Amendments to 944.47

1. State v. Watts

   462 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1985)   Cited 41 times

   Applying the rationale of Grappin to the instant case, it is apparent that Watt can only be charged with one count of possession of contraband. Watt has prosecuted under section 944.47, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides in relevant part:

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2. Watts v. State

   440 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 12 times

   § 944.47, Fla. Stat. (1981) provides in relevant part:

   PAGE 506
3. Clark v. State

   395 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1981)   Cited 13 times

   1 more...

   On February 20, 1979, appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere to charges of introducing contraband into a correctional or penal institution in violation of section 944.47, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), and possession of marijuana in violation of section 893.13(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1977). On April 19, 1979, appellant was sentenced to six months in the county jail for introducing contraband into a prison, but the trial court considered the act as a single transaction so did not impose a sentence on the possession charge. Appellant reserved the right to appeal denial of the motion to dismiss, attacking the constitutionality of section 944.47, and the motion to suppress evidence of illegally-seized contraband.

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4. Ruiz v. State

   488 So. 2d 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 3 times

   The remand for a new trial applies only to the charge of possession of cocaine upon the grounds of a state correctional institution, in violation of section 944.47. At the close of the evidence at appellant's original trial, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on the possession of cocaine charge under section 944.47 on the ground that the evidence did not show that appellant had introduced contraband into or had attempted to take it from the grounds of the prison. The trial judge ruled that the charge under that statute would be limited to possession of cocaine upon the prison grounds. Counsel then moved to merge counts one and two into one count of possession of cocaine within the prison system since possession of cocaine is included within the elements of the offense of possession of cocaine within the prison.
5. London v. State

   347 So. 2d 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 5 times

   Defendant seeks review of his conviction for unlawfully bringing cannabis upon the grounds of a penal institution in violation of Section 944.47, Florida Statutes (1975). The issue is whether the defendant was placed in double jeopardy because of his previous conviction for possession of the same cannabis in violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1975).
6. Bautista v. State

   863 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2003)   Cited 89 times

   Eight months after Grappin, we applied the a/any test in Watts and held that a prisoner could only be charged with one count of possession of contraband based on his possession of two prison-made knives discovered in his cell at the same time. Watts, 462 So.2d at 814. The contraband statute in Watts prohibited possession by an inmate of "[a]ny firearm or weapon of any kind." 462 So.2d at 814 (quoting section 944.47, Florida Statutes (1981)). In the Watts opinion, even though a completely different statute was at issue, there is no discussion of the common-sense approach to statutory interpretation employed in Grappin to determine the legislatively intended unit of prosecution. The Watts opinion simply extrapolates the a/any distinction specifically derived from section 812.041(2)(b) to a wholly unrelated statute. The prison contraband statute contained no variant uses of "a" or "any" before the prohibited items of property. Section 944.47 consistently used "any" before each item listed. So, unlike section 812.041(2)(b), within section 944.47 itself there was no clear expression of legislative intent as to the unit of prosecution. Unlike the Grappin…

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7. Hill v. State

   711 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 28 times

   In Watts, the defendant had been convicted of two counts of possession of contraband in a correctional facility in violation of section 944.47, Florida Statutes (1981), based upon his possession of two prison-made knives. Relying upon the analysis in its earlier decision of Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1984), the court concluded that, given the language of section 944.47, only one conviction was permissible:

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8. Terrien v. State

   94 So. 3d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 1 times

   The state charged Terrien by information with “introduc[ing] into or upon the grounds of a state correctional institution, U.S. CURRENCY, or tak [ing] or attempt[ing] to take or send[ing] or attempt[ing] to send therefrom, U.S. CURRENCY, a contraband article.” This language tracks squarely with section 944.47(1)(a). Thus, Terrien was accused of committing the charged offense under section 944.47(1)(a). The information did not accuse Terrien of possessing contraband inside a state correctional institution, found under section 944.47(1)(c).

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9. Wilcott v. State

   509 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1987)   Cited 45 times

   Section 944.47, Florida Statutes (1983), provides in pertinent part:

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10. Wright v. State

    442 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 17 times

    One of the things declared to be contraband by Section 944.47 is a "weapon of any kind. . . ." Section 944.47(1)(a)5. Appellant argues that one of the elements of section 944.47(1)(c), which must be proven by the State, is that the contraband was not authorized by the officer in charge of the institution. Appellee argues that this exception is an affirmative defense and not an element which the State must prove.

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