Cases from cite.case.law:

QUIJANO, v. STATE, 270 So. 3d 549 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Section 948.30, Florida Statutes, has long required that a trial court impose as a condition of sex offender . . . See, e.g., § 948.30(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . See ch. 2014-4, § 15, Laws of Fla.; see also § 948.30(5), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . See § 948.30(5). . . . See § 948.30(1)(g). The offenses underlying Mr. . . .

STATE v. WALK,, 267 So. 3d 437 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Because the trial court failed to comply with section 948.30(e), Florida Statutes, it lacked the authority . . . See § 948.30(1)(e), Fla. . . . Section 948.30(1)(e) provides: (e) If the victim was under the age of 18, a prohibition on contact with . . . grant the petition and remand the case to the trial court to either comply with the dictates of section 948.30 . . .

CASSEUS, v. STATE, 269 So. 3d 580 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2014), sets forth a list of additional terms and conditions of probation . . . are considered standard conditions and do not require oral pronouncement at the time of sentencing. § 948.30 . . . the trial court is required to order mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of probation. § 948.30 . . . Accordingly, we hold that mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under § 948.30 . . .

TAPLIN, v. STATE, 254 So. 3d 1137 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . A plain reading of section 948.30 compels us to conclude that the age restriction language-"the unlawful . . . State, 960 So.2d 797, 797-98 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("Under section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006), the . . . However, as the State points out, electronic monitoring could later be applied under section 948.30(2 . . . I concur with the majority concerning mandatory electronic monitoring pursuant to section 948.30(3)(c . . . However, I would not reach the separate issue of electronic monitoring pursuant to section 948.30(2)( . . .

MARTINEZ, v. STATE, 254 So. 3d 614 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . court was required to orally pronounce the conditions of sex offender probation pursuant to section 948.30 . . . Section 948.30 requires the trial court to impose certain conditions for sex offender probation for specified . . . The State seemed to believe that because the offenses in this case are not enumerated in section 948.30 . . .

JONES, v. STATE, 251 So. 3d 307 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . a sex act is not an enumerated offense for which sex offender probation is mandatory under section 948.30 . . . Jones was sentenced the First District held that for an offense that is not enumerated under section 948.30 . . . implicitly referenced sex offender probation by imposing a condition found exclusively within section 948.30 . . .

LEVANDOSKI, v. STATE, 245 So. 3d 643 (Fla. 2018)

. . . Thus, even if defendants understand that the term "sex offender probation" refers to section 948.30, . . . Indeed, none of the conditions in section 948.30 apply to violations of section 847.0135(3) and (4). . . . Additionally, section 948.30(4) applies only to probationers whose crimes were committed on or after . . . Id. § 948.30(4). . . . See, e.g. , § 948.30(2)(d), Fla. . . . court is required to orally pronounce each condition of "sex offender probation" contained in section 948.30 . . . The court ultimately denied Levandoski's motion to the extent he requested the section 948.30 conditions . . . Section 948.30 delineates the standard conditions of probation for those who commit certain enumerated . . . , the trial court is not required to orally pronounce each standard condition at sentencing. § 948.30 . . . See § 948.30(1) -(3), Fla. Stat. (2010)." (emphasis omitted) ); see also Staples v. . . . The majority acknowledges that the conditions of section 948.30 may be imposed only if they reasonably . . . There are provisions of section 948.30 that Levandoski could have reasonably inferred did not apply to . . . Section 948.30 (b), for example, prohibits living within 1000 feet of a location where children congregate . . .

SOLIMAN, v. STATE, 241 So. 3d 908 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 948.30, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

NERO, v. STATE, 216 So. 3d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . PROBATION” was illegal because he was not convicted of any of the enumerated felonies listed in section 948.30 . . .

LEVANDOSKI, v. STATE, 217 So. 3d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . in Sturges ], the sex offender probation conditions had been imposed mandatorily pursuant to section 948.30 . . . See § 948.30, Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

STAPLES, v. STATE, 202 So. 3d 28 (Fla. 2016)

. . . Sex offender probation under section 948.30(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2011), requires “[ajctive participation . . . See § 948.30(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . See §§ 948.30(1)(c), 948.001, Fla. Stat. (“Definitions”). . . .

