Amendments to 921.137

1. Hall v. Florida

   572 U.S. 701 (2014)   Cited 538 times   5 Legal Analyses

   On its face, the Florida statute could be consistent with the views of the medical community noted and discussed in Atkins. Florida’s statute defines intellectual disability for purposes of an Atkins proceeding as “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.” Fla. Stat. §921.137(1) (2013). The statute further defines “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning” as “performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test.” Ibid. The mean IQ test score is 100. The concept of standard deviation describes how scores are dispersed in a population. Standard deviation is distinct from standard error of measurement, a concept which describes the reliability of a test and is discussed further below. The standard deviation on an IQ test is approximately 15 points, and so two standard deviations is approximately 30 points. Thus a test taker who performs “two or more standard deviations from the mean” will score approximately 30 points below the mean on an IQ test, i.e., a score of…

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2. Cherry v. State

   959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007)   Cited 79 times   2 Legal Analyses

   Finally, Cherry challenges the circuit court's determination that he is not mentally retarded in accordance with the definition set forth in section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides:

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3. Dufour v. State

   69 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 2011)   Cited 22 times

   Dufour challenges the circuit court's determination that he is not mentally retarded in accordance with the definition set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203 and section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2005). In 2001, the Legislature enacted section 921.137, which barred the imposition of death sentences on the mentally retarded and established a method for determining which capital defendants are mentally retarded. See § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001). The following year, the United States Supreme Court held that execution of mentally retarded offenders constitutes “excessive” punishment under the Eighth Amendment, but left “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction” to the states. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).

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4. Rodgers v. State

   948 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2007)   Cited 91 times

   Rodgers presents two claims here. First, he argues that section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2003), which governs determinations of mental retardation in death-sentenced defendants, is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). As in our past cases, we find this claim meritless. See Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 43 (Fla. 2005) (holding that the defendant "has no right under Ring and Atkins [v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)] to a jury determination of whether he is mentally retarded"); accord Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252, 1267 (Fla. 2005) (citing Arbelaez and finding "no merit to [Rodriguez's] claim regarding the constitutionality of [section 921.137]").

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5. Brown v. State

   959 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2007)   Cited 33 times

   The motion also requested the trial court to declare a provision of section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2001), unconstitutional since section (8) of the statute stated that it was not to be applicable to defendants who were sentenced to death prior to the effective date of the act. Following Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), we adopted Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203, which adopted the statutory definition of mental retardation and recognized that Atkins applies to defendants currently on death row. See Phillips v. State, 894 So.2d 28, 39-40 (Fla. 2004) (holding that one may file an Atkins claim under rule 3.203 even if section 921.137 did not exist at time of sentencing). This renders moot the claim that the statute is unconstitutional. Moreover, the trial court determined Brown's claim of mental retardation using the statutory definition.

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6. Oats v. State

   181 So. 3d 457 (Fla. 2015)   Cited 18 times

   Contrary to the circuit court's decision, section 921.137 requires a showing only that an intellectual disability “manifested during the period from conception to age 18.” § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The term “manifest” means “[t]o show or demonstrate plainly.” The American Heritage Dictionary 1067 (5th ed. 2011). Accepting the position that “manifested” equates to “diagnosed” would render the first two prongs of the statutory test for an intellectual disability moot, as the only way to find an intellectual disability would be if the diagnosis already existed by the age of 18.

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7. Phillips v. State

   894 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2004)   Cited 35 times

   3 more...

   Phillips next asserts that his resentencing counsel rendered ineffective assistance for presenting insufficient evidence to show that his level of retardation met the criteria set forth in section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2001). Resentencing counsel cannot be deemed ineffective, however, because section 921.137, the statute prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded defendants, did not even exist at the time of Phillips's resentencing or subsequent direct appeal. Nevertheless, we do not preclude Phillips from raising the retroactive application of section 921.137 in a subsequent proceeding. Nor do we address the potential merits of a claim under Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, or Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203 (Defendant's/Prisoner's Mental Retardation as a Bar to Execution). Phillips is free to file a motion under rule 3.203. See Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 875 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2004). We express no opinion regarding the merits of such a claim.

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8. Atkins v. Virginia

   536 U.S. 304 (2002)   Cited 2,994 times   54 Legal Analyses

   Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a(h); Fla. Stat. § 921.137; Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 565.030(4)-(7); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2005.

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9. Carroll v. Secretary

   574 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2009)   Cited 274 times

   3 more...

   When Atkins was decided in 2002, the state of Florida already had a law prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded individuals. See Fla. Stat. § 921.137. That law defines "mental retardation" as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18." The statute further defines "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" as "performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test." The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted this definition as requiring a petitioner to establish he has an IQ of 70 or below. See Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319, 329 (Fla. 2007). Section 921.137, however, applies only to persons sentenced to death after the effective date of the statute in 2001. Fla. Stat. § 921.137(8). Thus, as the district court noted, § 921.137 is inapplicable to Carroll, and "it is only within the context of Atkins' mental retardation definition that this Court evaluates Petitioner's claim."

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10. Franqui v. State

    59 So. 3d 82 (Fla. 2011)   Cited 102 times

    2 more...

    When Atkins was issued, Florida had already enacted its statute prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded. § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001). Section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2009), which is almost identical to the 2001 version of the statute, provides in pertinent part as follows:

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