The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title X
PUBLIC OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND RECORDS

Chapter 111
PUBLIC OFFICERS: GENERAL PROVISIONS

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CHAPTER 111

PUBLIC OFFICERS: GENERAL PROVISIONS

111.012 Testimonials for public officers.

111.045 Salaries of officers payable upon requisition.

111.05 Officer reinstated after suspension; back pay.

111.065 Law enforcement or correctional officers, legal action against; employer payment of costs and attorney’s fees or provision of attorney.

111.07 Defense of civil actions against public officers, employees, or agents.

111.071 Payment of judgments or settlements against certain public officers or employees.

111.072 Insurance in anticipation of judgments or settlements against officers, employees, or agents of any county, municipality, or political subdivision.

111.075 Elected officials; prohibition concerning certain committees.

111.09 Peer support for first responders.

111.012 Testimonials for public officers.—

(1) When used in this section:

(a) “Testimonial” means any breakfast, dinner, luncheon, rally, party, reception, or other affair held to honor or raise funds on behalf of any elected public officer, except a campaign fund raiser held pursuant to s. 106.025(1).

(b) “Elected public officer” means any individual holding an elective state, county, municipal, or school or other district office or position.

(2)(a) No testimonial shall be held in honor or on behalf of any person holding public office unless a notice of intent to hold such testimonial has first been filed pursuant to this subsection by the person in charge of such testimonial and a testimonial account has been set up in a depository and a treasurer appointed therefor. No money or donation may be accepted, nor may any payment be made, with respect to such testimonial until the notice of intent has been filed and the testimonial account has been established and a treasurer has been appointed therefor.

(b) Such notice, in the case of a state or multicounty district officer, shall be filed with the Division of Elections or, in the case of any other public officer, with the supervisor of elections of the county in which such officer resides. Such notice shall state the date and place the testimonial is to be held, the name and address of the person or persons in charge of the testimonial, the name and address of the officer in whose honor or on whose behalf the testimonial is to be held, the purpose for which the testimonial is to be held, and the purpose for which the funds raised are to be used.

(c) All money and donations received, and all payments made, with respect to such testimonial shall be received and made only through the treasurer appointed pursuant to this subsection. The appointed treasurer shall keep detailed accounts of all deposits and all payments made with respect to such account.

(d) The proceeds of the testimonial held pursuant to this subsection remaining after the payment of the expenses therefor shall be disposed of as provided in this paragraph. All proceeds after payment of the expenses for such testimonial shall be donated to a charity stated in the notice of intent; returned pro rata to each person who purchased a ticket, gave money, or made a donation; or given, in the case of a state officer, to the state to be deposited in the General Revenue Fund or, in the case of an officer of a political subdivision, to the political subdivision to be deposited in the general fund thereof. A report of such disposition of funds shall be made by the person in charge of such testimonial within 90 days from the date the testimonial is held and shall be filed with the officer with whom the notice of intent is filed. Each report shall contain the following information:

1. The full name and address of each person who purchases one or more tickets or gives any money or donation with respect to such testimonial, together with the amount and date thereof.

2. The full name and address of each person, charity, or unit of government to whom any payment for expenses or disposition of funds is made with respect to such testimonial, together with the date and amount thereof and the purpose therefor.

(e) Any person or officer who holds a testimonial, or who consents to a testimonial being held, in violation of the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(f) Any person required by the provisions of this subsection to dispose of funds in a testimonial account who fails to dispose of the funds in the manner provided in this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

History.—s. 34, ch. 81-304; s. 30, ch. 83-217.

111.045 Salaries of officers payable upon requisition.—The salary of every officer shall be payable monthly upon his or her own requisition.

History.—Former s. 3, Art. XVI of the State Constitution of 1885, as amended, converted to statutory law by s. 10, Art. XII of the State Constitution as revised in 1968; see Flack v. Graham, 453 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1984); s. 674, ch. 95-147.

111.05 Officer reinstated after suspension; back pay.—An officer who is lawfully entitled to resume the duties of office after suspension by the Governor shall suffer no loss of salary or other compensation because of the suspension. Compensation which is unpaid because of the officer’s suspension is appropriated and shall be paid from the source and in the manner in which the compensation of the office is normally paid. If funds sufficient to pay the unpaid compensation are not available in the proper source, the deficit is appropriated and shall be paid from the general funds of the state or of the political subdivision under which the office exists, as the case may be.

History.—s. 1, ch. 57-71; s. 675, ch. 95-147.

111.065 Law enforcement or correctional officers, legal action against; employer payment of costs and attorney’s fees or provision of attorney.—

(1) For the purpose of this section only, the term “officer” means any law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), or (3), who is employed full time by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof.

(2) The employing agency of any officer has the option to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for any officer in any civil or criminal action commenced against such officer in any court when the action arose out of the performance of the officer’s official duties and:

(a) The plaintiff requests dismissal of the suit; or

(b) The officer is found to be not liable or not guilty.

