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F.S. 782 on Google Scholar

F.S. 782 on Casetext

Amendments to 782


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 782
HOMICIDE
View Entire Chapter
CHAPTER 782 Florida Statutes and Case Law
CHAPTER 782
HOMICIDE
782.02 Justifiable use of deadly force.
782.03 Excusable homicide.
782.035 Abrogation of common-law rule of evidence known as “year-and-a-day rule.”
782.04 Murder.
782.051 Attempted felony murder.
782.065 Murder; law enforcement officer, correctional officer, correctional probation officer.
782.07 Manslaughter; aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult; aggravated manslaughter of a child; aggravated manslaughter of an officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical technician, or a paramedic.
782.071 Vehicular homicide.
782.072 Vessel homicide.
782.08 Assisting self-murder.
782.081 Commercial exploitation of self-murder.
782.09 Killing of unborn child by injury to mother.
782.11 Unnecessary killing to prevent unlawful act.
782.30 Short title.
782.32 Definitions.
782.34 Partial-birth abortion.
782.36 Exceptions.
782.02 Justifiable use of deadly force.The use of deadly force is justifiable when a person is resisting any attempt to murder such person or to commit any felony upon him or her or upon or in any dwelling house in which such person shall be.
History.ss. 4, 5, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2378; ch. 4967, 1901; s. 1, ch. 4964, 1901; GS 3203; RGS 5033; CGL 7135; s. 66, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-24; s. 45, ch. 75-298; s. 1197, ch. 97-102.
782.03 Excusable homicide.Homicide is excusable when committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means with usual ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent, or by accident and misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, without any dangerous weapon being used and not done in a cruel or unusual manner.
History.s. 6, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2379; GS 3204; RGS 5034; CGL 7136; s. 1, ch. 75-13.
782.035 Abrogation of common-law rule of evidence known as “year-and-a-day rule.”The common-law rule of evidence applicable to homicide prosecutions known as the “year-and-a-day rule,” which provides a conclusive presumption that an injury is not the cause of death or that whether it is the cause cannot be discerned if the interval between the infliction of the injury and the victim’s death exceeds a year and a day, is hereby abrogated and does not apply in this state.
History.s. 1, ch. 88-39.
782.04 Murder.
(1)(a) The unlawful killing of a human being:
1. When perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being;
2. When committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any:
a. Trafficking offense prohibited by s. 893.135(1),
b. Arson,
c. Sexual battery,
d. Robbery,
e. Burglary,
f. Kidnapping,
g. Escape,
h. Aggravated child abuse,
i. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult,
j. Aircraft piracy,
k. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb,
l. Carjacking,
m. Home-invasion robbery,
n. Aggravated stalking,
o. Murder of another human being,
p. Resisting an officer with violence to his or her person,
q. Aggravated fleeing or eluding with serious bodily injury or death,
r. Felony that is an act of terrorism or is in furtherance of an act of terrorism, including a felony under s. 775.30, s. 775.32, s. 775.33, s. 775.34, or s. 775.35, or
s. Human trafficking; or
3. Which resulted from the unlawful distribution by a person 18 years of age or older of any of the following substances, or mixture containing any of the following substances, when such substance or mixture is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user:
a. A substance controlled under s. 893.03(1);
b. Cocaine, as described in s. 893.03(2)(a)4.;
c. Opium or any synthetic or natural salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium;
d. Methadone;
e. Alfentanil, as described in s. 893.03(2)(b)1.;
f. Carfentanil, as described in s. 893.03(2)(b)6.;
g. Fentanyl, as described in s. 893.03(2)(b)9.;
h. Sufentanil, as described in s. 893.03(2)(b)30.;
i. Methamphetamine, as described in s. 893.03(2)(c)5.; or
j. A controlled substance analog, as described in s. 893.0356, of any substance specified in sub-subparagraphs a.-i.,

is murder in the first degree and constitutes a capital felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082.

