The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . Pink , 315 U.S. 203, 229-230, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942) ; United States v. . . . at 442-445, 446 N.Y.S.2d 196, 430 N.E.2d at 1252-1253 ; In re Grand Jury Subpoenas , 72 N.Y.2d 307, 315 . . .
. . . Laws ch. 179, § 2, p. 315; Mass. Gen. Stat., ch. 165, § 9 (1860); Mich. Rev. Stat., Tit. . . .
. . . illegality rationale, still did not provide an adequate explanation for the September 2017 rescission. 315 . . .
. . . . § 315, id. , at 584. These proceedings take place in the U.S. . . .
. . . County of Los Angeles , 482 U.S. 304, 315-316, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987). . . .
. . . ." § 315(b). . . . That prohibition applies to § 315(b) issues, the Federal Circuit dissenters maintained, because § 315 . . . the § 315(b)-barred party can join a proceeding initiated by another petitioner. § 315(b), (c). . . . Take the provision before us, § 315(b). . . . Consider § 315(c). . . .
. . . Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 315, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion). . . .
. . . Id. , at 203 ; In re Frescati Shipping Co. , 886 F.3d 291, 300, 315 (2018) (case below). . . .
. . . Co. , 92 U.S. 315, 318-319, 23 L.Ed. 515 (1876) (distinguishing between a "mixed question of law and . . .
. . . United States , 711 F.3d 315 (CA2 2013) ; United States v. . . .
. . . No. 19-315 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . O'Neill , 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Risks of error rise when hearings are deferred, but these . . .
. . . Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943), the Supreme Court held that because "nothing in the language of the Sherman . . .
. . . Jacksonville Terminal Co. , 315 U.S. 386, 388, 404, 62 S.Ct. 659, 86 L.Ed. 914 (1942). . . . See Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood , 315 U.S. at 424, 62 S.Ct. 659 ("[The regular rate] is not an arbitrary . . . of compensation regularly and actually reaching the employee); see also Jacksonville Terminal Co. , 315 . . .
. . . Nu-Enamel Corp. , 305 U.S. 315, 333, 59 S.Ct. 191, 83 L.Ed. 195 (1938). . . .
. . . Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. , 315 F.R.D. 523, 572, 577-84 (N.D. Cal. 2016). . . .
. . . SCS Commc'ns, Inc. , 251 F.3d 315, 322 (2d Cir. 2001). . . .
. . . Marathon Oil Co. , 257 Kan. 315, 894 P.2d 788, 799 (Kan. 1995). . . .
. . . Lee , 315 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 2003). Condition (h) does not forbid Scanzani from doing anything. . . .
. . . See, e.g. , Rachid , 376 F.3d at 315 (finding evidence of age discrimination where the employer told . . .
. . . City & Cty. of San Francisco , 545 U.S. 323, 342, 125 S.Ct. 2491, 162 L.Ed.2d 315 (2005). . . .
. . . Williams , 622 F.3d 315, 324-25 (3d Cir. 2010). III. Analysis A. . . .
. . . Ace Patents Corp. , 315 U.S. 126, 136-37, 62 S.Ct. 513, 86 L.Ed. 736 (1942) ). . . .
. . . collection/p266001coll1/id/7630; the NRCS Manual and Procedures are in the Administrative Record (AR) at 315 . . .
. . . Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (1990) ; accord Pasternak v. . . .
. . . Osborne , 133 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1998). . . .
. . . Gregory , 315 F.3d 637, 640-41 (6th Cir. 2003) ; United States v. . . .
. . . . § 315(c) (2006). . . . We held that "the estoppel provision of § 315 is triggered not when examination is completed but only . . . The panel then rejected the argument that § 317(b) somehow showed that § 315(c) estoppel must apply as . . . Section 315(c) concerns estoppel in the opposite direction: when the PTO's determination in a reexam . . . Bettcher concluded that the estoppel provision of § 315 attaches when all appeal rights are exhausted . . .
. . . Co. , 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1986). . . .
. . . Superior Court , 53 Cal.4th 1004, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 273 P.3d 513 (2012), the district court concluded . . . which the employee is relieved of all duty during the 30-minute period meal period." 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 . . . Id. , 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 273 P.3d at 536-37. . . . Id., 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 273 P.3d at 537. . . . arises that the employee was not relieved of duty and no meal period was provided." 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 . . .
. . . See Elstad , 470 U.S. at 315, 105 S.Ct. 1285. . . .
. . . No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (1976). It was amended again in 1978. . . .
. . . Cyr , 533 U.S. 289, 315, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). . . .