(3) The employing agency shall provide an attorney and pay the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for any officer in a criminal action commenced against the officer in any court if the employing agency determines that the officer’s actions that gave rise to the charges:

(a)1. Occurred in response to what the officer reasonably believed was an emergency;

2. Occurred when the officer reasonably believed that his or her action was necessary to protect the officer or others from imminent death or bodily harm; or

3. Occurred in the course of the officer’s fresh pursuit, apprehension, or attempted apprehension of a suspect whom the officer reasonably believed had perpetrated, or attempted to perpetrate, a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08, or the offense of escape;

(b) Arose within the course and scope of the officer’s duties; and

(c) Were not acts of omission or commission which constituted a material departure from the employing agency’s written policies and procedures, or generally recognized criminal justice standards if no written policies or procedures exist.

(4)(a) If legal representation is requested under subsection (3) and the employing agency determines that the conditions set forth in subsection (3) have not been satisfied or the officer does not choose to use the employing agency’s designated attorney, the officer may:

1. Select from a list of attorneys provided by the employing agency; or

2. Choose his or her own attorney.

The officer may request the employing agency to reimburse reasonable attorney’s fees and costs if the officer’s actions giving rise to the charge did not result in the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or in a finding of guilt by a court or jury to any offense charged or any lesser or included offense that is substantially related to the offense charged.

(b) If legal representation is provided in accordance with paragraph (a), the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs shall be determined as follows:

1. The officer shall submit an application for payment of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the employing agency no later than 30 days after termination of the criminal action. Thereafter, the employing agency and the officer must agree on reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to be paid within 30 days after submitting the application for payment. The officer may only apply for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the actual defense of the prosecution of criminal charges, and the officer is not entitled to seek or collect attorney’s fees and costs related to efforts to collect attorney’s fees and costs under this section.

2. The application for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs must include an itemization statement from an attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the officer which states the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed.

3. If the officer and the employing agency do not reach an agreement or if payment is not provided within the specified time, the officer requesting payment of attorney’s fees and costs may submit the application to the court having jurisdiction over the criminal action within 30 days after the termination of the criminal action, failure to reach an agreement, or failure to pay the fees or costs, whichever is later. The court shall retain jurisdiction of the matter in order to determine entitlement to payment and the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

4. If the officer files an application for attorney’s fees and costs with the court, the employing agency shall have the right to respond to the application. The court shall make its determination as to entitlement and amount of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs based on:

a. Whether the officer’s actions complied with the requirements of paragraphs (3)(a), (b), and (c); and

b. Prevailing market rates in the appropriate market area for defense of similar actions, as well as other relevant factors.

(c) A lodestar or fee multiplier provision may not be used in any criminal prosecution defended under this subsection and the attorney’s fees and costs awarded may not exceed $100,000.

History.—s. 1, ch. 76-191; s. 676, ch. 95-147; s. 2, ch. 2004-38.

111.07 Defense of civil actions against public officers, employees, or agents.—Any agency of the state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of the state, is authorized to provide an attorney to defend any civil action arising from a complaint for damages or injury suffered as a result of any act or omission of action of any of its officers, employees, or agents for an act or omission arising out of and in the scope of his or her employment or function, unless, in the case of a tort action, the officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. Defense of such civil action includes, but is not limited to, any civil rights lawsuit seeking relief personally against the officer, employee, or agent for an act or omission under color of state law, custom, or usage, wherein it is alleged that such officer, employee, or agent has deprived another person of rights secured under the Federal Constitution or laws. Legal representation of an officer, employee, or agent of a state agency may be provided by the Department of Legal Affairs. However, any attorney’s fees paid from public funds for any officer, employee, or agent who is found to be personally liable by virtue of acting outside the scope of his or her employment, or was acting in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, may be recovered by the state, county, municipality, or political subdivision in a civil action against such officer, employee, or agent. If any agency of the state or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of the state is authorized pursuant to this section to provide an attorney to defend a civil action arising from a complaint for damages or injury suffered as a result of any act or omission of action of any of its officers, employees, or agents and fails to provide such attorney, such agency, county, municipality, or political subdivision shall reimburse any such defendant who prevails in the action for court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

History.—s. 1, ch. 72-36; s. 1, ch. 79-139; s. 2, ch. 80-271; s. 55, ch. 81-259; s. 1, ch. 83-183; s. 677, ch. 95-147.

111.071 Payment of judgments or settlements against certain public officers or employees.—

(1) Any county, municipality, political subdivision, or agency of the state which has been excluded from participation in the Insurance Risk Management Trust Fund is authorized to expend available funds to pay:

(a) Any final judgment, including damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, arising from a complaint for damages or injury suffered as a result of any act or omission of action of any officer, employee, or agent in a civil or civil rights lawsuit described in s. 111.07. If the civil action arises under s. 768.28 as a tort claim, the limitations and provisions of s. 768.28 governing payment shall apply. If the action is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. s. 1983, or similar federal statutes, payments for the full amount of the judgment may be made unless the officer, employee, or agent has been determined in the final judgment to have caused the harm intentionally.

(b) Any compromise or settlement of any claim or litigation as described in paragraph (a), subject to the limitations set forth in that paragraph.

