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F.S. 782.09 on Google Scholar

F.S. 782.09 on Casetext

Amendments to 782.09


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 782
HOMICIDE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 782.09 Florida Statutes and Case Law
782.09 Killing of unborn child by injury to mother.
(1) The unlawful killing of an unborn child, by any injury to the mother of such child which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed murder in the same degree as that which would have been committed against the mother. Any person, other than the mother, who unlawfully kills an unborn child by any injury to the mother:
(a) Which would be murder in the first degree constituting a capital felony if it resulted in the mother’s death commits murder in the first degree constituting a capital felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082.
(b) Which would be murder in the second degree if it resulted in the mother’s death commits murder in the second degree, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(c) Which would be murder in the third degree if it resulted in the mother’s death commits murder in the third degree, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) The unlawful killing of an unborn child by any injury to the mother of such child which would be manslaughter if it resulted in the death of such mother shall be deemed manslaughter. A person who unlawfully kills an unborn child by any injury to the mother which would be manslaughter if it resulted in the mother’s death commits manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) The death of the mother resulting from the same act or criminal episode that caused the death of the unborn child does not bar prosecution under this section.
(4) This section does not authorize the prosecution of any person in connection with a termination of pregnancy pursuant to chapter 390.
(5) For purposes of this section, the term “unborn child” has the same meaning as provided in s. 775.021(5).
History.s. 10, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2386; GS 3211; RGS 5041; CGL 7143; s. 717, ch. 71-136; s. 2, ch. 2005-119; s. 6, ch. 2014-194.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 782.09 on Google Scholar

F.S. 782.09 on Casetext

Amendments to 782.09


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 782.09
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

782.09 1a - HOMICIDE - INJURE MOTHER KILL UNBORN CHILD 1ST DEGREE - F: C
782.09 1b - HOMICIDE - INJURE MOTHER KILL UNBORN CHILD 2ND DEGREE - F: F
782.09 1c - HOMICIDE - INJURE MOTHER KILL UNBORN CHILD 3RD DEGREE - F: S
782.09 2 - HOMICIDE - INJURE MOTHER KILL UNBORN CHILD MANSLAUGHTER - F: S


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S782.09
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 782.09.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. State v. Pozo

    2002 WI App. 279 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 46 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Rodosvaldo Pozo appeals an order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His petition alleges that the information charging him with delivering cocaine as a second offense was legally insufficient and thus deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. Pozo requests that we vacate his conviction and grant him additional relief in the sum of $1000 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 782.09 (1999-2000). We conclude that Pozo's petition is without merit and therefore, we affirm the circuit court's order. In addition, because Pozo failed to develop any legal argument in support of his contention that § 782.09 entitles him to $1000, we decline to review the issue.
    PAGE 799
  2. Roe v. Wade

    410 U.S. 113 (1973)   Cited 4,006 times   24 Legal Analyses
    7. Florida — Fla. Acts 1st Sess., c. 1637, subc. 3, §§ 10, 11, subc. 8, §§ 9, 10, 11 (1868), as amended, now Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 782.09, 782.10, 797.01, 797.02, 782.16 (1965).
    PAGE 177
  3. Wilke v. Stublaski

    No. 19-1617 (7th Cir. Oct. 21, 2019)
    Wilke also maintains that the judges are not immune from his claim for damages under Wisconsin law for allegedly improperly refusing to grant a writ of habeas corpus. He relies on § 782.09, which provides: "Any judge who refuses to grant a writ of habeas corpus, when legally applied for, is liable to the prisoner in the sum of $1,000." We agree with Wilke that judicial immunity does not prevent him from bringing an action against the judges under this statute. Absolute immunity may be abrogated when a legislature clearly intends to do so. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984); Candee v. Egan, 267 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Wis. 1978). Section 782.09, a provision from 1849 that remains good, if rarely invoked, law, allows an "action for $1,000 in statutory damages" against a judge "for refusing to sign [a] writ of habeas corpus." J.V. by Levine v. Barron, 332 N.W.2d 796, 798, 802 (Wis. 1983). We offer no opinion about whether Wilke "legally applied" for a writ or is entitled to relief. But the district court should not have dismissed Wilke's claims against the three judges under § 782.09 on immunity grounds.
    PAGE 4
  4. Wyche v. State

