The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XL
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

Chapter 712
MARKETABLE RECORD TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY

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CHAPTER 712

MARKETABLE RECORD TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY

712.001 Short title.

712.01 Definitions.

712.02 Marketable record title; suspension of applicability.

712.03 Exceptions to marketability.

712.04 Interests extinguished by marketable record title.

712.05 Effect of filing notice.

712.06 Contents of notice; recording and indexing.

712.065 Extinguishment of discriminatory restrictions.

712.07 Limitations of actions and recording acts.

712.08 Filing false claim.

712.09 Extension of 30-year period.

712.095 Notice required by July 1, 1983.

712.10 Law to be liberally construed.

712.11 Covenant revitalization.

712.12 Covenant or restriction revitalization by parcel owners not subject to a homeowners’ association.

712.001 Short title.—This chapter may be cited as the “Marketable Record Title Act.”

History.—s. 1, ch. 2018-55.

712.01 Definitions.—As used in this chapter, the term:

(1) “Community covenant or restriction” means any agreement or limitation contained in a document recorded in the public records of the county in which a parcel is located which:

(a) Subjects the parcel to any use restriction that may be enforced by a property owners’ association; or

(b) Authorizes a property owners’ association to impose a charge or assessment against the parcel or the parcel owner.

(2) “Covenant or restriction” means any agreement or limitation contained in a document recorded in the public records of the county in which a parcel is located which subjects the parcel to any use or other restriction or obligation.

(3) “Parcel” means any real property that is subject to any covenant or restriction of a property owners’ association.

(4) “Person” includes the singular or plural, natural or corporate, private or governmental, including the state and any political subdivision or agency thereof as the context for the use thereof requires or denotes and including any property owners’ association.

(5) “Property owners’ association” means a homeowners’ association as defined in s. 720.301, a corporation or other entity responsible for the operation of property in which the voting membership is made up of the owners of the property or their agents, or a combination thereof, and in which membership is a mandatory condition of property ownership, or an association of parcel owners which is authorized to enforce a community covenant or restriction that is imposed on the parcels.

(6) “Root of title” means any title transaction purporting to create or transfer the estate claimed by any person which is the last title transaction to have been recorded at least 30 years before the time when marketability is being determined. The effective date of the root of title is the date on which it was recorded.

(7) “Title transaction” means any recorded instrument or court proceeding that affects title to any estate or interest in land and that describes the land sufficiently to identify its location and boundaries.

History.—s. 1, ch. 63-133; s. 11, ch. 65-420; s. 1, ch. 81-242; s. 1, ch. 97-202; s. 56, ch. 2000-258; s. 16, ch. 2000-317; s. 2, ch. 2018-55.

712.02 Marketable record title; suspension of applicability.—Any person having the legal capacity to own land in this state, who, alone or together with her or his predecessors in title, has been vested with any estate in land of record for 30 years or more, shall have a marketable record title to such estate in said land, which shall be free and clear of all claims except the matters set forth as exceptions to marketability in s. 712.03. A person shall have a marketable record title when the public records disclosed a record title transaction affecting the title to the land which has been of record for not less than 30 years purporting to create such estate either in:

(1) The person claiming such estate; or

(2) Some other person from whom, by one or more title transactions, such estate has passed to the person claiming such estate, with nothing appearing of record, in either case, purporting to divest such claimant of the estate claimed.

History.—s. 2, ch. 63-133; s. 1, ch. 85-83; s. 63, ch. 87-226; s. 797, ch. 97-102.

712.03 Exceptions to marketability.—Such marketable record title shall not affect or extinguish the following rights:

¹(1) Estates or interests, easements and use restrictions disclosed by and defects inherent in the muniments of title on which said estate is based beginning with the root of title, provided that in the muniments of title those estates, interests, easements, or use restrictions created before the root of title are preserved by identification in the legal description of the property by specific reference to the official records book and page number, instrument number, or plat name or there is otherwise an affirmative statement in a muniment of title to preserve such estates, interests, easements, or use restrictions created before the root of title as identified by the official records book and page or instrument number; subject, however, to subsection (5).

(2) Estates, interests, claims, or charges, or any covenant or restriction, preserved by the filing of a proper notice in accordance with the provisions hereof.

(3) Rights of any person in possession of the lands, so long as such person is in such possession.

(4) Estates, interests, claims, or charges arising out of a title transaction which has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title.

(5) Recorded or unrecorded easements or rights, interest or servitude in the nature of easements, rights-of-way and terminal facilities, including those of a public utility or of a governmental agency, so long as the same are used and the use of any part thereof shall except from the operation hereof the right to the entire use thereof. No notice need be filed in order to preserve the lien of any mortgage or deed of trust or any supplement thereto encumbering any such recorded or unrecorded easements, or rights, interest, or servitude in the nature of easements, rights-of-way, and terminal facilities. However, nothing herein shall be construed as preserving to the mortgagee or grantee of any such mortgage or deed of trust or any supplement thereto any greater rights than the rights of the mortgagor or grantor.