. . . Barker , 723 F.3d 315, 322-23 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. . . .
. . . Collins , 415 F.3d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) ; U.S. v. Gray , 177 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 1999). . . .
. . . Sellars , 20 N.C. 315 (1838) (holding that conviction is conclusive evidence of probable cause, even . . .
. . . . § 340A.315, subd. 2. . . . Stat. § 340A.315, subds. 1, 2, 9. . . . Stat. § 340A.315, subd. 4. . . .
. . . City of Chesterfield , 64 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (quoting King Gen. . . .
. . . Ortiz , 315 F.3d 873, 903 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lewis v. . . . See Ortiz , 315 F.3d at 903. . . . guarantees 'the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.' " Ortiz , 315 . . . Ortiz , 315 F.3d at 888. . . . trial judge is in the best position to analyze the demeanor and credibility of a venireman," Ortiz , 315 . . .
. . . Commissioner, 142 T.C. 308, 315 (2014). . . .
. . . Waller , 326 F.2d 314, 315 (4th Cir. 1963) ). . . . United States , 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). . . .
. . . Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), and suspected criminals injured while . . .
. . . FDIC , 315 U.S. 447, 472, 62 S.Ct. 676, 86 L.Ed. 956 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing Bd. of . . .
. . . Cyr , 533 U.S. 289, 315, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) ("[T]he term 'removal' was substituted . . .
. . . Gaubert , 499 U.S. 315, 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v. . . . WMATA , 315 F.3d 302, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2003). . . . Abdulwali , 315 F.3d at 305. For example, in Abdulwali , the D.C. . . . Circuit held that sovereign immunity bars review of the design of warning signs on Metro cars. 315 F.3d . . .
. . . Starks , 861 F.3d 306, 315 (1st Cir. 2017). . . . Starks , 861 F.3d at 315. . . .
. . . Manchester Farming P'ship , 315 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir.), as amended on denial of reh'g , 326 F.3d . . .
. . . in federal proceedings due to the government's decision to take an interlocutory appeal. 474 U.S. at 315 . . .
. . . SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA , 315 F.3d 533, 537-38 (5th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . Bayer Corp. , 564 U.S. 299, 315, 131 S.Ct. 2368, 180 L.Ed.2d 341 (2011) (holding plaintiff's claim could . . .
. . . Brown , 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943), in which the Supreme Court held that States . . .
. . . In re Coram Healthcare Corp. , 315 B.R. 321, 330 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004). . . .
. . . City Comm'rs of City of Cordele, 315 Ga.App. 696, 727 S.E.2d 524, 527 (2012). . . .
. . . App'x 312, 315-16 (5th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . United States, 638 F.3d 315, 320-21 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Clay v. . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 315, 318 (D.D.C. 2011) (describing the FOIA's "statute of limitations '[a]s a jurisdictional . . .
. . . Tillerson , 315 F. Supp. 3d 47, 67 (D.D.C. 2018) ; cf. Miller v. . . .
. . . Howell , 410 U.S. 315, 329, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973) (noting that deviation of 16.4% "may . . .
. . . Brown , 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943), the Village enjoys antitrust immunity. . . .
. . . Supp. 311, 315 (W.D. Va. 1979) )). . . . Supp. 311, 315 (W.D. Va. 1979) ). . . . Supp. at 315, and the Court of Appeals of Virginia in Jackson v. . . .
. . . Trigg , 976 F.2d 308, 312-13, 315 (1992), we held that "[u]rine tests are searches for Fourth Amendment . . . But surely the collecting of urine in Forbes , 976 F.2d at 315, the catherization challenged in Sparks . . .
. . . . § 315(b) ; see also Hage , 810 F.3d at 717. . . . of Land Mgmt. , 150 F.3d 1132, 1138 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) (binding on federal agencies). 43 U.S.C. § 315 . . .
. . . Curry, 627 F.3d 312, 315 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). . . .
. . . Sokolov , 315 F. . . .
. . . Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). . . .
. . . Q. 315, 335 (2014); Jennifer S. Wong, Laura J. . . .
. . . Gamache , 566 F.3d 307, 315 (2d Cir. 2009). . . . County of Rockland , 373 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 2004). . . .
. . . Gamache , 566 F.3d 307, 315 (2d Cir. 2009). . . . County of Rockland , 373 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 2004). . . .