(c) Any reimbursement required under s. 111.07 for court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees when the county, municipality, political subdivision, or agency of the state has failed to provide an attorney and the defendant prevails.

(2) For purposes of this section, a “final judgment” means a judgment upon completion of any appellate proceedings.

(3) “Agency of the state” or “state agency,” as used in this section, includes an executive department, a constitutional officer, the Legislature, and the judicial branch.

(4) This section is not intended to be a waiver of sovereign immunity or a waiver of any other defense or immunity to such lawsuits.

History.—s. 2, ch. 79-139; ss. 2, 3, ch. 80-271.

111.072 Insurance in anticipation of judgments or settlements against officers, employees, or agents of any county, municipality, or political subdivision.—Any county, municipality, or political subdivision is authorized to be self-insured, to enter into risk management programs, or to purchase liability insurance for whatever coverage it may choose or to have any combination thereof in anticipation of any judgment or settlement which its officers, employees, or agents may be liable to pay pursuant to a civil or civil rights lawsuit described in s. 111.07.

History.—s. 3, ch. 79-139.

111.075 Elected officials; prohibition concerning certain committees.—Elected officials are prohibited from being employed by, or acting as a consultant for compensation to, a political committee.

History.—s. 26, ch. 89-256; s. 28, ch. 2013-37.

111.09 Peer support for first responders.—

(1) For purposes of this section, the term:

(a) “Affiliated first responder organization” includes, but is not limited to, any of the following organizations:

1. Regularly organized volunteer firefighting departments or associations.

2. Regularly organized volunteer ambulance services.

3. Combination fire departments, as that term is defined in s. 633.135(1).

(b) “First responder” has the same meaning as provided in s. 112.1815 and includes 911 public safety telecommunicators as defined in s. 401.465.

1. Is not a health care practitioner as defined in s. 456.001.

2. Has experience working as or with a first responder, including active, volunteer, and retired first responders, regarding any physical or emotional conditions or issues associated with the first responder’s employment.

3. Has been designated by the first responder’s employing agency or affiliated first responder organization to provide peer support as provided in this section and has received training for this purpose.

(d) “Peer support” means the provision of physical, moral, or emotional support to a first responder by a first responder peer for the purpose of addressing physical or emotional conditions or other issues associated with being a first responder.

(e) “Peer support communication” means electronic, oral, or written communication, made with a mutual expectation of confidentiality while a first responder peer is providing peer support in his or her official capacity.

(2) A first responder peer may not divulge information from or testify about a peer support communication in a civil, criminal, administrative, or disciplinary proceeding, unless:

(a) The first responder peer is a defendant in a civil, criminal, administrative, or disciplinary proceeding arising from a complaint filed by the first responder who was a party to the peer support communication, in which case such information may be divulged but is limited to the scope of the proceeding;

(b) The first responder who was a party to the peer support communication agrees, in writing, to allow the first responder peer to testify about or divulge information related to the peer support communications;

(c) Based on the peer support communications, the first responder peer suspects that the first responder who was a party to the peer support communications has committed a criminal act or intends to commit a criminal act. There is no liability on the part of, and no cause of action of any nature may arise against, the first responder peer for disclosing information under this paragraph; or

(d) There are articulable facts or circumstances that would lead a reasonable, prudent person to fear for the safety of the first responder who was a party to the peer support communication, another person, or society, and the first responder peer communicates the information only to a potential victim and law enforcement or other appropriate authorities. There is no liability on the part of, and no cause of action of any nature may arise against, the first responder peer for disclosing information under this paragraph.

(3) This section does not limit the disclosure, discovery, or admissibility of information, testimony, or evidence that is obtained by a first responder peer from a source other than a first responder through a peer support communication.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2020-104; s. 1, ch. 2023-252.

F.S. 111 on Google Scholar

F.S. 111 on Casetext

Amendments to 111

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 111

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S101.111 2 - ELECTION LAWS - FRIVOLOUS CHALLENGE OF RIGHT TO VOTE - M: F

S101.111 4 - ELECTION LAWS - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 6439 - M: F