(6) Rights of any person in whose name the land is assessed on the county tax rolls for such period of time as the land is so assessed and which rights are preserved for a period of 3 years after the land is last assessed in such person’s name.

(7) State title to lands beneath navigable waters acquired by virtue of sovereignty.

(8) A restriction or covenant recorded pursuant to chapter 376 or chapter 403.

(9) Any right, title, or interest held by the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, any water management district created under chapter 373, or the United States.

History.—s. 3, ch. 63-133; s. 12, ch. 65-420; s. 1, ch. 73-218; s. 1, ch. 78-288; s. 2, ch. 97-202; s. 17, ch. 2000-317; s. 1, ch. 2010-104; s. 1, ch. 2022-171.

¹Note.—Section 6, ch. 2022-171, provides that “[a] person with an interest in land which may potentially be extinguished by this act, and whose interest has not been extinguished before July 1, 2022, must file a notice pursuant to s. 712.06, Florida Statutes, by July 1, 2023, to preserve such interest. Any county as defined in s. 125.011(1), Florida Statutes, with an interest in land which may potentially be extinguished by this act, and whose interest has not been extinguished before July 1, 2022, must file a notice pursuant to s. 712.06, Florida Statutes, by July 1, 2025, to preserve such interest.”

¹712.04 Interests extinguished by marketable record title.—Subject to s. 712.03, a marketable record title is free and clear of all estates, interests, claims, covenants, restrictions, or charges, the existence of which depends upon any act, title transaction, event, zoning requirement, building or development permit, or omission that occurred before the effective date of the root of title. Except as provided in s. 712.03, all such estates, interests, claims, covenants, restrictions, or charges, however denominated, whether they are or appear to be held or asserted by a person sui juris or under a disability, whether such person is within or without the state, natural or corporate, or private or governmental, are declared to be null and void. However, this chapter does not affect any right, title, or interest of the United States, Florida, or any of its officers, boards, commissions, or other agencies reserved in the patent or deed by which the United States, Florida, or any of its agencies parted with title. This section may not be construed to alter or invalidate:

(1) A comprehensive plan or plan amendment; zoning ordinance; land development regulation; building code; development permit; development order; or other law, regulation, or regulatory approval, to the extent such law, regulation, or regulatory approval operates independently of matters recorded in the official records; or

(2) Any recorded covenant or restriction that on the face of the first page of the document states that it was accepted by a governmental entity as part of, or as a condition of, any such comprehensive plan or plan amendment; zoning ordinance; land development regulation; building code; development permit; development order; or other law, regulation, or regulatory approval.

History.—s. 4, ch. 63-133; s. 1, ch. 65-280; s. 2, ch. 2010-104; s. 2, ch. 2022-171.

712.05 Effect of filing notice.—

(1) A person claiming an interest in land or other right subject to extinguishment under this chapter may preserve and protect such interest or right from extinguishment by the operation of this chapter by filing for record, at any time during the 30-year period immediately following the effective date of the root of title, a written notice in accordance with s. 712.06.

(2) A property owners’ association may preserve and protect a community covenant or restriction from extinguishment by the operation of this chapter by filing for record, at any time during the 30-year period immediately following the effective date of the root of title:

(a) A written notice in accordance with s. 712.06; or

(b) A summary notice in substantial form and content as required under s. 720.3032(2); or an amendment to a community covenant or restriction that is indexed under the legal name of the property owners’ association and references the recording information of the covenant or restriction to be preserved. Failure of a summary notice or amendment to be indexed to the current owners of the affected property does not affect the validity of the notice or vitiate the effect of the filing of such notice.

(3) A notice under subsection (1) or subsection (2) preserves an interest in land or other right subject to extinguishment under this chapter, or a covenant or restriction or portion of such covenant or restriction, for not less than 30 years after filing the notice unless the notice is filed again as required in this chapter. A person’s disability or lack of knowledge of any kind may not delay the commencement of or suspend the running of the 30-year period. Such notice may be filed for record by the claimant or by any other person acting on behalf of a claimant who is:

(a) Under a disability;

(b) Unable to assert a claim on his or her behalf; or

(c) One of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is uncertain at the time of filing such notice of claim for record.

The property owners’ association or clerk of the circuit court is not required to provide additional notice pursuant to s. 712.06(3) for a notice filed under subsection (2). The preceding sentence is intended to clarify existing law.

(4) It is not necessary for the owner of the marketable record title, as described in s. 712.02, to file a notice to protect his or her marketable record title.

History.—s. 5, ch. 63-133; s. 798, ch. 97-102; s. 3, ch. 97-202; s. 1, ch. 2003-79; s. 7, ch. 2014-133; s. 3, ch. 2018-55.

