The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLII
ESTATES AND TRUSTS

Chapter 740
FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS

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CHAPTER 740

FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS

740.001 Short title.

740.002 Definitions.

740.003 User direction for disclosure of digital assets.

740.004 Terms-of-service agreement preserved.

740.005 Procedure for disclosing digital assets.

740.006 Disclosure of content of electronic communications of deceased user.

740.007 Disclosure of other digital assets of deceased user.

740.008 Disclosure of content of electronic communications of principal.

740.009 Disclosure of other digital assets of principal.

740.01 Disclosure of digital assets held in trust when trustee is the original user.

740.02 Disclosure of content of electronic communications held in trust when trustee is not the original user.

740.03 Disclosure of other digital assets held in trust when trustee is not the original user.

740.04 Disclosure of digital assets to guardian of ward.

740.05 Fiduciary duty and authority.

740.06 Custodian compliance and immunity.

740.07 Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

740.08 Applicability.

740.09 Severability.

740.11 Relation to wills.

740.001 Short title.—This chapter may be cited as the “Florida Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act.”

History.—s. 2, ch. 2016-46.

740.002 Definitions.—As used in this chapter, the term:

(1) “Account” means an arrangement under a terms-of-service agreement in which the custodian carries, maintains, processes, receives, or stores a digital asset of the user or provides goods or services to the user.

(2) “Agent” means a person that is granted authority to act for a principal under a durable or nondurable power of attorney, whether denominated an agent, an attorney in fact, or otherwise. The term includes an original agent, a co-agent, and a successor agent.

(3) “Carries” means to engage in the transmission of electronic communications.

(4) “Catalog of electronic communications” means information that identifies each person with which a user has had an electronic communication, the time and date of the communication, and the electronic address of the person.

(5) “Content of an electronic communication” means information concerning the substance or meaning of the communication which:

(a) Has been sent or received by a user;

(b) Is in electronic storage by a custodian providing an electronic communication service to the public or is carried or maintained by a custodian providing a remote computing service to the public; and

(6) “Court” means a circuit court of this state.

(7) “Custodian” means a person that carries, maintains, processes, receives, or stores a digital asset of a user.

(8) “Designated recipient” means a person chosen by a user through an online tool to administer digital assets of the user.

(9) “Digital asset” means an electronic record in which an individual has a right or interest. The term does not include an underlying asset or liability unless the asset or liability is itself an electronic record.

(10) “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.

(11) “Electronic communication” has the same meaning as provided in 18 U.S.C. s. 2510(12).

(12) “Electronic communication service” means a custodian that provides to a user the ability to send or receive an electronic communication.

(13) “Fiduciary” means an original, additional, or successor personal representative, guardian, agent, or trustee.

(14) “Guardian” means a person who is appointed by the court as guardian of the property of a minor or an incapacitated individual. The term includes an original guardian, a coguardian, and a successor guardian, as well as a person appointed by the court as an emergency temporary guardian of the property.

(15) “Information” means data, text, images, videos, sounds, codes, computer programs, software, databases, or the like.

(16) “Online tool” means an electronic service provided by a custodian which allows the user, in an agreement distinct from the terms-of-service agreement between the custodian and user, to provide directions for disclosure or nondisclosure of digital assets to a third person.

(17) “Person” means an individual, estate, trust, business or nonprofit entity, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or other legal entity.

(18) “Personal representative” means the fiduciary appointed by the court to administer the estate of a deceased individual pursuant to letters of administration or an order appointing a curator or administrator ad litem for the estate. The term includes an original personal representative, a copersonal representative, and a successor personal representative, as well as a person who is entitled to receive and collect a deceased individual’s property pursuant to an order of summary administration issued pursuant to chapter 735.

(19) “Power of attorney” means a record that grants an agent authority to act in the place of a principal pursuant to chapter 709.

(20) “Principal” means an individual who grants authority to an agent in a power of attorney.

(21) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

(22) “Remote computing service” means a custodian that provides to a user computer processing services or the storage of digital assets by means of an electronic communications system as defined in 18 U.S.C. s. 2510(14).

(23) “Terms-of-service agreement” means an agreement that controls the relationship between a user and a custodian.

(24) “Trustee” means a fiduciary that holds legal title to property under an agreement, declaration, or trust instrument that creates a beneficial interest in the settlor or other persons. The term includes an original trustee, a cotrustee, and a successor trustee.

(25) “User” means a person that has an account with a custodian.

(26) “Ward” means an individual for whom a guardian has been appointed.

(27) “Will” means an instrument admitted to probate, including a codicil, executed by an individual in the manner prescribed by the Florida Probate Code, which disposes of the individual’s property on or after his or her death. The term includes an instrument that merely appoints a personal representative or revokes or revises another will.

History.—s. 3, ch. 2016-46.

