Amendments to 790.115

1. T.H. v. State

   859 So. 2d 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 3 times

   T.H. argues that neither the BB gun nor the paint ball gun found in his book-bag meet the statutory definition of a "firearm" or "weapon." Both this court and the Second District have previously held that a BB gun has the capacity to inflict great bodily harm and, therefore, qualifies as a deadly weapon. See In re W.M., 491 So.2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Depasquale v. State, 438 So.2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Further, here, Officer Ortiz testified that a shot from a BB gun can damage an eye and, if shot at close range, can penetrate the skin. The trial court did not err in finding that the BB gun was a weapon within the meaning of section 790.115(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), which prohibits the possession of such objects on school grounds.
2. Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Fla.

   133 So. 3d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 22 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   While it provides an exception to the general prohibition, section 790.115(2)(a) 3. also contains a waiver provision providing that “school districts may adopt written and published policies that waive the exception in this subparagraph for purposes of student and campus parking privileges.” § 790.115(2)(a) 3., Fla. Stat. (2011). The statute clearly grants school districts the power to waive the exception—not colleges or universities. UNF attempted to exercise this waiver in adopting the operative regulation; however, UNF is not a “school district.” Section 790.115 only uses the term “school district” once; outside of subsection 790.115(2)(a)3., the statute uses the word “school” alone. UNF, as a public post-secondary school, falls within the definition of a “school” in section 790.115(2)(a), but that does not mean that it also falls within the definition of “school district,” a term that is not defined in section 790.115.

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3. Dozier v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd.

   312 So. 3d 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)

   • Motion to dismiss

   Section 1006.12(3) states that school guardians act "in support of school-sanctioned activities for purposes of s. 790.115 ...." In turn, section 790.115(2)(a) creates an exception to the prohibition against the carrying of firearms on school campus where the act is "authorized in support of school-sanctioned activities." Section 1006.12(3) tracks the exact language of 790.115 in placing school guardians squarely within the exception permitting the carrying of firearms on school campuses.

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4. L.B. v. State

   700 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1997)   Cited 83 times

   The statute reads: "A person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon on the property of any school, school bus, or school bus stop . . . ." § 790.115(2), Fla. Stat. (1995).
5. Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of Fla.

   180 So. 3d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 8 times

   • Motion for summary judgment

   In attempting to reconcile section 790.25(3)(n) with section 790.115( 2)(a), we are guided by the fact that the Legislature, based upon the plain language of section 790.115( 2)(a), clearly intended to make it unlawful for individuals to possess firearms and other weapons “on the property of any school,” including “postsecondary school[s], whether public or nonpublic.” In enacting section 790.115 twenty-seven years after the enactment of section 790.25, the Legislature chose to include in subsection (2)(a) three exceptions to the prohibition on firearms on campus, thereby permitting the carrying of firearms in a case to a firearms program, class or function, in a case to a career center having a firearms training range, or in a vehicle. It is significant to our conclusion in this case that the Legislature cited and relied upon section 790.25(5), the provision allowing for firearms in private conveyances, in section 790.115( 2)(a) 3. when it made an exception for vehicles on school property. Had the Legislature viewed section 790.25 as preempting section 790.115 based on the “supersede” language in section 790.25(4), the exception as to…

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6. R.H. v. State

   56 So. 3d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 12 times

   The key definitional provision of section 790.001(13), referenced in section 790.115(2), exempts a common pocketknife from the ambit of the statute for which R.H. was adjudged to have violated. We are therefore compelled to reverse R.H.'s adjudication by the plain language of the statutes. If the legislature wanted to prohibit the possession of a common pocket-knife on school premises, the legislature could and would have included the "common pocketknife" in the list of prohibited weapons found in section 790.115(2). Further, the legislature could have removed the defining reference to section 790.001(13) in section 790.115(2) and included a special definition of "weapon" for that section. Instead, the legislature relied on a definition of "weapon" explicitly excluding the device R.H. possessed on school grounds.

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7. Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Thrasher

   248 So. 3d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)

   • Motion for summary judgment

   Section 790.115(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2015), states, "[t]he penalties of this subsection shall not apply to persons licensed under s. 790.06," the CWL statute. Section 790.06(12)(a) in turn states:

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8. J.M.P. v. State

   43 So. 3d 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 4 times

   We emphasize that while a BB gun could be included within the weapons prohibited by section 790.115(2), the State here failed in its burden to show that the BB gun in question met the statutory criteria. Of course, the Legislature may choose to enumerate BB guns as prohibited weapons under the statutory scheme of section 790.115 and, thus, eliminate the State's burden to prove their harmful propensities. To date, it has not done so.

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9. Forrester v. Sch. Bd. of Sumter Cnty.

   316 So. 3d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 3 times

   Since 1987, the State has preempted the field of firearm regulations "to the exclusion of all existing and future county, city, town, or municipal ordinances or regulations relating thereto." § 790.33(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). As part of this statutory scheme, the legislature generally prohibits the possession of firearms on school grounds, but there are exceptions. For one, section 790.25, Florida Statutes (2017), permits a person to carry a firearm in a private conveyance if it is securely encased. § 790.25(5), Fla. Stat. However, section 790.115, Florida Statutes (2017), contains a waiver provision permitting school districts to "adopt written and published policies that waive the exception ... for purposes of student and campus parking privileges." § 790.115(2)(a) 3., Fla. Stat. This appeal concerns a policy of the Sumter County School Board, purportedly enacted pursuant to the waiver provision of section 790.115.

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10. J.T. v. State

    47 So. 3d 934 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 7 times

    • Motion to dismiss

    Section 790.115(2) prohibits the possession of a firearm "or other weapon as defined in s. 790.001(13)" on school property. A BB gun is not a firearm, see Wilson v. State, 901 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), and thus that provision of the statute does not apply. The relevant portion of section 790.001(13) defines "weapon" as "other deadly weapon except a firearm. . . ." A deadly weapon is one which can inflict death or great bodily injury. See Dale v. State, 703 So.2d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 1997).

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