The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXIII
MOTOR VEHICLES

Chapter 316
STATE UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL

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F.S. 316.85

316.85 Autonomous vehicles; operation; compliance with traffic and motor vehicle laws; testing.—

(1) Notwithstanding any other law, a licensed human operator is not required to operate a fully autonomous vehicle as defined in s. 316.003(3).

(2) A fully autonomous vehicle may operate in this state regardless of whether a human operator is physically present in the vehicle.

(3)(a) For purposes of this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, the automated driving system, when engaged, shall be deemed to be the operator of an autonomous vehicle, regardless of whether a person is physically present in the vehicle while the vehicle is operating with the automated driving system engaged.

(b) Unless otherwise provided by law, applicable traffic or motor vehicle laws of this state may not be construed to:

1. Prohibit the automated driving system from being deemed the operator of an autonomous vehicle operating with the automated driving system engaged.

2. Require a licensed human operator to operate a fully autonomous vehicle.

(4) An on-demand autonomous vehicle network shall operate pursuant to state laws governing the operation of transportation network companies and transportation network company vehicles as defined in s. 627.748, except that any provision of s. 627.748 that reasonably applies only to a human driver does not apply to the operation of a fully autonomous vehicle with the automated driving system engaged while logged on to an on-demand autonomous vehicle network. A fully autonomous vehicle with the automated driving system engaged while logged on to an on-demand autonomous vehicle network must meet the insurance requirements in s. 627.749.

(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, an autonomous vehicle or a fully autonomous vehicle equipped with a teleoperation system may operate without a human operator physically present in the vehicle when the teleoperation system is engaged. A vehicle that is subject to this subsection must meet the requirements of s. 319.145 and is considered a vehicle that meets the definition provided in s. 316.003(3)(c) for the purposes of ss. 316.062(5), 316.063(4), 316.065(5), 316.1975(3), and 316.303(1).

(6) It is the intent of the Legislature to provide for uniformity of laws governing autonomous vehicles throughout the state. A local government may not impose any tax, fee, for-hire vehicle requirement, or other requirement on automated driving systems or autonomous vehicles or on a person who operates an autonomous vehicle, including, but not limited to, a person who operates an autonomous vehicle for purposes of providing passenger transportation services. This subsection does not prohibit an airport or a seaport from charging reasonable fees consistent with any fees charged to companies that provide similar services at that airport or seaport for their use of the airport’s or seaport’s facilities, nor does it prohibit the airport or seaport from designating locations for staging, pickup, or other similar operations at the airport or seaport.

History.—s. 3, ch. 2012-111; s. 107, ch. 2012-174; s. 7, ch. 2016-181; s. 12, ch. 2016-239; s. 8, ch. 2019-101.

F.S. 316.85 on Google Scholar

F.S. 316.85 on Casetext

Amendments to 316.85

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 316.85

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 316.85.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

In BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, INC. SECURITIES, DERIVATIVE, AND ERISA LITIGATION. To, 763 F. Supp. 2d 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . implemented CSE structure, may cause an incentive or pressure for fraudulent financial reporting (AU 316.85 . . .

SMITH STEEL CASTING COMPANY, v. E. BROCK,, 800 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1986)

. . . preceding the inspection, respondent had a gross income of $7,096,499.55 with a net profit of $480,-316.85 . . .

In TONYAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. TONYAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. R. B. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. v. McHENRY STATE BANK, W. J., 28 B.R. 714 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983)

. . . $101,148.01 of the Lincoln Towers proceeds was deposited by the Bank into Debtor’s general account, $22,-316.85 . . .

BROWN v. UNITED STATES, 37 F. Supp. 444 (Ct. Cl. 1941)

. . . This balance sheet shows that the company had total assets of $29,-316.85, exclusive of good will, which . . .

FIRST NAT. BANK OF KANSAS CITY, MO. v. RUSH, 85 F. 539 (8th Cir. 1898)

. . . capital stock was $50,000, and that the net profits of the bank from July 1 to October 2, 1894, were $316.85 . . .