Amendments to 921.143

1. Smith v. State

   982 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 2 times

   Section 921.143(1) vindicates important victims' rights. But, if construed so as to conflict with Rule 3.720(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (2005), section 921.143(1) might create as many constitutional problems as it helps solve. See Military Park Fire Control Tax Dist. No. 4 v. DeMarois, 407 So.2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) ("Matters of practice and procedure in state courts are solely the province of the Supreme Court. . . . Thus it has been held that a statute which purports to create or modify a procedural rule of court is constitutionally infirm."). Appellant's construction of the statute raises both separation of powers and due process questions. Section 921.143(1) fosters important victims' rights-as article I, section 16(b) of the Florida Constitution now contemplates-without appellant's restrictive interpretation no less than with it. The statute should not be read as limiting the testimony Rule 3.720(b) allows trial courts to consider at sentencing hearings.

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2. Jackson v. State

   983 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2008)   Cited 170 times

   1 more...

   Where, as here, the defendant is convicted of a felony, Florida law requires that "[a]t the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition of sentence . . . the sentencing court shall permit the victim of the crime . . . to: (a) Appear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a statement under oath for the record; and (b) Submit a written statement under oath to the office of the state attorney, which statement shall be filed with the sentencing court." § 921.143(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The statement "shall relate to the facts of the case and the extent of any harm, including social, psychological, or physical harm, financial losses, loss of earnings directly or indirectly resulting from the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, and any matter relevant to an appropriate disposition and sentence." § 921.143(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); see also art. I, § 16(b), Fla. Const. ("Victims of crime . . . are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused.").

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3. Dickie v. State

   216 So. 3d 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 4 times

   The Patterson court's construction of section 921.143(1) is unsupportable by the statute's text. The plain language of section 921.143(1) does not impose any "requirement" on victims or their families. In fact, the word "require" does not appear in the statute at all. The only constraint section 921.143(1) creates is on trial courts, to the extent that the trial courts "shall permit" victims the opportunity to be heard so long as those victims make their statements under oath. The Patterson court's interpretation of section 921.143(1) as "requiring" that only sworn statements of victims be considered by the trial courts markedly changes the meaning of the statute, encroaches on the legislature's role to write the laws of our state, and therefore contravenes bedrock principles of separation of powers.

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4. Taylor v. State

   264 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)

   The Patterson court's construction of section 921.143(1) is unsupportable by the statute's text. The plain language of section 921.143(1) does not impose any "requirement" on victims or their families. In fact, the word "require" does not appear in the statute at all. The only constraint section 921.143(1) creates is on trial courts, to the extent that the trial courts "shall permit" victims the opportunity to be heard so long as those victims make their statements under oath. The Patterson court's interpretation of section 921.143(1) as "requiring" that only sworn statements of victims be considered by the trial courts markedly changes the meaning of the statute, encroaches on the legislature's role to write the laws of our state, and therefore contravenes bedrock principles of separation of powers ....

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5. State v. Warner

   762 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2000)   Cited 97 times

   See § 921.143(1), Fla. Stat. (1999) (providing that "[a]t the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition of sentence upon any defendant who has been convicted of any felony or who had pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to any crime . . . the sentencing court shall permit the victim of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, or the next of kin of the victim if the victim has died from causes related to the crime, to: (a) Appear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a statement under oath for the record; and (b) Submit a written statement under oath to the office of the state attorney, which statement shall be filed with the sentencing court").

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6. Grossman v. State

   525 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1988)   Cited 138 times   1 Legal Analyses

   1 more...

   Florida's death penalty statute, section 921.141, limits the aggravating circumstances on which a sentence of death may be imposed to the circumstances listed in the statute. § 921.141(5). The impact of the murder on family members and friends is not one of these aggravating circumstances. Thus, victim impact is a non-statutory aggravating circumstance which would not be an appropriate circumstance on which to base a death sentence. Blair v. State, 406 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 1981); Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1979); Riley v. State, 366 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1978). Florida law provides, however, that prior to sentencing any defendant convicted of a homicide, the next-of-kin of the homicide victim will be permitted to either appear before the court or to submit a written statement under oath for the consideration of the sentencing court. These statements shall be limited solely "to the facts of the case and the extent of any harm, including social, psychological, or physical harm, financial losses, and loss of earnings directly or indirectly resulting from the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced." § 921.143( 2), Fla. Stat. (1985). Thus, it is clear that the…

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7. Baugh v. State

   253 So. 3d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 1 times

   Section 921.143 provides in pertinent part as follows:

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8. Patterson v. State

   994 So. 2d 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 3 times

   The appellant's third claim alleged that trial counsel failed to object to a letter from the victim's brother submitted for consideration during sentencing when the letter was not authenticated, not handwritten and not signed. The circuit court held that, pursuant to section 921.143, Florida Statutes, a statement from a victim's family member may be considered at the sentencing hearing and the appellant failed to demonstrate any error by counsel. However, section 921.143, Florida Statutes, requires that the victim or family member either appear before the sentencing court under oath or submit a written statement under oath to the state attorney, neither of which occurred in this case. Furthermore, it is apparent that the sentencing judge relied on the erroneously admitted evidence when imposing appellant's sentence. Therefore, it appears that the circuit court erred in summarily denying this facially sufficient claim.
9. Andrade v. State

   328 So. 3d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)

   In addition to being notified of s. 921.143 [permitting victims the opportunity to appear before the sentencing court to make a statement or to submit a written statement to be filed with the sentencing court], the victim of a felony involving physical or emotional injury or trauma ... shall be consulted by the state attorney in order to obtain the views of the victim ... about the disposition of any criminal or juvenile case brought as a result of such crime, including the views of the victim or family about[ ] ... [p]articipation in pretrial diversion programs[.]
10. Owen v. State

    560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990)   Cited 65 times

    We address additional issues which may recur should a retrial occur. In accordance with section 921.143, Florida Statutes (1983), the trial judge heard testimony from the victim's family on the impact of the crime after receiving the jury's advisory recommendation of death. The judge did not have the benefit of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440, (1987), and of Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1354, 103 L.Ed.2d 822 (1989), but nevertheless recognized that victim impact evidence by family members could not be used as an aggravating factor. If a death penalty phase is reached in a retrial, such evidence should not be received.

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