740.003 User direction for disclosure of digital assets.—

(1) A user may use an online tool to direct the custodian to disclose to a designated recipient or not to disclose some or all of the user’s digital assets, including the content of electronic communications. If the online tool allows the user to modify or delete a direction at all times, a direction regarding disclosure using an online tool overrides a contrary direction by the user in a will, trust, power of attorney, or other record.

(2) If a user has not used an online tool to give direction under subsection (1) or if the custodian has not provided an online tool, the user may allow or prohibit disclosure to a fiduciary of some or all of the user’s digital assets, including the content of electronic communications sent or received by the user, in a will, trust, power of attorney, or other record.

(3) A user’s direction under subsection (1) or subsection (2) overrides a contrary provision in a terms-of-service agreement that does not require the user to act affirmatively and distinctly from the user’s assent to the terms of service.

History.—s. 4, ch. 2016-46.

740.004 Terms-of-service agreement preserved.—

(1) This chapter does not change or impair a right of a custodian or a user under a terms-of-service agreement to access and use the digital assets of the user.

(2) This chapter does not give a fiduciary or a designated recipient any new or expanded rights other than those held by the user for whom, or for whose estate or trust, the fiduciary or designated recipient acts or represents.

(3) A fiduciary’s or designated recipient’s access to digital assets may be modified or eliminated by a user, by federal law, or by a terms-of-service agreement if the user has not provided direction under s. 740.003.

History.—s. 5, ch. 2016-46.

740.005 Procedure for disclosing digital assets.—

(1) When disclosing the digital assets of a user under this chapter, the custodian may, at its sole discretion:

(a) Grant a fiduciary or designated recipient full access to the user’s account;

(b) Grant a fiduciary or designated recipient partial access to the user’s account sufficient to perform the tasks with which the fiduciary or designated recipient is charged; or

(c) Provide a fiduciary or designated recipient a copy in a record of any digital asset that, on the date the custodian received the request for disclosure, the user could have accessed if the user were alive and had full capacity and access to the account.

(2) A custodian may assess a reasonable administrative charge for the cost of disclosing digital assets under this chapter.

(3) A custodian is not required to disclose under this chapter a digital asset deleted by a user.

(4) If a user directs or a fiduciary requests a custodian to disclose under this chapter some, but not all, of the user’s digital assets to the fiduciary or a designated recipient, the custodian is not required to disclose the assets if segregation of the assets would impose an undue burden on the custodian. If the custodian believes the direction or request imposes an undue burden, the custodian or the fiduciary may seek an order from the court to disclose:

(a) A subset limited by date of the user’s digital assets;

(b) All of the user’s digital assets to the fiduciary or designated recipient, or to the court for review in chambers; or

History.—s. 6, ch. 2016-46.

740.006 Disclosure of content of electronic communications of deceased user.—If a deceased user consented to or a court directs the disclosure of the content of electronic communications of the user, the custodian shall disclose to the personal representative of the estate of the user the content of an electronic communication sent or received by the user if the personal representative gives to the custodian:

(1) A written request for disclosure which is in physical or electronic form;

(2) A certified copy of the death certificate of the user;

(3) A certified copy of the letters of administration, the order authorizing a curator or administrator ad litem, the order of summary administration issued pursuant to chapter 735, or other court order;

(4) Unless the user provided direction using an online tool, a copy of the user’s will, trust, power of attorney, or other record evidencing the user’s consent to disclosure of the content of electronic communications; and

(5) If requested by the custodian:

(a) A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the user’s account;

(b) Evidence linking the account to the user; or

1. The user had a specific account with the custodian, identifiable by information specified in paragraph (a);

2. Disclosure of the content of electronic communications of the user would not violate 18 U.S.C. ss. 2701 et seq., 47 U.S.C. s. 222, or other applicable law;

3. Unless the user provided direction using an online tool, the user consented to disclosure of the content of electronic communications; or

4. Disclosure of the content of electronic communications of the user is reasonably necessary for the administration of the estate.

History.—s. 7, ch. 2016-46.

740.007 Disclosure of other digital assets of deceased user.—Unless a user prohibited disclosure of digital assets or the court directs otherwise, a custodian shall disclose to the personal representative of the estate of a deceased user a catalog of electronic communications sent or received by the user and digital assets of the user, except the content of electronic communications, if the personal representative gives to the custodian:

(1) A written request for disclosure which is in physical or electronic form;

(2) A certified copy of the death certificate of the user;

(4) If requested by the custodian:

(a) A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the user’s account;

(b) Evidence linking the account to the user;

(c) An affidavit stating that disclosure of the user’s digital assets is reasonably necessary for the administration of the estate; or

(d) An order of the court finding that:

1. The user had a specific account with the custodian, identifiable by information specified in paragraph (a); or

2. Disclosure of the user’s digital assets is reasonably necessary for the administration of the estate.

History.—s. 8, ch. 2016-46.

