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F.S. 921.16 on Google Scholar

F.S. 921.16 on Casetext

Amendments to 921.16


The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)

Title XLVII
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CORRECTIONS
Chapter 921
SENTENCE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 921.16 Florida Statutes and Case Law
921.16 When sentences to be concurrent and when consecutive.
(1) A defendant convicted of two or more offenses charged in the same indictment, information, or affidavit or in consolidated indictments, informations, or affidavits shall serve the sentences of imprisonment concurrently unless the court directs that two or more of the sentences be served consecutively. Sentences of imprisonment for offenses not charged in the same indictment, information, or affidavit shall be served consecutively unless the court directs that two or more of the sentences be served concurrently. Any sentence for sexual battery as defined in chapter 794 or murder as defined in s. 782.04 must be imposed consecutively to any other sentence for sexual battery or murder which arose out of a separate criminal episode or transaction.
(2) A county court or circuit court of this state may direct that the sentence imposed by such court be served concurrently with a sentence imposed by a court of another state or of the United States or, for purposes of this section, concurrently with a sentence to be imposed in another jurisdiction. In such case, the Department of Corrections may designate the correctional institution of the other jurisdiction as the place for reception and confinement of such person and may also designate the place in Florida for reception and confinement of such person in the event that confinement in the other jurisdiction terminates before the expiration of the Florida sentence. The sheriff shall forward commitment papers and other documents specified in s. 944.17 to the department. Upon imposing such a sentence, the court shall notify the Florida Commission on Offender Review as to the jurisdiction in which the sentence is to be served. Any prisoner so released to another jurisdiction shall be eligible for consideration for parole by the Florida Commission on Offender Review pursuant to chapter 947, except that the commission shall determine the presumptive parole release date and the effective parole release date by requesting such person’s file from the receiving jurisdiction. Upon receiving such records, the commission shall determine these release dates based on the relevant information in that file and shall give credit toward reduction of the Florida sentence for gain-time granted by the jurisdiction where the inmate is serving the sentence. The Florida Commission on Offender Review may concur with the parole release decision of the jurisdiction granting parole and accepting supervision.
(3) A county court or circuit court of this state may not direct that the sentence imposed by such court be served coterminously with a sentence imposed by another court of this state or imposed by a court of another state.
History.s. 261, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(271); s. 124, ch. 70-339; s. 1, ch. 78-219; s. 24, ch. 79-3; s. 12, ch. 79-42; s. 1, ch. 79-310; s. 43, ch. 88-122; s. 10, ch. 95-283; s. 2, ch. 2000-179; s. 1, ch. 2003-128; s. 22, ch. 2014-191; s. 21, ch. 2016-24; s. 27, ch. 2017-37; s. 13, ch. 2017-107.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: March 07, 2023
F.S. 921.16 on Google Scholar

F.S. 921.16 on Casetext

Amendments to 921.16


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 921.16
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 921.16.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S921.16
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 921.16.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Almendares v. State

    916 So. 2d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 34 times
    A trial judge may sentence a criminal defendant to concurrent or consecutive sentences. See § 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) ("and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively"); § 921.16(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (a defendant convicted of two or more offenses charged in a single information shall serve the sentences concurrently "unless the court directs that two or more of the sentences be served consecutively"); § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2003) ("The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively" when imposing standard sentences under the Criminal Punishment Code).
    PAGE 30
  2. Rozmestor v. State

    381 So. 2d 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 18 times
    Unless there is specific statutory authority to impose a sentence, it cannot stand. Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853, 13 So.2d 458 (1943). Wright v. State, 348 So.2d 633, 634 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). And the language susceptible of differing constructions shall be construed most favorably to the accused. § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). A defendant convicted of two or more offenses not charged in the same information shall serve the sentences imposed consecutively unless the court directs that some or all be served concurrently. § 921.16(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). The statute provides for concurrent sentences or consecutive sentences, but not a combination. Divided or non-consecutive sentences have been uniformly disapproved in this state. In State v. Coleman, 149 Fla. 28, 5 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1941) a prisoner was released shortly after she commenced to serve her sentence. After the prison term would have expired the state sought to imprison her to serve the full term. The Supreme Court held the state could not further imprison her: ". . . the convict has a right to pay his debt to society by one continuous period of imprisonment." Id. at 61. (Emphasis supplied).
    PAGE 326
  3. Oregon v. Ice

    555 U.S. 160 (2009)   Cited 1,195 times   5 Legal Analyses
    2. E.g., Florida (Fla. Stat. § 921.16 (2007)); Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21–4608 (2007));Mississippi (Miss.Code Ann. § 99–19–21 (2007)).
    PAGE 177
  4. Campbell v. State