VILLANUEVA, v. STATE, 200 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2016)

. . . the authority to impose the special condition of probation of “sex offender treatment” under section 948.30 . . . State, 65 So.3d 104, 105 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), that sex offender treatment is limited under, section 948.30 . . . (1) as a condition to probation only to the enumerated felonies • of section 948.30(1), which are specific . . . Because the jury in this case acquitted the defendant of a sex offense outlined in section 948.30(1), . . . This interpretation of section 948.30(1) follows from the text of the statute and the rules of statutory . . . The court explained that section 948.30 “contains no language that prohibits these conditions from being . . . of the defendant’s probation — the sex offender conditions found in section 948.30. . . . The Fifth District explicitly found that although the conditions found in section 948.30 were imposed . . . See § 948.30, Fla. . . . Because this matter is not discussed by section 948.30, we must consider it purposely unaddressed and . . . Thus, it is not clear whether the trial court imposed the disputed condition under section 948.30, the . . . Regardless, I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that section 948.30 is inherently ambiguous . . . The Third District correctly noted that section 948.30 does not clearly provide an answer to the question . . . prohibit or allow such action, and therefore I agree with the majority in its conclusion that section 948.30 . . . This provision supports the conclusion that the provisions required by section 948.30 are not exclusive . . .

SENGER, v. STATE, 200 So. 3d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Contemporaneous with his plea, Senger executed a document titled “Special Conditions for Sex Offenders per E.S. 948.30 . . . He contends that the imposition of sex offender probation pursuant to section 948.30, Florida Statutes . . . that his conviction for traveling after solicitation is not one of the enumerated crimes under section 948.30 . . . 2011), this court reversed the imposition of sex offender conditions of probation pursuant to section 948.30 . . .

SHAW, v. PATTON,, 823 F.3d 556 (10th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 948.30(l)(b) (2015) (sup-, plying a probation condition that prohibits certain sex offenders from . . .

STAPLER, v. STATE, 190 So. 3d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . a sex offender and imposed “sex-offender probation with all the standard conditions” under section 948.30 . . . the offenses that require the imposition of. all the standard sex-offender conditions under section ⅛ 948.30 . . . permitted to impose sex-offender conditions as special conditions, even for crimes not listed in section 948.30 . . .

DORSEY, v. STATE, 169 So. 3d 1286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . offender probation because unlawful use of a computer service was not an enumerated offense under section 948.30 . . .

DOE I, v. CITY OF PALM BAY,, 169 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . sexual offenders moves into the City, and WHEREAS, Sections 947.1405(7)(a)(l) and (2), and Sections 948.30 . . .

PARKERSON, v. STATE, 163 So. 3d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . The defendant was not convicted of any of the sex offenses specified in section 948.30, Florida Statutes . . . imposed at sentencing, and did not mention any of the other possible conditions identified in section 948.30 . . . See generally § 948.30, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . determine if 'it should add voyeurism and video voyeurism to the sex offenses specified in section 948.30 . . .

HARRELL, v. STATE, 162 So. 3d 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . He also cites section 948.30(l)(k), Florida Statutes (2005), which authorizes warrantless searches for . . .

SNOW, v. STATE, 157 So. 3d 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Section 948.30 provides that the court “must impose” certain standard conditions of sex offender probation . . . have held that it is error to impose sex offender probation for an offense not enumerated by section 948.30 . . .

RIVERA, v. STATE, 157 So. 3d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 948.30(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . See § 948.30(1)(a). Rivera was also required to perform community service. . . .

STAPLES, v. STATE, 161 So. 3d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 948.30(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . Section 948.30 provides for additional terms and conditions of probation or community control for certain . . .

F. MOHAMMED, v. STATE, 149 So. 3d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . The dispositive issue on appeal turns on the construction of section 948.30(1), Florida Statutes (2013 . . . ), which, in pertinent part, provides: 948.30 Additional terms and conditions of probation or community . . . children regularly congregate is subsequently established within 1,000 feet of his or her residence. § 948.30 . . . Appellant contends that the last sentence of section 948.30(l)(b) authorizes him to remain in his residence . . . Therefore, the last sentence of section 948.30(l)(b) does not apply to his situation and the trial court . . .