    232 So. 3d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 2 times
    § 782.09, Fla. Stat. (2013) (defining "unborn quick child" as a "viable fetus") (emphasis added).
    PAGE 1119
  5. ¶ 23 In his appellate brief, Rodriguez for the first time seeks $1000 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 782.09, which provides: “Any judge who refuses to grant a writ of habeas corpus, when legally applied for, is liable to the prisoner in the sum of $1,000.” (Italics added.) Rodriguez's single paragraph argument does not explain the legal standards that would apply to an analysis of such a claim, whether he can seek relief under § 782.09 for the first time on appeal, whether he would have to file a separate civil action, or whether he could be entitled to $1000 if this court affirms the dismissal of his petition. His reply brief also did not address those issues. We decline to address the merits of Rodriguez's claim because it is inadequately briefed. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis.2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct.App.1992).
  6. Davis v. Douma

    859 N.W.2d 628 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014)
    ¶ 18 Last, we deny Davis's request that we assess a monetary penalty against the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 782.09. The statute provides that “[a]ny judge who refuses to grant a writ of habeas corpus, when legally applied for, is liable to the prisoner in the sum of $1,000.” Id. Davis raises the issue for the first time on appeal, and his appellant's brief includes only a cursory discussion of the basis for his request. As the State points out, Davis's opening brief does not analyze: (1) whether a litigant may request a monetary penalty for the first time on appeal; (2) whether a litigant may seek the penalty in the habeas corpus proceeding rather than initiate an independent legal action for the penalty; or (3) whether a litigant may obtain a financial award when both the circuit court and this court conclude that the litigant is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. We are satisfied that Davis has not adequately briefed the issue, and we therefore do not address it. See Pozo, 258 Wis.2d 796, ¶ 11, 654 N.W.2d 12 (declining, in an appeal from an order denying a writ of habeas corpus, to address an inadequately briefed claim for a financial award under …
  7. Maier v. Byrnes

    358 N.W.2d 833 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 9 times   2 Legal Analyses
    These statute sections govern the manner in which an action or special proceeding is commenced. They do not, however, expressly require the filing of the petition as a condition precedent to the commencement of a civil action commenced against a judge who allegedly refuses to grant a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to sec. 782.09, Stats. If the law requires the timely filing of the petition as prerequisite to the commencement of an action under sec. 782.09 for the refusal to grant a writ of habeas corpus, it must be found elsewhere than in the provisions of sec. 801.02(1) and (5), Stats.
    PAGE 260
  8. State v. Clincy

    Appeal Nos. 2016AP1317 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2017)
    ¶1 PER CURIAM. Kenyatta Sobeasr Clincy, pro se, appeals from an order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Clincy argues that the circuit court erred in denying his petition without an evidentiary hearing and that under WIS. STAT. § 782.09 (2015-16) he is entitled to receive $1000 from each of the two circuit court judges who reviewed his petition. We disagree and affirm.
    PAGE 2
  9. State ex Rel. Smith v. Berge

    798 N.W.2d 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011)
    ¶ 19 Smith asserts that he is entitled to $1000 from the judge that transferred his case to Milwaukee County and $1000 from the judge that denied his petition. Smith relies on WIS. STAT. § 782.09, which provides: "Any judge who refuses to grant a writ of habeas corpus, when legally applied for, is liable to the prisoner in the sum of $1,000."
  10. BANK OF LUXEMBURG v. WERY

    Case No. 98-0283 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1998)
    In any event, the writ was not "legally applied for" within the meaning of § 782.09, Stats. "Although most often inspired by other proceedings, habeas corpus nonetheless stands as an independent civil action and not as a motion in another proceeding." Maier v. Byrnes , 121 Wis.2d 258, 260, 358 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Ct.App. 1984). In order to be "legally applied for" within the meaning of § 782.09, the requirements of § 782.04, Stats., must be satisfied. Id . at 262-63, 358 N.W.2d at 836. Here, Wery failed to meet several of the requirements, including the failure to have the petition verified. See id. at 262, 358 N.W.2d at 836. Also, the filing of a petition for a writ with the clerk of court as a separate action is a prerequisite to an action against a judge, see id ., but Wery filed the petition in his foreclosure proceeding.