(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 shall be followed in order to determine sentence of death or life imprisonment. If the prosecutor intends to seek the death penalty, the prosecutor must give notice to the defendant and file the notice with the court within 45 days after arraignment. The notice must contain a list of the aggravating factors the state intends to prove and has reason to believe it can prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The court may allow the prosecutor to amend the notice upon a showing of good cause.
(2) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual, is murder in the second degree and constitutes a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) When a human being is killed during the perpetration of, or during the attempt to perpetrate, any:
(a) Trafficking offense prohibited by s. 893.135(1),
(b) Arson,
(c) Sexual battery,
(d) Robbery,
(e) Burglary,
(f) Kidnapping,
(g) Escape,
(h) Aggravated child abuse,
(i) Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult,
(j) Aircraft piracy,
(k) Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb,
(l) Carjacking,
(m) Home-invasion robbery,
(n) Aggravated stalking,
(o) Murder of another human being,
(p) Aggravated fleeing or eluding with serious bodily injury or death,
(q) Resisting an officer with violence to his or her person, or
(r) Felony that is an act of terrorism or is in furtherance of an act of terrorism, including a felony under s. 775.30, s. 775.32, s. 775.33, s. 775.34, or s. 775.35,

by a person other than the person engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate such felony, the person perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate such felony commits murder in the second degree, which constitutes a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(4) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any felony other than any:
(a) Trafficking offense prohibited by s. 893.135(1),
(b) Arson,
(c) Sexual battery,
(d) Robbery,
(e) Burglary,
(f) Kidnapping,
(g) Escape,
(h) Aggravated child abuse,
(i) Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult,
(j) Aircraft piracy,
(k) Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb,
(l) Unlawful distribution of any substance listed in sub-subparagraphs (1)(a)3.a.-j. by a person 18 years of age or older, when such substance is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user,
(m) Carjacking,
(n) Home-invasion robbery,
(o) Aggravated stalking,
(p) Murder of another human being,
(q) Aggravated fleeing or eluding with serious bodily injury or death,
(r) Resisting an officer with violence to his or her person, or
(s) Felony that is an act of terrorism or is in furtherance of an act of terrorism, including a felony under s. 775.30, s. 775.32, s. 775.33, s. 775.34, or s. 775.35,

