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F.S. 943.10 on Google Scholar

F.S. 943.10 on Casetext

Amendments to 943.10


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVII
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CORRECTIONS
Chapter 943
DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 943.10 Florida Statutes and Case Law
943.10 Definitions; ss. 943.085-943.255.The following words and phrases as used in ss. 943.085-943.255 are defined as follows:
(1) “Law enforcement officer” means any person who is elected, appointed, or employed full time by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof; who is vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests; and whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state. This definition includes all certified supervisory and command personnel whose duties include, in whole or in part, the supervision, training, guidance, and management responsibilities of full-time law enforcement officers, part-time law enforcement officers, or auxiliary law enforcement officers but does not include support personnel employed by the employing agency.
(2) “Correctional officer” means any person who is appointed or employed full time by the state or any political subdivision thereof, or by any private entity which has contracted with the state or county, and whose primary responsibility is the supervision, protection, care, custody, and control, or investigation, of inmates within a correctional institution; however, the term “correctional officer” does not include any secretarial, clerical, or professionally trained personnel.
(3) “Correctional probation officer” means a person who is employed full time by the state whose primary responsibility is the supervised custody, surveillance, and control of assigned inmates, probationers, parolees, or community controllees within institutions of the Department of Corrections or within the community. The term includes supervisory personnel whose duties include, in whole or in part, the supervision, training, and guidance of correctional probation officers, but excludes management and administrative personnel above, but not including, the probation and parole regional administrator level.
(4) “Employing agency” means any agency or unit of government or any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof, or any agent thereof, which has constitutional or statutory authority to employ or appoint persons as officers. The term also includes any private entity which has contracted with the state or county for the operation and maintenance of a nonjuvenile detention facility.
(5) “Commission” means the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission.
(6) “Part-time law enforcement officer” means any person employed or appointed less than full time, as defined by an employing agency, with or without compensation, who is vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests and whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state.
(7) “Part-time correctional officer” means any person who is employed or appointed less than full time, as defined by the employing or appointing agency, with or without compensation, whose responsibilities include the supervision, protection, care, custody, and control of inmates within a correctional institution.
(8) “Auxiliary law enforcement officer” means any person employed or appointed, with or without compensation, who aids or assists a full-time or part-time law enforcement officer and who, while under the direct supervision of a full-time or part-time law enforcement officer, has the authority to arrest and perform law enforcement functions.
(9) “Auxiliary correctional officer” means any person employed or appointed, with or without compensation, who aids or assists a full-time or part-time correctional officer and who, while under the supervision of a full-time or part-time correctional officer, has the same authority as a full-time or part-time correctional officer for the purpose of providing supervision, protection, care, custody, and control of inmates within a correctional institution or a county or municipal detention facility.
(10) “Private criminal justice training school” means any private school, corporation, or institution, for profit or not for profit, devoted wholly or in part to instruction, by correspondence or otherwise, in criminal justice services, administration, training, and education, which awards any type of certificate, diploma, degree, or recognition for attendance, graduation, study, or participation to students, enrollees, or participants. This definition applies to all such schools operating wholly or in part within the state, including those chartered, incorporated, or formed outside the state.
(11) “Support personnel” means any person employed or appointed by an employing agency who is not an officer or, as specified by the commission, other professional employee in the criminal justice system.
(12) “Program” means the Criminal Justice Professionalism Program of the Department of Law Enforcement.
(13) “Head of the department” means the Governor and Cabinet, as provided for in ss. 20.201 and 20.03(4).
(14) “Officer” means any person employed or appointed as a full-time, part-time, or auxiliary law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer.
(15) “Public criminal justice training school” means any academy operated by an employing agency that is certified by the commission to conduct criminal justice training courses.
(16) “Criminal justice training school” means any private or public criminal justice training school certified by the commission.
(17) “Training center director” means a full-time salaried employee of a criminal justice training school who is responsible for the scheduling and general management of criminal justice courses and supervision and evaluation of criminal justice instructors.
(18) “Auxiliary correctional probation officer” means any person employed or appointed, with or without compensation, who aids or assists a full-time or part-time correctional probation officer and who, while under the supervision of a full-time or part-time correctional probation officer, has the same authority as a full-time or part-time correctional probation officer for the purpose of providing supervision of offenders in the community.
(19) “Part-time correctional probation officer” means a person who is employed less than full time by the state whose primary responsibility is the supervised custody, surveillance, and control of assigned inmates, probationers, parolees, or community controllees within institutions of the Department of Corrections or in the community.
(20) “Diverse population” means members of a cultural group with common origins, customs, and styles of living. This definition includes both ethnic and religious minorities.
(21) “Criminal justice executive” includes executives of law enforcement, correctional, and correctional probation agencies.
(22) “Special operations forces” means those active and reserve component forces of the military services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. The term includes, but is not limited to, servicemembers of the United States Army Special Forces and the United States Army 75th Ranger Regiment; the United States Navy SEALs and Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen; the United States Air Force Combat Control, Pararescue, and Tactical Air Control Party specialists; the United States Marine Corps Critical Skills Operators; and any other component of the United States Special Operations Command approved by the commission.
History.s. 7, ch. 74-386; s. 4, ch. 78-323; s. 2, ch. 80-71; ss. 4, 24, 25, ch. 81-24; s. 1, ch. 82-46; s. 1, ch. 83-259; s. 2, ch. 83-265; s. 1, ch. 84-156; s. 3, ch. 84-258; ss. 6, 40, ch. 86-183; s. 5, ch. 86-187; ss. 5, 6, ch. 87-186; s. 39, ch. 89-526; s. 47, ch. 91-110; s. 5, ch. 91-429; s. 12, ch. 95-283; s. 1, ch. 97-225; s. 16, ch. 98-94; s. 1042, ch. 2002-387; s. 2, ch. 2007-45; s. 1, ch. 2018-46.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 943.10 on Google Scholar