740.008 Disclosure of content of electronic communications of principal.—To the extent a power of attorney expressly grants an agent authority over the content of electronic communications sent or received by the principal and unless directed otherwise by the principal or the court, a custodian shall disclose to the agent the content if the agent gives to the custodian:

(1) A written request for disclosure which is in physical or electronic form;

(2) An original or copy of the power of attorney expressly granting the agent authority over the content of electronic communications of the principal;

(3) A certification by the agent, under penalty of perjury, that the power of attorney is in effect; and

(4) If requested by the custodian:

(a) A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the principal’s account; or

(b) Evidence linking the account to the principal.

History.—s. 9, ch. 2016-46.

740.009 Disclosure of other digital assets of principal.—Unless otherwise ordered by the court, directed by the principal, or provided by a power of attorney, a custodian shall disclose to an agent with specific authority over the digital assets or with general authority to act on behalf of the principal a catalog of electronic communications sent or received by the principal, and digital assets of the principal, except the content of electronic communications, if the agent gives the custodian:

(1) A written request for disclosure which is in physical or electronic form;

(2) An original or a copy of the power of attorney which gives the agent specific authority over digital assets or general authority to act on behalf of the principal;

(3) A certification by the agent, under penalty of perjury, that the power of attorney is in effect; and

(4) If requested by the custodian:

(a) A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the principal’s account; or

(b) Evidence linking the account to the principal.

History.—s. 10, ch. 2016-46.

740.01 Disclosure of digital assets held in trust when trustee is the original user.—Unless otherwise ordered by the court or provided in a trust, a custodian shall disclose to a trustee that is an original user of an account any digital asset of the account held in trust, including a catalog of electronic communications of the trustee and the content of electronic communications.

History.—s. 11, ch. 2016-46.

740.02 Disclosure of content of electronic communications held in trust when trustee is not the original user.—Unless otherwise ordered by the court, directed by the user, or provided in a trust, a custodian shall disclose to a trustee that is not an original user of an account the content of an electronic communication sent or received by an original or successor user and carried, maintained, processed, received, or stored by the custodian in the account of the trust if the trustee gives the custodian:

(1) A written request for disclosure which is in physical or electronic form;

(2) A certified copy of the trust instrument, or a certification of trust under s. 736.1017, which includes consent to disclosure of the content of electronic communications to the trustee;

(3) A certification by the trustee, under penalty of perjury, that the trust exists and that the trustee is a currently acting trustee of the trust; and

(4) If requested by the custodian:

(a) A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the trust’s account; or

(b) Evidence linking the account to the trust.

History.—s. 12, ch. 2016-46.

740.03 Disclosure of other digital assets held in trust when trustee is not the original user.—Unless otherwise ordered by the court, directed by the user, or provided in a trust, a custodian shall disclose to a trustee that is not an original user of an account, a catalog of electronic communications sent or received by an original or successor user and stored, carried, or maintained by the custodian in an account of the trust and any digital assets in which the trust has a right or interest, other than the content of electronic communications, if the trustee gives the custodian:

(1) A written request for disclosure which is in physical or electronic form;

(2) A certified copy of the trust instrument, or a certification of trust under s. 736.1017;

(3) A certification by the trustee, under penalty of perjury, that the trust exists and that the trustee is a currently acting trustee of the trust; and

(4) If requested by the custodian:

(a) A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the trust’s account; or

(b) Evidence linking the account to the trust.

History.—s. 13, ch. 2016-46.

740.04 Disclosure of digital assets to guardian of ward.—

(1) After an opportunity for a hearing under chapter 744, the court may grant a guardian access to the digital assets of a ward.

(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or directed by the user, a custodian shall disclose to a guardian the catalog of electronic communications sent or received by the ward and any digital assets in which the ward has a right or interest, other than the content of electronic communications, if the guardian gives the custodian:

(a) A written request for disclosure which is in physical or electronic form;

(b) A certified copy of letters of plenary guardianship of the property or the court order that gives the guardian authority over the digital assets of the ward; and

1. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the ward’s account; or

2. Evidence linking the account to the ward.

(3) A guardian with general authority to manage the property of a ward may request a custodian of the digital assets of the ward to suspend or terminate an account of the ward for good cause. A request made under this section must be accompanied by a certified copy of the court order giving the guardian authority over the ward’s property.

History.—s. 14, ch. 2016-46.

740.05 Fiduciary duty and authority.—

(1) The legal duties imposed on a fiduciary charged with managing tangible property apply to the management of digital assets, including:

(a) The duty of care;

(b) The duty of loyalty; and

(2) A fiduciary’s or designated recipient’s authority with respect to a digital asset of a user:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in s. 740.003, is subject to the applicable terms-of-service agreement;

(b) Is subject to other applicable law, including copyright law;

(d) May not be used to impersonate the user.

