921.0024(2) is an exception to the general provision of section 921.002(1)(g) that sentences cannot exceed the statutory maximum. We do, however, hold that when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose.

   PAGE 556
7. Moore v. State

   882 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2004)   Cited 76 times

   Under the CPC, "[t]he trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation or community control." § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). The Legislature expressed that the primary purpose of sentencing is to be punishment. See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). As with the sentencing guidelines, a single scoresheet for all offenses is used for CPC sentencing. However, a single sentencing range is not established under the CPC as occurred under the prior guidelines. "The permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum . . . for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively." § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (1999).

   PAGE 985
8. Jackson v. State

   64 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2011)   Cited 43 times

   The CPC is silent on how a trial court must resentence a defendant when the original departure sentence is reversed on appeal. However, the Legislature has expressed certain principles embodied by the CPC. See § 921.002(1). Among these principles is the notion that

   PAGE 92
9. Peterson v. State

   775 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 37 times

   Section 921.002(1)(h) does not prohibit all appeals by a defendant, but rather grants the state the right to appeal a departure sentence, defining a departure sentence as one that is less than the calculated lowest permissible sentence. Under earlier versions of the sentencing guidelines, the propriety of an upward departure could be raised. Section 921.002(1)(h) is directed at that appellate issue, and no more. A defendant can still raise constitutional issues such as judicial vindictiveness. See Gardner v. State, 699 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (reviewing record under earlier version of section 921.001(5) to determine whether sentence which fell within the sentencing guidelines was vindictive).

   PAGE 379
10. Champagne v. State

    269 So. 3d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 16 times

    The CPC provides that "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002( 1)(b). It also provides that "[t]he penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense" and that "[t]he severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record." § 921.002( 1)(c), (d). "Primary offense" is defined as the "the offense at conviction pending before the court for sentencing for which the total sentence points recommend a sanction that is as severe as, or more severe than, the sanction recommended for any other offense committed by the offender and pending before the court at sentencing." § 921.0021(4). "Prior record" is defined as "a conviction for a crime committed ... prior to the time of the primary offense." § 921.0021(5). Additional offenses, those "for which an offender is convicted and which [are] pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense," § 921.0021(1), are scored and included in the total sentence points calculation, which is then used solely to determine the offender's LPS, see § 921.0024(1)(a)…

    PAGE 632