HAWTHORNE, v. BUTLER,, 151 So. 3d 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See generally § 948.30(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

STATE v. A. FUREMAN,, 161 So. 3d 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . section 777.04 and not actual lewd and lascivious battery in violation of section 800.04(4)(a), section 948.30 . . . impose the following conditions in addition to all other standard and special conditions imposed § 948.30 . . . Section 948.30(1) “mandates that for probationers who committed certain specified sex-based crimes after . . . attempted sexual battery is an offense under the battery statute, the mandatory provisions in section 948.30 . . .

VILLANUEVA, v. STATE, 118 So. 3d 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2011), establishes the conditions for “sex offender probation.” . . . .” § 948.30(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . See § 948.30, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . Section 948.30 reflects the clear intent of the Legislature that all of these conditions be imposed when . . . Courts already have imposed some of the individual conditions listed in section 948.30 for offenses other . . .

T. BROWN, v. STATE, 117 So. 3d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . The statute has been amended and renumbered, see § 948.30(l)(g), Fla. . . .

SCHULTHEIS, v. STATE, 125 So. 3d 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . One of the conditions of probation, which tracked the language of sub-section 948.30(l)(h), Florida Statutes . . . witnesses accused appellant of criminal acts that took place prior to July 1, 2005, rendering section 948.30 . . .

DRISCOLL, v. STATE, 111 So. 3d 945 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . the trial court erred in ruling that he was subject to probationary conditions set forth in section 948.30 . . . Driscoll argued that section 948.30(1) did not apply to him because his crimes were committed before . . . Section 948.30(1), which sets forth mandatory conditions of probation for defendants convicted of certain . . . Thus, Driscoll is not subject to the probation conditions under section 948.30(1) that were not orally . . . Section 948.30(1) was originally created as section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1995). . . .

W. BAUER, v. STATE, 96 So. 3d 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 948.30(l)(g), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .

STATE v. FLYNN,, 95 So. 3d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . meet the criteria for the mandatory imposition of electronic monitoring under sections 948.063 and 948.30 . . . Both this Court and the Third District have acknowledged that section 948.30(3) compels electronic monitoring . . . State, 2 So.3d 362, 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (noting that “[u]nder section 948.30, Florida Statutes, the . . . court is required to impose mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of probation” under section 948.30 . . . By the plain language of section 948.30(3), the trial court was prohibited from granting Floyd’s motion . . .

HOSTETTER, v. STATE, 82 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . In Kasisehke, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted what is now section 948.30(1) (g), Florida Statutes . . . ’s deviant behavior pattern” must be interpreted as qualifying each of the prohibitions in section [948.30 . . . Section 948.30(1) (g), Florida Statutes provides: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided . . .

DAVIS, Sr. v. STATE, 76 So. 3d 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . probation on Count I included “[standard sex offender conditions 14 through 30” pursuant to section 948.30 . . .

BLUE, v. STATE, 73 So. 3d 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . The issue before us is whether the trial court made the requisite statutory findings under section 948.30 . . . Next, while conceding that electronic monitoring could be applied under section 948.30, Florida Statutes . . . her supervisor, and ordered by the court at the recommendation of the Department of Corrections.” § 948.30 . . . While the trial court could have imposed electronic monitoring under section 948.30(2), it did not make . . . See § 948.30(2)(e). . . .

WITCHARD, v. STATE, 68 So. 3d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 948.30(3), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . See, e.g., §§ 947.1405(10), 948.30(3), Fla. Stat. (2008). . In Johnson v. United. . . . Both cases dealt with the section 948.30(3), Florida Statutes, requirement that a trial court imposing . . .

ARIAS, v. STATE, 65 So. 3d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . On appeal, Arias challenges the imposition of sex offender conditions as found in section 948.30, Florida . . . Although the crime to which Arias pled is not one of the crimes enumerated in section 948.30, the trial . . . and imposed as special conditions of probation the sexual offender conditions set forth in section 948.30 . . . offender conditions of probation unless the defendant is convicted of a crime specified in section 948.30 . . . We recognize that the court imposed the conditions found in section 948.30 as special conditions of Arias . . .