(3) A fiduciary with authority over the tangible personal property of a decedent, ward, principal, or settlor has the right to access any digital asset in which the decedent, ward, principal, or settlor had or has a right or interest and that is not held by a custodian or subject to a terms-of-service agreement.

(4) A fiduciary acting within the scope of the fiduciary’s duties is an authorized user of the property of the decedent, ward, principal, or settlor for the purpose of applicable computer fraud and unauthorized computer access laws, including under chapter 815.

(5) A fiduciary with authority over the tangible personal property of a decedent, ward, principal, or settlor:

(a) Has the right to access the property and any digital asset stored in it; and

(b) Is an authorized user for the purpose of computer fraud and unauthorized computer access laws, including under chapter 815.

(6) A custodian may disclose information in an account to a fiduciary of the user when the information is required to terminate an account used to access digital assets licensed to the user.

(7) A fiduciary of a user may request a custodian to terminate the user’s account. A request for termination must be in writing, in paper or electronic form, and accompanied by:

(a) If the user is deceased, a certified copy of the death certificate of the user;

(b) A certified copy of the letters of administration; the order authorizing a curator or administrator ad litem; the order of summary administration issued pursuant to chapter 735; or the court order, power of attorney, or trust giving the fiduciary authority over the account; and

1. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the user’s account;

2. Evidence linking the account to the user; or

3. A finding by the court that the user had a specific account with the custodian, identifiable by the information specified in subparagraph 1.

History.—s. 15, ch. 2016-46.

740.06 Custodian compliance and immunity.—

(1) Not later than 60 days after receipt of the information required under ss. 740.006-740.04, a custodian shall comply with a request under this chapter from a fiduciary or designated recipient to disclose digital assets or terminate an account. If the custodian fails to comply, the fiduciary or designated recipient may apply to the court for an order directing compliance.

(2) An order under subsection (1) directing compliance must contain a finding that compliance is not in violation of 18 U.S.C. s. 2702.

(3) A custodian may notify a user that a request for disclosure or to terminate an account was made under this chapter.

(4) A custodian may deny a request under this chapter from a fiduciary or designated recipient for disclosure of digital assets or to terminate an account if the custodian is aware of any lawful access to the account following the receipt of the fiduciary’s request.

(5) This chapter does not limit a custodian’s ability to obtain or require a fiduciary or designated recipient requesting disclosure or termination under this chapter to obtain a court order that:

(a) Specifies that an account belongs to the ward or principal;

(b) Specifies that there is sufficient consent from the ward or principal to support the requested disclosure; and

(6) A custodian and its officers, employees, and agents are immune from liability for an act or omission done in good faith in compliance with this chapter.

History.—s. 16, ch. 2016-46.

740.07 Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.—This chapter modifies, limits, and supersedes the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, or supersede s. 101(c) of that act, 15 U.S.C. s. 7001(c), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in s. 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. s. 7003(b).

History.—s. 17, ch. 2016-46.

740.08 Applicability.—

(1) Subject to subsection (3), this chapter applies to:

(a) A fiduciary acting under a will, trust, or power of attorney executed before, on, or after July 1, 2016;

(b) A personal representative acting for a decedent who died before, on, or after July 1, 2016;

(c) A guardian appointed through a guardianship proceeding, whether pending in a court or commenced before, on, or after July 1, 2016; and

(d) A trustee acting under a trust created before, on, or after July 1, 2016.

(2) This chapter applies to a custodian if the user resides in this state or resided in this state at the time of the user’s death.

(3) This chapter does not apply to a digital asset of an employer used by an employee in the ordinary course of the employer’s business.

History.—s. 18, ch. 2016-46.

740.09 Severability.—If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History.—s. 19, ch. 2016-46.

740.11 Relation to wills.—No act taken pursuant to this chapter is valid to affect the obligation of a person to deposit a will of a decedent as required under s. 732.901.

History.—s. 39, ch. 2019-71.

F.S. 740 on Google Scholar

F.S. 740 on Casetext

Amendments to 740

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 740

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 740.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

LITTLE, v. RECLAIM IDAHO,, 140 S. Ct. 2616 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Thurston , 967 F. 3d 727, 740-41 (C.A.8, July 23, 2020), and Morgan v. . . .

P. BARR, v. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, INC., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Mathews , 465 U.S. 728, 740, 104 S.Ct. 1387, 79 L.Ed.2d 646 (1984). . . . Mathews , 465 U.S., at 737-740, 104 S.Ct. 1387 (a plaintiff who suffers unequal treatment has standing . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Falcon , 457 U.S. 147, 156, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. THURAISSIGIAM, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Boumediene , 553 U.S. at 740, 128 S.Ct. 2229. . . .