S111.012 - ELECTION LAWS - HOLD CONSENT TO UNLAWFUL TESTIMONIAL - M: F

S228.111 - EMBEZZLE - REPEALED BY CH. 2002-387 - M: S

S415.111 1 - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - FAIL REPORT ABUSE NEGLECT OF VULNERABLE ADULT - M: S

S415.111 2 - INVADE PRIVACY - DISCLOSE CONFIDENTIAL INFO FROM ABUSE HOTLINE - M: S

S415.111 3 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - REFUSE ACCESS ABROGATED CONFIDENTIAL RECORD - M: S

S415.111 4 - MAKING FALSE REPORT - RENUMBERED. SEE REC #7136 - F: T

S415.111 5 - MAKING FALSE REPORT - OF ABUSE OF VULNERABLE ADULT - F: T

S415.111 5 - MAKING FALSE REPORT - ABUSE NEGLECT EXPLOIT VULNERABLE ADULT - F: T

S415.111 5a - ASSAULT - REMOVED - M: F

S415.111 5b - BATTERY - REMOVED - F: T

S415.111 5c - AGGRAV ASSLT - WEAPON - REMOVED - F: S

S415.111 5d - AGGRAV BATTERY - REMOVED - F: F

S513.111 - FRAUD - REPEALED 2013-091 - M: S

S526.111 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - PROHIBITED DISPLAY OF GASOLINE PRICES - M: S

S552.111 1 - SELLING WEAPON - MFGR DISTR SELL EXPLOSIVE TO PERSON WO LICENSE - M: F

S552.111 2 - SELLING WEAPON - DEALER DISPENSE EXPLOSIVE TO PERSON WO LICENSE - M: F

S552.111 3 - WEAPON OFFENSE - FAIL TO MAINTAIN RECORD SALE OF EXPLOSIVES - M: F

S552.111 6 - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - MISREPRESENT ENTRY ON SALES OF EXPLOSIVE - M: F

S560.111 1a - FRAUD - MONEY SERVICES TAKE PROPERTY OMIT TRUE ENTRY - F: T

S560.111 1b - FRAUD - MONEY SERVICES EMBEZZLE MISAPPLY MONEY PROP - F: T

S560.111 1c - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - MONEY SERVICES MAKE FALSE ENTRIES ACCOUNTS ETC - F: T

S560.111 1d - FRAUD - MONEY SERVICES VIOL FEDERAL STATE LAWS - F: T

S560.111 1e - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - MONEY SERVICES FILE FALSE INFO WITH OFR - F: T

S560.111 1e - FRAUD - RENUMBERED. SEE RECORD # 7264 - F: T

S560.111 1f - FRAUD - MONEY SERVICES USE FRAUDULENT WORTHLESS ASSETS - F: T

S560.111 1g - FRAUD - MONEY SVCS KNOWING POSS FRAUD ID PARAPHERNALIA - F: T

S560.111 2 - FRAUD - DEFRAUD MONEY SERVICES BUSINESS OR VENDOR - F: T

S560.111 3 - FRAUD - PERSON NOT CONDUCTOR PROVIDE CUST PER ID INFO - F: T

S560.111 5 - FRAUD - UNLICENSED DEFERRED PRESENTMENT PROVIDER - F: T

S560.111 5 - FRAUD - VIOL DEFERRED PRESENTMENT PROVIDER REGS - F: T

S560.111 5 - FRAUD - PROVIDER PRESENT DRAWER CHECK BEFORE DATE DUE - F: T

S560.111 6 - FRAUD - CHK CASHIER EXCHGR FAIL KEEP REC 1000D OR GRTR - F: T

S562.111 - LIQUOR-POSSESS - BY PERSON UNDER 21 YOA SUBSQ OFF - M: F

S562.111 - LIQUOR-POSSESS - BY PERSON UNDER 21 YOA 1ST OFF - M: S

S806.111 - INCENDIARY DEVICE-USING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8713 - F: T

S806.111 1 - INCENDIARY DEVICE-USING - POSSESS MFG FIREBOMB WIT EXPLODE OR DAMAGE - F: T

S877.111 1 - DANGEROUS DRUGS - INHALE INGEST HARMFUL CHEMICALS - M: S

S877.111 2 - DANGEROUS DRUGS - POSS BUY SELL TRANSFER HARMFUL CHEMICALS - M: S

S877.111 4 - DANGEROUS DRUGS - UNLAWFUL DISTRB NITROUS OXIDE - F: T

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S111

R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

S562.111 (1) POSSESSION of ALCOHOLIC beverage by a MINOR (except exempt under F.S. 562.13) [See 322.056 & 562.111(2)] - Points on Drivers License: 0 R/S

S562.111 (1) POSSESSION of ALCOHOLIC beverage by a MINOR (except exempt under F.S. 562.13) [See 322.056 & 562.111(2)] Note 22 - Points on Drivers License: 0

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

J. TRUMP, v. R. VANCE, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 2412 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Enterprises, Inc. , 498 U.S. 292, 299, 111 S.Ct. 722, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991). . . . Enterprises, Inc. , 498 U.S. at 297, 111 S.Ct. 722. . . . Corp. , 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948) ). . . .

MCGIRT, v. OKLAHOMA, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 738-739, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). . . . Coleman , supra , at 735-736, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Crim. 111, 61 P.2d 1139 (1936) ); see also United States v. . . . No. 111, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 5, 8 (1897) (resolution of the Creek Nation "recogniz[ing]" that Congress . . . See, e.g. , Ex parte Nowabbi , 60 Okla.Crim. 111, 61 P.2d 1139 (1936), overruled by State v. . . .

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL, v. MORRISSEY- BERRU St. v., 140 S. Ct. 2049 (U.S. 2020)

. . . App. 110-111; Scott , 550 U.S. at 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769. . . .

P. BARR, v. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, INC., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Georgia , 501 U.S. 529, 548-549, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment . . .

ESPINOZA, v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (forbidding "resolution of a federal . . .