¹712.06 Contents of notice; recording and indexing.—

(1) To be effective, the notice referred to in s. 712.05, other than the summary notice and the amendment referred to in s. 712.05(2)(b), must contain:

(a) The name or description and mailing address of the claimant or the property owners’ association desiring to preserve any covenant or restriction.

(b) The name and mailing address of an owner, or the name and mailing address of the person in whose name the property is assessed on the last completed tax assessment roll of the county at the time of filing, who, for purpose of such notice, shall be deemed to be an owner; however, if a property owners’ association is filing the notice, the requirements of this paragraph may be satisfied by attaching to and recording with the notice an affidavit executed by the appropriate member of the board of directors of the property owners’ association affirming that the board of directors of the property owners’ association caused a statement in substantially the following form to be mailed or hand delivered to the members of that property owners’ association:

STATEMENT OF MARKETABLE TITLE ACTION

The (name of property owners’ association) (the “Association”) has taken action to ensure that the (name of declaration, covenant, or restriction) , recorded in Official Records Book , Page , of the public records of County, Florida, as may be amended from time to time, currently burdening the property of each and every member of the Association, retains its status with regard to the affected real property. To this end, the Association shall cause the notice required by chapter 712, Florida Statutes, to be recorded in the public records of County, Florida. Copies of this notice and its attachments are available through the Association pursuant to the Association’s governing documents regarding official records of the Association.

(c) A full and complete description of all land affected by such notice, which description shall be set forth in particular terms and not by general reference, but if said claim is founded upon a recorded instrument or a covenant or a restriction, the description in such notice may be the same as that contained in such recorded instrument or covenant or restriction, provided the same shall be sufficient to identify the property.

(d) A statement of the claim showing the nature, description, and extent of such claim or other right subject to extinguishment under this chapter or, in the case of a covenant or restriction, a copy of the covenant or restriction or a reference to the book and page or instrument number in which the same is recorded, except that it is not necessary to show the amount of any claim for money or the terms of payment.

(e) If such claim or other right subject to extinguishment under this chapter is based upon an instrument of record or a recorded covenant or restriction, such instrument of record or recorded covenant or restriction shall be deemed sufficiently described to identify the same if the notice includes a reference to the book and page in which the same is recorded.

(f) Such notice shall be acknowledged in the same manner as deeds are acknowledged for record.

(2) Such notice shall be filed with the clerk of the circuit court of the county or counties where the land described therein is situated, together with a true copy thereof. The clerk shall enter, record, and index said notice in the same manner that deeds are entered, recorded, and indexed, as though the claimant were the grantee in the deed and the purported owner were the grantor in a deed, and the clerk shall charge the same fees for recording thereof as are charged for recording deeds. In those counties where the circuit court clerk maintains a tract index, such notice shall also be indexed therein.

(3) The person providing the notice referred to in s. 712.05, other than a notice for preservation of a community covenant or restriction, shall:

(a) Cause the clerk of the circuit court to mail by registered or certified mail to the purported owner of said property, as stated in such notice, a copy thereof and shall enter on the original, before recording the same, a certificate showing such mailing. For preparing the certificate, the claimant shall pay to the clerk the service charge as prescribed in s. 28.24(9) and the necessary costs of mailing, in addition to the recording charges as prescribed in s. 28.24(13). If the notice names purported owners having more than one address, the person filing the same shall furnish a true copy for each of the several addresses stated, and the clerk shall send one such copy to the purported owners named at each respective address. Such certificate shall be sufficient if the same reads substantially as follows:

I hereby certify that I did on this , mail by registered (or certified) mail a copy of the foregoing notice to each of the following at the address stated:

(Clerk of the circuit court)
of County, Florida,
By (Deputy clerk)

The clerk of the circuit court is not required to mail to the purported owner of such property any such notice that pertains solely to the preserving of any covenant or restriction or any portion of a covenant or restriction; or

(b) Publish once a week, for 2 consecutive weeks, the notice referred to in s. 712.05, with the official record book and page number in which such notice was recorded, in a newspaper as defined in chapter 50 in the county in which the property is located.

(4) Failure of any purported owner to receive the mailed notice shall not affect the validity of the notice or vitiate the effect of the filing of such notice.

History.—s. 6, ch. 63-133; s. 5, ch. 77-354; s. 7, ch. 82-205; s. 57, ch. 95-211; s. 4, ch. 97-202; s. 2, ch. 2003-79; s. 110, ch. 2003-402; s. 3, ch. 2010-104; s. 4, ch. 2018-55; s. 25, ch. 2021-116.