F.S. 943.10 on Casetext

Amendments to 943.10


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 943.10
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 943.10.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S943.10
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 943.10.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Levesque v. State

    63 Wis. 2d 412 (Wis. 1974)   Cited 33 times
    To constitute the crime of burglary under sec. 943.10( 1)(a), Stats., one must enter the building without the consent of the person in possession. Concurrently with the entry he must have the intention to steal or commit a felony. It has been broadly stated that entry into a place while open to the general public is with consent ( see sec. 943.10( 3)). Such entry by the general public to a building is impliedly conditioned by time, place and purpose. It is the extent and scope of the consent of the one in possession which determines the legality of the entry and presence of the public within the structure. Entry into a building means more than the passing through a door or opening; it includes the idea of presence within the building resulting from passing through the door or opening. The consent of the one in possession of a building, if he be a merchant, is impliedly conditioned by the purpose of doing business with the merchant in the area set aside for that purpose. The consent given to the public to enter is not for all things and all purposes. A hawker of baubles is a member of the public who does not have the consent of a jeweler to enter his store to…
    PAGE 416
  2. Gilbertson v. State

    230 N.W.2d 874 (Wis. 1975)   Cited 10 times
    The plaintiff in error Leonard Gilbertson (hereinafter "defendant") was charged in a criminal complaint issued August 24, 1973, with burglary in violation of sec. 943.10 (1) (a), Stats., in that he did, on or about August 22, 1973:
    PAGE 589
  3. State v. Pettit

    171 Wis. 2d 627 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 1,914 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Our references to the armed burglary charge in this opinion consciously bear in mind that we deal here with a charge of armed burglary with intent to steal. See sec. 943.10(1), Stats. The discussion and holding of this opinion as it applies to intent to steal would not apply where burglary is charged "with intent to . . . commit a felony." See id.
    PAGE 635
  4. United States v. Stitt

    139 S. Ct. 399 (2018)   Cited 179 times
    Alaska Stat. §§ 11.46.300, 11.46.310, 11.81.900(b)(3) (1989) (effective 1978); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13–1501(7)–(8), 13–1507, 13–1508 (1978); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 41–2001(1), 41–2002 (Michie 1977); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 459, 460 (West 1970) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18–4–101(1) – (2), 18–4–202, 18–4–203 (1978) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a–100(a), 53a–101, 53a–103 (1985 Cum. Supp.); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 222(1), 824, 825 (1979); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 810.011(2), 810.02 (1976) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 16–7–1(a) (1984); Idaho Code Ann. § 18–1401 (1979); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 38, § 19–1 (West 1985) ; Iowa Code §§ 702.12, 713.1 (1985); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21–3715, 21–3716 (1988) (effective 1970); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:62 (West 1974 Cum. Supp.); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §§ 2(10), 2(24), 401 (1983) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 266, § 16A (West 1970) ; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–2–101(40), 45–6–204 (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 205.060 (1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 635:1 (1974) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:18–1, 2C:18–2 (West 1982) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30–16–3, 30–16–4 (2018) (effective 1978); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2909.01, 2911.11, 2911.12 (Lexis 1982) ; Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 1435…
    PAGE 408
  5. United States v. Edwards

    836 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2016)   Cited 96 times
    The parties haven't directed us to a decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that construes subsection (a) of the state's burglary statute, and our own search has yielded none. Accordingly, we're on our own and turn first to the text and structure of the statute itself. Section 943.10(1m) provides:
    PAGE 836
  6. State v. Klessig

    211 Wis. 2d 194 (Wis. 1997)   Cited 229 times   18 Legal Analyses
    Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1)(a) states in relevant part:
    PAGE 198
  7. McLaughlin v. State

    721 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1998)   Cited 91 times
    Applying the above principles to the present statutes, we note that section 784.07(1)(a) states that "the term `law enforcement officer' includes a law enforcement officer . . . [as] defined in s. 943.10." Section 943.10 provides at the outset that `"[l]aw enforcement officer' means any person who is elected, appointed, or employed full time by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof." The meaning of these words cannot be plainer: A "law enforcement officer" for section 784.07 purposes must be either a state or local officer.
    PAGE 1173
  8. State v. Kuntz

    160 Wis. 2d 722 (Wis. 1991)   Cited 148 times   3 Legal Analyses
    On September 18, 1987, Harold Kuntz was convicted of three felonies: committing battery in the course of a burglary, contrary to sec. 943.10(2)(d), Stats.; arson, contrary to sec. 943.02(1)(a); and first-degree murder, contrary to sec. 940.01. Kuntz's convictions stem from occurrences on the evening of March 1, 1987, at the Twin Oaks Trailer Court near Whitewater, Wisconsin where Kuntz's estranged wife, Karen Kuntz, lived with her daughters Sandy and Susan Bowers.
    PAGE 731
  9. United States v. Franklin

    2019 WI 64 (Wis. 2019)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    ¶11 Moreover, similar to the alternative prohibited intents set forth in the child enticement statute in Derango, Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m) does not create different penalties for the possible locational alternatives set forth in subsections (a)-(f). See Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶ 16, 613 N.W.2d 833. Instead, regardless of which of the six locations a burglar enters, the punishment is determined by the offense's status as a Class F felony. The absence of different penalties for the locational alternatives weighs against the federal government's argument that § 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) contains separate elements. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 ("If statutory alternatives carry different punishments, then under Apprendi they must be elements."). The plain text of § 943.10(1m) thus supports the conclusion that the statute creates a single crime of burglary with multiple means of commission, rather than multiple, separate offenses.
    PAGE 268