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Florida Statute 921.143 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 921.143 Case Law from Google Scholar
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Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 921.143

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVII
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CORRECTIONS
Chapter 921
SENTENCE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 921.143
921.143 Appearance of victim, next of kin, or law enforcement, correctional, or correctional probation officer to make statement at sentencing hearing; submission of written statement.
(1) At the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition of sentence upon any defendant who has been convicted of any felony or who has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to any crime, including a criminal violation of a provision of chapter 316, the sentencing court shall permit the victim of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, the victim’s parent or guardian if the victim is a minor, the lawful representative of the victim or of the victim’s parent or guardian if the victim is a minor, or the next of kin of the victim if the victim has died from causes related to the crime, to:
(a) Appear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a statement under oath for the record; and
(b) Submit a written statement under oath to the office of the state attorney, which statement shall be filed with the sentencing court.
(2) The state attorney or any assistant state attorney shall advise all victims or, when appropriate, the victim’s parent, guardian, next of kin, or lawful representative that statements, whether oral or written, shall relate to the facts of the case and the extent of any harm, including social, psychological, or physical harm, financial losses, loss of earnings directly or indirectly resulting from the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, and any matter relevant to an appropriate disposition and sentence.
(3)(a) This subsection shall be known by the popular name the “Officer Cheryl Seiden Act.”
(b) The court may not accept a plea agreement that prohibits a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer from appearing or speaking at a parole hearing or clemency hearing.
(c) In any case in which the victim is a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer, a plea agreement may not prohibit the officer or an authorized representative of the officer’s employing agency from appearing or providing a statement at the sentencing hearing.
(d) As used in this subsection, the terms “law enforcement officer,” “correctional officer,” “correctional probation officer,” and “employing agency” have the meanings ascribed in s. 943.10.
(e) This subsection does not impair any right afforded under chapter 960 or under s. 16(b), Art. I of the State Constitution.
(4) The court may refuse to accept a negotiated plea and order the defendant to stand trial.
History.ss. 9, 10, ch. 76-274; s. 3, ch. 84-363; s. 2, ch. 88-196; s. 1, ch. 97-120; s. 4, ch. 2001-209; s. 1, ch. 2004-14.

F.S. 921.143 on Google Scholar

F.S. 921.143 on Casetext

Amendments to 921.143


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 921.143
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 921.143.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

TAYLOR, v. STATE, 264 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . circuit court erred by accepting the victim's unsworn statement at sentencing in violation of section 921.143 . . . Section 921.143(1) states, in pertinent part: At the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition . . . The sole judicial opinion construing section 921.143(1) as a barrier to the admissibility of unsworn . . . In remanding for an evidentiary hearing on this ground, the First District read section 921.143(1) as . . . The Patterson court's construction of section 921.143(1) is unsupportable by the statute's text. . . .

BAUGH, v. STATE, 253 So. 3d 761 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ." § 921.143(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . State , which held that section 921.143, Florida Statutes (2016), bars the admission of an unsworn victim . . . In a short opinion, we construed section 921.143 to require that written statements from victims or their . . . Section 921.143 provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) At the sentencing hearing, and prior to the . . .

DICKIE, v. STATE, 216 So. 3d 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Dickie’s sentencing was improper pursuant to section 921.143(l)(a)-(b), Florida Statutes (2015), and . . . The plain language of section 921.143(1) does nothing to restrict the type of information that a court . . . In pertinent part, section 921.143(l)(a)-(b) provides that a sentencing court “shall permit the victim . . . The sole judicial opinion construing section 921.143(1) as a barrier to the admissibility of unsworn . . . The Patterson court’s construction of section 921.143(1) is unsupportable by the statute’s text. . . .

J. JULES, v. STATE, 165 So. 3d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . crimes in 1989, the trial court failed to consider victim input pursuant to Florida Statutes section 921.143 . . .

E. PACE, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 554 F. App'x 787 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 921.143(l)(a) (emphasis added). And, “[a]n unsworn witness is not competent to testify.” . . .

STATE v. McMAHON,, 94 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 2012)

. . . that the court is required to and will consider any victim input which is offered pursuant to section 921.143 . . .

STATE v. L. HAYES,, 997 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . .; § 921.143(1), Fla. Stat. . . .

PATTERSON, v. STATE, 994 So. 2d 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . The circuit court held that, pursuant to section 921.143, Florida Statutes, a statement from a victim . . . However, section 921.143, Florida Statutes, requires that the victim or family member either appear before . . .

JACKSON, v. STATE, 983 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2008)

. . . .” § 921.143(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . .” § 921.143(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); see also art. I, § 16(b), Fla. Const. . . .

R. SMITH, v. STATE, 982 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . sister and mother, in addition to the victim herself, to testify at the sentencing hearing, section 921.143 . . . Section 921.143(1) provides: At the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition of sentence upon . . . Today, as when section 921.143 was originally enacted, see Ch. 76-274, § 9, at 748, Laws of Fla. (1976 . . . Much has transpired as regards putting on evidence in sentencing hearings since section 921.143(1) was . . . Section 921.143(1) vindicates important victims’ rights. . . .

UNITED STATES v. M. DEGENHARDT,, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (D. Utah 2005)

. . . . § 921.143(2)(a) (permitting victim impact testimony at sentencing, limited to the facts of the case . . .

POWER, v. STATE v. V. Jr., 886 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2004)

. . . evidence, away from the jury; successfully argued a motion challenging the constitutionality of section 921.143 . . .

L. ROBINSON, v. W. MOORE,, 300 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 921.143(6)(h). . . . .

STATE v. WARNER,, 762 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2000)

. . . that the court is required to and will consider any victim input which is offered pursuant to section 921.143 . . . See § 921.143(1), Fla.Stat. (1999)(provid-ing that "[a]t the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition . . .

ROBERTSON, v. STATE, 780 So. 2d 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . .; § 921.143, Fla. . . .

STATE v. DAVIDSON,, 753 So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . See 731 So.2d at 692; § 921.143, Fla. Stat. . . .

STATE v. P. GITTO, P., 731 So. 2d 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Section 921.143, Florida Statutes, requires that before the court imposes a sentence upon any defendant . . .

ADAMS, v. STATE, 702 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . which may include an oral or written statement submitted by the victim or next of kin pursuant to § 921.143 . . .

STATE v. MAXWELL,, 647 So. 2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Another statute, section 921.143, Florida Statutes, allows victim statements about the extent of harm . . .

T. THOMPSON, v. STATE, 638 So. 2d 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Stat. (1993), prior to a sentencing hearing and prior to review of any victim impact, § 921.143, Fla.Stat . . .

LEON, Jr. v. L. DUGGER,, 750 F. Supp. 1103 (M.D. Fla. 1990)

. . . . §§ 921.143(3), 960.-001(1)(e). 2. . . .

OWEN, v. STATE, 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990)

. . . In accordance with section 921.143, Florida Statutes (1983), the trial judge heard testimony from the . . .

LeCROY, v. STATE, 533 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1988)

. . . State, 525 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1988), and determined that the provisions of section 921.143, Florida Statutes . . .

GROSSMAN, v. STATE, 525 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1988)

. . . .” § 921.143(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). . . . Accordingly, we hold that the provisions of section 921.143 are invalid insofar as they permit the introduction . . . Since § 921.143 was amended by ch. 84-363, Laws of Fla., the next-of-kin of homicide victims are permitted . . .

STATE M. C. WILHOIT, v. B. WELLS,, 356 So. 2d 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . See § 921.143, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976). . . .