712.065 Extinguishment of discriminatory restrictions.—

(1) As used in this section, the term “discriminatory restriction” means a provision in a title transaction recorded in this state which restricts the ownership, occupancy, or use of any real property in this state by any natural person on the basis of a characteristic that has been held, or is held after September 4, 2020, by the United States Supreme Court or the Florida Supreme Court to be protected against discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or under s. 2, Art. I of the State Constitution, including race, color, national origin, religion, gender, or physical disability.

(2) A discriminatory restriction is not enforceable in this state, and all discriminatory restrictions contained in any title transaction recorded in this state are unlawful, are unenforceable, and are declared null and void. Any discriminatory restriction contained in a previously recorded title transaction is extinguished and severed from the recorded title transaction, and the remainder of the title transaction remains enforceable and effective. The recording of any notice preserving or protecting interests or rights pursuant to s. 712.06 does not reimpose or preserve any discriminatory restriction that is extinguished under this section.

(3) Upon request of a parcel owner, a discriminatory restriction appearing in a covenant or restriction affecting the parcel may be removed from the covenant or restriction by an amendment approved by a majority vote of the board of directors of the respective property owners’ association or an owners’ association in which all owners may voluntarily join, notwithstanding any other requirements for approval of an amendment of the covenant or restriction. Unless the amendment also changes other provisions of the covenant or restriction, the recording of an amendment removing a discriminatory restriction does not constitute a title transaction occurring after the root of title for purposes of s. 712.03(4).

History.—ss. 1, 2, ch. 2020-164.

712.07 Limitations of actions and recording acts.—Nothing contained in this law shall be construed to extend the period for the bringing of an action or for the doing of any other act required under any statute of limitations or to affect the operation of any statute governing the effect of the recording or the failure to record any instrument affecting land. This law shall not vitiate any curative statute.

History.—s. 7, ch. 63-133.

712.08 Filing false claim.—No person shall use the privilege of filing notices hereunder for the purpose of asserting false or fictitious claims to land; and in any action relating thereto if the court shall find that any person has filed a false or fictitious claim, the court may award to the prevailing party all costs incurred by her or him in such action, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, and in addition thereto may award to the prevailing party all damages that she or he may have sustained as a result of the filing of such notice of claim.

History.—s. 8, ch. 63-133; s. 799, ch. 97-102.

712.09 Extension of 30-year period.—If the 30-year period for filing notice under s. 712.05 shall have expired prior to July 1, 1965, such period shall be extended to July 1, 1965.

History.—s. 9, ch. 63-133.

712.095 Notice required by July 1, 1983.—Any person whose interest in land is derived from an instrument or court proceeding recorded subsequent to the root of title, which instrument or proceeding did not contain a description of the land as specified by s. 712.01(7), and whose interest had not been extinguished prior to July 1, 1981, shall have until July 1, 1983, to file a notice in accordance with s. 712.06 to preserve the interest.

History.—s. 2, ch. 81-242; s. 11, ch. 2018-55.

712.10 Law to be liberally construed.—This law shall be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record title as described in s. 712.02 subject only to such limitations as appear in s. 712.03.

History.—s. 10, ch. 63-133.

712.11 Covenant revitalization.—A property owners’ association not otherwise subject to chapter 720 may use the procedures set forth in ss. 720.403-720.407 to revive covenants that have lapsed under the terms of this chapter.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2007-173; s. 5, ch. 2018-55.

712.12 Covenant or restriction revitalization by parcel owners not subject to a homeowners’ association.—

(1) As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Community” means the real property that is subject to a covenant or restriction that is recorded in the county where the property is located.

¹(b) “Covenant or restriction” means any agreement or limitation contained in a document recorded in the public records of the county in which a parcel is located and which subjects the parcel to any use restriction that may be enforced by a parcel owner.

(c) “Parcel” means real property that is used for residential purposes and that is subject to exclusive ownership and any covenant or restriction that may be enforced by a parcel owner.

(d) “Parcel owner” means the record owner of legal title to a parcel.

(2) The parcel owners of a community not subject to a homeowners’ association may use the procedures set forth in ss. 720.403-720.407 to revive covenants or restrictions that have lapsed under the terms of this chapter, except:

(a) A reference to a homeowners’ association or articles of incorporation or bylaws of a homeowners’ association under ss. 720.403-720.407 is not required to revive the covenants or restrictions.

(b) The approval required under s. 720.405(6) must be in writing, and not at a meeting.

(c) The requirements under s. 720.407(2) may be satisfied by having the organizing committee execute the revived covenants or restrictions in the name of the community.

(d) The indexing requirements under s. 720.407(3) may be satisfied by indexing the community name in the covenants or restrictions as the grantee and the parcel owners as the grantors.

(3) With respect to any parcel that has ceased to be governed by covenants or restrictions as of October 1, 2018, the parcel owner may commence an action by October 1, 2019, for a judicial determination that the covenants or restrictions did not govern that parcel as of October 1, 2018, and that any revitalization of such covenants or restrictions as to that parcel would unconstitutionally deprive the parcel owner of rights or property.