is murder in the third degree and constitutes a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(5) As used in this section, the term “terrorism” means an activity that:
(a)1. Involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life which is a violation of the criminal laws of this state or of the United States; or
2. Involves a violation of s. 815.06; and
(b) Is intended to:
1. Intimidate, injure, or coerce a civilian population;
2. Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
3. Affect the conduct of government through destruction of property, assassination, murder, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy.
History.s. 2, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2380; GS 3205; RGS 5035; s. 1, ch. 8470, 1921; CGL 7137; s. 1, ch. 28023, 1953; s. 712, ch. 71-136; s. 3, ch. 72-724; s. 14, ch. 74-383; s. 6, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 76-141; s. 290, ch. 79-400; s. 1, ch. 82-4; s. 1, ch. 82-69; s. 1, ch. 84-16; s. 6, ch. 87-243; ss. 2, 4, ch. 89-281; s. 4, ch. 90-112; s. 3, ch. 93-212; s. 11, ch. 95-195; s. 18, ch. 96-322; s. 1, ch. 98-417; s. 10, ch. 99-188; s. 16, ch. 2000-320; s. 2, ch. 2001-236; s. 2, ch. 2001-357; s. 1, ch. 2002-212; s. 12, ch. 2005-128; s. 1, ch. 2010-121; s. 2, ch. 2012-21; s. 4, ch. 2014-176; s. 9, ch. 2015-34; s. 2, ch. 2016-13; s. 2, ch. 2016-24; s. 24, ch. 2016-105; s. 4, ch. 2017-1; s. 7, ch. 2017-37; s. 2, ch. 2017-107; s. 17, ch. 2018-13; ss. 114, 122, ch. 2019-167; s. 1, ch. 2022-129.
782.051 Attempted felony murder.
(1) Any person who perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate any felony enumerated in s. 782.04(3) and who commits, aids, or abets an intentional act that is not an essential element of the felony and that could, but does not, cause the death of another commits a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life, or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, which is an offense ranked in level 9 of the Criminal Punishment Code. Victim injury points shall be scored under this subsection.
(2) Any person who perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate any felony other than a felony enumerated in s. 782.04(3) and who commits, aids, or abets an intentional act that is not an essential element of the felony and that could, but does not, cause the death of another commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, which is an offense ranked in level 8 of the Criminal Punishment Code. Victim injury points shall be scored under this subsection.
(3) When a person is injured during the perpetration of or the attempt to perpetrate any felony enumerated in s. 782.04(3) by a person other than the person engaged in the perpetration of or the attempt to perpetrate such felony, the person perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate such felony commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, which is an offense ranked in level 7 of the Criminal Punishment Code. Victim injury points shall be scored under this subsection.
History.s. 1, ch. 96-359; s. 18, ch. 97-194; s. 12, ch. 98-204; s. 4, ch. 2001-236; s. 6, ch. 2012-21; s. 23, ch. 2017-37.
782.065 Murder; law enforcement officer, correctional officer, correctional probation officer.Notwithstanding ss. 775.082, 775.0823, 782.04, 782.051, and chapter 921, a defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for release upon findings by the trier of fact that, beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) The defendant committed murder in the first degree in violation of s. 782.04(1) and a death sentence was not imposed; murder in the second or third degree in violation of s. 782.04(2), (3), or (4); attempted murder in the first or second degree in violation of s. 782.04(1)(a)1. or (2); or attempted felony murder in violation of s. 782.051; and
(2) The victim of any offense described in subsection (1) was a law enforcement officer, part-time law enforcement officer, auxiliary law enforcement officer, correctional officer, part-time correctional officer, auxiliary correctional officer, correctional probation officer, part-time correctional probation officer, or auxiliary correctional probation officer, as those terms are defined in s. 943.10, engaged in the lawful performance of a legal duty.
History.s. 1, ch. 2008-74; s. 3, ch. 2010-121; ss. 3, 7, ch. 2012-21; s. 20, ch. 2016-24; s. 24, ch. 2017-37.
782.07 Manslaughter; aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult; aggravated manslaughter of a child; aggravated manslaughter of an officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical technician, or a paramedic.
(1) The killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without lawful justification according to the provisions of chapter 776 and in cases in which such killing shall not be excusable homicide or murder, according to the provisions of this chapter, is manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) A person who causes the death of any elderly person or disabled adult by culpable negligence under s. 825.102(3) commits aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) A person who causes the death of any person under the age of 18 by culpable negligence under s. 827.03(2)(b) commits aggravated manslaughter of a child, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(4) A person who causes the death, through culpable negligence, of an officer as defined in s. 943.10(14), a firefighter as defined in s. 112.191, an emergency medical technician as defined in s. 401.23, or a paramedic as defined in s. 401.23, while the officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician, or paramedic is performing duties that are within the course of his or her employment, commits aggravated manslaughter of an officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical technician, or a paramedic, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.RS 2384; GS 3209; RGS 5039; CGL 7141; s. 715, ch. 71-136; s. 180, ch. 73-333; s. 15, ch. 74-383; s. 6, ch. 75-298; s. 12, ch. 96-322; s. 2, ch. 2002-74; s. 12, ch. 2012-155.
782.071 Vehicular homicide.“Vehicular homicide” is the killing of a human being, or the killing of an unborn child by any injury to the mother, caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another.
(1) Vehicular homicide is:
(a) A felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if:
1. At the time of the accident, the person knew, or should have known, that the accident occurred; and
2. The person failed to give information and render aid as required by s. 316.062.

This paragraph does not require that the person knew that the accident resulted in injury or death.