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, LLC, III v. LLC, v. LLC, n De De La El Y v., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 289 U.S. 516, 53 S.Ct. 740, 77 L.Ed. 1356 (1933), and especially Palmore v. . . . States' " and "recipients of the judicial power of the United States." 289 U.S. at 546, 548, 53 S.Ct. 740 . . . Id. , at 551, 53 S.Ct. 740. . . . United States , 289 U.S. 516, 537, 53 S.Ct. 740, 77 L.Ed. 1356 (1933) )). . . .

MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS, v. UNITED STATES v. v. v., 140 S. Ct. 1308 (U.S. 2020)

. . . declined to revisit the court's decision en banc, 908 F.3d 738 (2018) (per curiam ); see also id., at 740 . . .

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE PISTOL ASSOCIATION, INC. v. CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK,, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Plano Independent School Dist. , 589 F.3d 740, 748, n. 32 (C.A.5 2009) ; Bernhardt v. . . .

RAMOS, v. LOUISIANA, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 333 U.S. 740, 68 S.Ct. 880, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948), the Court repeated that "[u]nanimity . . . Duvall , 740 F.3d 604, 610-611 (CADC 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) . . . United States , 333 U.S. 740, 748, 68 S.Ct. 880, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948) ; Thompson v. . . . United States , 333 U.S. 740, 748, 68 S.Ct. 880, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948) ("Unanimity in jury verdicts is . . .

KANSAS, v. GLOVER, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 270, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (officer observed an "adult man" driving . . . Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 276, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (crediting officer assessment of driver . . . Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), for, as we have explained, "[t]o be . . .

BUTTS, A. F. a v. UNITED STATES., 140 S. Ct. 1113 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-740 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. , 484 U.S. 365, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988) ; In re . . . other grounds by Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. , 484 U.S. 365, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 . . .

THOMPSON, v. HEBDON,, 140 S. Ct. 348 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Leake , 660 F.3d 726, 739-740 (C.A.4 2011) ; Zimmerman v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. B. LOWRY,, 935 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ). . . .

RAY, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, v. As, 935 F.3d 703 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Morrison , 199 F.3d 733, 738, 740 (4th Cir. 1999), the Fourth Circuit addressed an issue much like the . . . jurisdiction and that the rules apply as of the effective date originally scheduled. " 199 F.3d at 740 . . . the intervening vacatur did not alter the original effective date of the pricing rules. 199 F.3d at 740 . . .

J. GENZER, v. JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY,, 934 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Solvay Chems., Inc. , 740 F.3d 530, 538 (10th Cir. 2014). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HAWKINS, a. k. a. D III, a. k. a., 934 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Alonso , 740 F.2d 862, 868 (11th Cir. 1984) ); accord Van Horn , 789 F.2d at 1496. . . . Alonso , 740 F.2d at 868 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. . . .

SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR v. BRISTOL EXCAVATING, INC., 935 F.3d 122 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Holyoke , 740 F. Supp. 2d 246, 256 (D. Mass. 2010) ; Nolan v. City of Chi. , 125 F. . . .

R. MEIER v. ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, CITY OF s St. H. St. St. St. St. G. a St. St. P. O. DSN, 934 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rice County, 621 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2010) ("A policy can be inferred from a single decision taken . . .

S. BLEDSOE, v. VANDERBILT,, 934 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original); see also Buckley I, 509 U.S. at . . . See Warnick, 895 F.3d at 753 ; see also Fields, 740 F.3d at 1114 ("[T]he existence of a cause of action . . . See, e.g., id.; Fields, 740 F.3d 1107 ; McGhee v. . . .

MYMAIL, LTD. v. OOVOO, LLC, IAC, 934 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . J.A. 733, J.A. 734 n.8, J.A. 740, J.A. 750-82. In Yahoo! . . . J.A. 740. ooVoo and IAC, on the other hand, argued that the Yahoo! . . .

TIJERINO v. STETSON DESERT PROJECT, LLC, L J., 934 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Servs., LLC , 565 U.S. 368, 377, 132 S.Ct. 740, 181 L.Ed.2d 881 (2012) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods . . .

MEJIA- RAMOS, v. P. BARR,, 934 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mukasey, 527 F.3d 737, 740 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Menjivar v. . . .

IN RE JOHNSON, v., 935 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . In re Morris , 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bennett v. . . .

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 933 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . -Mexico , 740 F.3d 195, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2014). . . .

HARDEMAN, v. CURRAN,, 933 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . This was no small issue, as the jail has a capacity of approximately 740 inmates. . . .

LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. FOWLKES PLUMBING, L. L. C., 934 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co., Inc. , 48 Wash.App. 792, 740 P.2d 913, 916 (1987). . . .

ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, v. HOSPIRA, INC. v. Dr. s Dr. s, 933 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Festo VIII , 535 U.S. at 740-41, 122 S.Ct. 1831 (citing Exhibit Supply Co. v. . . . Festo VIII , 535 U.S. at 740, 122 S.Ct. 1831. . . . Festo VIII , 535 U.S. at 740, 122 S.Ct. 1831. . . .