(4) Revived covenants or restrictions that are implemented pursuant to this section do not apply to or affect the rights of the parcel owner which are recognized by any court order or judgment in any action commenced by October 1, 2019, and any such rights so recognized may not be subsequently altered by revived covenants or restrictions implemented under this section without the consent of the affected parcel owner.

History.—s. 6, ch. 2018-55; s. 3, ch. 2022-171.

F.S. 712 on Google Scholar

F.S. 712 on Casetext

Amendments to 712

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 712

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 712.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL, v. MORRISSEY- BERRU St. v., 140 S. Ct. 2049 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Davey , 540 U.S. 712, 124 S.Ct.1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004), the Court concluded that it would violate . . .

ESPINOZA, v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Davey , 540 U.S. 712, 718, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) ). . . . Davey , 540 U.S. 712, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004). . . . Davey , 540 U.S. 712, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004), which Montana principally relies on to justify . . . Hodges , 576 U.S. 644, 712, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) (ROBERTS, C.J., dissenting). . . . Davey , 540 U.S. 712, 726, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Everson . . . See id ., at 709-712, 720, 101 S.Ct. 1425. . . . Davey , 540 U.S. 712, 718, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) ). . . . Davey , 540 U.S. 712, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1. . . . Davey , 540 U.S. 712, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) ; see also Trinity Lutheran , 582 U.S., at . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Rep. 710, 712 (H. L. 1703); see also Webb v. Portland Mfg. . . .

SEILA LAW LLC, v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Jones , 520 U.S. 681, 712-713, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. THURAISSIGIAM, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (U.S. 2020)

. . . or for any suspicion, or for no cause, perhaps any person, he or they shall think proper. 5 id. , at 712 . . .

ROGERS, v. GREWAL,, 140 S. Ct. 1865 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Gallagher , 712 F.3d 865, 876 (C.A.4 2013) ; Drake v. . . .

NASRALLAH, v. P. BARR,, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States Attorney General , 712 F.3d 517, 532 (CA11 2013), with Wanjiru v. . . .

HAMP S CONSTRUCTION, LLC, v. INLAND MARINE SERVICES, L. L. C., 140 S. Ct. 959 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-712 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

R. ISOM v. ARKANSAS, 140 S. Ct. 342 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Larkin , 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) ). . . .

BIODELIVERY SCIENCES INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. AQUESTIVE THERAPEUTICS, INC. RX, LLC,, 935 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. 1547, 203 L.Ed.2d 712 (2019). . . .

IN RE BOWLES,, 935 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-14 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam), abrogated by Hall v. . . . Id. at 712, 134 S. Ct. at 1995. . . .

J. GENZER, v. JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY,, 934 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lillard , 61 Okla. 206, 160 P. 705, 712 (1916) ; Bailey v. . . .

COLE v. CARSON, v., 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mullenix , 773 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2014), rev'd sub nom. Mullenix v. Luna, --- U.S. ----, 136 S. . . . Mullenix , 773 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2014), we sent a state trooper to a jury "in defiance" of "the concept . . .

CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE, v. MCMAHON,, 934 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mission Indian Relief Act, ch. 65, 26 Stat. 712, 712 (1891). . . . Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony , 538 U.S. 701, 712, 123 S.Ct. 1887, . . . Inyo Cty. , 538 U.S. at 712, 123 S.Ct. 1887. . . .

SAM K. v. SAUL,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Berryhill , 870 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .

SENNE v. KANSAS CITY ROYALS BASEBALL CORP. LLC LLC LP St. LLC LLC LLC LLC L. P. L. P. LLC LLC L. P. AZPB L. P. P LLC LLC LP LLP LLC LLC,, 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Multi-Cinema, Inc. , 623 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2010) ). . . .

A. VAN BUSKIRK A. v. UNITED GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC. DCG LLC, DCG UGOC II, LLC, J. F. MCM LLC, LLC, F. F. W. Jr., 935 F.3d 49 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Fishbein , 712 F. . . .

NEW YORK STATE CITIZENS COALITION FOR CHILDREN, v. J. POOLE,, 935 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Kincade , 712 F.3d 1190, 1197 (8th Cir. 2013) ("[F]inding an enforceable right solely within a purely . . . Kincade , 712 F.3d 1190 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that the CWA does not confer a privately enforceable . . . Midwest Foster Care , 712 F.3d at 1194. . . .

WAL- MART STORES, INCORPORATED L. L. C. s v. TEXAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMMISSION, 935 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Castille , 712 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2013). . . .

J. YOCHIM, v. S. CARSON, Sr. U. S., 935 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Vill. of Bedford Park , 215 F.3d 703, 712-13 (7th Cir. 2000). . . .

