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Florida Statute 92.53 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 92.53 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VII
EVIDENCE
Chapter 92
WITNESSES, RECORDS, AND DOCUMENTS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 92.53
92.53 Videotaping the testimony of a victim or witness under age 18 or who has an intellectual disability.
(1) On motion and hearing in camera and a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that a victim or witness who is under the age of 18 or who has an intellectual disability as defined in s. 393.063 would suffer at least moderate emotional or mental harm due to the presence of the defendant if such victim or witness is required to testify in open court, or is unavailable as defined in s. 90.804(1), the trial court may order the videotaping of the testimony of the victim or witness in a case, whether civil or criminal in nature, in which videotaped testimony is to be used at trial in lieu of trial testimony in open court.
(2) The motion may be filed by:
(a) The victim or witness, or the victim’s or witness’s attorney, parent, legal guardian, or guardian ad litem;
(b) A trial judge on his or her own motion;
(c) Any party in a civil proceeding; or
(d) The prosecuting attorney or the defendant, or the defendant’s counsel.
(3) The judge shall preside, or shall appoint a special master to preside, at the videotaping unless:
(a) The child or the person who has the intellectual disability is represented by a guardian ad litem or counsel;
(b) The representative of the victim or witness and the counsel for each party stipulate that the requirement for the presence of the judge or special master may be waived; and
(c) The court finds at a hearing on the motion that the presence of a judge or special master is not necessary to protect the victim or witness.
(4) The defendant and the defendant’s counsel must be present at the videotaping unless the defendant has waived this right. The court may require the defendant to view the testimony from outside the presence of the child or the person who has an intellectual disability by means of a two-way mirror or another similar method that ensures that the defendant can observe and hear the testimony of the victim or witness in person, but the victim or witness cannot hear or see the defendant. The defendant and the attorney for the defendant may communicate by any appropriate private method.
(5) Any party, or the court on its own motion, may request the aid of an interpreter, as provided in s. 90.606, to aid the parties in formulating methods of questioning the child or person who has the intellectual disability and in interpreting the answers of the child or person during proceedings conducted under this section.
(6) The motion referred to in subsection (1) may be made at any time with reasonable notice to each party to the cause, and videotaping of testimony may be made any time after the court grants the motion. The videotaped testimony is admissible as evidence in the trial of the cause; however, such testimony is not admissible in any trial or proceeding in which such witness testifies by use of closed-circuit television pursuant to s. 92.54.
(7) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for its ruling under this section.
History.ss. 1, 2, ch. 79-69; s. 1, ch. 84-36; ss. 5, 9, ch. 85-53; s. 9, ch. 85-80; s. 1, ch. 93-131; s. 21, ch. 94-154; s. 1379, ch. 95-147; s. 30, ch. 99-2; s. 4, ch. 2000-338; s. 89, ch. 2004-267; s. 4, ch. 2013-162; s. 1, ch. 2016-199.
Note.Former ss. 918.17, 90.90.

F.S. 92.53 on Google Scholar

F.S. 92.53 on Casetext

Amendments to 92.53


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 92.53
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 92.53.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

A. KNIGHT, v. STATE, 254 So. 3d 642 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Consistent with that interest, sections 92.53 and 92.54, Florida Statutes, allow children to testify . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 200 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 2016)

. . . (amending section 92.53, Fla. Stat. (2015)). . . . See § 92.53, Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

In A. B. a T. B. v. R. B., 186 So. 3d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . We recognize that pursuant to sections 92.53 and 92.55, the trial court was permitted to order on its . . . Section 92.53(3) expressly conditions the trial court’s power to order testimony by videotaped interview . . . A.B. properly conducted by a judge or special master, as it was statutorily obligated to do, see § 92.53 . . . See, e.g., § 92.53(4) (“The defendant and the defendant’s counsel must be present at the videotaping . . . The Father should have been allowed to attend the videotaped interview, as required by section 92.53( . . .

MONTEIRO, v. MONTEIRO,, 55 So. 3d 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . (c) The use of testimony taken outside of the courtroom, including proceedings under ss. 92.53 and 92.54 . . .

ROGERS, v. STATE, 40 So. 3d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . 212 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907, 109 S.Ct. 3219, 106 L.Ed.2d 569 (Fla.1989); see also § 92.53 . . .