LAVALLEE, v. MED- SOLUTIONS, LLC,, 932 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . because "whatever information [was] conveyed [could not] be understood as 'regarding a debt.' " 804 F.3d 740 . . .

PATEL, v. FACEBOOK, INC., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . The plaintiffs allege that Facebook violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), 740 . . . Illinois's "limited State law regulating the collection, use, safeguarding, and storage of biometrics." 740 . . . the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied." 740 . . . safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and information." 740 . . . State as pilot testing sites for new applications of biometric-facilitated financial transactions," 740 . . .

PARENT PROFESSIONAL ADVOCACY LEAGUE M. W. a F. D. S. S. a S. Y. v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS J., 934 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). . . .

CHAVEZ, De E. De De De v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a, 933 F.3d 186 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Bank of China Ltd. , 740 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 2014) (certifying questions permitted "where the New . . .

AJINOMOTO CO. INC. v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, CJ CJ PT CJ CJ PT v. Co., 932 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. , 535 U.S. 722, 740, 122 S.Ct. 1831, 152 L.Ed.2d 944 (2002). . . . Id. at 740-41, 122 S.Ct. 1831. . . .

UNITED STATES v. NYGREN,, 933 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Aldawsari, 740 F.3d 1015, 1021 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding no clear error when district court relied on . . .

SANDKNOP v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS O, 932 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . White, 852 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, --- U.S. ----, 136 S. . . .

COFFEY, v. CARROLL, 933 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wisconsin , 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) ("When the government's interest . . .

BREDA, v. CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, d b a, 934 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 372, 132 S.Ct. 740, 181 L.Ed.2d 881 (2012) (summarizing congressional findings . . . The TCPA targets both "telemarketing" calls, see Mims, 565 U.S. at 372, 132 S.Ct. 740, and non-governmental . . .

VIRNETX INC. v. APPLE INC., 931 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Garvey , 532 U.S. 504, 508 n.1, 121 S.Ct. 1724, 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001) (per curiam) (noting Supreme Court . . . Garvey , 532 U.S. 504, 508 n.1, 121 S.Ct. 1724, 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001) (per curiam) ("[W]e have authority . . .

UNITED STATES v. BOSYK,, 933 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . McCall , 740 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Sgro v. . . . Richardson , 607 F.3d at 370 (quoting McCall , 740 F.2d at 1136 ). . . . Cty. of Rensselaer , 740 F.3d 817, 841 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) ("Probable cause is not backward looking. . . . McCall , 740 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (4th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . McCall , 740 F.2d at 1336 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . McCall , 740 F.2d at 1335-36. . . .

D. LISLE, Jr. v. WELBORN,, 933 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Abbott Labs. , 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th Cir. 2014) (remanding for a new trial after Batson violation in . . . Meyerhoff , 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013), citing Marion v. . . .

JOHNSON O v. DUXBURY, MASSACHUSETTS, 931 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) ). . . .

MCCOTTRELL S. v. WHITE, 933 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cook County , 833 F.3d 728, 740 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .

AL- BALUCHI a k a v. T. ESPER,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Councilman, 420 U.S. at 740, 95 S.Ct. 1300 ; see also id. at 757-60, 95 S.Ct. 1300. . . .

IN RE KARA HOMES, INC. v., 603 B.R. 286 (Bankr. N.J. 2019)

. . . Plaza Square Apartments , 740 F. App'x 766, 767 n.1 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Spruill v. . . .

IN RE HOME DEPOT INC. O v. U. S. A., 931 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Airlines Voucher Litig. , 898 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2018) ("Fee awards for class counsel are part of . . .

IN RE CANNON,, 931 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jones, 854 F.3d 737, 740-41 & n.2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S. . . .

IN RE BELMONTE, D. v. P. A., 931 F.3d 147 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Enodis Corp ., 540 F.3d 721, 740 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he trustee can recover from any combination of . . .

MEJIA- CASTANON, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 931 F.3d 224 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Holder , 745 F.3d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 2014). . . .

HUPP R. H. a v. COOK C. R., 931 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wisconsin , 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) ("Our hesitation in finding exigent . . .

Z. J. a BY AND THROUGH Je JONES, v. KANSAS CITY BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS,, 931 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . White , 852 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2017). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HALL, III,, 931 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Johnson , 827 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2016), we have never held that variances are prohibited on the . . .

ANDERSON, v. CITY OF ROCKFORD,, 932 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Pierce , 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). . . . Wharrie , 740 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). . . . See Fields, 740 F.3d at 1112 (explaining that investigators fabricated evidence when they "told witnesses . . .

HIGHPOINT TOWER TECHNOLOGY INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,, 931 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States, 740 F.3d 998, 1010 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the partnership-level court had jurisdiction . . .