PIZZUTO, Jr. v. BLADES,, 933 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 712, 134 S.Ct. 1986. . . . Id. at 712, 134 S.Ct. 1986. . . . Ct. at 1051 ; Hall , 572 U.S. at 705, 712, 134 S.Ct. 1986 ; Smith , 813 F.3d at 1186. . . .

IN RE J. SHENK, Sr. J. Sr. v. U. S., 603 B.R. 671 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 2019)

. . . In re Grubin , 476 B.R. 699, 712-13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012). . . .

EFFEX CAPITAL, LLC, v. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION,, 933 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mait , 712 F.2d 1148, 1152-54 (7th Cir. 1983), or where state law would be "an obstacle to the accomplishment . . .

CLARK, v. WARDEN,, 934 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Parker , 712 F.3d 283, 295 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a claim may be procedurally defaulted if . . .

MARTIN, v. MARINEZ,, 934 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Simon , 712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim of false arrest . . .

COEUR D ALENE TRIBE, a v. W. HAWKS A., 933 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Paiute-Shoshone Indians , 538 U.S. 701, 712, 123 S.Ct. 1887, 155 L.Ed.2d 933 (2003). . . .

H. BURTON, v. KOHN LAW FIRM, S. C., 934 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Pigatto , 712 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted . . .

CONSTANCE S. v. SAUL,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 583 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Berryhill , 870 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017) But, in the Seventh Circuit, the ALJ also has an obligation . . .

BRENDA L. v. SAUL,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 858 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Berryhill , 870 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017). . . . Colvin , 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013). . . .

A. LAVITE, v. J. DUNSTAN,, 932 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lincoln Land Community College , 420 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2005), quoting in turn Eiland v. . . .

ALONSO, LLP LLP S. v. J. WEISS, 932 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . App. 3d 712, 732, 331 Ill.Dec. 557, 911 N.E.2d 378 (1st Dist. 2009) (quoting Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. . . .

ALI, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 931 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Att'y Gen. , 712 F.3d 517, 534 (11th Cir. 2013) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HUNTER, 932 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Binns , 712 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (7th Cir. 2013) ("There are only two requirements for admissibility under . . .

COFFEY, v. CARROLL, 933 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Broadview Heights , 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pearson v. . . .

SPORTFUEL, INC. v. PEPSICO, INC., 932 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . WD-40 Co. , 792 F.3d 712, 722 (7th Cir. 2015). . . .

UNITED STATES v. ESCALANTE,, 933 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ibarra-Luna , 628 F.3d 712, 714 (5th Cir. 2010) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. PORTER,, 933 F.3d 226 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Curcio , 712 F.2d 1532, 1538-39 & n.10 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale . . . Curcio , 712 F.2d at 1539 (quoting Westen, supra , at 1226). . . .

UNITED STATES v. THOMAS, v., 933 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cunningham , 462 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2006). . . .

SIMMONS, v. SAFEWAY, INC. d b a a, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1305 (W.D. Wash. 2019)

. . . Gonzaga University, 191 Wash.2d 712, 722-23, 425 P.3d 837 (2018). . . .

CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, a v. WELLS FARGO CO. N. A., 931 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . The credit score for this borrower is 712, the borrower's loan-to-value ratio is 98 percent, and the . . .

UNITED STATES v. LOCKE,, 932 F.3d 196 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bethurum , 343 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2003). . . .

OWENS, v. PARRIS,, 932 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Parker , 712 F.3d 283, 303-04 (6th Cir. 2013). . . .

ALEXIS BAILLY VINEYARD, INC. a LLC, a v. HARRINGTON, s, 931 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Troutman , 712 F.3d 412, 416 (8th Cir. 2013). . . .

DAVIS, v. GUAM M. C. F. P. F. I. M., 932 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States today is a group having a common ancestry and distinct physical traits," 520 F.3d 710, 712 . . .

UNITED STATES v. VALENZUELA,, 931 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Holder , 757 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). . . .

UNITED STATES v. DOE,, 932 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Calton , 900 F.3d 706, 712-13 (5th Cir. 2018). . . . consider the appeal of a Rule 35(b) determination, must come from § 3742."); see also Calton , 900 F.3d at 712 . . .

UNITED STATES v. LEBEDEV R. J. M., 932 F.3d 40 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . James , 712 F.3d 79, 106 (2d Cir. 2013) ; see also United States v. . . . James , 712 F.3d at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .

TRACIE H. v. SAUL,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 990 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Berryhill , 870 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017) ; Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997). . . . Berryhill , 870 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .

Z. J. a BY AND THROUGH Je JONES, v. KANSAS CITY BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS,, 931 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hall , 375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir. 2004) ). . . . Scott , 720 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Davis , 375 F.3d at 712 ). C. . . .

BROWN, v. KANSAS CITY LIVE, LLC LLC LLC,, 931 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 242 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Mo. 2008) (en banc). . . .