L. BLANTON, v. STATE, 978 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 2008)

. . . Section 92.53, Florida Statutes (2006), details just how the defendant’s right to confront and the child . . . Section 92.53 provides for the use of videotape to perpetuate a child victim’s testimony. . . . presence of the defendant would cause the child at least moderate emotional or mental harm, section 92.53 . . . Rule 3.190(j) has been repealed insofar as it is inconsistent with section 92.53. . . . In addition to a child witness under age 16, section 92.53 applies to a person with mental retardation . . .

UNITED STATES v. YATES, F., 391 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2004)

. . . . § 92.53. . . . .

DOE, C. B. a v. BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD YMCA,, 744 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . Section 92.53, Florida Statutes (1997)(Videotaping of testimony of victim or witness under the age of . . . A videotaped statement of a child taken pursuant to section 92.53 is admissible in court and satisfies . . . Section 92.53 delineates specific procedural requirements which must be met, including the filing of . . . See § 92.53, Fla. Stat.; Feller v. State, 637 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1994). . . . Section 92.53 does not convert ordinary depositions or other hearsay statements into admissible testimony . . .

RITCHIE, v. STATE, 720 So. 2d 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Section 92.53(1), Florida Statutes (1997), allows the use of videotaped testimony of child victims of . . . Subsection (7) of section 92.53 requires that the court make specific findings of fact on the record . . . the evidence, the court would not only be ignoring the clear and unequivocal directive of subsection 92.53 . . . As stated by the court in Leggett, the failure of the trial court to comply with subsection 92.53(7) . . . also asserted a “staleness” objection, arguing that the evaluation of harm to the child under section 92.53 . . .

HARTFORD ACCIDENT INDEMNITY COMPANY, v. PRO- FOOTBALL, INC. d b a, 127 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

. . . Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 92.53-92.65 (1997) (describing assigned risk, retrospective . . .

BARTON, v. STATE, 704 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . presence if required to testify in open court; and that the state had not met its burden under section 92.53 . . . Section 92.53, Florida Statutes, provides that the testimony of a child under sixteen may be presented . . . defendant has waived the right to contest the adequacy of the trial court’s findings under section 92.53 . . . Although the defendant objected under section 92.53 during the hearing on the state’s motion to videotape . . . State, 637 So.2d 911, (Fla.1994), that the failure to make findings under section 92.53(7), Florida Statutes . . .

MATHIS, v. STATE, 682 So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . trial court offered to support conclusion that child could testify by videotape, pursuant to section 92.53 . . .

SAVAGE, v. STATE, 643 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . The State agrees that the applicable standard is contained in section 92.53, Florida Statutes (1993), . . .

YOUNG, v. STATE, 645 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1994)

. . . . § 92.53, Fla.Stat. (1993). . . .

SIGMON, v. STATE, 641 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1994)

. . . trial court does not commit fundamental error when it fails to make the findings required by section 92.53 . . .

FELLER, v. STATE, 637 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1994)

. . . importance: DOES A TRIAL COURT COMMIT FUNDAMENTAL ERROR BY FAILING TO MAKE THE FINDINGS REQUIRED BY SECTION 92.53 . . . IF THE FAILURE TO MAKE THE FINDINGS REQUIRED BY SECTION 92.53(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), IS FUNDAMENTAL . . . The state attorney responded that this Court had upheld section 92.53 as constitutional and noted the . . . For the reasons expressed in Hopkins, we find that failure to make the findings required by section 92.53 . . . Failure to make the ease-specific findings mandated by section 92.53 constitutes an independent ground . . .

HOPKINS, v. STATE, 632 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1994)

. . . 212, 217 (Fla.1988) (finding no violation of guarantee of right to confrontation in applying section 92.53 . . . See § 92.53, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

R. R. a v. PORTESY, D., 629 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . court allowed a child who witnessed a murder to present her testimony by videotape, relying on sections 92.53 . . .

LEWIS, v. STATE, 626 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . earlier opinion, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the similar statutory standard provided in Section 92.53 . . .

STATE v. FORD,, 626 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1993)

. . . The district court found that sections 92.53 and 92.54, Florida Statutes (1989), did not allow the trial . . . We agree with the district court that sections 92.53 and 92.54 do not apply to the instant case because . . . victim's testimony by way of videotape or closed-circuit television, except in the context of sections 92.53 . . .