(2) For purposes of this section, the term “unborn child” has the same meaning as provided in s. 775.021(5).
(3) A right of action for civil damages shall exist under s. 768.19, under all circumstances, for all deaths described in this section.
(4) In addition to any other punishment, the court may order the person to serve 120 community service hours in a trauma center or hospital that regularly receives victims of vehicle accidents, under the supervision of a registered nurse, an emergency room physician, or an emergency medical technician pursuant to a voluntary community service program operated by the trauma center or hospital.
History.s. 16, ch. 74-383; s. 6, ch. 75-298; s. 12, ch. 86-296; s. 14, ch. 96-330; s. 9, ch. 98-417; s. 1, ch. 99-153; s. 2, ch. 2001-147; s. 5, ch. 2014-194.
782.072 Vessel homicide.“Vessel homicide” is the killing of a human being by the operation of a vessel as defined in s. 327.02 by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another. Vessel homicide is:
(1) A felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if:
(a) At the time of the accident, the person knew, or should have known, that the accident occurred; and
(b) The person failed to give information and render aid as required by s. 327.30(1).

This subsection does not require that the person knew that the accident resulted in injury or death.

History.s. 1, ch. 87-20; s. 15, ch. 96-330; s. 2, ch. 99-153.
782.08 Assisting self-murder.Every person deliberately assisting another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.s. 9, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2385; GS 3210; RGS 5040; CGL 7142; s. 716, ch. 71-136.
782.081 Commercial exploitation of self-murder.
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Deliberately assisting” means carrying out a public act that is intended to:
1. Aid, abet, facilitate, permit, advocate, or encourage;
2. Publicize, promote, advertise, operate, stage, schedule, or conduct;
3. Provide or secure a venue, transportation, or security; or
4. Result in the collection of an admission or fee.
(b) “Self-murder” means the voluntary and intentional taking of one’s own life. As used in this section, the term includes attempted self-murder.
(c) “Simulated self-murder” means the artistic depiction or portrayal of self-murder which is not an actual self-murder. The term includes, but is not limited to, an artistic depiction or portrayal of self-murder in a script, play, movie, or story presented to the public or during an event.
(2) A person may not for commercial or entertainment purposes:
(a) Conduct any event that the person knows or reasonably should know includes an actual self-murder as a part of the event or deliberately assist in an actual self-murder.
(b) Provide a theater, auditorium, club, or other venue or location for any event that the person knows or reasonably should know includes an actual self-murder as a part of the event.
(3) This section does not prohibit any event during which simulated self-murder will occur.
(4) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that an attempted self-murder did not result in a self-murder.
(5) A person who violates this section commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(6) The Attorney General or any state attorney may bring a civil proceeding for declaratory, injunctive, or other relief to enforce the provisions of this section.
History.s. 1, ch. 2004-30; s. 141, ch. 2005-2.
782.09 Killing of unborn child by injury to mother.
(1) The unlawful killing of an unborn child, by any injury to the mother of such child which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed murder in the same degree as that which would have been committed against the mother. Any person, other than the mother, who unlawfully kills an unborn child by any injury to the mother:
(a) Which would be murder in the first degree constituting a capital felony if it resulted in the mother’s death commits murder in the first degree constituting a capital felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082.
(b) Which would be murder in the second degree if it resulted in the mother’s death commits murder in the second degree, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(c) Which would be murder in the third degree if it resulted in the mother’s death commits murder in the third degree, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) The unlawful killing of an unborn child by any injury to the mother of such child which would be manslaughter if it resulted in the death of such mother shall be deemed manslaughter. A person who unlawfully kills an unborn child by any injury to the mother which would be manslaughter if it resulted in the mother’s death commits manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) The death of the mother resulting from the same act or criminal episode that caused the death of the unborn child does not bar prosecution under this section.