. . . FIG.3 shows the biological signal200 having a series of events305, 310, 315, 320, 325, 330, 335, 340, . . . Events305, 310, 315, 320, 325, 330, 335, 340, 345 generally are periods in time210 when the information . . . Events305, 310, 315, 320, 325, 330, 335, 340, 345 need not be of equal or predetermined duration. . . . The increased relevance of events305, 310, 315, 320, 325, 330, 335, 340, 345 can be determined using . . . Events305, 310, 315, 320, 325, 330, 335, 340, 345 also can be identified based on characteristics of . . .
. . . Gamache , 566 F.3d 307, 315 (2d Cir. 2009). . . . County of Rockland , 373 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 2004). . . .
. . . . § 315(e), standing alone, do not create an injury. Maj. Op. 1354-55. . . . Although we have not decided whether § 315(e) would estop an IPR petitioner who lacked standing to appeal . . . See § 315(e)(2). . . . Thus, while I agree that 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) estoppel alone does not create an injury-in-fact, its potential . . . . § 315(e). For the reasons stated below, we reject GE's arguments. . . . GE also contends that estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) creates injury in fact for standing purposes. . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 312, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). . . . Supp. 2d at 315 (citation omitted). . . .
. . . ECF No. 315. . . .
. . . Servs., 944 So. 2d 306, 315 (Fla. 2006) ("In the past, we have pointed to language in other statutes . . .
. . . Fiasconaro, 315 F.3d 28, 37 (1st Cir. 2002). See also United States v. . . .
. . . McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684 (D. Mass. 2018). Zadvydas v. . . . Government bear the burden of proof at bond hearings for non-criminal aliens detained under § 1226(a). 315 . . . See Pensamiento, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 692. . . . See 315 F. Supp. 3d at 693. . . . this injunction because the INA is silent on the procedural rules for bond hearings, see Pensamiento, 315 . . .
. . . City & Cty. of San Francisco , 545 U.S. 323, 125 S.Ct. 2491, 162 L.Ed.2d 315 (2005) ; see also John G . . .
. . . Laubenheimer , 290 U.S. 276, 295, 54 S.Ct. 191, 78 L.Ed. 315 (1933). . . .
. . . Lee , 358 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2004). . . .
. . . Miller Waste Mills, 315 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . Coca-Cola Co. , 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. . . .
. . . United States , 638 F.3d 315, 322 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying the reasoning of Holland v. . . . No. 315, habeas petition filed as Civil Action No. 17-12065-DPW (D. . . .
. . . Laws ch. 106 § 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose created by a "seller" of the . . .
. . . Chakrabarty , 447 U.S. 303, 315, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 (1980) (declining to create a rule that . . .
. . . Dist. , 309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . Shirey, 293 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2002) Brown, 214 F.3d at 723. . . . McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (citing Perry v. . . .
. . . Lyon , 875 F.3d 310, 315-16 (6th Cir. 2017) ; see also Susan B. Anthony List v. . . .
. . . The Bagger 293 is an excavating machine that is 315 feet tall and 738 feet wide. . . .
. . . App. 315, 2014 WL 2159326, at *2 (2014) (same); Johnson v. State , 71 Ark. . . .
. . . New York , 315 U.S. 752, 752, 62 S.Ct. 854, 86 L.Ed. 1166 (1942) ). . . .
. . . City & Cty. of San Francisco , 545 U.S. 323, 125 S.Ct. 2491, 162 L.Ed.2d 315 (2005). . . .
. . . Columbia's argument centers on the phrase "reasonably could have raised." 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). . . . raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review. " 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). . . . The Federal Circuit's interpretation of § 315(e) estoppel in Shaw does not preclude this result. 2. . . . A plain reading of § 315(e)(2) coupled with the purpose of inter partes review , makes clear that § 315 . . . See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). . . . . § 315(e)(2). Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc. , 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1026-27 (E.D. . . .
. . . Alston , 17 N.C.App. 712, 195 S.E.2d 314, 315 (1973) ("An accessory before the fact is one who meets . . .
. . . United States, 33 C.I.T. 315, 325, 612 F. . . .
. . . See Greer , 884 F.3d at 315. . . .
. . . State , 928 So. 2d 315, 324 n.10 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). . . .
. . . record only contains direct evidence about the qualifications of roughly 25 investors, leaving nearly 315 . . .
. . . The District Court dismissed the Enumeration Clause claim but allowed the other claims to proceed. 315 . . . because "asking such questions bears no relationship whatsoever to the goal of an accurate headcount." 315 . . .
. . . Clark , 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) ; Couture v. . . . Clark , 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that content and implementation analyses . . . Clark , 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Bobby R. approvingly but noting the parties did . . .