DJERF, v. L. RYAN,, 931 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ryan , 740 F.3d 1302, 1321 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (expansion of the record is "severely restrict[ed . . .

GEMINI TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. SMITH WESSON CORP. a a, 931 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bloomberg LP , 740 F.3d 211, 228 (2d Cir. 2014) ("We decline to enforce a forum selection clause under . . .

KHRAPUNOV, v. PROSYANKIN, 931 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Carr , 18 F.3d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1994) )). . . .

UNITED STATES v. CORRALES- VAZQUEZ,, 931 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ada , 528 U.S. 250, 257-58, 120 S.Ct. 740, 145 L.Ed.2d 747 (2000) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. . . .

COMMANDER v. AMERICAN CRUISE LINES, INC., 389 F. Supp. 3d 180 (N.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) ). . . . Sept. 25, 2015) (quoting Martinez, 740 F.3d at 217 ). . . . Martinez, 740 F.3d at 217. . . . See Martinez, 740 F.3d at 217. . . . Martinez, 740 F.3d at 218. . . .

PEREZ, v. ABBOTT,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 803 (W.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . Clinton , 740 F. Supp. 585, 587 (E.D. . . . Clinton , 740 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. . . . Jeffers , 740 F. Supp. at 589. . . . Jeffers , 740 F. Supp. at 592. . . . Jeffers , 740 F. Supp. at 601. . . .

TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC v. PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR ACRES, PERMANENT OVERLAY EASEMENT FOR ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR ACRES IN MILFORD AND WESTFALL TOWNSHIPS, PIKE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBERS a c o L. P., 931 F.3d 237 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 740, 99 S.Ct. 1448. . . .

DIAZ- QUIRAZCO, v. P. BARR,, 931 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . INS , 785 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The BIA acts arbitrarily when it disregards its own precedents . . . the BIA where the law impacting a case had changed since the BIA's decision); Israel , 785 F.2d at 740 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MCKOWN,, 930 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Doe , 740 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1984). . . .

BRAEBURN INC. v. UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . challenged the IRS's failure to revoke tax exemptions from racially-segregated private schools. 468 U.S. at 740 . . .

NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY P. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Section, Int'l Boundary and Water Comm'n, 740 F.3d 195, 203 (D.C. . . . Jan. 6, 2017) (quoting PEER , 740 F.3d at 203 ). . . .

DE LA FUENTE, v. PADILLA,, 930 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Brown , 415 U.S. 724, 740, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) ("Standing alone, gathering 325,000 signatures . . .

PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, v. CHICAGO TRUST COMPANY, THE BABY FOLD,, 930 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . App. 3d 630, 219 Ill.Dec. 62, 670 N.E.2d 740 (1996). See also Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. . . .

E. APONTE- RAMOS, v. UNITED STATES, 391 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Jones, 854 F.3d 737, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2017) ; Ovalles v. . . .

ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY AFFILIATED PLANS, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 22 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . impos[ing] disclosure, anti-blocking, and anti-discrimination requirements on broadband providers." 740 . . . See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 639. . . .

L. KEEN, v. C. HELSON, LLC, N. A. N. A. J. P. N. A., 930 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. , 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988). . . .

PURCELL, v. NEW YORK INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY COLLEGE OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE,, 931 F.3d 59 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . claim-funneling doctrine to federal antidiscrimination claims in state court, but see Haywood , 556 U.S. at 740 . . .

MANNING v. CALDWELL, s FOR CITY OF ROANOKE s, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Duvall , 740 F.3d 604, 616 (D.C. . . .

SHOCKLEY, v. PRIMELENDING, a, 929 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ass'n. , 209 F.3d 740, 747 (D.C. . . .

PHILLIPS, v. V. SPENCER,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 136 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Ass'n , 209 F.3d 740, 746 (D.C. . . .

STARR INDEMNITY LIABILITY COMPANY, v. BRIGHTSTAR CORP., 388 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Co., 95 N.Y.2d 334, 340, 717 N.Y.S.2d 75, 740 N.E.2d 220 (2000) (citing cases). . . . See Westview Assocs., 95 N.Y.2d at 340, 717 N.Y.S.2d 75, 740 N.E.2d 220. . . . described below, even without the application of the rule in Westview, 95 N.Y.2d 334, 717 N.Y.S.2d 75, 740 . . . See Westview Assocs., 95 N.Y.2d at 340, 717 N.Y.S.2d 75, 740 N.E.2d 220 ("To negate coverage by virtue . . .

IN RE CHICAGO MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP, INC. v., 929 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 548 and the IUFTA, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/5 (2010). . . . Ill. 2005) ; see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (defining "insolvent"); 740 ILL. COMP. . . . Motors Corp. , 150 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 1998). . . .