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, v. BOOKING. COM B. V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Solimino , 501 U.S. 104, 108, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991). . . . National Biscuit Co. , 305 U.S. 111, 118-119, 59 S.Ct. 109, 83 L.Ed. 73 (1938), or because it has invested . . . Lasting Impression I, Inc. , 543 U.S. 111, 122-123, 125 S.Ct. 542, 160 L.Ed.2d 440 (2004). . . .

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., 140 S. Ct. 2082 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Sullivan , 500 U.S. 173, 196-198, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991) (similar). . . . affiliate-and if not, not); Regan , 461 U.S. at 544, 103 S.Ct. 1997 (similar); Rust , 500 U.S. at 196-198, 111 . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . equal protection rights of potential jurors whom they have never met, Powers , 499 U.S. at 410-416, 111 . . . Ohio , 499 U.S. 400, 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) ). . . . 14, 17, n. 2, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) ; Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice § 6.26(h), at 6-111 . . . Ohio , 499 U.S. 400, 410-411, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). . . . Akron Center for Reproductive Health , 497 U.S. 502, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 111 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990) ; Hodgson . . . Minnesota , 497 U.S. 417, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990) ; Williams v. Zbaraz , 448 U. . . . Commissioner , 501 U.S. 868, 878-880, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991). . . .

SEILA LAW LLC, v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (U.S. 2020)

. . . vigorous debate about the removal of executive officers in what is known as the Decision of 1789, id. , at 111 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. THURAISSIGIAM, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Tyler, Habeas Corpus in Wartime, at 111. . . .

C. LIU, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Local 111 , 278 F.2d 823, 825 (CA1 1960) (enforcing a disgorgement order from the agency). . . .

BOSTOCK, v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA v. Jr. Co- R. G. G. R. v., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Casey , 499 U.S. 83, 101, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991) ; see id., at 92, 111 S.Ct. 1138. . . . Hospitals , 499 U.S. at 99, 111 S.Ct. 1138. So it is here. . . . Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, Art. 1(a), June . . . Roemer , 501 U.S. 380, 410, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991) (dissenting opinion). . . . NEWTON in Zoologist Ser. 111. . . . Roemer , 501 U.S. 380, 405, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We are . . .

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, v. COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION LLC, v., 140 S. Ct. 1837 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Ashcroft , 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). . . .

L. BAXTER v. BRACEY,, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Reed , 500 U.S. 478, 489-492, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). . . .

ROGERS, v. GREWAL,, 140 S. Ct. 1865 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 524 U.S. 125, 143, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); . . .

J. THOLE, v. U. S. BANK N. A, 140 S. Ct. 1615 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Mendell , 501 U.S. 115, 125-126, 111 S.Ct. 2173, 115 L.Ed.2d 109 (1991) (suggesting that shareholder . . . Ohio , 499 U.S. 400, 410-411, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). . . . S. 115, 111 S.Ct. 2173, 115 L.Ed.2d 109 (1991), and Craig v. Boren , 429 U. . . . See Gollust , 501 U.S. at 125-127, 111 S.Ct. 2173 (allowing indirect owners of a corporation to sue under . . .

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, LLC, III v. LLC, v. LLC, n De De La El Y v., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 159 U.S. 596, 601, 16 S.Ct. 111, 40 L.Ed. 271 (1895) (judicial decisions could not later . . . Commissioner , 501 U.S. 868, 883, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) ; see also The Federalist No . . . Freytag , supra , at 884, 111 S.Ct. 2631 ; see also Edmond , 520 U.S. at 659, 117 S.Ct. 1573. . . . Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. , 501 U.S. 252, 270-271, 111 S.Ct. 2298, 115 L.Ed.2d 236 . . . Commissioner , 501 U.S. 868, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764, and Lucia v. . . .

BANISTER, v. DAVIS,, 140 S. Ct. 1698 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Zant , 499 U.S. 467, 483, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). . . . Id., at 485, 111 S.Ct. 1454. But the rule against repetitive litigation still had plenty of bite. . . .

LUCKY BRAND DUNGAREES, INC. v. MARCEL FASHIONS GROUP, INC., 140 S. Ct. 1589 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id. , at 111. . . . Lucky," and in the 2011 Action, Lucky Brand was found not to have violated that injunction. 779 F.3d at 111 . . .

UNITED STATES, v. SINENENG- SMITH, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Ohio , 499 U.S. 400, 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) ; see also Clark v. . . . Powers , supra , at 410-411, 111 S.Ct. 1364. . . .

MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS, v. UNITED STATES v. v. v., 140 S. Ct. 1308 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Services- Program Management' account, may be used for payments under section 1342(b)(1) of Public Law 111 . . .

GEORGIA, v. PUBLIC. RESOURCE. ORG, INC., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Rural Telephone Service Co. , 499 U.S. 340, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991). . . .

THRYV, INC. v. CLICK- TO- CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP,, 140 S. Ct. 1367 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. , 498 U.S. 479, 496, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991). . . .

RAMOS, v. LOUISIANA, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) ). . . . Payne , 501 U.S. at 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597. . . . Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). . . . Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). . . . Payne , 501 U.S. at 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597 ; Gamble , 587 U. . . . Arizona , 501 U.S. 624, 634, n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (plurality opinion). . . . Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted . . .

COMCAST CORPORATION, v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN- OWNED MEDIA,, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Co. , 111 U.S. 228, 241, 4 S.Ct. 369, 28 L.Ed. 410 (1884) ; Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 . . .

GUERRERO- LASPRILLA, v. P. BARR, v. P., 140 S. Ct. 1062 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. , 498 U.S. 479, 496, 498, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991), when a . . . S.Ct. 2227, 132 L.Ed.2d 375 (1995) ; internal quotation marks omitted); see McNary , 498 U.S. at 496, 111 . . . recognition that it is a "well-settled" principle of statutory construction, McNary , 498 U.S. at 496, 111 . . .

L. ALLEN, v. A. COOPER, III,, 140 S. Ct. 994 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Native Village of Noatak , 501 U.S. 775, 779, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 115 L.Ed.2d 686 (1991). . . . Blatchford , 501 U.S. at 779, 111 S.Ct. 2578. But not entirely. . . .

SHULAR, v. UNITED STATES, 140 S. Ct. 779 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 524 U.S. 125, 138-139, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) ). . . . United States , 524 U.S. 125, 138, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) ; Caron v. . . . United States , 498 U.S. 395, 410, 111 S.Ct. 840, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991) ; Moskal v. . . . United States , 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) ; Callanan v. . . . United States , 500 U.S. 453, 463, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) ; Huddleston v. . . .

MONASKY, v. TAGLIERI, 140 S. Ct. 719 (U.S. 2020)

. . . C-111/17, ¶42 (Judgt. of June 8); accord Office of the Children's Lawyer v. Balev , [2018] 1 S. . . . C-111/17, ¶42 (the habitual residence of a child "must be established ... taking account of all the circumstances . . .

C. HERNANDEZ, v. MESA, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 735 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Arabian American Oil Co. , 499 U.S. 244, 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274 (1991). . . . Corp. , 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948) ). . . .

PETER, v. NANTKWEST, INC., 140 S. Ct. 365 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Casey , 499 U.S. 83, 88, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991) (looking to statutory usage to determine . . . expenses," without indicating whether "expenses" encompasses attorney's fees); Casey , 499 U.S. at 99, 111 . . .

C. ROTKISKE, v. KLEMM,, 140 S. Ct. 355 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Gilbertson , 501 U.S. 350, 363, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) ; Lozano v. . . .

NATIONAL REVIEW, INC. v. E. MANN v. E., 140 S. Ct. 344 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Lorain Journal Co. , 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). . . .

FERNANDO I. v. MARGARITA O., 140 S. Ct. 72 (U.S. 2019)

. . . No. 19-111 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

UNITED STATES, v. ROMERO, Jr., 935 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 111-12, 98 S.Ct. 330. . . .

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 935 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n , 497 U.S. 871, 889, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. LILLARD,, 935 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) (internal citations omitted) . . .

TIMS, v. LGE COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION,, 935 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 111-203, Title X, § 1084, 124 Stat. 1376, 2081-83. . . .

L. SMITH, v. SHARP,, 935 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010), mandates the use of the term "intellectual disability" in place of . . .

UNITED STATES v. TOWN OF COLORADO CITY,, 935 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. , 498 U.S. 479, 494, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991). . . .

IN RE BOWLES,, 935 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). . . .

PEREZ- SANCHEZ, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2019) ("The Attorney General has promulgated regulations governing removal . . .

CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC. v. TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO. OWT ET Co., 935 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . P'ship , 564 U.S. 91, 111, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011) ("When warranted, the jury may be instructed . . .

PANAH, v. CHAPPELL,, 935 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991), here there is no reasoned state . . . Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) ("A confession is like no other . . . See Richter, 562 U.S. at 111, 131 S.Ct. 770 ("In many instances cross-examination will be sufficient . . . Id. at 111-13, 131 S.Ct. 770. The Court's reasoning is almost entirely applicable here. . . .

UNITED STATES v. R. GREEN,, 935 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Kamsomphou, 111 F. App'x 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Thompson, 49 F. . . .

IN RE J. BARIBEAU,, 603 B.R. 797 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . Co. of El Paso, Tex. , 111 B.R. 604, 617 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990). . . .

DIVERSE POWER, INC. v. CITY OF LAGRANGE, GEORGIA,, 934 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc. , 499 U.S. 365, 372, 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1350, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991). . . . Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. , 499 U.S. 365, 111 S. . . . Id. at 367-68, 111 S. Ct. at 1347-48. . . . Id. at 373, 111 S. Ct. at 1350. And Omni isn't an outlier. . . .

SCRIMO, v. LEE,, 935 F.3d 103 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000). * * * We conclude that Scrimo's claim is based on clearly established . . . Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) ). . . .

WOLFINGTON, v. RECONSTRUCTIVE ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES II PC, a k a, 935 F.3d 187 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 111-203, § 1100A(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2107 (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(b) ). . . .

BACA v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, G. T. L. M., 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Higgins , 498 U.S. 439, 448, 111 S.Ct. 865, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991). . . . Id. at 448-49, 111 S.Ct. 865 (third alteration in original) (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BEGAY,, 934 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . .**, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) ("Although a murder may be committed without an intent to . . .

