Amendments to 921.0027

1. Williamson v. State

   852 So. 2d 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 2 times

   Because Williamson's offense is a true continuing offense, the date of her last overt act is considered to be the date of offense. Young v. Moore, 820 So.2d 901, 903 n. 4 (Fla. 2002). That date is October 31, 2000, which is "on or after October 1, 1998." Thus, section 921.0027 applies.

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2. Moore v. State

   859 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 12 times

   WHEN SENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT CODE (§§ 921.002- 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (1999)) FOR A VIOLATION OF A PROBATIONARY TERM ORIGINALLY IMPOSED TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO A PRISON TERM IMPOSED FOR A DIFFERENT OFFENSE, DO Tripp v. State, 622 So.2d 941 (Fla. 1993), AND ITS PROGENY REQUIRE THE TRIAL COURT TO AWARD CREDIT FOR TIME PREVIOUSLY SERVED ON THE SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR THE DIFFERENT OFFENSE?

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3. State v. Vanbebber

   848 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2003)   Cited 14 times

   §§ 921.002- 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).

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4. Moore v. State

   882 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2004)   Cited 76 times

   WHEN SENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT CODE (§§ 921.002— 921.0027, Fla.Stat.(1999)) FOR A VIOLATION OF A PROBATIONARY TERM ORIGINALLY IMPOSED TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO A PRISON TERM IMPOSED FOR A DIFFERENT OFFENSE, DO Tripp v. State, 622 So.2d 941 (Fla. 1993), AND ITS PROGENY REQUIRE THE TRIAL COURT TO AWARD CREDIT FOR TIME PREVIOUSLY SERVED ON THE SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR THE DIFFERENT OFFENSE?
5. Maddox v. State

   760 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2000)   Cited 249 times

   We note that the Legislature recently amended the sentencing statute applicable to felonies committed after October 1, 1998. See ch. 97-194, Laws of Florida (creating the Florida Criminal Punishment Code, codified at sections 921.002- 921.0026, Florida Statutes (1997)); see also § 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (1999). Under this statute, the trial judge must calculate the "lowest permissible sentence." See § 921.00265, Fla. Stat. (1999). Written reasons for imposing a departure sentence are still required when a judge imposes a downward departure. See §§ 921.002(1)(f), .0025, .0026, Fla. Stat. (1999); see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(25)-(26). However, the statute allows the judge to impose a sentence "up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense," section 921.002(1)(g), without requiring the filing of any reasons for doing so. See §§ 921.002(1)(f)-(h), 921.0026; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(25)-(26).

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6. State v. Rife

   789 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2001)   Cited 64 times

   Section 921.0016 is applicable to a defendant who committed a crime before October 1, 1998, and therefore it is applicable to Rife. The Legislature amended the sentencing statute applicable to felonies committed on or after October 1, 1998. See ch. 97-194, Laws of Fla. (creating the Florida Criminal Punishment Code, codified at sections 921.002- 921.0026, Florida Statutes (1997)); see also § 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (1999). Section 921.0026(2)(f), Florida Statutes (1999), provides for the same mitigating circumstance as provided by section 921.0016(4)(f), where "[t]he victim was an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident."

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7. Seagrave v. State

   802 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2001)   Cited 67 times

   Section 921.0011 is applicable to a defendant who committed a crime before October 1, 1998, and therefore it is applicable to Seagrave. See State v. Rife, 26 Fla. L. Weekly S226, S229 n. 2 (Fla. Apr. 12, 2001). The Legislature amended the sentencing statute applicable to felonies committed on or after October 1, 1998. See ch. 97-194, Laws of Fla. (creating the Florida Criminal Punishment Code, codified at sections 921.002- 921.0026, Florida Statutes (1997)); see also § 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (1999). Section 921.0021, Florida Statutes (2000) provides for the same scoring guidelines for victim injury regarding sexual contact as provided by section 921.0011.

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8. Blair v. State

   181 So. 3d 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

   Delma McNally Blair appeals the sentence imposed after revocation of his probation, under the criminal punishment code, sections 921.002 to 921.0027, Florida Statutes (2013). The state concedes error, and we reverse and remand for resentencing. “Sentences imposed after revocation of probation or community control must be imposed according to the sentencing law applicable at the time of the commission of the original offense.” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(30). The criminal punishment code applies only to felony offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2013).
9. Desmoke v. State

   912 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 1 times

   Section 775.082(8)(e), Florida Statutes (2001), states: "Felonies, except capital felonies, with continuing dates of enterprise shall be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines or the Criminal Punishment Code in effect on the beginning date of the criminal activity." Because Desmoke's offense of aggravated stalking was a true continuing offense, he was subject to the version of the Criminal Punishment Code that was in existence at the time of the beginning date of the offense. See, e.g., Williamson v. State, 852 So.2d 880, 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that "[b]ecause a scheme to defraud is a true continuing offense, Williamson's sentence is controlled by section 921.0027, Florida Statutes (2000), which applies to felonies committed on or after October 1, 1998, and provides that felonies with continuing dates of enterprise are to be sentenced under the sentencing laws in effect on the beginning date of criminal activity"). The amendment to the PRR statute, which allowed for PRR sentencing where the defendant commits one of the enumerated offenses within three years from the date of his release from a correctional institution in another state, could not be utilized in…

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10. Smith v. State

    876 So. 2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 1 times

    Appellant argues that the guidelines under which he was sentenced for robbery and burglary, section 921.001, Florida Statutes (1983), were later declared unconstitutional until enacted by the legislature on July 1, 1984. See Smith v. State, 537 So.2d 982, 988 (Fla. 1989). The State properly concedes that, for this reason, Appellant should be re-sentenced on those counts. We therefore reverse the denial of Appellant's 3.800 motion on the robbery and burglary counts and remand for re-sentencing either to non-guideline, parole-eligible sentences, or, if Appellant elects, to sentences under the version of the sentencing statutes in effect at the time that Appellant makes an effective election. See §§ 921.002— 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (2003); Copeland v. State, 842 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). See also Braggs v. State, 642 So.2d 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Fowler v. State, 641 So.2d 941 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Appellant has the right to be present at re-sentencing and to be represented by counsel. See Duhart v. State, 858 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

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