(4) This section does not authorize the prosecution of any person in connection with a termination of pregnancy pursuant to chapter 390.
(5) For purposes of this section, the term “unborn child” has the same meaning as provided in s. 775.021(5).
History.s. 10, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2386; GS 3211; RGS 5041; CGL 7143; s. 717, ch. 71-136; s. 2, ch. 2005-119; s. 6, ch. 2014-194.
782.11 Unnecessary killing to prevent unlawful act.Whoever shall unnecessarily kill another, either while resisting an attempt by such other person to commit any felony, or to do any other unlawful act, or after such attempt shall have failed, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.s. 13, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2388; GS 3213; RGS 5043; CGL 7145; s. 719, ch. 71-136.
782.30 Short title.Sections 782.30-782.36 may be cited as the “Partial-Birth Abortion Act.”
History.s. 1, ch. 2000-142.
Note.Section 5, ch. 2000-142, provides that “[t]his act shall be liberally construed to effectively carry out its purposes. In the event of conflict between this act and any other provision of law, the provisions of this act shall govern.”
782.32 Definitions.As used in this act, the term:
(1) “Partially born” means the living fetus’s intact body, with the entire head attached, is presented so that:
(a) There has been delivered past the mother’s vaginal opening:
1. The fetus’s entire head, in the case of a cephalic presentation, up until the point of complete separation from the mother whether or not the placenta has been delivered or the umbilical cord has been severed; or
2. Any portion of the fetus’s torso above the navel, in the case of a breech presentation, up until the point of complete separation from the mother whether or not the placenta has been delivered or the umbilical cord has been severed.
(b) There has been delivered outside the mother’s abdominal wall:
1. The fetus’s entire head, in the case of a cephalic presentation, up until the point of complete separation from the mother whether or not the placenta has been delivered or the umbilical cord has been severed; or
2. Any portion of the child’s torso above the navel, in the case of a breech presentation, up until the point of complete separation from the mother whether or not the placenta has been delivered or the umbilical cord has been severed.
(2) “Living fetus” means any unborn member of the human species who has a heartbeat or discernible spontaneous movement.
(3) “Suction or sharp curettage abortion” means an abortion, as defined in chapter 390, in which the developing fetus and the products of conception are evacuated from the uterus through a suction cannula with an attached vacuum apparatus or with a sharp curette.
History.s. 2, ch. 2000-142.
Note.Section 5, ch. 2000-142, provides that “[t]his act shall be liberally construed to effectively carry out its purposes. In the event of conflict between this act and any other provision of law, the provisions of this act shall govern.”
782.34 Partial-birth abortion.Except as provided in s. 782.36, any person who intentionally kills a living fetus while that fetus is partially born commits the crime of partial-birth abortion, which is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.s. 3, ch. 2000-142.
Note.Section 5, ch. 2000-142, provides that “[t]his act shall be liberally construed to effectively carry out its purposes. In the event of conflict between this act and any other provision of law, the provisions of this act shall govern.”
782.36 Exceptions.
(1) A patient receiving a partial-birth-abortion procedure may not be prosecuted under this act.
(2) This act does not apply to a suction or sharp curettage abortion.
(3) This act does not constitute implicit approval of other types of abortion, which remain subject to all other applicable laws of this state.
(4) This act does not prohibit a physician from taking such measures as are necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, provided that every reasonable precaution is also taken, in such cases, to save the fetus’s life.
History.s. 4, ch. 2000-142.
Note.Section 5, ch. 2000-142, provides that “[t]his act shall be liberally construed to effectively carry out its purposes. In the event of conflict between this act and any other provision of law, the provisions of this act shall govern.”