SIGMON, v. STATE, 622 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to allow the videotape testimony of the victim under section 92.53 . . . presented expert and lay testimony which would, if accepted, support the finding required by section 92.53 . . . s testimony, he did not object to the trial court’s failure to make specific findings under section 92.53 . . . WHETHER IT IS FUNDAMENTAL ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL TO MAKE THE FINDINGS REQUIRED BY SECTION 92.53 . . . Section 92.53, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: (1) On motion and hearing in camera and . . .

CUMBIE, v. K. SINGLETARY,, 991 F.2d 715 (11th Cir. 1993)

. . . . § 92.53, allowing videotaping of testimony of child witness, while defendant watched from behind two-way . . .

FELLER, v. STATE, 617 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . court did not make sufficient specific findings of fact to comply with the requirements of section 92.53 . . . opinion concludes that any error regarding the sufficiency of the findings of fact required by section 92.53 . . . Section 92.53 sets out the special statutory procedure that must be followed by the trial court in determining . . . Thereafter, the videotape testimony was taken in the presence of the judge as specified in section 92.53 . . . Section 92.53 contemplates that the decision to use videotape testimony in lieu of live testimony at . . . s decision to allow the victim, W.O., to give her trial testimony by videotape, pursuant to section 92.53 . . . In response, the prosecutor called the court’s attention to section 92.53, explaining the requirement . . . trial did the defense object to any lack of specificity in the judge’s findings made under section 92.53 . . . a record already exists upon which the trial court could consider the findings required by section 92.53 . . . Section 92.53(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides: "On motion and hearing in camera and a finding that . . . the trial court is the failure of the trial court to make the specific findings required by section 92.53 . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE, 608 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1992)

. . . Juvenile Court Rules Committee proposed rule 8.102, a new rule that tracks the language of section 92.53 . . . Section 92.53 clearly sets out the circumstances under which the videotaping of the victim or witness . . .

HOPKINS, Sr. v. STATE, 608 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . State, 536 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), the state had filed a motion under section 92.53, Florida Statutes . . . Section 92.53 sanctions such a procedure, but, as in section 92.54(5) at issue here, the trial court . . . Section 92.53(7), Fla.Stat. . . . of the record reflects that the trial court did not make the required findings of fact under section 92.53 . . . Section 92.54, like its companion, section 92.53, impacts a defendant’s right to a “face-to-face meeting . . .

HERNANDEZ, v. STATE, 597 So. 2d 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . We note that the legislature recognized these important policy interests in enacting sections 92.53, . . .

FORD, v. STATE, 592 So. 2d 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . The legislature restricted the procedures contained in sections 92.53 and 92.54, Florida Statutes (1989 . . . As opposed to sections 92.53 and 92.54, where the legislature acted, section 92.55 is a nonoperative . . .

FLANAGAN, v. STATE, 586 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Such testimony, taken before a trial pursuant to Section 92.53, Florida Statutes (1985), is essentially . . .

W. GAITHER, v. STATE, 581 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . moderate emotional or mental harm if she were required to testify at trial, as required by section 92.53 . . . In August 1987, when the child was almost nine years old, the state moved pursuant to section 92.53, . . . The trial court’s failure to make the finding required by section 92.53(1), Florida Statutes (1985), . . . The finding under section 92.53(1) is not merely a technical requirement. . . . Because we have determined that it was reversible error to omit the finding under 92.53(1), we do not . . .

DISINGER, v. STATE, 569 So. 2d 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . Section 92.53, Florida Statutes (1985), allows videotaping of the testimony of a victim or witness who . . .

LEGGETT, v. STATE, 565 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1990)

. . . permitted to give videotaped testimony rather than personally appearing in court, pursuant to section 92.53 . . . Section 92.53 reads in pertinent part: (1) On motion and hearing in camera and a finding that there is . . . Further, there was a failure to comply with subsection 92.53(7) by making specific findings of fact on . . . It may be that the judge’s failure to pronounce the “magic words” called for by subsection 92.53(1) could . . . of the record reflects that the trial court did not make the required findings of fact under section 92.53 . . .

MARYLAND v. CRAIG, 497 U.S. 836 (U.S. 1990)

. . . . §92.53 (1989); Haw. Rev. Stat., ch. 626, Rule Evid. 616 (1985); Ill. Rev. . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 560 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes, when the three year old victim recanted during section 92.53 . . .

POUKNER, v. STATE, 556 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . First, Poukner contends that section 92.53, Florida Statutes (1985), is unconstitutional. . . . testimony of one of the child victims without making an individualized finding, as required by section 92.53 . . .