STATE v. COLEMAN,, 44 So. 3d 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 948.30(1)-(S), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . See § 948.30(l)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

CORREA, a k a v. STATE, 43 So. 3d 738 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . probation, you shall be placed on electronic monitoring if you meet the conditions set forth in F.S. 948.30 . . .

HITT, v. STATE, 31 So. 3d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Lacayo, 8 So.3d 385 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (holding that section 948.30(3), Florida Statutes, requiring a . . .

BELL, v. STATE, 24 So. 3d 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . by his probation officer, and imposed electronic monitoring under the Jessica Lunsford Act, section 948.30 . . . See § 948.30(3) (stating that electronic monitoring must be imposed on sex offenders whose offenses occurred . . .

HARDER, v. STATE, 14 So. 3d 1291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . State, 993 So.2d 998, 999 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (finding that section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006), did . . . See § 948.30(3), Fla. Stat. (2006); § 948.03, Fla. Stat. (1995). . . .

KELLY, v. STATE, 13 So. 3d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . court’s decision to revoke his sex-offender probation without making a finding, pursuant to section 948.30 . . . standard conditions of Appellant’s probation (designated as Condition (40)) is taken verbatim from section 948.30 . . . The court never addressed the qualifying language in section 948.30(l)(g) limiting the prohibition of . . . relating to “relevance” in section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (1999)— which was renumbered section 948.30 . . .

STATE v. LACAYO,, 8 So. 3d 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . appellee’s (“defendant”) probation to include mandatory electronic monitoring, pursuant to Section 948.30 . . . Stat. § 948.30(3)(b) (2007) (emphasis added). . . . Crime, as stated in § 948.30(3), is defined as a felony or misdemeanor. Fla. . . . Stat. § 948.30(3). . . . Stat. § 948.30(3)(b). Reversed and remanded. . . .

M. HOFFMAN, v. STATE, 997 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . This is a statutory condition authorized by paragraph 948.30(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2006). . . .

GROSSO, v. STATE, 2 So. 3d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Under section 948.30, Florida Statutes, the trial court was required to impose electronic monitoring . . . See § 948.30(3). . . .

KING, v. STATE, 990 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 948.03(5)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2001) (currently section 948.30(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2008 . . .

KASISCHKE, v. STATE, 991 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 2008)

. . . Legislature transferred the language contained in the 1999 version of section 948.03(5)(a)(7) to section 948.30 . . . In 2005, the Legislature amended section 948.30(l)(g) by adding "accessing” to the total prohibition . . . Ch. 2005-67, § 4, at 467, Laws of Fla.; § 948.30(l)(g), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis supplied). . . . . A similar cabining of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (1999), and sections 948.30(l)(g), and . . . This statute has been renumbered as section 948.30(l)(g), Florida Statutes (2007) (“Unless otherwise . . .

JOSLIN, v. STATE, 984 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . I note that section 948.30(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2007), which was not in effect when Joslin committed . . .

A. SAMUEL, v. J. FRANK,, 525 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2008)

. . . . §§ 948.02(2), 948.31(2), 948.30, and was sentenced to 38 years in prison to be followed by 16 years . . .

ADAMS, v. STATE, 979 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 2008)

. . . Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2007), requires the imposition of mandatory standard conditions of . . . See § 948.30(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007) (previously codified at § 948.03(5)(a)(3), Fla. . . . Lawson, 969 So.2d at 232; see §§ 948.001(10), 948.30(1)(c), 948.31, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

DONOHUE, v. STATE, 979 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006), a portion of the Jessica Lunsford Act, states: (2) Effective . . . Under section 948.30(2)(e), Florida Statutes, the court was required to impose electronic monitoring . . .