STATE BY AND THROUGH TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,, 931 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . the Virginia House of Delegates could litigate on behalf of the state); Hollingsworth , 570 U.S. at 712 . . .

NEWIRTH, BY AND THROUGH J. NEWIRTH, v. AEGIS SENIOR COMMUNITIES, LLC,, 931 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wells Fargo Bank, NA , 704 F.3d 712, 721-22 (9th Cir. 2012). . . .

DOBBINS, v. STATE, 275 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . State, 896 So. 2d 712, 720 n.5 (Fla. 2005) (applying the inference regarding possession of recently stolen . . .

UNITED STATES v. IWAI,, 930 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . App'x 711, 712 (9th Cir. 2012) ("No facts indicated that essential evidence would imminently be destroyed . . .

DIAZ- QUIRAZCO, v. P. BARR,, 931 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Holder , 605 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 2010). . . .

IN RE J. LONG A., 603 B.R. 812 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2019)

. . . Miscellaneous Firearms, Explosives, Destructive Devices & Ammunition , 376 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 2004 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MIXON,, 930 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Manzo , 712 F.3d 805, 810 (3d Cir. 2013) (courts analyzing Hyde Amendment claims assess "the government's . . .

UNITED STATES v. MCKOWN,, 930 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . App'x at 712 ; Ferro , 321 F.3d at 762 ; Donofrio , 896 F.2d at 1302 ; Shawar , 865 F.2d at 861. . . .

ZACARIAS v. STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK, LIMITED, L. v. S. S. v. a a v. De v. S. v. L. v. S. C. v. WGH De De De La v. De De De v. a a De v., 931 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . ("DSCC") , 712 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying standing limitation to the Receiver). Id. . . . authority over assets belonging to third parties to which the receivership estate has no claim."); DSCC , 712 . . . Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., Inc. , 712 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2013) ("[A] federal equity receiver . . .

BIGSBY, Jr. v. BARCLAYS CAPITAL REAL ESTATE, INC., 391 F. Supp. 3d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . to it mistakenly to reduce its losses on a customer's overdraft. 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 . . .

IN RE LICKING RIVER MINING, LLC, v. LLC,, 603 B.R. 336 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2019)

. . . Servs.) , 974 F.2d 712, 717-18 (6th Cir. 1992). . . .

DISABILITY RIGHTS MONTANA, INC. v. BATISTA,, 930 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rowley , 847 F.3d 705, 712-13 (9th Cir. 2017). . . .

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. WATTLES COMPANY, a, 930 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co., 266 Ga. 712, 470 S.E.2d 659, 663 (1996) ). . . .

IN RE TRONOX, v. LLP D. A., 603 B.R. 712 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . III, L.P. , 496 B.R. 706, 712-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). . . .

MARINELARENA, v. P. BARR,, 930 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Holder , 757 F.3d 712, 720 n.6 (7th Cir. 2014), and the question remains open in the Fifth Circuit. . . . Holder , 757 F.3d 712, 720 n.6 (7th Cir. 2014) (agreeing with the Fourth and Tenth Circuit that "if the . . .

COTTO L PEZ, v. UNI N DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA EL CTRICA Y RIEGO, X, Y, Z A, B, C, 392 F. Supp. 3d 263 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 116 S.Ct. 2353, 135 L.Ed.2d 874 (1996) ). . . .

WESTERN WATERSHEDS PROJECT, v. BERNHARDT,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D. Or. 2019)

. . . Estate of Hage , 810 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 315b ). . . .

COASTAL CREEK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. v. FLA TRUST SERVICES LLC,, 275 So. 3d 836 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Londono , 130 So. 3d 711, 712 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) ; Aventura Mgmt., LLC , 105 So. 3d at 637. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BUTT,, 930 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Collins , 712 F. . . .

A. SEVER, v. CITY OF SALEM,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 299 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Town of Wrentham, 712 F.3d 634, 637 (1st Cir. 2013). . . .

UNITED STATES v. MILLS,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Mich. 2019)

. . . Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 720-721 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (distinguishing between prosecutors, who are " . . .

S. R. NEHAD K. R. v. N. BROWDER, 929 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . California Highway Patrol , 712 F.3d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . A.D. , 712 F.3d at 451. . . . A.D. , 712 F.3d at 453 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .

CURRY- MALCOLM, v. ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 189 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Dept of Educ. , 712 F. App'x 43 (2d Cir. 2017). . . .

IN RE TS EMPLOYMENT, INC. S. TS v. LLP, 603 B.R. 700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Inc. , 712 F.3d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ); McHale . . .

A. L. v. STATE, 275 So. 3d 819 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . State, 896 So. 2d 712, 720 n.5 (Fla. 2005) ). . . .

BLAKE, E. S. T. v. ST. JOHNS RIVER POWER PARK SYSTEM EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT PLAN,, 275 So. 3d 804 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles , 87 So. 3d 712, 723 (Fla. 2012) ). . . .

