Amendments to 921.161

1. Kronz v. State

   462 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1985)   Cited 70 times

   We agree with the conclusion of the First District Court of Appeal in both Kurlin and the instant case, and hold that the term "county jail" is applicable only to Florida jails and, in our view, was not intended by the legislature to apply to various places of incarceration in other jurisdictions. We note that the award of credit for time served in Florida jails prior to sentencing has not always been a matter of right. Prior to 1973, section 921.161 provided that the only credit that must be given was for that time served in a "county jail" between the imposition of sentence and the defendant's transfer to the state prison system. § 921.161( 2), Fla. Stat. (1969). Clearly, the incarceration referred to in that statute could have been only in a Florida county jail. Section 921.161( 1), Florida Statutes (1969), also gave the trial judge discretionary authority to award credit for time sewed in county jails prior to sentencing. This provision was amended in 1973 to mandate that such credit be given. Ch. 73-71, Laws of Fla. Interpreting the term "county jail," as used in sections 921.161( 1) and (2), we conclude that section 921.161( 1…

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2. Daniels v. State

   491 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1986)   Cited 150 times

   We approve the district court's decision. The law is clear that a defendant is entitled to have his sentence reflect credit for any time served in jail prior to sentencing. Formerly, the determination as to whether the defendant should be allowed credit for all or part of the time spent in county jail before sentencing was left to the sole discretion of the sentencing court. In 1973, however, the legislature amended section 921.161(1) to provide that the court must allow a defendant credit for all of the time spent in the county jail before sentencing. See ch. 73-71, Laws of Fla.

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3. Tal-Mason v. State

   515 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1987)   Cited 55 times

   2 more...

   Section 921.161(1) states:
4. Fernandez v. State

   627 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 28 times

   In Fraser, the trial court had initially given the defendant a downward departure sentence of community control. Because the trial court failed to provide contemporaneous written reasons for the departure, the state appealed and this court reversed the sentence. State v. Fraser, 564 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In a subsequent appeal, we held that the trial court could not provide written reasons for a downward departure at Fraser's sentencing on remand, but was required to sentence Fraser to a guidelines sentence. State v. Fraser, 582 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Because it seemed unfair to imprison Fraser merely as a result of a paperwork error by the trial judge, we certified two questions to the supreme court. One of those questions asked whether a trial court "can" give credit for time served on community control. Thus, the issue before the supreme court in Fraser was whether the trial court had the discretion under section 921.161, Florida Statutes (1989), to give jail credit for successfully completed periods of community control.

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5. Kurlin v. State

   302 So. 2d 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 20 times

   We now turn to appellant's contention that the trial court erred in failing to credit "jail time" in accordance with Florida Statute 921.161(1) as amended by Chapter 73-71 Laws of Florida 1973. In that regard, the trial court stated, incident to sentencing the appellant, when the question of credit for jail time was raised:

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6. United States v. Wilson

   503 U.S. 329 (1992)   Cited 2,961 times   1 Legal Analyses

   Several States have recognized the advantages of assigning to the court the task of calculating jail credit. See Fla. Stat. § 921.161 (1991) ("A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence. The credit must be for a specified period of time and shall be provided for in the sentence"); see also Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 2900.5(d) (West Supp. 1992); Mass.Gen. Laws § 279:33A (1990).

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7. Johnson v. State

   60 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. 2011)   Cited 290 times

   In the instant cases, the written plea agreements informed Johnson and Joyner that by accepting the agreements, they contracted to accept a specific amount of credit for time served. In their motions filed under rule 3.800(a), Johnson and Joyner claimed — notwithstanding the terms of their plea agreements — that they were entitled to relief because section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (2006), created a statutory right to credit for time served while awaiting sentencing and they did not receive all of the credit to which they were entitled. Johnson and Joyner did not assert in their rule 3.800(a) motions that their plea agreements should be set aside because they were unaware of the credit-for-time-served provisions or because their pleas were otherwise involuntary. They simply claimed entitlement to the full amount of credit for time served authorized by section 921.161(1).

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8. State v. Mancino

   714 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1998)   Cited 286 times

   In support of the Second District's conclusion, Mancino cites Hopping v. State, 650 So.2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), which states that failure to grant proper jail credit for time served is an illegal sentence under rule 3.800 since section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1995) affirmatively mandates that no sentence may be imposed without crediting a defendant with jail time already served. Judge Barkdull, writing for the Third District, reasoned:

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9. State v. Cregan

   908 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2005)   Cited 110 times

   The statute that governs jail-time credit is section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (2003). It provides:
10. Ransone v. State

    48 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 2010)   Cited 38 times

    Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (2004), sets forth the parameters for how the running of a sentence is calculated, including how presentence jail-time credit is awarded. Section 921.161(1) provides, in its entirety, as follows: "A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time she or he spent in the county jail before sentence. The credit must be for a specified period of time and shall be provided for in the sentence." (Emphasis added.) While establishing that a defendant is entitled to credit for presentence jail time, the statute does not distinguish between concurrent and consecutive sentences, and no other statute is on point.

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