BURKHART, v. STATE, 974 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . court erred in concluding that Appellant’s previous conviction was a qualifying offense under section 948.30 . . . Under section 948.30(3)(c), any probationer or community controllee whose crime was committed on or after . . . not require the trial court to impose electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under section 948.30 . . . The State concedes that section 948.30 does not support the trial court’s decision to modify Appellant . . . Although it concedes that section 948.30 does not support the trial court's modification of Appellant . . .

STURGES, v. STATE, 980 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . 364 days in prison, anger management, and five years of sex offender probation pursuant to sections 948.30 . . . See § 948.30(1), Fla. Stat.; Muzzo v. State, 773 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). . . .

BURRELL, v. STATE, 993 So. 2d 998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . offender probation by requiring electronic monitoring under the Jessica Lunsford Act (the Act), section 948.30 . . . agree with Burrell that the offense occurred before the effective date of the Act; therefore, section 948.30 . . . Section 948.30 states: Additional terms and conditions of probation or community control for certain . . .

FIELDS, v. STATE, 968 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . imposed electronic monitoring as a mandatory condition of the defendant’s probation pursuant to section 948.30 . . .

STATE v. SPRINGER,, 965 So. 2d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . trial court was without authority to modify the statutorily mandated condition set forth in section 948.30 . . . As required by section 948.30(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), included in the conditions of his probation . . . That language existed in § 948.03 at the time § 948.30 was promulgated. . . . Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006), formerly appeared as section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (2004 . . . This section now provides in pertinent part: 948.30. . . .

A. C. HARROLL, v. STATE, 960 So. 2d 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . trial court re-visited the issue of the mandatory-monitoring sentencing requirements under section 948.30 . . . Under section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006), the trial court is required to impose mandatory electronic . . . On August 18, 2006, pursuant to section 948.30, the trial court imposed G.P.S. electronic monitoring . . . Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006) provides in pertinent part: 948.30. . . .

GRIFFIN, v. STATE, 958 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . .” § 948.30(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005); see also Cassamassima v. . . . See § 948.30(2)(a). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, v. DAUGHTRY,, 954 So. 2d 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . violating the probation of every sex offender who fails to give an address acceptable pursuant to § 948.30 . . . Additionally, § 948.30(l)(b), Fla. . . . violating the probation of every sex offender who fails to give an address acceptable pursuant to § 948.30 . . .

KALINOWSKI, v. STATE, 948 So. 2d 962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . This is one of the standard conditions of sex offender probation mandated by section 948.30, Florida . . . See § 948.30(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005); State v. . . . Additionally, because section 948.30(1), Florida Statutes (2005), requires the court to impose this condition . . . Section 948.30 formerly appeared as section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (2004). . . .

KASISCHKE, v. STATE, 946 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . This statute has been renumbered and is now section 948.30(l)(g), Florida Statutes (2006). . . . .

MELVIN, v. STATE, 915 So. 2d 251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . permits the Department of Corrections, (“DOC”), to recommend electronic monitoring pursuant to section 948.30 . . . See § 948.30(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005); State v. Beasley, 580 So.2d 139 (Fla.1991). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, v. HARRISON,, 896 So. 2d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Section 948.30(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2004) provides as a standard condition of probation for sexual . . .

WOODSON, v. STATE, 889 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2004)

. . . See § 948.30(l)(c), Fla. . . .

L. VAN LOO, v. BRAUN,, 940 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D. Wis. 1996)

. . . . § 948.30(l)(b) by detaining a child who was not their own with the unlawful purpose of depriving the . . . violated Wis.Stat. § 939.05(2)(b) by conspiring with Eileen and Elton Van Loo to violate Wis.Stat. § 948.30 . . . The plaintiff invokes Wis.Stat. § 948.30(1) and (2) and Wis.Stat. § 948.31(2). . . . Stat. § 948.30(l)(b) and Wis.Stat. § 948.31(2). . . . Wis.Stat. § 948.30(1) and (2) state in pertinent part: (1) Any person who, for any unlawful purpose, . . .

THOMAS AND DRISCOLL v. THE UNITED STATES, 32 Ct. Cl. 41 (Ct. Cl. 1896)

. . . Painting walls, second story, 3,161 square yards, at 30 cents (inside). 948.30 10.Painting and cleaning . . .