BETANSOS, v. P. BARR,, 928 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Holder , 605 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Because the BIA failed to identify the elements of § 268 . . .

SPARTAN CONCRETE PRODUCTS, LLC, v. ARGOS USVI, CORP. f k a USVI,, 929 F.3d 107 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Andrx Corp. , 369 F.3d 700, 712 (3d Cir. 2004) ); see 9C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. . . .

ARRAZABAL, v. P. BARR,, 929 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Holder , 578 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2009). . . .

EDGE, v. CITY OF EVERETT, a, 929 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . City of L.A. , 638 F.3d 703, 712 (9th Cir. 2011). . . .

COLBRUNO, v. KESSLER, a, 928 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Meachum , 684 F.2d 712, 713 (10th Cir. 1982), we considered a prisoner's complaint that his constitutional . . .

A. ZADEH v. ROBINSON,, 928 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Burger , 482 U.S. at 712, 107 S.Ct. 2636. . . .

UNITED STATES v. DINKINS,, 928 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Alston , 17 N.C.App. 712, 195 S.E.2d 314, 315 (1973) ("An accessory before the fact is one who meets . . .

DOE, v. PURDUE UNIVERSITY,, 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Clause by posting flyers falsely asserting that the plaintiff was an active shoplifter. 424 U.S. at 712 . . .

CLAIBORNE, v. BLAUSER, S., 928 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted)). . . .

CLAIBORNE, v. BLAUSER, S., 934 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rushen , 883 F.2d 712, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted)). . . .

D. NELSON, v. GREAT LAKES EDUCATIONAL LOAN SERVICES, INC., 928 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Automated Medical Labs., Inc. , 471 U.S. 707, 712-13, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985), quoting . . .

HALL- WADLEY, v. MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT,, 386 F. Supp. 3d 512 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Clearfield Cty. , 712 F. Supp. 65, 66 (W.D. . . .

L. KISOR, v. WILKIE,, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Larkin , 421 U.S. 35, 54, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) (permitting such a combination of functions . . .

MULLER, v. GOGUEN,, 385 F. Supp. 3d 121 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Dubois , 55 F.3d 712, 716 (1st Cir. 1995) ). . . .

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY v. FIGG BRIDGE ENGINEERS, INC., 389 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . Travelers Property Casualty Company of America , 712 F. . . . See Witkin Design Group, Inc. , 712 F. App'x at 894. . . . See Witkin Design Grp., Inc. , 712 F. App'x at 895. . . . Witkin Design Grp., Inc. , 712 F. App'x at 897 (alteration added). . . . Witkin Design Grp., Inc. , 712 F. App'x at 897 (alteration added; citation omitted). . . .

ESTATE OF OSUNA, v. COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, s, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1162 (E.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . California Highway Patrol , 712 F.3d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 2013). . . .

HARRIS v. BLUE RIDGE HEALTH SERVICES, INC., 388 F. Supp. 3d 633 (M.D.N.C. 2019)

. . . Supp. 2d 712, 727-28 (W.D.N.C. 2012). . . .

BROWN, Jr. v. J W GRADING, INC. IQ, ECO IQ LLC IQ, LLC LLC LLC, 390 F. Supp. 3d 337 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510 (1st Cir. 1983). . . . Donovan, 712 F.2d at 1510-11 (citing Falk v. . . . Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Donovan, 712 F.2d at 1511 ). . . .

W. EVES, v. R. LEPAGE,, 927 F.3d 575 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 116 S.Ct. 2353, 135 L.Ed.2d 874 (1996), to argue that LePage violated . . . City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 116 S.Ct. 2353, 135 L.Ed.2d 874 (1996), and Board of County Commissioners . . .

AMERICAN ALLIANCE FOR HARDWOOD PLYWOOD v. UNITED STATES, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2019)

. . . United States, 26 C.I.T. 709, 712-15 (2002) (sustaining a finding that there was "at least a moderate . . .

MARTINEZ, v. L. RYAN,, 926 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Larkin , 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). . . .

MATTHEWS, v. P. BARR,, 927 F.3d 606 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 712. . . .

PELZER, v. MAHALLY PA, 388 F. Supp. 3d 366 (M.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 804 (3d Cir. 2013). II. . . . Ross, 712 F.3d at 799. . . . Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 804 (3d Cir. 2013). . . . Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 804 (3d Cir. 2013). . . . Varano , 712 F.3d 784, 804 (3d Cir. 2013). . . .

UNITED STATES v. ARELLANO- BANUELOS,, 927 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Compian-Torres , 712 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2013) ; see also Santana-Castellano , 74 F.3d at 597 (explaining . . . See 712 F.3d at 207-08. . . . Branch , 91 F.3d 699, 712 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the district court may "refuse to give a requested . . .