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 782 on Google Scholar

F.S. 782 on Casetext

Amendments to 782


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 782
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

782.04 1a1 - HOMICIDE - MURDER FIRST DEGREE PREMEDITATED - F: C
782.04 1a2 - HOMICIDE - MURDER WHILE ENGAGED IN CERTAIN FELONY OFFENSE - F: C
782.04 1a3 - HOMICIDE - MURDER RESULTING FROM DISTRIBUTION CNTRL SUBS - F: C
782.04 2 - HOMICIDE - MURDER DANGEROUS DEPRAVED WO PREMEDITATION - F: F
782.04 3 - HOMICIDE - MURDER NOT PREMEDITATED DURING SPECIFIC FELONY - F: F
782.04 4 - HOMICIDE - MURDER NOT PREMEDITATED DURING OTHER FELONY - F: S
782.051 1 - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - SPECIF FELONY COMMIT ACT COULD CAUSE DEATH - F: F
782.051 2 - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - OTHER FELONY COMMIT ACT COULD CAUSE DEATH - F: F
782.051 3 - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - SPECIF FELONY COMMIT 3RD PERS CAUSE INJURY - F: S
782.07 1 - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL - OTHER THAN BY MOTOR VEHICLE - F: S
782.07 2 - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL - AGGRAV NEGLECT ELDERLY DISABLED ADULT - F: F
782.07 3 - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL - AGGRAVATED OF CHILD - F: F
782.07 4 - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL - AGGRAV LEO EMT FIREFIGHTER PARAMEDIC - F: F
782.071 1a - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL-VEH - KILLING OF PERSON OR VIABLE FETUS W VEH - F: S
782.071 1b - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL-VEH - FAIL TO GIVE INFORMATION AND RENDER AID - F: F
782.072 1 - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL - VESSEL - F: S
782.072 2 - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL - VESSEL FAIL TO GIVE INFORMATION AND RENDER AID - F: F
782.08 - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL - ASSISTING IN SELF MURDER - F: S
782.081 - HOMICIDE - COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OR ASSIST SELF-MURDER - F: T
782.09 1a - HOMICIDE - INJURE MOTHER KILL UNBORN CHILD 1ST DEGREE - F: C
782.09 1b - HOMICIDE - INJURE MOTHER KILL UNBORN CHILD 2ND DEGREE - F: F
782.09 1c - HOMICIDE - INJURE MOTHER KILL UNBORN CHILD 3RD DEGREE - F: S
782.09 2 - HOMICIDE - INJURE MOTHER KILL UNBORN CHILD MANSLAUGHTER - F: S
782.11 - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL - UNNECESSARY KILLING TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ACT - F: S
782.34 - HOMICIDE-WILFUL KILL - INTENT KILL PARTIAL BORN LIVING FETUS - F: S


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S782
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

S782.04 Murder resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle. U.T.C. must be written pursuant to 316.650(1). [See 322.26(1)(a) and 322.28(3)] - Points on Drivers License: 0 R
S782.07 MANSLAUGHTER - involving the use of a motor vehicle U.T.C. must be written pursuant to 316.650(10). [See 322.28(4)] - Points on Drivers License: 0 R
S782.071 VEHICULAR HOMICIDE [See 322.28(4)] - Points on Drivers License: 0 R


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. People v. Banks

    61 Cal.4th 788 (Cal. 2015)   Cited 1,028 times
    To understand the import of Tison, we start with an earlier case upon which Tison builds, Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368. In that case, defendant Earl Enmund purchased a calf from victim Thomas Kersey and in the process learned Kersey was in the habit of carrying large sums of cash on his person. A few weeks later, Enmund drove two armed confederates to Kersey's house and waited nearby while they entered. When Kersey's wife appeared with a gun, the confederates shot and killed both Kerseys. Enmund thereafter drove his confederates away from the scene and helped dispose of the murder weapons, which were never found. He was convicted of robbery and first degree murder and sentenced to death. ( Id. at pp. 784–787, 102 S.Ct. 3368 ; Enmund v. State (1981) 399 So.2d 1362, 1363–1367, revd. sub nom. Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368.)
    PAGE 336
  2. In re Greg F.

    55 Cal.4th 393 (Cal. 2012)   Cited 269 times
    The dissent's unease that juvenile courts may abuse section 782 to circumvent the legislative goal of realignment also ignores the scrutiny such decisions undergo on appellate review. A juvenile court's decision to dismiss a 602 petition under section 782 must be supported by a statement of “specific reasons” in a minute order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.790(a)(2)(A); see In re Juan C. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 748, 752–753, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 573.) A section 782 dismissal is also subject to review for abuse of discretion. (See In re Jesus J. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1060, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 429.) If the juvenile court's action is arbitrary, or does not comport with section 782's requirements that the dismissal serve the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor, it can be reversed on appeal as an abuse of discretion.
    PAGE 414
  3. State v. Bertrand