STATE v. ASFOUR,, 555 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . or “direct testimony” and considered whether section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1987), or section 92.53 . . . The court held that the videotape was “direct testimony” rather than “hearsay,” and that section 92.53 . . . Section 92.53, Florida Statutes (1987), provides a method whereby an out-of-court statement can be treated . . . Section 92.53 is not applicable, however, to an already existing hearsay statement such as the challenged . . . Because of its initial error regarding the applicability of sections 92.53 and 90.803(23), the trial . . .

WALLIS, v. STATE, 548 So. 2d 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . an anteroom to the courtroom outside the presence of the defendant under the authority of sections 92.53 . . .

I. CASTELLANOS, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Ad, 545 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . The mother, however, argues that certain sections of the Florida Evidence Code [§§ 92.53 and 92.54, Fla.Stat . . . present and a limited right to cross examine the child witness with assistance from an interpreter. §§ 92.53 . . . In support of this point, the mother urges at some length the applicability of Sections 92.53, 92.54, . . .

LEGGETT, v. STATE, 548 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . He alleges that the trial court erred in granting the state’s motion, pursuant to Section 92.53(1), Florida . . .

JAGGERS, v. STATE, 536 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . on the ground that it was not supported by any specific findings of fact as required under section 92.53 . . . Recently, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 92.53, the Florida statute . . . It is this requirement of individualized findings under section 92.53, which the Florida Supreme Court . . . Although there is no constitutional infirmity with the procedures outlined under section 92.53, those . . . The relevant portions of the statute are as follows: 92.53 Sexual abuse or child abuse case; videotaping . . . reversal of the niece’s conviction because I also find error in the trial court’s application of section 92.53 . . . The record in this case is devoid of the specific findings of trauma required under section 92.53 to . . . Since I find that the trial court’s failure to abide by section 92.53 in the introduction of the video . . .

GLENDENING, v. STATE, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988)

. . . Section 92.53 provides that upon a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that a victim or witness . . . Section 92.53(1) provides that when the requisites of the statute are met, the trial court may order . . . Application of section 92.53 to permit videotaping the child’s testimony instead of requiring the child . . . In contrast to the statute at issue in Coy, section 92.53 requires an individual determination for each . . . Section 92.53(4) provides that [t]he court may require the defendant to view the testimony from outside . . .

STATE v. DIAMOND,, 553 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . Section 92.53 — Sexual abuse or child abuse case; videotaping of testimony of victim or witness under . . .

L. YOUNG, v. STATE, 506 So. 2d 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . Pursuant to section 92.53, Florida Statutes, the trial court permitted the State to videotape the victim . . .

CHAMBERS, v. STATE, 504 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . Section 92.53, Florida Statutes (1985), previously section 90.90, specifically allowed for the videotaping . . . presence at the videotaped hearing to viewing the witnesses behind a two-way mirror, pursuant to section 92.53 . . . prosecutor and defense counsel discussed the State’s motion in terms of the procedure set forth in section 92.53 . . . Section 92.53(1) provides: On motion and hearing in camera and a finding that there is a substantial . . . Section 90.90, the predecessor to section 92.53, did not provide for the defendant’s presence to be limited . . .

GLENDENING, v. STATE, 503 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . state served a motion to video tape Jennifer’s testimony for introduction at trial pursuant to section 92.53 . . .

E. M. v., 77 T.C. 1096 (T.C. 1981)

. . . 1975, he determined an addition to tax under section 6653(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 of $92.53 . . .

P. SHULTZ, v. CANAL ZONE BUS SERVICE, INC. a a, 311 F. Supp. 978 (D.C.Z. 1970)

. . . De Beuville 92.53 D. Estable 53.20 Feliciano Galvez 100.73 D. Giron 81.00 D. P. Gordon 228.55 R. . . .

FINN v. EMPIRE TRUST CO., 121 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)

. . . Tucker, Anthony & Company (hereinafter called “the Underwriting Syndicate”) purchased from Childs at 92.53% . . . Underwriting Syndicate whereby Empire committed itself to purchase $2,000,000 of said debentures at a price of 92.53% . . .

SAM M. BRABSON v. THE UNITED STATES, 95 Ct. Cl. 187 (Ct. Cl. 1941)

. . . On December 10, 1989, he submitted the instant claim in the amount of $92.53' ($127.50 less $34.97) to . . . the provisions of the Act of March 4,. 1921, and recommended that it be approved in the amount of $92.53 . . .