    884 So. 2d 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 146 times
    The trial court denied the motion because the oral pronouncement was made in a way that suggested consecutive sentences. We disagree. It is apparent from the sentencing transcript that the trial court did not direct the sentences to run consecutively. Therefore, the prison sentences shall run concurrently, and the written sentences shall be corrected to conform to the oral pronouncement of sentence. See § 921.16(1); Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 2003); Hunter v. State, 846 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to correct the written sentences to reflect that the prison sentences are to run concurrently.
  5. Ransone v. State

    48 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 2010)   Cited 38 times
    Here, the Fourth District properly applied our precedent in Daniels and the statutory requirements of section 921.16(1). Ransone was sentenced on separately charged offenses, and the trial court did not make the Broward sentence concurrent with any other sentence. Therefore, under section 921.16(1), Ransone's Broward sentence was consecutive to his previous Miami-Dade sentence. And, pursuant to Daniels, because the sentences were consecutive, Ransone was not entitled to jail-time credit toward his Broward sentence for the time spent in the Miami-Dade jail, which was already credited toward the Miami-Dade sentence. Accordingly, the Fourth District properly denied Ransone additional jail-time credit toward his Broward sentence.
    PAGE 694
  6. Benyard v. Wainwright

    322 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1975)   Cited 101 times
    We recognize direct conflict exists between Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.722, adopted February 1, 1973, and Section 921.16, Florida Statutes (1973). Our Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.722 directs that sentences are concurrent unless affirmatively designated as consecutive by the sentencing court. In our opinion, the statute must prevail over our rule because the subject is substantive law.
    PAGE 475
  7. Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp.

    171 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2005)   Cited 238 times
    Tittizer argues that the language in her lease allows Union Gas to make the effective date of the pooled unit retroactive by language in the Designation. On the contrary, under the terms of the lease, pooling can only be effectuated upon recordation of an instrument identifying the pooled unit. While the lease allows Union Gas to pool by recording at any time, it does not allow Union Gas to pool on a date other than that of recordation of the Designation. Therefore, the attempt by Union Gas to effect pooling on a date prior to the date of recordation, by assigning a different effective date in the Designation, is contrary to the unambiguous terms of the lease. Our courts of appeals have also reached the same conclusion on similar lease language. See, e.g., Sauder v. Frye, 613 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex.Civ.App.Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (holding, in interpreting a pooling clause providing that the lessee "shall execute in writing and record" an instrument identifying the units, that the intent of the parties was for unitization to be effective only upon recording of the designation); Yelderman v. McCarthy, 474 S.W.2d 781, 782, 784 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd…
    PAGE 861
  8. Mount v. State

    97 So. 3d 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 14 times
    The court did not have a reason to do so because the Miami–Dade sentences had been completed. Nevertheless, because this case was charged separately from the Miami–Dade cases, by operation of statute, the Broward sentence was consecutive to the Miami–Dade sentences. § 921.16(1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (providing: “Sentences of imprisonment for offenses not charged in the same indictment, information, or affidavit shall be served consecutively unless the court directs that two or more of the sentences be served concurrently”). See also State v. Matthews, 891 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla.2004) (explaining that, pursuant to section 921.16(1), because the trial court did not specify that a sentence was concurrent, a sentence for violation of probation was automatically structured to run consecutive to the sentence on an unrelated new offense committed while defendant was on probation). This conclusion is buttressed by common sense in that the Miami–Dade “time served” sentences were completed before the sentence was imposed in this unrelated case. Id. at 447–48.
    PAGE 954
  9. Ransone v. State

    20 So. 3d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 12 times
    The Broward case was unrelated to the Miami-Dade charges and was charged in a separate information. When the trial court sentenced Ransone, it did not indicate that the sentence would be concurrent with any other sentences. The court did not have a reason to do so because the Miami-Dade sentences had been completed. Nevertheless, because this case was charged separately from the Miami-Dade cases, by operation of statute, the Broward sentence was consecutive to the Miami-Dade sentences. § 921.16( 1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (providing: "Sentences of imprisonment for offenses not charged in the same indictment, information, or affidavit shall be served consecutively unless the court directs that two or more of the sentences be served concurrently"). See also State v. Matthews, 891 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that, pursuant to section 921.16( 1), because the trial court did not specify that a sentence was concurrent, a sentence for violation of probation was automatically structured to run consecutive to the sentence on an unrelated new offense committed while defendant was on probation). This conclusion is buttressed by common sense in that the Miami-Dade…
    PAGE 448