BOWLES, v. DESANTIS,, 934 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (recognizing the "State's interest in . . . Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) ("There is no constitutional right . . .

BENTLEY, v. AUTOZONERS, LLC, LLC,, 935 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 111. . . .

S. BLEDSOE, v. VANDERBILT,, 934 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991), wherein they examine the "nature of . . . See also Burns, 500 U.S. at 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934 ("[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune from liability . . . Burns, 500 U.S. at 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934. . . .

UNITED STATES v. TURNER,, 934 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ). . . .

AMAZON. COM, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,, 934 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ohio Power Co. , 498 U.S. 73, 78, 111 S.Ct. 415, 112 L.Ed.2d 374 (1990), Amazon argues that the Commissioner's . . . BethEnergy Mines, Inc. , 501 U.S. 680, 707, 111 S.Ct. 2524, 115 L.Ed.2d 604 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting . . .

UNITED STATES v. BROWN,, 935 F.3d 43 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Lake , 419 F.3d 111, 113 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005). . . .

A. VAN BUSKIRK A. v. UNITED GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC. DCG LLC, DCG UGOC II, LLC, J. F. MCM LLC, LLC, F. F. W. Jr., 935 F.3d 49 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Morgan Stanley & Co. , 772 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2014). . . .

NALPROPION PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. ACTAVIS LABORATORIES FL, INC., 934 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Patent 7,375,111 ("the '111 patent"), claims 26 and 31 of U.S. . . . date of any FDA approval of ANDA No. 208043 shall be no earlier than the latest expiration of the '111 . . . 195 patent not invalid for lack of written description, but did err in finding that claim 1 of the '111 . . . Orange Booklisted patents for Contrave® that Nalpropion asserted against Actavis: the '626, '195, and '111 . . . Finally, the '111 patent is directed to a composition of sustained-release bupropion and naltrexone for . . .

MENAKER, v. HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY,, 935 F.3d 20 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . App. 111 (Am. Compl. ¶ 51). . . . Hosp. , 239 Conn. 574, 592-93, 687 A.2d 111 (1996) ("[C]ourts will entertain a cause of action for institutional . . .

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR SEIDENBACH, INCORPORATED, v., 935 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . White , 111 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1997) ). . . .

CAPIZ- FABIAN, v. P. BARR,, 933 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. , 498 U.S. 479, 485-86, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991). II. . . .

PIZZUTO, Jr. v. BLADES,, 933 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Nunnemaker , 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) ; Hibbler v. . . .

CHABAD LUBAVITCH OF LITCHFIELD COUNTY, INC. v. LITCHFIELD HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION,, 934 F.3d 238 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 111, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) ). . . . Farrar , 506 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. 566 (internal citations omitted). . . . Id . at 111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566. . . . Farrar , 506 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. 566. Defendants' reliance on Rhodes v. . . .

MAMMANA, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, 934 F.3d 368 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 300, 111 S.Ct. 2321. . . . Id. at 308, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (quoting Rhodes v. . . . Id. at 302, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (quoting Whitley v. . . . (quoting Wilson , 501 U.S. at 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321 ). Id. . . . Wilson , 501 U.S. at 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321 ; accord Gaston v. . . .

YOUKHANNA v. CITY OF STERLING HEIGHTS C., 934 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . asked for consent to search his bag while on a bus that he did not want to exit. 501 U.S. 429, 434-36, 111 . . .

IN RE J. SHENK, Sr. J. Sr. v. U. S., 603 B.R. 671 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 2019)

. . . Garner , 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991). . . .

IN RE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE S SUNDAY TICKET ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Jr. v. LLC LLC NFL LLC LLC LP LLC LLC NFL LP LLC LP LLC LP Co. LLC LP LLC, 933 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . UtiliCorp United, Inc. , 497 U.S. 199, 216, 110 S.Ct. 2807, 111 L.Ed.2d 169 (1990) ("[A]mple justifications . . .

J. MALOUF, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,, 933 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 501 U.S. 868, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991). . . . judges for the Tax Court were inferior officers subject to the Appointments Clause. 501 U.S. at 881, 111 . . . See id. at 881-82, 111 S.Ct. 2631 (noting that special trial judges "take testimony, conduct trials, . . .

IN RE M. STERLING,, 933 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Veterans Affairs , 498 U.S. 89, 91, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) ("Under our system . . .

SMITH, OSF v. OSF HEALTHCARE SYSTEM,, 933 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Dkt. 111, at 11, 21-22 (court discussing pending discovery requests and disputes). . . . Dkt. 111 at 38-41. The Supreme Court decided Advocate Health on June 5, 2017. . . .

GREYER, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, v., 933 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) ). . . .

EFFEX CAPITAL, LLC, v. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION,, 933 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (in part, expanding the Commission's authority to oversee the swaps . . .

M. RODEN, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 548 (S.D. Ohio 2019)

. . . Sullivan , 501 U.S. 89, 100, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991). . . .