IN RE HARMS, v., 603 B.R. 19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Righetti (In re Johnson) , 756 F.2d 738, 740-41 (9th Cir. 1985) ); see also Grella v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. FIGUEROA- FIGUEROA,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 70 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Salvador, 740 F.2d 752, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied , 469 U.S. 1196, 105 S.Ct. 978, 83 L.Ed.2d . . . Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) ). . . .

M. D. BY NEXT FRIEND R. STUKENBERG Z. H. B. S. A. A. M. J. S. J. H. V. J. L. H. C. C. H. C. A. R. v. ABBOTT, Jr., 929 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Gutierrez , 740 F. . . .

IN RE SPIECH FARMS, LLC,, 603 B.R. 395 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2019)

. . . See In re Buccaneer Res., L.L.C. , 912 F.3d at 293-94 ; In re Emoral, Inc. , 740 F.3d 875, 880 (3d Cir . . . See, e.g. , In re Emoral, Inc. , 740 F.3d at 879-80. . . .

R. OBERDORF A. v. AMAZON. COM INC. a, 930 F.3d 136 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Leasing Corp. , 497 Pa. 126, 439 A.2d 633, 636 (1981) (quoting Francioni , 372 A.2d at 740 n.3 ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. SMITH,, 928 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273-74, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ; Missouri v. . . . Ct. 744, 750-51, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (explaining the Supreme Court has "deliberately avoided reducing . . .

J. CUNNINGHAM, v. WAWA, INC., 387 F. Supp. 3d 529 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) ("Even after a certification order is . . .

TD BANK N. A. v. W. HILL, II,, 928 F.3d 259 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 738, 740-41, 109 S.Ct. 2166. . . . general principles of agency law, citing section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 490 U.S. at 740 . . .

KIEBALA, v. BORIS,, 928 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . audience or any one broadcast over radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion picture." 740 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MATHEWS,, 928 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Maryland , 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) ) (internal quotation marks omitted . . .

BAKER v. EQUITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, L. L. C. EQR- LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 246 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. . . .

CLAIBORNE, v. BLAUSER, S., 928 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir. 2014)), and we declined to "punish a pro se litigant with plain error . . .

CLAIBORNE, v. BLAUSER, S., 934 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cox , 740 F.3d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir. 2014) ), and we declined to "punish a pro se litigant with plain . . .

BERNARD M. D. v. INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF INDIANA MEDICAL LICENSING BOARD, 392 F. Supp. 3d 935 (S.D. Ind. 2019)

. . . Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. , 735 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 2013) ). . . .

HAMMONDS, v. STATE, 275 So. 3d 797 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . State, 915 So. 2d 740, 741 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ; accord Murphy v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. FURLOW,, 928 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Sulton , 740 F. App'x 45, 46 (4th Cir. 2018). . . .

PAVATT, v. CARPENTER,, 928 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 746 n.8 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that "[s]ua sponte consideration of exhaustion . . .

GREEN, v. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 68 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . permit pre-enforcement review is at its peak when claims are rooted in the First Amendment,' " Id. at 740 . . . on the merits, concluded that the regulations did not "raise a First Amendment concern." 825 F.3d at 740 . . .

P. MITCHELL, v. WISCONSIN, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Wisconsin , 466 U.S. 740, 749-750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). . . . Wisconsin , 466 U.S. 740, 749-750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) ; see Coolidge v. . . .

IN RE GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS PRICING ANTITRUST LITIGATION LLC, v., 386 F. Supp. 3d 477 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . See 740 Ill. Comp. . . . claim where it was based on "the inadequate allegations contained in the federal antirust claim"); 740 . . .

UNITED STATES v. HEARTLAND HOSPICE, INC., 386 F. Supp. 3d 884 (N.D. Ohio 2019)

. . . Keypoint Gov't Sols. , 923 F.3d 729, 740 (10th Cir. 2019) (applying industry-wide public disclosure theory . . .

LEAL, P. A. v. BENITEZ, Jr., 275 So. 3d 774 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . J.G., 740 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) ). Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed. . . .

STEMCOR USA INCORPORATED, v. CIA SIDERURGICA DO PARA COSIPAR, v. v. L. L. P., 927 F.3d 906 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cia Siderurgica do Para Cosipar , 740 F. App'x 70 (5th Cir. 2018). . . . Cia Siderurgica do Para Cosipar , 740 F. App'x 70 (5th Cir. 2018). . . . Cia Siderurgica do Para Cosipar , 740 F. App'x 70 (5th Cir. 2018). . . .

UNITED STATES v. PATTON,, 927 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jones , 740 F.3d 127, 138-39 (3d Cir. 2014). Before the Supreme Court decided United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BERNARD,, 927 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Green , 740 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). . . . Williams , 740 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2014). . . .

AKANDE, v. PHILIPS, I. C. E. Co-, 386 F. Supp. 3d 281 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . start of discovery," and denying the issuance of subpoenas because "discovery is premature"), aff'd , 740 . . .