    6 So. 3d 738 (La. 2009)   Cited 249 times
    This Court has previously discussed and affirmed the constitutionality of Article 782 on at least three occasions. In State v. Jones, 381 So.2d 416 (La. 1980), we ruled that Article 782 did not violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Later, in State v. Simmons, 414 So.2d 705 (La. 1982), we found that Article 782 did not violate either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, in State v. Edwards, 420 So.2d 663 (La. 1982), we again affirmed the statute's constitutionality.
    PAGE 742
  4. Cabana v. Bullock

    474 U.S. 376 (1986)   Cited 372 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), we ruled that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on "one . . . who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed." Id., at 797. This case requires us to determine in whose hands the decision that a defendant possesses the requisite degree of culpability properly lies.
    PAGE 379
  5. People v. Tidwell

    163 Cal.App.4th 1447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 129 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Section 782 was inapplicable because it was R.C.'s allegedly false complaints that the defense sought to use as impeachment evidence, not her prior sexual conduct or willingness to engage in sexual activity. Under these circumstances, the language of section 782 does not apply and the procedure mandated by section 782 is unnecessary. Accordingly, defendant fails in his assertion that, pursuant to section 782, the trial court was required to allow him to question R.C. in a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine whether she would recant her prior complaints of rape.
    PAGE 1456
  6. United States v. Thomas

    775 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2014)   Cited 99 times
    Amendment 782 has a broader focus than the crack cocaine amendments, lowering the base offense level for most drug quantity offenses under § 2D1.1. Thomas correctly notes that the Commission expressly made Amendment 782 retroactive (effective November 1, 2015). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d) and (e)(1). However, like the earlier crack cocaine amendments, Amendment 782 amended § 2D1.1. It did not lower the sentencing range established for a career offender by § 4B1.1. Therefore, Thomas's “applicable guidelines range” was unaffected by Amendment 782. The Commission made this clear in its commentary explaining Amendment 782: “guideline enhancements for offenders who ... are ... career offenders, ensure that the most dangerous or serious offenders will continue to receive appropriately severe sentences.” U.S.S.G. Supp.App. C, at 74 (2014).
    PAGE 983
  7. People v. Fontana

    49 Cal.4th 351 (Cal. 2010)   Cited 102 times
    Under California's rape shield law, specific instances of a complaining witness's sexual conduct are not admissible to prove consent by the complaining witness in a prosecution for specified sex offenses. (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (c)(1).) Such evidence may be admissible, though, when offered to attack the credibility of the complaining witness, provided that its probative value outweighs the danger of undue prejudice and the defendant otherwise complies with the procedures set forth in Evidence Code section 782. First, the defendant must file a written motion and an offer of proof detailing the relevancy of the evidence. ( Id., § 782, subd. (a)(1), (2).) If the court finds the offer sufficient, it shall order a hearing out of the presence of the jury to allow questioning of the complaining witness regarding the offer of proof. ( Id., § 782, subd. (a)(3).) If the court finds the evidence relevant under section 780 and admissible under section 352, the court may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant and what questions are permitted. ( Id., § 782, subd. (a)(4).)
    PAGE 353
  8. People v. Franklin

    25 Cal.App.4th 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 107 times
    Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Shayna's "precocious sexual knowledge" pursuant to section 782 He contends that the evidence did not involve sexual conduct, and that it was relevant to the contested issues in this case.
    PAGE 334
  9. People v. Daggett

    225 Cal.App.3d 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 156 times
    Daggett contends, among other matters, that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to hold a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 782 on the admissibility of evidence that Daryl had been previously molested by other children. He also asserts prosecutorial misconduct. We agree and reverse.
    PAGE 753
  10. United States v. Akers

    892 F.3d 432 (D.C. Cir. 2018)   Cited 14 times
    In 2016, Akers moved to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. This amendment, which took effect on November 1, 2014 and applies retroactively, reduced by two levels the base offense level for most drug-trafficking offenses, including the offense of which Akers was convicted. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amends. 782 (reduction), 788 (retroactivity). The district court denied Akers' motion, concluding that Akers was ineligible for a sentence reduction because Amendment 782 did not lower the sentencing range applicable to career offenders. Akers appealed, and our review is de novo . See United States v. Berry , 618 F.3d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
    PAGE 433