PAUL G. a BY AND THROUGH STEVE G. v. MONTEREY PENINSULA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 933 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Educ. , 111 F.3d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 1997). . . .

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GUN RIGHTS, INC. v. MANGAN, G. J., 933 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ass'n , 111 Wash.App. 586, 49 P.3d 894, 903 (2002) ). . . . 30 days, a United States citizen, not currently incarcerated for a felony, and of sound mind. § 13-1-111 . . .

LAFFERTY, v. BENZON,, 933 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 323, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991), for the proposition that a federal . . .

HARDEMAN, v. CURRAN,, 933 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Seiter , 501 U.S. 294, 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) ). That is the case here. . . . Wilson , 501 U.S. at 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321 ("Indeed, the medical care a prisoner receives is just as much . . . See Wilson , 501 U.S. at 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321 ; Bell , 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ("[I]f a restriction . . .

BASTARDO- VALE, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES, 934 F.3d 255 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (noting that stare decisis "promotes . . .

SHIFFLETT, v. Mr. KORSZNIAK, SCI Dr. Dr. Dr. Dr. Dr. Dr. P., 934 F.3d 356 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Napoleon , 897 F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1990), and therefore must be separately grieved. . . .

LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. FOWLKES PLUMBING, L. L. C., 934 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rogers-Usry Chevrolet, Inc. , 908 So.2d 107, 111 (Miss. 2005) ("When construing a contract, we will read . . .

CLARK, v. WARDEN,, 934 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Nunnemaker , 501 U.S. 797, 803, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) ("[W]here, as here, the last reasoned . . .

UNITED STATES v. JONES,, 935 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) ). . . .

JANJUA, v. NEUFELD, USCIS T. USCIS K. U. S. U. S. P. U. S., 933 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Apex Marine Corp. , 498 U.S. 19, 30 n.1, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990). . . .

UNITED STATES v. NG LAP SENG, Ng, Ng W. C., 934 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Ashcroft , 501 U.S. 452, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991), which holds that Congress must speak . . . Ashcroft , 501 U.S. at 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (recognizing that sovereign defines itself "[t]hrough the . . . Ashcroft , 501 U.S. at 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (observing that "[a]s long as it is acting within the powers . . . Ashcroft , 501 U.S. at 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (stating that courts "must assume Congress does not exercise . . . United States , 500 U.S. 257, 273, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1991) (holding that elected official . . .

H. BURTON, v. KOHN LAW FIRM, S. C., 934 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C. , 111 F.3d 1322, 1325 (7th Cir. 1997) ). Id. . . .

REYES, v. FISCHER, J. X., 934 F.3d 97 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Halpin, 885 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2018) (per curiam). . . .

UNITED STATES v. TREVINO,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 901 (W.D. Mich. 2019)

. . . United States, 498 U.S. 1043, 111 S.Ct. 747, 112 L.Ed.2d 768 (1991) (affirming the denial of the defendant's . . . Yakes, 226 Wis.2d 425, 595 N.W.2d 108, 111-12 (Wis. . . .

UNITED STATES v. M. SWARTZ,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 199 (N.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Nos. 103, 108, 111, 113, 115. . . .

SIEGEL, s s v. HSBC NORTH AMERICA HOLDINGS, INC. HSBC USA, N. A. HBUS,, 933 F.3d 217 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at ¶¶ 108, 111. . . .

L. ROMANSKY, v. SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI, 933 F.3d 293 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Morton , 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HEGWOOD,, 934 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ( Public Law 111 . . . court, impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ( Public Law 111 . . . accordance with the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ( Public Law 111 . . . No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010). . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. HARPER,, 934 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . approximately 156 to 162 months when, the parties agree, the correct range might have been as low as 101 to 111 . . .

EVANS, v. GRIFFIN,, 932 F.3d 1043 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . NASCO, Inc. , 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) ). . . . Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123. . . .

KELLY, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., 933 F.3d 173 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . NLRB , 501 U.S. 190, 207, 111 S.Ct. 2215, 115 L.Ed.2d 177 (1991). . . . Printing Div. , 501 U.S. at 203, 111 S.Ct. 2215 ; see also Tackett , 135 S. . . .

O NEAL, v. BALCARCEL,, 933 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (second and third quotes quoting . . . Id. at 296, 302, 111 S.Ct. 1246. . . . See Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 299, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (concluding that the erroneous admission of one confession . . .

KORTRIGHT CAPITAL PARTNERS LP, TY v. INVESTCORP INVESTMENT ADVISERS LIMITED,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 1997) (authorizing district courts to address "excessive, redundant . . .

PALIN, v. NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY,, 933 F.3d 160 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Lorain Journal Co., , 19-20, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); see also Celle, 209 F.3d at 178 (noting . . .

A. JALUDI, v. CITIGROUP, 933 F.3d 246 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) ). . . .

BERGAMATTO, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE NYSA ILA PENSION FUND, 933 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Groves , 803 F.2d at 111, 118 ; see also Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd. . . . documentation that a plan administrator must provide, simply asked to schedule a meeting); Groves , 803 F.2d at 111 . . .